



CBRA Monthly

CBRA Monthly 2/2016

Blogs



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- 3 MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO, September 2012

Dear CBRA Monthly Reader,

Cross-border Research Association has been recently awarded a research contract on best practices and future trends in Border Agency Cooperation (BAC), by the Secretariat of the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation, of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation. The study seeks to advise policy makers and border agencies on best practices to improve border agency cooperation among the OIC member states, and beyond, for facilitating trade and logistics. I kindly ask your inputs with the following three questions:

- Could you suggest any country / countries as “good practice case studies” on concrete BAC improvements, either on national cooperation e.g. between customs and police, or on international cooperation e.g. customs-customs, say from the past 1-2 years?
- Do you have information on previous case studies, which have already been published, and which could be summarized in our upcoming report? This includes past programs, projects and other initiatives, say from the past 3-6 years, where improved BAC has led to tangible benefits for supply chain operators, or for border agencies, or, for both.
- Are you aware of any current BAC improvement projects or plans, which could be summarized in this new COMCEC-CBRA study on Border Agency Cooperation?

Please consider emailing your ideas to us already this week, by 4 March; or, latest by 20 March 2016. Thanks in advance for your assistance!

I also hope you enjoy reading this second issue of CBRA Monthly.

In Lausanne, 29 February 2016

Dr. Juha Hintsa
Executive Director of CBRA

PS. Warm thanks to all the individual experts and all the international organizations who have helped us so far in BAC case study identification – the long list includes: ADB, AfDB, IDB, OSCE, UNCTAD, UNECE, UNODC, WCO, World Bank (and still few more to come, by 4 March – thanks in advance to those!)

PPS. If you would like to gain access to full reviews in the CORE-Observatory (on supply chain security, trade facilitation and other relevant documentation), and to receive the CBRA Monthly issues by email, please become a Registered User at: www.cross-border.org/



Blog: Border Agency Cooperation Part 3 of 3


The last blog in our three-part series on **Border Agency Cooperation** introduces a **conceptual framework capturing the essential dimensions of Border Agency Coordination**: three levels of collaboration, four areas of integration and four objects for sharing. We hope that the framework helps the customs and other border agency communities to see all levels of Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) so that they can move from isolated coexistence towards more active cooperation at the borders. Higher levels of cooperation are likely to translate into higher levels of trade facilitation, control over cross-border cargo flows and resource efficiency, simultaneously. Compared with the previous BAC Blog Part 2, this BAC Blog Part 3 intends to present a comprehensive framework surrounding BAC ambitions, plans, implementations and monitoring activities – while the previous BAC Blog 2 focused purely on a set of 15 key BAC actions, grouped according to the main beneficiary groups. This final BAC Blog has been written by Dr. Toni Männistö of CBRA.

Let's start by first presenting the BAC diagram: **Conceptual framework on Border Agency Cooperation** (source: Männistö, T., and Hintsä J., 2015; inspired by Polner, 2011 and by Institute of Policy Studies, 2008)

Levels of cooperation



Intra-agency cooperation is about aligning goals and work within one organization, either horizontally between departments or vertically between headquarters and local branches, in particular border-crossing offices / stations. Ways to foster horizontal intra-agency cooperation include development of intranet networks, cross-training, inter-departmental rotation of staff, and establishment of joint task forces that tackle multifaceted challenges like transnational terrorism. Ideally, the vertical cooperation would be bi-directional: headquarters would define priorities and objectives and then communicate them to local branches. The branches would, reciprocally, send back status reports and suggest improvements to the general policies. Solving intra-agency cooperation lays a basis for broader cooperation: it's hard for any organization to



Männistö, T., and Hintsä J., Theory of Border Agency Cooperation, CBRA working paper, 2015, Lausanne, Switzerland.



cooperate efficiently with external stakeholders if it struggles with internal problems. The logical first step in coordinated border management is therefore breaking departmental silos and building a culture of cooperation within boundaries of one organization.



Inter-agency cooperation, at the operational level, concerns relationships among a broad range of border agencies that play a role in controlling cross-border trade and travel. In many countries, primary agencies present at the borders include customs, border guards, immigration authorities and transport security agencies. However, also police organizations, health authorities, and phytosanitary and veterinary controllers, among others, take part in border management. According to a recent study, typical areas of customs- border guard inter-agency cooperation can include strategic planning, communication and information exchange, coordination of workflow of border crossing points, risk analysis, criminal investigations, joint operations, control outside border control points, mobile units, contingency/emergency, infrastructure and equipment sharing, and training and human resource management (CSD, 2011). Governmental inter-agency cooperation occurs between border control agencies and ministries and policy making bodies that are responsible for oversight and financing of border management activities.



International cooperation may take place locally at both sides of a border. One Stop Border Posts, OSBPs - border crossings managed jointly by two neighboring countries - are prime examples of such cooperation. One Stop Border Posts can involve various forms of collaboration: harmonization of documentation, shared maintenance of the infrastructure, joint or mutually recognized controls, exchange of data and information and common investments in infrastructure and so forth. Operational arrangements between the Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish customs illustrate advanced international cross-border cooperation that save time and money of border control authorities and trading companies. The cooperation builds on division of labor, where the national border authorities of each country are

allowed to provide services and exercise legal powers of their home country and neighboring countries. For instance, when goods are exported from Norway, all paperwork related to both exports and imports may be attended by either Swedish, Finnish or Norwegian customs office (Norwegian Customs, 2011). At the political level, this requires international cooperation between authorities and policy makers in two or more countries. Operational cooperation (e.g., mutual recognition of controls or regional Single Window), often bringing tangible trade facilitation benefits, usually follows from political, supranational decisions (e.g., the WCO's Revised Kyoto Convention and SAFE Framework of Standards).


Areas of integration




Technical integration often entails improving connectivity and interoperability of information and communication technology systems within and across



organizations. Single Window solutions are typical outcomes of technical cooperation as they enable automatic exchange of electronic trade information among border control agencies. The UN Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, UN/CEFACT, is an important international organization helping to build connectivity across countries and between business and governmental stakeholders. UN/CEFACT, for instance, develops and maintains globally recognized standards for EDI messages.

 **Operational integration** is largely about coordination of inspection and auditing activities among border control agencies. Benefits of synchronized activities are evident: organizing necessary controls at one place and at the same time reduces delays and administrative burden that trading companies and travelers face at borders. A simple and powerful example of operational integration is coordination of opening hours and days of customs offices at the both sides of a border. Operational integration also covers provision of mutual administrative assistance, joint criminal investigations and prosecution, and sharing of customs intelligence and other information.


 **Legislative integration** seeks to remove legal barriers and ambiguities that prevent border control agencies from exchanging information, sharing responsibilities or otherwise deepening their cooperation. Essentially, most forms of Border Agency Coordination require some degree of legislative harmonization and political commitment.

For example, Article 8 of the WTO/TFA to the WTO Members requires that national authorities and agencies responsible for border controls and dealing with the importation, exportation and transit of goods must cooperate with one another and coordinate their activities in order to facilitate trade.



Institutional integration is about restructuring roles and responsibilities of border controls agencies. An example of a major restructuring is the annexing of US border control agencies—including the US Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration and Coast Guard – into the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, a body that took over the key governmental functions involved in the US non-military counter-terrorism efforts in the aftermaths of the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Objects of sharing

 **Sharing of information** – data, knowledge and intelligence – reduce duplicate work (e.g., sharing of audit findings), enable operational coordination (e.g., synchronized border controls) and facilitate development of common agenda for future border agency coordination. At the global level, the WCO’s Customs Enforcement Network CEN is an example of a trusted communication system for exchanging information and intelligence, especially seizure records, between customs officials worldwide. Another WCO initiative, the Globally Networked



Customs, analyzes potential to further “rationalize, harmonize and standardize the secure and efficient exchange of information between WCO Members” (WCO 2015).



Resource sharing involves multi-agency joint investments in equipment, facilities, IT systems, databases, expertise and other common resources.

The joint investment activities are likely to result in higher resource utilization and bulk purchasing discounts. For example, national and regional Single Window solutions are often outcomes of joint development and investment activities of various government agencies.



Sharing of work is mostly about rationalization of overlapping border control activities, controls and formalities. If two border control agencies, for instance, agree to

recognize each other’s controls, there is no need to control the same goods more than once. Combining forces to investigate and prosecute crime also often help border control agencies to use their limited resources more efficiently.



Sharing of responsibilities is about coordinating and streamlining administrative and control tasks among border control agencies. Norway, again,

sets a good example of sharing the responsibilities. The Norwegian customs represents all other border control agencies - except the veterinary office - at the frontier. Customs officers are responsible for routine border formalities, and they summon representatives of other border control agencies as and when the officers need assistance. Internationally, the Norwegian customs cooperates closely with Swedish and Finnish border control authorities at the Northern Scandinavian border posts. Bilateral agreements between its neighbors allow Norwegian customs officers authority to perform most customs checks and formalities for and on behalf of their Swedish and Finnish colleagues. The coordination decreases border-crossing times and lowers administrative costs for trading companies and the border control agencies in the three countries.

This concludes now our three-part series on Border Agency Cooperation. In Part 1, we shared an illustrative worst case example on how complex, slow and expensive a cross-border supply chain execution comes when no cooperation takes place between relevant government agencies, neither nationally nor internationally. In Part 2, we presented a conceptual BAC model with 15 key actions to improve the degree of cooperation in a given country or region – for the direct benefit of supply chain companies, or government agencies, or both. And in this Part 3, we finally presented our comprehensive BAC framework, which hopefully helps government policy makers and border agencies to design, implement and monitor their future BAC programs and initiatives in an effective and transparent manner. Toni Männistö and Juha Hintsa.

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Polner, M. (2011). Coordinated border management: from theory to practice. *World Customs Journal*, 5(2), 49-61.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2011 *Border Agency Coordination*”, UNCTAD Trust Fund for Trade Facilitation Negotiations Technical Note No. 14.



Blog: Supply chain security education materials

FP7-CORE is the European flagship research, development and demonstration project in supply chain security and trade facilitation, running from May 2014 to April 2018. In today's CBRA Blog we focus on education and training material development – Work package 19, Task 19.1 – in the CORE-project.

The CORE Task 19.1 - Education and training materials development – has an impressive set of partners: INTERPOL, World Customs Organization (WCO), European Shippers Council (ESC), European association for forwarding, transport, logistics and customs services (CLECAT), International Road Union (IRU), and Technical University of Delft (TU Delft) as the established big players; ourselves Cross-border Research Association (CBRA) as the Task leader (and an enthusiastic lecturing body in supply chain security and trade facilitation); as well as the BMT Group, as the Work package 19 leader. We first started interaction with the entire Task 19.1 team during summer 2014, when the CORE-project had just been kicked off, and everything was still in it's infancy.

Today, at the end of February 2016 - near two years into the project - we are about to launch the full scale production of the CORE education and training materials. We vision content to be produced in three parallel categories: CORE Flagship Handbook (CFH); Partner-specific materials; and Other education content. Content which is considered to be near-final can be published on-the-fly for example

at CBRA's web-portal, www.cross-border.org, where a new section is planned for the "CORE Education" (like the "CORE Observatory" which has been live since last autumn). Having just over two years left with the CORE-project, we are right on schedule to start the full production of education and training materials!

CORE Flagship Handbook (CFH) will be the main joint outcome of Task 19.1, thus we welcome INTERPOL, WCO, ESC, CLECAT, IRU, TU Delft and BMT to work closely with us in the production, review and piloting of the Handbook. In our current plans the Flagship Handbook has the following four sections, each section having multiple chapters (typically between two and six chapters per section):

1. Introduction to CORE innovation agenda; including explaining key CORE themes and concepts; and frameworks and models.
2. CORE outcomes, findings and results – written primarily in the context of the 16 CORE-Demonstrations.
3. Interpretation of CORE results per key stakeholder group: customs, police, cargo owners, logistics sector, security sector and academics
4. Future research and development roadmap –



focusing on gaps and shortcomings; critical assessment on what works and what doesn't by the end of CORE-project.

Partner specific materials typically fall into two sub-categories. First one is generic, introductory materials which would be of relevance to 1-2 stakeholder groups – for example Supply chain management 101 for police officers. Such materials can quite easily be developed within Task 19.1, using CORE supply chains and trade lanes as examples. At the same time, such basic education material would not be of relevance for supply chain companies, thus it should not be published in the CORE Flagship Handbook, CFH. Second sub-category is on detailed technical content, which again would be relevant to 1-2 stakeholder groups. An example could be technical review on risk management tools for the logistics sector.

Other education material may consist of the following content buckets, listed in a rough “simple to more complex” -order: Factsheets; Quizzes; Basic

case studies; Comprehensive case studies; Videos and animations; Serious games, and so forth. It is still early days to decide what makes sense to develop – and for what we have adequate resources, skills and budgets. Maybe we will start with some simple factsheets, quizzes and basic case studies – this is still to be discussed among Task 19.1 partners.

Finally, the plans regarding the **CORE Education web-portal** are still in a preliminary stage. We could have a simple dropdown menu at www.cross-border.org, for example with the following selection options: Introductory materials; Technical sections; and Factsheets & quizzes. In the last category we could share first outcomes of Task 19.1 work. Here, just like in all other aspects of CORE Task 19.1, we welcome ideas and feedback from the Task 19.1 team, and from the whole CORE Consortium – and even beyond, from any interested stakeholders and potential future users of CORE Education materials!

In Lausanne on 29.2.2016 - CBRA Blog by Juha Hintsa



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Interview with Mr. David Hamon: Criminalization of global supply chains

Hi David, and thanks for joining a CBRA Interview – can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I served in the US Army as a logistician, served with the United Nations Peacekeeping Department as well as work with the UN humanitarian organizations. I recently retired from a not-for-profit government contractor to pursue more creative work. Whilst at the latter position I was seconded to the US Defense Department, first in African Affairs, and then as Research and Studies Director for a strategic studies office within a US Defense Agency. I currently work, mostly independently, on a great many things related to future threats and re-defining of security/stability as it pertains and impacts diplomacy, development, defense, society, and economics/finance.

We met first time in Lausanne, Switzerland, around 2005 – what was that roundtable event again about?

Many years before cyber based terror threats were on the radar, we launched an inquiry into what we termed “Economic/Financial Terrorism” and whether security threats emanating from terrorism in the future would take the form of attacks on the Western system of finance and the economy. We brought in a host of experts from the US and Europe to debate the changing face of terrorism and likely goals of future terror groups. We examined everything from evolving ideology, motivation and intent, culture and identity to strategy, tactics, targets, weapons, and groups. It was an extremely interesting event with industry admitting - at the time - they were not prepared for this phenomenon and governments largely split on the issue. Additionally, experts and think tanks disagreed on whether economic terrorism was tangible. It was very forward-looking for its time. All participants came away with greater awareness on the subject as we went above and beyond what is currently called “financial crimes,” exploring potential kinetic based threats terror groups would use against the economic and financial machinery that included physical attacks on the supply chain, tourist industry, psychological undermining of the Western economic system to disrupt the normal provision of goods and services.

Can you tell more about your views on ‘criminalization of global supply chains’?

I take similar views on the subject as Dr. Moisés Naim, in his 2005 book ‘Illicit: How smugglers, traffickers, and copycats are hijacking the global economy.’ He addresses



several tenants that remain true today including the role of governments, technology, the illicit traders mimicking licit trade and logistics actors - while simultaneously collaborating with many of them, and criminal groups seek high-profit opportunities as opposed to any other attribution (see CBRA Blog 21 October 2014). Terror groups care less about profit but when thinking about logistics networks, what if the two groups collaborated? Today logistics systems are more complex and move faster than ever in history, have less margin to fail, are far less ‘hands-on’ and offer many ways and places to hide illegal activity. Detection and interdiction of this activity isn’t exclusively in the realm of governments. Industry has a role to play if it wishes to minimize new regulations, taxes, deter corruption, and other drains on efficiency and profit. Experts, both public and private, rarely take a systems approach to detecting criminal activity with much throughput going undetected. Both parties want to specialize on one aspect and miss the big picture. A good example was the AQ Khan network. How long has it been since industry has undertaken an assessment of whether there is a new “Khan” network out there? Do trade organizations war-game with governments on criminality within supply chains?

Interesting! What are your views on ‘multi-commodity trafficking / crime portfolios’?

At the last corporate organization where I worked my team did some analysis on unregulated, illegal fishing as a security threat to Pacific Island nations. In the course of this analysis, we discovered it was the same actors doing the illegal fishing as doing illegal dumping, illegal smuggling, illegal trafficking, among other illicit activities. The criminality was only one aspect of the supply chain as

the “demand” side as well as the delivery side was entirely legal and within businesses who conduct practically all business legally. The same boats as platforms - and their crews - were used to conduct all activity legal and illegal and to the local authorities - as well as donor nations attempting to help - it was impossible to project accurately when the activity would switch between licit and illicit. We couldn't analyze if this was a regional or global phenomena but I guess it was a widely copied practice. As Anthony Barone has pointed out, border management and controls are not the panacea of containment but need to be part of a larger practice (see CBRA Interview 18 December 2015). Criminals use technology just as effectively! His idea of assembling a group of independent experts to rethink new approaches to border management - and I might add, redefining the meaning of borders and how thinking differently about borders per se - is a good start. Using strategic foresight come up with several alternative futures to present to a dedicated [supply chain] private-public partnership empowered to make changes would be my overarching recommendation



Sounds that the global supply chain community is facing increasingly more threats and risks! Any other suggestions on how to improve the situation, both short term and long term?

In the short term, as I mentioned, conduct a public-private-partnership exercise to rethink the concept supply chain surveillance for illicit activity and anticipating new and emerging illicit activity. In the long run, we don't give enough thought to knowledge as a part of the supply chain. Using the supply chain for illicit activity begins with motivation and intent getting out in front of those who may do harm. To address alternative futures will take some innovation and creativity, but the stakes are high. The next AQ Khan Network may bring very bad things into Europe (and beyond!) compliments of ISIS. We don't know what knowledge the current refugee population possesses that may be part of some future attack on the financial and economic system of the EU or if some refugees worked on chemical or biological programs in their countries of origin.

Thanks David for this interview – and let's start working towards a joint project on these topics of common professional and research interest!

Web-links:

<http://www.cross-border.org/2014/10/21/dr-naim-on-illicit-trade/>

<http://www.cross-border.org/interviews/new-approaches-to-border-management/>



Mr. Mike Ellis, Assistant Director of Illicit Trade and Anti-counterfeit Sub-crime Directorate at INTERPOL – Interview on illicit trade and counterfeiting

Hi Mike, can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I am the Assistant Director for Police Services at INTERPOL, based in Lyon France. INTERPOL is the world's largest international police organization. Our role is to assist law enforcement agencies in our 190 member countries to combat all forms of transnational crime. We work to help police across the world meet the growing challenges of crime in the 21st century by providing a high-tech infrastructure of technical and operational support. Our services include targeted training, expert investigative support, specialized databases and secure police communications channels. I am responsible for the coordination of

all activities related to illicit trade, smuggling of illicit goods and counterfeiting for the organization and police forces within our 190 member countries. I lead a team of expert officers who are engaged in training, capacity building, and operational support who operate along with my analytical support who manage risk awareness and intelligence handling.

From your perspective, how bad is the current situation with counterfeit and other illicit trade in global supply chains? Can one for example see links between illicit trade and transnational organized crime groups; or, even terrorist organizations?

For many years the clear link has been established between the trafficking of illicit goods and transnational organized crime. Criminal organizations are attracted by the lucrative profits involved in trading counterfeit or fake goods, or in trading legitimate goods through illicit channels. The criminals involved manufacture and trade illicit goods on a regional and increasingly global scale. It is well documented that they use the profits to fund other criminal activities such as drug trafficking and people smuggling, and for investment into funding subversive political groups. Selling fake or counterfeit products is one aspect of illicit trade, as is selling genuine goods on the black market to avoid paying taxes. By avoiding regulatory controls, the criminals behind these activities peddle dangerous and illicit goods with a complete disregard for the health and safety of consumers. The phenomenon has grown to an unprecedented level, posing tremendous risks to society and the global economy. Counterfeiting harms businesses which produce and sell legitimate products, governments lose tax revenue from products manufactured or sold on the black market, and consumers are at risk from substandard products.



By the way, we met first time about one year ago in Lyon at an INTERPOL workshop linked to FP7-Project CORE. One of the main objectives of CORE-project is to develop leading edge education and training materials on supply chain security – for the benefit of law enforcement agencies, supply chain practitioners, and academics alike. Can you share your views about law enforcement – academia – industry cooperation in education material development, as well as in the broader field of supply chain security management?

One of our principle functions is capacity building and training. At INTERPOL we recognize that capacity building brings with it raised identification of the impact of illicit cross-border trade and counterfeiting and all our new operations, or established operations in new regions, are preceded by a capacity building workshop. The public domain is represented by police, customs, border control officials, and prosecutors, as well as representatives from various regulatory bodies including trading standards. In addition, INTERPOL TIGC, the Trafficking in Illicit Goods and Counterfeiting program which I am heading, has developed a Mentoring Program which aims to increase cross-border, cross-industry law enforcement operational interventions by: strengthening capacity to deal with all types of cross-border trafficking in illicit and counterfeit products. We have also developed an online International Intellectual Property Crime Investigator's College and have built already a robust network of over 10.000 law enforcement officers, and partner stakeholders with specialist knowledge and skillset. This online training

course provides specialist knowledge on transnational organized crime. It is aimed at all law enforcement officials, regulatory authorities and private sector investigators who are committed in the fight against illicit trade and intellectual property crime. We aim to provide crime professionals with specialist awareness and learning on the subject of transnational organized intellectual property, IP, crime, and illicit trade, by delivery of leading-edge training that meets international standards and allows crime investigators from any discipline to quickly identify other certified investigators. Through this learning platform we also facilitate cooperation between the public and private sectors in the fight against IP crime, and ensure all public and private sector crime investigators have a common understanding of the problems facing them, while being aware of each other's competencies and roles. We seek to promote knowledge on what intervention strategies and tactics work, in order that all stakeholders are better able to work together in partnership in enforcement operations.

Thank you Mike for this highly interesting interview. It complements well our previous interviews on similar themes - with non-law enforcement experts including Mr. David Hamon and Mr. Tony Barone. CBRA and the whole FP7-CORE consortium, around 70 partners in total, wishes to continue the great cooperation in research and education material development with INTERPOL, throughout the CORE-project, until April 2018 - and beyond! Juha.



Professor Guido Palazzo on illicit waste supply chains

Hi Guido, and thanks for joining a CBRA Interview – can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I am a Professor of Business Ethics at the University of Lausanne since 2003. In my research I focus on the dark side of the force. I examine human rights problems in global supply chains, the driving forces of unethical decision making in organizations and the interface of business and organized crime. In the early 2000s, when I started with my research, business ethics was largely marginalized and perceived as rather irrelevant for both business schools and companies. This has changed dramatically in recent years. Ethical questions have moved center stage.

One of your research project focuses on illicit waste supply chains, particularly in Italy. How bad is the situation there?

Since 25 years, organized crime, in particular Camorra and Ndrangheta are involved in the business of toxic waste recycling. This business is ideal from the perspective of a Mafia organization: Legal risks are negligible and profits are huge. Operating with straw firms they offer their services across Europe up to 90% below the prices of their legal competitors. Obviously, they do not really recycle the waste but simply dump it in South Italy mainly in Campania province, but also in Africa and Eastern Europe. We are talking here about slag and chemicals and tire and other forms of waste from hospitals, garment industry, chemical industry, nuclear industry and so on. The waste includes toxins like cyanide, dioxin, asbestos, chlorines and includes also nuclear waste. Since 25 years, millions of cubic meters of such waste have been dumped in a region which the Romans once called Campania Felix for its fruitful soil. Billions of Euros of profit have been made and laundered by banks in Zurich, London and New York. And the most amazing think is that until recently, this destruction of one of the



most beautiful regions of Italy occurred in complete silence. Now, toxins have arrived at the ground water and cancer rates of people living around the waste dumps explode.

Sad and interesting – at the same time - to hear about this... If I recall correctly, I gave you couple of months ago a copy of the FP7-CWIT project's final report – with recommendations and a tangible roadmap to better mitigate risks of illegal activities in electronic waste... Do you foresee opportunities for similar research projects in the field of toxic waste trade, supply chains and logistics?

We do indeed need a similar research project in order to better understand the journey of illegal waste through Europe and the critical points in the supply chain of toxic waste recycling where organized crime interferes. We need public awareness for the urgency of the problem, develop a better regulatory governance around waste recycling and impose a compliance system on companies so that the existing silent collusion can be stopped.

Thanks Guido for this enlightening interview; and let's start working together – as UNIL, CBRA and other partners – towards future research funding & project, on this crucial environmental and human health protection topic!



CORE Information Observatory, February 2016 entries



- 1 SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices, GAO, April 2008 (CORE1011)
- 2 SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – Examinations of High- Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed, GAO, January 2008 (CORE1010)
- 3 SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain, GAO, August 2008 (CORE1009)
- 4 AVIATION SECURITY – Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO, April 2007 (CORE1008)
- 5 MARITIME SECURITY – DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy, GAO, October 2013 (CORE1016)
- 6 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY – Action Needed to Strengthen TSA’s Security Threat Assessment Process, GAO, 2013 (CORE1015)
- 7 SUPPLYCHAINSECURITY–CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System, GAO, October 2012 (CORE1014)
- 8 MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO, September 2012 (CORE1013)
- 9 Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration 2015 (CORE2010)
- 10 Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions. Barka, H., B., 2012 (CORE2009)



Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration 2015 (CORE2010)

This document sets a vision of the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the primary border control agency present at the US borders, for year 2020. The vision builds on four general goals and associated objectives that aim to improve safety, security and prosperity of the American people. Collaboration, risk management as well as exchange and exploitation of information and intelligence are in the heart of the vision document and integral elements of its goals and objectives. The vision document is available at: <http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf>

Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions. Barka, H., B., 2012 (CORE2009)

Pan-African economic integration has progressed over past years, producing a broad range of regional trade agreements and economic communities that seek to harmonise policies, develop common infrastructure and remove barriers to intra-African trade. Against expectations, however, this increased integration has not translated into strong economic growth in Africa. This article discusses how sub-Saharan countries can overcome trade barriers that undermine the African economic integration. The article's focus is on border posts and customs procedures that play a key role in facilitating cross-border traffic.



According to the article, the problems of international trade in Africa are largely explained by inadequate infrastructure that creates congestion and limits connectivity, delays that stem from complex and manual customs procedures, corruption and by illicit trade. One-stop-border-posts are a promising approach to streamline customs procedures and curb corruption. The joint border post may bring trade facilitation benefits as significant as costly investments on roads, ports, bridges and other transport infrastructure. The article highlights the Chirundu One-Stop Border Post between Zambia and Zimbabwe as a successful case of border agency cooperation. Previous Observatory review (CORE2008, 20 January 2016) describes the Chirundu border crossing in more detail.

The paper concludes by suggesting One-Stop-Border-Post as a promising way towards higher trade facilitation and African integration. To organise one-stop-border-post, the first thing to do is to analyse roles and procedures of different border control agencies. The task of high-level governance is to define how responsibilities across the various border control agencies are harmonised, coordinated and delegated. Metrics and statistics should underpin the design, as numerical data into traffic flows and clearance times are likely to reveal the major bottlenecks in the cross-border traffic. Finally, the article proposes extended exchange of information and data across government agencies, domestically and internationally. The article is available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE_INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE.pdf



MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO, September 2012 (CORE1013)

This GAO report reviews how the US government has advanced maritime security since the introduction of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 2002 and what kind of challenges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies have encountered in translating the Act's requirements into practice. The report describes

in detail the character, progress and future vision of main US maritime security programs, which, according to the report, fall into four domains: (1) security planning, (2) port and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information exchange and (4) international supply chain security. The report points out that the US maritime security scheme calls for further improvements in the areas of (1) program management and implementation, (2) partnerships and collaboration, (3) resources, funding, and sustainability as well as (4) performance measures. This report describes the entire field of US maritime security, and this information is very useful for CORE demonstrations that involve shipping into, through or out of the US ports. The report is available at: <http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647999.pdf>



in CBRA Monthly 3/2016

Blogs



- 1 SIECA roundtrip in Europe (June 2015)
- 2 Power of Visualization
- 3 Customs Risk Management

Interviews



- 1 Dr. Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia, Program Coordinator with the Emerging Crimes Unit at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, UNICRI, Torino, Italy. The upcoming CBRA Interview with Dr. Luda di Cortemiglia covers a crucial illegal supply chain topic of “Illicit Pesticides, Organized Crime and Supply Chain Integrity” – how bad is the situation today, and what can we do to improve it in the future.
- 2 Mr. Tom Butterly, Director and Lead Consultant at TDAF Consulting, Geneva, Switzerland. The upcoming CBRA Interview with Mr. Butterly focuses on the challenges and potential benefits with the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (WTO TFA) implementation, across the globe.
- 3 Professor Ari-Pekka Hameri, Operations Management, Faculty of Business and Economics at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland: Decade of research and education cooperation between HEC UNIL and CBRA

CORE Observatory



- 1 “Draft SADC guidelines for Coordinated Border Management: A Practical Guide on Best Practices and Tools for Implementation”, August 2011.
- 2 “Better Management of EU Borders through Cooperation”, Study to Identify Best Practices on the Cooperation Between Border Guards and Customs Administrations Working at the External Borders of the EU, 2011, CSD.
- 3 Hintsä, J., Ahokas, J., Gallagher, R., and Männistö, T., (2015), “Supply Chain Security: Survey on Law Enforcement Agencies’ Training Needs”, Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL), September 24-25, 2015, Hamburg.
- 4 Männistö, T., and Hintsä, J., (2015), “A decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight”, Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL), September 24-25, 2015, Hamburg.
- 5 Hintsä, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains”, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapters 3-5



FP7-project CORE is one of the largest European research and demonstration projects. Around 70 Partners aim to demonstrate that supply chain security and trade facilitation can go hand in hand, building upon proven concepts from previous R&D projects such as CASSANDRA, INTEGRITY, LOGSEC, CONTAIN, EUROSKY and SAFEPOST.

The project is strongly supported by a number of EU-Directorates, particularly, DG-TAXUD (e-Customs and customs risk management policy), DG-HOME (security policy), DG-MOVE (e-freight/e-maritime and land transport security policies) and DG-JRC (scientific support in policy implementation), and is managed by the Research Executive Agency. The daily management of this 4-year project is done by an Executive Committee consisting of the European Shippers' Council, Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO and BMT Group Ltd. International trade is surrounded by commercial and societal risks. CORE starts from the belief that commercial and societal objectives can be better balanced and even be optimized simultaneously by applying the right innovative concepts.

In order to better cope with the societal risks and challenges, Europe developed 'rules of the game', economic operators in trade have to comply to these rules. Control authorities such as customs help shaping, supervising and enforcing them. The development of these set of rules and regulation has evolved in a 'silo' approach, resulting in unnecessary and disturbing interventions in the supply chain and high compliance costs for trusted and compliant companies.

Risk management: On the business side, commercial actors along the chain manage the associated commercial risks by a portfolio of transfer, tolerate, terminate and actively treat or mitigate these risks. Many of them have sophisticated strategies so transfer risks and control the most pertinent enterprise risks effectively, but they lack capabilities to seriously consider deploying collaborative chain control measures, despite the fact that it often provides a sound commercial business case to deploy them.

Within CORE, the partners have committed to work together with the objective of maximizing the speed and reliability as well as minimizing the cost of

fulfilling global trade transactions, making supply chains more transparent and resilient and bringing security to the highest level. CORE will show how protecting and securing the Global Supply Chain, and reducing its vulnerability to disruption - whether caused by organized criminal groups, by terrorist or other forms of undesirable or illegal activity - can be done while guaranteeing the promotion of a timely and efficient flow of legitimate commerce through the European Union and other nations around the world.

CORE will demonstrate that this can be done while at the same time offering tangible benefits to involved stakeholders - transaction, transport, regulatory and financial operators - thus facilitating its adoption by commercial entities. Within many demonstrators, a challenge is capturing high quality data along the transport chain and enabling data sharing. This would allow businesses along the supply chain to better control their risks and optimize their processes. On the other hand, control agencies like Customs can improve their risk analysis allowing for alternative ways of supervision – and, by doing this, to reduce physical checks.

The four main areas: CORE will address in an integrated and stakeholder-friendly way in four main areas:

1. End-to-end Supply Chain Security fostering standardization, harmonization and mutual recognition;
2. Controlled global visibility of security risks and other supply chain threats and their impact on supply chain flows around the world;
3. Real-time Lean Agile Resilient Green Optimized supply chain solutions offering a highly innovative approach to designing supply chains resilient in real-time to major disturbances caused by high impact events; and
4. New and innovative supervision models for trusted and secure supply chains

To reach the challenging target, various demonstrations transporting goods with different trade compliance requirements, with different transport modes and from different geographic scopes are included in the project. CORE will focus on demonstrating practical solutions to be implemented within the current legislative framework. Thus, the results also provide input for EU policies or drafting future legislation.

More information at: <http://www.coreproject.eu/>

Project corner

Starting with CBRA Monthly 3/2016, we plan to publish key updates on our six main research projects, including these two FP7- and H2020-projects




synchro-NET

H2020-project SYNCHRO-NET: "Synchro-modal Supply Chain Eco-Net". Date: 1.5.2015-31.12.2018. <http://www.synchro-net.org/>



FP7-project SAFEPOST: "Reuse and Development of Security Knowledge Assets for International Postal Supply Chains". Date: 1.4.2012-31.3.2016. <http://www.safepostproject.eu>



Supply Chains, Security and Cyber Threats: Promoting US-Japan Cooperation to Mitigate Risks and Improve Practices
9 March 2016, Newark, USA

IFCBA World Conference "Facilitating Trade Through the Customs-Business Connection"
13-21 May 2016, Shanghai, China

WCO IT Conference & Exhibition
01-03 June 2016, Dakar, Senegal

10th IATA World Cargo Symposium

15- 17 March 2016, Berlin, Germany

Anti-Corruption: London Edition - 10th Anniversary
20-21 June, London, UK

WCO Knowledge Academy
27 June- 06 July, Brussels, Belgium

ASIS 15th European Security Conference & Exhibition
06- 08 April 2016, London, UK

UPU Postal Strategy Congress
19 September-1 October (dates to be confirmed)
Istanbul, Turkey

TAPA EMEA Conference
13-14 April 2016, Paris, France

IATA Ops Conference 2016: "Managing Operations in a Changing World"
18-20 April 2016, Copenhagen, Denmark

11th WCO PICARD Conference
27-29 September 2016
Manila, The Philippines

3rd Global WCO AEO Conference
11-13 May 2016, Cancun, Mexico



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