Retailer - Cross-border Research Association

Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

October 26, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Analytic, BMT, Capacity building, CBRA, CLECAT, Consulting, CORE-Observatory, CPT, Customs, Dangerous goods, DCA, Demo-cluster, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, ESC, Exporter, Express courier, Freight forwarder, Global, High-taxed goods, High-value goods, ILS, Importer, INTERPOL, IRU, ISL, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Perishable goods, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Resilience, Restricted goods, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scientific, Shipper, Strategic goods, Supply chain, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Time-critical goods, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, TUD, Warehouse keeper, WCO, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP6 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: Supply chain security culture (SCSC) is as an overall organizational philosophy embracing norms and values that keep employees vigilant when performing supply chain security practices. The article presents a scale that makes possible to gauge supply chain security culture and its correlation to organization’s ability to respond to unexpected disruptions. Employees are asked to assess two topics: security strategy of the company and impacts of significant supply chain breech to business operations. According the study improved supply chain security culture makes company more resilient against major disruptions. This research helps executives to justify their expenditures on security efforts. The reviewed document can be purchased here: http://dx.doi.org.

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Full review: Researchers have stressed the importance of having an organizational culture that highlights proactivity and vigilance toward supply chain security breaches. In security-focused supply chain management environment workers are empowered to detected and handle supply chain security threats without seeking formal permission from supervisors and managers. Company security strategy gives specific attention how SCS concepts are embedded into firm processes and procedures. Alignment with organizational culture and business or corporate-level strategies is believed to result in enhanced organizational performance. In addition, organization culture encompasses supply chain continuity management. The paper presents a scale for measuring supply chain security culture defined as the overall organizational philosophy that creates supply chain security as a priority among its employees through embracing and projecting norms and values to support secure activities and to be vigilant with security efforts.

The study makes possible to assess how implemented FP7-CORE security technologies, tools and practices influence on supply chain resilience based on the perception of company managers and employees. The article gives also guidelines how to develop survey forms and protocols in order to assess the influence of implemented security measures on other KPIs such as supply chain visibility and reliability. The survey tools based on perceived operational and organizational changes complete toolbox to measure impacts of introduced security interventions.

Reference: Zachary Williams, Nicole Ponder, Chad W. Autry, “Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation”, The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 20 Iss: 2, pp.243 – 260

CORE1200

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Global supply chain design considerations: Mitigating product safety and security risks (Speier et al. 2011)

June 30, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Demo-cluster, Freight forwarder, Global, IT, Manufacturer, Optimization, Other-cluster, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scientific, Shipper, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Transport carrier, USA, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP19, WP2, WP3, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary

There is a broad consensus among supply chain professionals that supply chain disruptions are very bad for business: supply chain glitches commonly lower operational performance and reduce shareholder value. Regardless of this, there is surprisingly little research on supply chain design strategies that have the highest potential to mitigate the risk of disruptions. Based on interviews with 75 US-based managers, an industry survey and a case study, Speier et al. (2011) identify types of SCS strategies and examine how contextual factors influence business managers to select a set of SCS design strategies. They argue that the depth and breadth of security initiatives depend mainly on top management mindfulness, operational complexity, product risk and coupling. The abstract is available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

The paper of Speier et al. (2011) is quite theoretical and it has therefore only a limited impact on CORE work. It is useful for people for the CORE demonstrators to be aware of various supply chain design strategies and factors that support their selection. All in all, the paper introduces an interesting table that shows what supply chain factors typically affect selection of certain supply chain design strategies (see table below). The paper also includes a useful discussion about the nature of supply chain security risks. The authors point out that supply chain security covers risks of contamination, damage and destruction of products or other supply chain assets, and that these risks may arise from intentional or unintentional activities.

Reference

Speier, C., Whipple, J. M., Closs, D. J., & Voss, M. D. (2011). Global supply chain design considerations: mitigating product safety and security risks. Journal of Operations Management, 29(7), 721-736.

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Supply chain security orientation: conceptual development and a proposed framework (Autry and Bobbit 2008)

June 30, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, All-clusters, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Demo-cluster, Freight forwarder, Global, Manufacturer, Retailer, Risk management, Scientific, Shipper, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Transport carrier, USA, Warehouse keeper, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP19, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary

Even though supply chain security has become an increasingly important managerial domain, there is little understanding about what security aware firms are, what enables and drives security awareness, and what are the outcomes of supply chain security (SCS) orientation. Autry and Bobbit (2008) set out conceptualize, validate and operationalize the construct of SCS orientation. Based on 31 interviews with US-based managers, they conclude that SCS orientation comprises four general categories of security solutions: security preparation and planning, security-related partnerships, organizational adaptation and security-dedicated communications and technology. The authors write that these security solutions “could result in supply chain risk management-related efficiencies, such as decreased lead times to customers, greater product reliability, waste reduction, and increased delivery reliability, due to the lessened need for operations workers to perform security-related tasks such as redundant container checking, securing shipments, or other similar tasks.” The abstract is available at: http://www.emeraldinsight.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

The CORE demonstrators could a learn lesson from the research paper of Autry and Bobbit (2008) that organizational commitment to security plays a critical role in the fight against supply chain crime. Ideas and findings of the research paper also contribute to the development of the CORE educational and training material (WP19). The article shows that top management support, employee security attitudes, employee integrity/loyalty are key internal factors that strengthen the SCS orientation. External contributing factors include political political/legal factors/support, partner cooperation, and partner support. Strong SCS orientation is expected to translate into higher business performance, customer satisfaction and supply chain chain continuity.

Reference

Autry, C.W. & Bobbitt, L.M., 2008. Supply chain security orientation: conceptual development and a proposed framework. The International Journal of Logistics Management, 19(1), pp.42–64.

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Interview with Mr. Thorsten Neumann on TAPA EMEA

June 21, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, CBRA, Exporter, Freight forwarder, Global, High-value goods, Importer, Interviews, Manufacturer, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Shipper, Supply chain security, TAPA, Theft, Transport carrier, Warehouse keeper, WP3, WP4, WP5 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

21.6.2016: Today’s CBRA Interview is with Mr. Thorsten Neumann, from TAPA EMEA and Microsoft.

Hey Thorsten, can you first tell a bit about yourself and what you do?

Hey Juha, thanks for the opportunity to give an interview for the CBRA. First of all, my name is Thorsten Neumann, and I’m the chair of the Transport Assets Protection Association TAPA Europe, Middle East and Africa. I’m leading the board of directors in EMEA and I am the representative in the TAPA Worldwide Council. Furthermore, I’m the director for channel security management at Microsoft within the ANTIPIRACY services department, and I’m leading all our risk management-related Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and Volume Licensing (VL) efforts inside our company. I’m in charge of business resilience, as well.

Can you tell more on TAPA EMEA: What are your main activities in the field of supply chain security?

Since TAPA was founded in 1997 in the US by four major global manufacturing companies, the organization has transformed into a completely new business model. And what we mainly do is, that we connect the dots within the end-to-end supply chain security world. In TAPA EMEA, we have people who are experts in various technologies, industries and countries. If you take a look what we’ve achieved in the last ten to twenty years, you can see that our security certification model has been very successful. It is today one of the most important pillars within the TAPA organization globally. The certification program covers mainly the Freight Security Requirements (FSR) and the Truck Security Requirements (TSR). We are now also working on new Parking Security Requirements (PSR). We also offer a lot of other services and systems, like the Incident Information Service (IIS) that provide tremendous benefits to our members. TAPA is involved in regulatory affairs, as well: we are interacting with the European Commission, the United Nations, the World Customs Organization and other great institutions – they all see us as the leading industry association fighting cargo theft in the global supply chain.

How would you describe both the benefits and challenges of conducting industry-academia research in the field of supply chain security?

Considering the ongoing TAPA-CBRA work, I think increased transparency and the opportunity to identify and fix the weakest security links in the supply chain are the main benefits. I do strongly believe in proactive partnerships with research experts who are capable of identifying and analysing return on investment linked to the great work we are doing as an association. I trust on CBRA’s professional skills and their outstanding network. I’m convinced that, with inputs from TAPA members, CBRA will build the most robust model possible for estimating the total cost of cargo theft. From the study point of view, I’m looking forward to work with you guys.

Can you elaborate a bit on the “Total Cost of Cargo Theft” study background and the expected outcomes of it?

In the first kick-off phase, we try to estimate the total cost of cargo theft in all three TAPA regions – EMEA, Americas and APAC. This study gives us a unique, global overview on the total cost of cargo theft and estimates on various cost components that account for the total cost. I’m proud to work together with CBRA, the Borås University in Sweden and Texas A&M in the US. The plan is also to engage the Singapore Institute for Materials Management (SIMM) in the study.

The background and motive of this study is the following: we are operating in a very competitive business environment, and therefore security managers need to justify and explain budget that they spend on cargo security. With this study, we could underline how dramatic impact cargo theft has not only on company profits but also on the entire economy of a country. If you take a look on what is happening right now for example in Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France, but also in South Africa, Brazil, Malaysia and so forth, you realize the seriousness of modern cargo crime. The study would give us the analytical background and results we need to sell what we do also to the government, to our own companies, to the CEO, CFO, but also of course the WCO, as one of the driving factors of fight against criminals within the supply chain.

Thanks a lot for this interview, Thorsten! By the way, HEC University of Lausanne Executive MBA students learn every spring about the latest & greatest in supply chain security management, including from “TAPA activists” like our buddy Gilad…. Maybe next year you could also join as a guest lecturer at the UNIL eMBA class?

I would be really happy and proud to be a guest lecturer at your university. This fits quite nicely my current activities as I’m already running lectures at the University in Bremen. Count me in and see you in the class room next year. Thanks!

CASSANDRA compendium. Standards in supply chain management (Ch. 9)

June 8, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Data quality, Data sharing, Deliverable, EU, FP7, Freight forwarder, Global, Manufacturer, Other-cluster, Retailer, Shipper, Supply chain security, Trade facilitation, Transport carrier, WP18, WP19 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: Chapter 9 of the CASSANDRA compendium lists and discusses various standards that set the context for international supply chain management. The chapter focuses especially on management standards (e.g., ISO28000), technical standards (e.g., RFID, electronic seals and barcodes), standards for exchange of information among supply chain stakeholders (e.g., UN/EDIFACT and XML messaging), and customs security standards (especially the World Customs Organisations’ SAFE Framework of Standards). GS1 Global Visibility Framework and other industry standards are included in the discussion, as well. The chapter points out that because a large variety of standards are already available, the challenge is not a lack of standardisation but the lack of harmonisation between different standards. The section also concludes that even if the diversity of standards was harmonised, the next step would be to ensure that the standards would be consistently implemented in different contexts.

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Full review: The chapter focuses on listing different standards that affect the modern supply chain management. There not much details to be reported in this section. However, especially people working with CORE work package 6 “SCS Reference Framework and Standards” should read the brief listing and general discussion of standards and standardisation. Other chapters of the CASSANDRA compendium provide complementary information about standardisation in the field of supply chain management (e.g., Ch. 5 & 6).

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapter 9

CORE2007

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CASSANDRA compendium. Technologies for supply chain visibility and security (Ch. 8)

June 8, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Data quality, Data sharing, Deliverable, EU, Exporter, FP7, Freight forwarder, Global, Importer, IT, Manufacturer, Police, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Satellites, Scanning, Screening, Shipper, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Tracking, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP2, WP3, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: Chapter 8 of the CASSANDRA compendium reviews current and future technologies that help managers to improve visibility and security over global end-to-end supply chains. The supply chain visibility technologies, in essence, provide logistics managers with a variety of information – shipment data, performance metrics, inventory levels, production / delivery schedules and sales forecast, for example – in or close to real time. The chapter’s review on supply chain security technologies focus mainly on security sensors (e.g., motion detectors), container seals, biometric user authentication devices (e.g., fingerprints), and non-intrusive inspection equipment (e.g., X-ray screening stations). The section also elaborates modern ways for sharing information among stakeholders that are concerned about security of the supply chain. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: Chapter 8 includes some interesting details and insights about modern visibility and security technologies, many of which are relevant especially for CORE demonstrations but also for other work packages such as WP2 (SCS controls), WP7 (CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment) and WP8 (CORE Ecosystem).

Many large logistics operators have developed own supply chain visibility systems to coordinate and organise logistics operations. A large logistics service provider, Kühne+Nagel uses its KN login visibility system that allows the company to optimise its complex global operations in terms of speed, time-certainty, security and cost-efficiency and many other relevant metrics. DHL, a German-based international express courier and logistics company, uses its LOGIS software for its operations. Previous EU projects have also developed visibility systems, for example Smart CM SICIS (Shared Intermodal Container Information System).

These visibility systems enable fast response to most operational contingencies that are about cause deviations from original plans. For instance, if a shipper got instant information about a stolen container, a new delivery could be quickly arranged and the consignee could be informed as soon as possible about the reshipment. Moreover, the visibility systems often interface ITC systems of other key stakeholders in the international supply chains. Customs, for example, receive advance cargo information (ACI) automatically from these systems.

The second part of the chapter 8 focuses exclusively on security technologies. The review starts with description of security sensors that are designed to detect tampering, unplanned detours, and other suspicious events in the supply chain. The modern sensor technologies sense at least changes in lighting, acceleration, location (geo-fencing functionality), motion and CO2 levels (used, e.g., to detect stowaways inside shipping containers). The chapter introduces modern user authentication technologies (e.g., fingerprints, face, retina, hand geometry and other unique biometric characteristics). Some information is provided regarding non-intrusive screening solutions that are often considered to be necessary for fast and secure screening operations. The rest of the chapter discusses various technical and institutional solutions for exchanging security-relevant information among supply chain operators and relevant government agencies. Especially interoperability of ICT systems seems to be crucial for effective security efforts in the global supply chains. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapter 8

CORE2007

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CASSANDRA compendium. Private sector perspectives on risk management (Ch. 5) and crime prevention and security management in supply chains (Ch. 6)

June 8, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, Authorized Economic Operator, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Corruption, Counter-terrorism, Counterfeiting, Customs, Customs risks, Cybercrime, Deliverable, Document forgery, Environmental crime, Exporter, FP7, Fraud, Freight forwarder, Global, Hijacking, Human trafficking, Identity theft, Importer, Manufacturer, Money laundry, Other-cluster, Police, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Shipper, Supply chain security, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, Trusted Trader, Violence, Warehouse keeper, WP18, WP19, WP2, WP3, WP4 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: Chapters 5 & 6 of the CASSANDRA compendium provide a general overview on supply chain security risk management from the private sector perspective. Explaining the essentials of supply chain risk management, Chapter 5 introduces commonly used risk management models and tools (e.g., risk matrices and risk registers), discusses various classifications of supply chain risks, and elaborates current trends of risks and risk management in the supply chain context. Chapter 6 focuses on specific challenges of supply chain security risks – the risks that arise from intentional, man-made criminal activities such as terrorism, theft, trafficking, and sabotage. The chapter explains a few early classifications of supply chain security risks (e.g., motive-based typology and taxonomies based on private sector perspectives). Following the classifications of security risks, the chapter puts forth a few models for managing security risks in the supply chain context (e.g., the 8-layer model for supply chain security management). The chapter concludes with a detailed case study on security management of an international security company and a comparison of supply chain security management and the total quality management (TQM) management philosophy. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: Previous observatory entries have already shown the relevance of the CASSANDRA compendium to the community of supply chain management professionals. The compendium’s chapters 5 & 6 give a brief summary of risk management and security risk management in the context of international supply chains. The contents of the chapters are relevant and useful for people involved in FP7 CORE project, especially for those involved in work packages 3 (Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis Suite) and 4 (SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps).

Chapter 5 elaborates a set of common supply chain risk management tools. The model of Waters (2007) summarises rather obvious three steps of the risk management process: identifying risks, analysing risks and responding to risks. The model proposes, for example, that managers can identify supply chain risks through analysis of past events, collection of opinions, and through operational analysis. The model also calls for managerial attention to prerequisites of successful risk management – mutual trust, cooperation and information exchange among relevant stakeholders involved in supply chain management – and highlights importance of continuous monitoring and controlling the risk management process. The chapter concludes with the four classic approaches to risk management: risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer (e.g., insurance and contractual agreements), and acceptance. The classifications of supply chain risks include typologies focusing on risk sources (natural hazards operational failure and terrorism), risk consequences (e.g., risk to operations, risk to reputation and risk to profits), and objects of vulnerability (e.g., information, materials, personnel and financial flows).

The chapter on crime prevention and security management (Ch. 6) in supply chains provides a concise summary on supply chain security management from the private sector perspective. The chapter starts by describing some early classifications of supply chain security risks. A motive-based taxonomy classifies such risks into the three categories: economic crime (profit as motive), other crime types (ideological, emotional and other reasons as motive) and facilitating crime that covers activities that do not bring direct crime benefits but help committing other rewarding crime crimes later on. (e.g., document fraud, bribery and use of intimidation). The chapter’s next section elaborates ways to mitigate security risks in the global supply chains, highlighting the key ideas of the so-called 8-layer model for supply chain security management (the model incorporates multiple aspects of risk assessment, hands-on design and planning, implementation of a variety of technologies, procedures, and incentives as well as preparation for dealing with the consequences of supply chain crime). The chapter provides also a case study with an international tobacco company that runs high security risk supply chain operations. The section also contrasts, rather interestingly, principles of security management against the fundaments of the total quality management (TQM) management philosophy. The chapter continues with a brief review of regulations (e.g., EU customs security and aviation security regulations) and standards on supply chain security management (World Customs Organization’s SAFE framework of standards, and industry standards of the Transported Asset Protection Association).

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapters 5 & 6

CORE2007

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AEO benefits, or, no benefits, that’s the?

May 8, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Analytic, Authorized Economic Operator, Blog, CBRA, Customs, Exporter, Express courier, Freight forwarder, Global, Importer, ISO28000, Known Consignor, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Mutual Recognition Agreement, Other-cluster, Regulated Agent, Retailer, Risk-cluster, Scientific, Shipper, Supply chain security, TAPA, Tax evasion, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Trusted Trader, Warehouse keeper, WCO, WCO, WP19 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

“To be, or not be – that is the question”, was Prince Hamlet wondering already some 412 years ago. 400 years later, the CBRA research team started to raise the question of “AEO benefits, or no AEO benefits – that is the ?”…

Around year 2004, we first started to study the emerging AEO-types of programs in Europe and globally, working intensively with multinational companies (clothing, cigarettes, machinery etc.), and with multiple governments. Initially, we reviewed any data available from C-TPAT, StairSec, BASC and TAPA programs, and later we concentrated on EU AEO and all other AEO programs across the globe. After 12 years of research our intention is to publish an academic journal paper summarizing all the knowledge from the literature as well as from our own research on AEO benefits for Customs administrations and for supply chain companies – focusing on the tangible, realized benefits, instead of “paper tiger / lip service” types of benefit checklists.

As the last step of data collection, we are now launching the study: “Customs Supply Chain Security Programs (AEO, C-TPAT etc.) – Survey on Supply Chain and Government Benefits – WCO 3rd Global AEO Conference, Cancun, Mexico, 11-13 May 2016 – Research project by CBRA, ZLC, UCR, HEC UNIL and FP7-CORE”. This survey is a direct follow-up with the one CBRA did in the 2^nd Global AEO Conference in Madrid two years ago. Ms. Susana Wong Chan from the University of Costa Rica and Cross-border Research Association is presenting the survey in Cancun next week, and collecting as many replies as possible, in person during the conference (and by email after).

We have three main questions in the Cancun AEO survey, each one with multiple sub-questions (all questions are presented with a five-point Likert scale, plus one option for “cannot say”):

Question for Customs administrations, supply chain companies, and all other experts in cross-border supply chains and Customs supply chain security programs: How often are the supply chain security program certified companies in your country benefiting from the following Customs granted incentives?
Question for Customs administrations only: What are the benefits for the Customs administration in your country arising from the supply chain security program?
Question for supply chain companies only: What are the additional benefits for the supply chain companies in your country, arising from the supply chain security program participations / certifications?

The full list of questions and sub-questions is shared at the end of this blog. In addition, you can download the questionnaire in word-format, in English and in Spanish, at: https://www.cross-border.org/downloads/

Why don’t (near) perfect AEO benefit -papers exist yet in the literature? One would think that the topic attracts lots of academics to carry out such research, and to publish their exciting findings, rather sooner than later… Well, it is quite challenging topic to study: where is the objective, non-biased data located, and how do you get access to it? How to deal with all the politics linked to the topic, as maybe many countries would like to be perceived as “leading edge AEO program holders, with a set of fantastic, innovative benefits delivered to the trade and logistics…”? How to differentiate between all the AEO marketing materials and incentive promises from what is actually implemented on the ground, for the real benefit of supply chain companies; and so forth..? To expand on these thoughts, one could revisit our article on the WCO News No 74 of June 2014. The table on page 45 includes a row on challenges and peculiarities with different categories of possible AEO benefits, sharing following observations and notes:

As some of the Customs granted benefits existed in many countries before the AEO era, companies which have enjoyed “such pre-AEO benefits” may fear a potential reduction in existing trade facilitation measures – instead of the introduction of truly new benefits.
Due to the dynamics in the cross-border flow of goods, outcomes might vary considerably over time – ‘seeing is believing’; in particular, the benefits linked to ‘elevated threat’ and ‘post-incident recovery’, may appear quite theoretical until such situations actually emerge (and the benefits materialize – or, not).
Some could also consider that the AEO system may become a technical trade barrier – the ´become an AEO or die´ scenario.
Some might think that an AEO program deters crime, as criminals would rather choose an easy target (i.e. a non-AEO target), for example in the case of warehouse theft; and, alternatively, other might think that an AEO program attracts criminals, as they know there are likely to be fewer Customs interventions – the smuggling of narcotics, for example.

Dear CBRA Blog reader: although this is very challenging research topic, and one should not dream of reaching “one ultimate truth out there” – we kindly ask that if you are in Cancun 11-13 May for the 3^rd Global AEO Conference, please take 10 minutes to reply the questionnaire..! Next to the good vibrations gained from participation in this highly important study, you will join a lucky drawing of a nice Costa Rican souvenir! In Lausanne, 9 May 2016, Juha Hintsa.

PS. List of benefit survey questions, for the CBRA Blog readers:

Customs Supply Chain Security Programs (AEO, C-TPAT etc.) – Survey on Supply Chain and Government Benefits – WCO 3rd Global AEO Conference, Cancun, Mexico, 11-13 May 2016 – Research project by CBRA, ZLC, UCR, HEC UNIL and FP7-CORE

Question for Customs administrations, supply chain companies, and all other experts in cross-border supply chains and Customs supply chain security programs: How often are the supply chain security program (AEO, C-TPAT etc.) certified companies in your country benefiting from the following Customs granted incentives?

Use the following scale: Very frequently – Frequently – Occasionally – Rarely – Never / Not applicable in our country (or, this is nothing specific for certified companies) – Cannot say

Are companies submitting entry/exit summary declarations with reduced data sets?
Are companies benefiting from reduced number of data elements in their final declaration?
Are companies benefiting from increased paperless processing of import/export shipments?
Are companies offered the option of audit-based / account-based controls (versus only transaction-based controls)?
Are companies having access to / pre-qualification with various simplified customs procedures?
Are companies self-managing their bonded warehouses?
Are companies benefiting from tax privileges, such as speedier tax refunds and compensation?
Are companies benefiting from financial guarantee waivers, reductions or rebates?
Are companies benefiting from reduction of any Customs fees or charges?
Are companies benefiting from access to self-audit or reduced audit programs?
Are companies allowed to conduct self-assessments when Customs automated systems are not functioning?
Are companies benefiting from designated Customs contact points / assistance by Customs supply chain security experts?
Are companies benefiting from training provided by Customs experts?
Are companies enjoying easier access to other governmental certification in the supply chain, e.g. in aviation security?
Are companies benefiting from the option to manage clearance formalities, inspections etc. at the business site?
Are companies benefiting from a minimum number of cargo security inspections?
Are companies being notified of the intention to release goods prior to their arrival? (“pre-clearance”)
Are companies benefiting from “extended Customs office opening hours”, during high peak / congestion times?
Are companies benefiting from choice of place of controls, if selected for control?
Are companies benefiting from priority treatment of consignments if selected for control?
Are companies benefiting from priority use of non-intrusive inspection techniques when examination is required?
Are companies guaranteed a priority Customs processing during a period of elevated threat conditions?
Are companies guaranteed preferential treatment at border crossings in post-disaster/post-attack situations?
Are companies guaranteed a priority in exporting to affected countries after a security incident?
Are companies benefiting from expedited processes to resolve post-entry or post-clearance inquiries?
Are companies benefiting from priority response to requests for ruling from Customs?
Are companies benefiting from privileges in any kind of non-criminal legal cases?
Are companies enjoying tangible benefits due to mutual recognition agreements / arrangements (MRAs) with 3rd countries?

Question for Customs administrations only: What are the benefits for the Customs administration in your country arising from the supply chain security program (AEO, C-TPAT etc.)?

Use the following scale: Strongly Agree – Agree – Neither Agree nor Disagree – Disagree – Strongly Disagree – Cannot say

Better overall allocation of governmental resources
Improved indirect tax revenue collection
Improved prevention of trafficking and illicit trade
Improved detection and/or seizures in trafficking and illicit trade
Improved prosecution to judgements -ratio (= higher percentage of successful prosecutions)
Increased confiscations of criminal assets and/or proceeds of crime
Improved collaboration with supply chain companies
Improved collaboration with other national government agencies
Improved international collaboration with Customs administrations in other countries

Question for supply chain companies only: What are the additional benefits for the supply chain companies in your country, arising from the supply chain security program participations / certifications (AEO, C-TPAT etc.)?

Use the following scale: Strongly Agree – Agree – Neither Agree nor Disagree – Disagree – Strongly Disagree – Cannot say

Improved customer service
Improved customs loyalty
Increased market share/ gaining more new customers
Improved security commitment of employees
Improved company image and credibility
Reduced overall vulnerability of the supply chain
Improved supply chain resiliency
Reduced cargo theft incidents
Reduced tax fraud incidents
Reduced illicit trade / trafficking incidents
Reduced insurance fees
Improved inventory management
Fewer delayed cross-border shipments
Reduced lead time variability in the cross-border supply chain

PPS. Related literature by the Cross-border Research Association team and key partners:

Most of these papers are available for download at ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Juha_Hintsa/publications . And all of them can be naturally requested by email ( cbra@cross-border.org )

Hintsa, J., Mohanty, S., Rudzitis, N., Fossen, C. and Heijmann, F. (2014), “The role and value of customs administrations in minimization of socio-economic negative impacts related to illicit import flows in freight logistics systems- three preliminary cases in Europe – FP7-CORE”, Proceedings of the 9th WCO PICARD Conference, September 17-19, 2014, Puebla.

Hintsa, J. (2013), AEO – MRA Study for RTC- Thailand Europe Cooperation TEC-II, PDSC: Implementation of international standards on Supply Chain Security leading to a secure Trade Environment and to increased Trade Facilitation (Activity Code : TRA 4), Final Report, Bangkok.

Urciuoli, L. and Ekwall, D. (2012), “Possible impacts of supply chain security certifications on efficiency – a survey study about the possible impacts of AEO security certifications on supply chain efficiency”, Proceedings of Nofoma Conference, June 6-8, 2012, Naantali.

Hintsa, J., Männistö, T., Hameri, A.P., Thibedeau, C., Sahlstedt, J., Tsikolenko, V., Finger, M. and Granqvist, M. (2011), Customs Risk Management (CRiM): A Survey of 24 WCO Member Administrations, Study for World Customs Organization (WCO), February 28, 2011, Lausanne

Hintsa, J., Hameri, A.P., Männistö, T., Lazarescu, M., Ahokas, J. and Holmström, J. (2010), ”Conceptual model for measuring benefits of security in global supply chains”, Proceedings of the the 3rd International Conference on Transportation and Logistics (T-LOG), September 6-8, 2010, Fukuoka City.

Hintsa, J., Ahokas, J., Männistö, T. and Sahlstedt, J. (2010), “CEN supply chain security (SCS) feasibility study”, CEN/TC 379 Supply Chain Security, Final report, January 15, 2010

Three calls for journal and conference papers

April 21, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Authorized Economic Operator, Blog, CBRA, Coordinated border management, Customs, Cybersecurity, Environmental agency, Exporter, Express courier, Freight forwarder, Global, Importer, ISO28000, Known Consignor, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Mutual Recognition Agreement, Other-cluster, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Regulated Agent, Retailer, Risk-cluster, Scientific, Shipper, Supply chain security, TAPA, Trade facilitation, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, Trusted Trader, Warehouse keeper, WCO, WCO, WP19 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

This CBRA Blog advertises three important calls for papers in 2016: Special Issue for Journal of Transportation Security (to be published in 2017); the 11^th WCO Customs-Academia PICARD Conference (Sep.2016); and the 7^th European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (Aug.2016).

1. Journal of Transportation Security, Special Issue: Enhancing supply chain security through government-to-government and government-to-business partnerships and collaboration

Journal of Transportation Security (JTRS): The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent events have compelled stakeholders to understand transport security as more than a single element of the global networks that move people and goods. Once a routine component of modern transportation, security now represents a vital necessity and an urgent national priority. The Journal of Transportation Security probes the relevant aspects of many critical areas of study, including supply chain and logistics; information technology; public policy; international business; political science; engineering; transportation; economics; and counterterrorism, among others. This journal is the first to take a global, apolitical, and in-depth multidisciplinary look at the field. The mission of the journal is to disseminate new research, thought, and analysis for teachers, researchers, policy makers and practitioners around the world who view transportation security as a critical element in the post 9/11 world.

Partnerships and collaboration play a crucial role in the fight against crime in the global supply chains. Investments in traditional security areas such as physical security, personnel security, and IT security no longer suffice. Both government and business actors should extend their security efforts beyond their organizational boundaries, by fostering relationships with each other. Further government-to-government and government-to-business collaboration has a great potential to improve security of the supply chain and regulatory compliance of the trading community, while facilitating trade and logistics for the legitimate, security aware companies. The scope of collaboration covers a broad range of activities, including sharing of information and data; investing in common resource pools and sharing resources; and agreeing on optimum protocols for conducting inspections and audits in the supply chains. Enhancing the information exchange, for example, would help governments and companies to prevent and detect security breaches in supply chains and to recover faster once the breaches happen. In principle, both government and business actors share a common goal of mitigating crime in the global supply chains. Priorities and procedures, however, differ markedly between various business actors (e.g., shippers, carriers, freight forwarders) and government agencies (e.g., customs, police and transport security authorities).

Call for abstracts for the JTRS Special issue is open until 30 September 2016, please visit: www.springer.com …

(CBRA / Dr. Juha Hintsa is the lead guest editor for this special issue; and abstract review panel consists of multiple experts in FP7-CORE project).

2. The 11th Annual WCO Picard Conference – Manila, Philippines – 27-29 September 2016

The World Customs Organization and the Philippine Bureau of Customs are pleased to announce the 11th annual WCO Picard Conference. You are invited to submit your research for presentation at the conference. Papers should focus on Customs or, more globally, the regulation, dynamics, and practices of international trade. Although not required, writers could consider submitting research on the following topics: Digital Customs; security; taxation and other revenue matters; and illicit trade.

Call for papers is open until 15 June 2016, please visit: www.wcoomd.org…

(CBRA / Dr. Juha Hintsa is part of the Scientific Board for the conference; and he also belongs to the PICARD Advisory Group).

3. The 7^th European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC) – Uppsala, Sweden – 17-19 August 2016

Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) research is an interdisciplinary field of research that focuses on the development, use, and evaluation of advanced information technologies, including methodologies, models and algorithms, systems, and tools, for local, national and international security related applications. Over the past decade, the ISI research community has matured and delivered an impressive array of research results that are both technically innovative and practically relevant. The 2016 European ISI Conference is the seventh ISI conference to be organized by the European ISI community. The conference was first held in 2008 and has been organized annually since 2011.

Call for papers is open until 18 May 2016, please visit: http://www.eisic.eu/call.aspx

(CBRA / Dr. Toni Männistö delivers a keynote presentation on FP7-CORE, focusing on Supply chain security education and training (CORE WP19.1) ).

FP7-CORE Education – Two new diagrams

March 10, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, Blog, CBRA, Corruption, Counterfeiting, Customs, Customs risks, Cybercrime, Demo-cluster, Document forgery, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, Environmental crime, Exporter, Express courier, Fraud, Freight forwarder, Global, Hijacking, Human trafficking, Identity theft, Importer, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Money laundry, Other-cluster, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Restricted goods, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Shipper, Socio-economic impacts, Strategic goods, Supply chain security, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, Violence, Warehouse keeper, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP3, WP4, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Today’s CBRA Blog presents two new diagrams which have been recently designed and developed in the context of FP7-CORE Education and training work (Work package 19.1). The information visualized in the diagram is based on CBRA’s supply chain security research work since year 2001, particularly from the past 5-6 years.

Some background information on the first diagram of crime types in global supply chains has been presented before for example in CBRA’s Blog of 13 October 2014 – Crime taxonomies from Athens. In the center of this diagram we list the crime types – including document fraud and cybercrime – which in the supply chain criminal context are performed in order to succeed with the actual economic or ideological crime, e.g. cargo theft or terrorism.

The left area of the circle lists four examples of crime types, which typically are of primary concern for supply chain companies: cargo theft, sabotage, parallel trade and product specification fraud. With such crime types it is commonly up to the companies to prevent, to detect and to react – of course, law enforcement agencies can be called for any time there is reasonable suspicion of such activities (and naturally in certain cases the government agencies may even be the first ones to detect and react, e.g. in case of armed robberies and truck hijackings).

The right area of the circle deals with supply chain incidents where the authorities typically focus on prevention, detection and reaction: fraud in indirect border taxes; trafficking / violations in cross-border restrictions and prohibitions; human trafficking; and exploitation of illicit labor. From supply chain perspective one can characterize them as “a priori non-disruptive illegal activities – only if / after authorities detect the violations, the supply chain is disrupted and the involved supply chain companies can get in trouble”.

Lastly, on the bottom area of the circle, we list four supply chain crime areas where the prevention typically is in strong interest of both supply chain companies and governmental agencies – and, the detection and (instant) reaction varies on case-by-case basis: counterfeiting, sales channel violations, sea piracy and terrorism. Counterfeiting hits revenues on both sides of the equation, and, with many products can also be health damaging or even lethal. Not having proper sales licenses, and/or selling to unauthorized buyers – for example cigarettes and alcohol, dual use and strategic goods etc. – can again harm both the involved companies and the society as a whole. And of course, sea pirates hijacking cargo ships; bombs exploding and bringing planes down; and terrorists attacking critical supply chain infrastructures, all are in the best interest of both companies and government agencies to prevent, to detect, and to react – in the fastest and most effective possible manner.

The second new educational diagram below depicts the negative socio-economic impact areas – six in total – caused by twelve typical smuggling and trafficking activities. The data behind it has been presented before e.g. in CBRA’s Blog of 14 January 2015 – Socio-economic damages. Inside the square we present the six societal impact areas – the larger the area, the more links there are between the trafficking activities and the negative impacts. As an example of a “big area”, seven different types of trafficking typically lead into increasing market place distortions and/or unfair competition. In the other extreme, only trafficking in stolen cultural products leads to losses in cultural heritage.

That’s all for the CBRA Blog today – please let us know if you see this type of visualization as beneficial when teaching and learning about the big picture of supply chain security! Thanks, Juha Hintsa ( email: cbra@cross-border.org )

Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

Global supply chain design considerations: Mitigating product safety and security risks (Speier et al. 2011)

Supply chain security orientation: conceptual development and a proposed framework (Autry and Bobbit 2008)

Interview with Mr. Thorsten Neumann on TAPA EMEA

CASSANDRA compendium. Private sector perspectives on risk management (Ch. 5) and crime prevention and security management in supply chains (Ch. 6)

AEO benefits, or, no benefits, that’s the?

Three calls for journal and conference papers

FP7-CORE Education – Two new diagrams

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