High-taxed goods - Cross-border Research Association

Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks (CORE1204)

November 11, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Analytic, Coordinated border management, CORE-Observatory, Customs, Customs risks, Dangerous goods, Demo-cluster, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, Global, High-taxed goods, Investigations, Organized crime groups, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Restricted goods, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scanning, Scientific, Screening, Socio-economic impacts, Strategic goods, Supply chain, Supply chain security, Trafficking, WCO, WP1, WP3 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: The requirement for 100% container scanning has been a burning topic, since U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the initiative in order to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destructions into the U.S. The paper explores how much it is reasonable to come down from the 100% inspection rate, if deterrence and cost of retaliation are considered in the model. Deterrence means the power to dissuade an attacker from attempting to smuggle weapons as opposite to use coerce or compel. Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred by an attacker e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network. It is assumed the defender discloses in advance how many containers are inspected. The paper can be viewed here: https://www.researchgate.net.

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Full review: The study provides an economical model based on the game theory to estimate the optimal inspection rates in order to deter perpetrators from smuggling weapons into the U.S. The model assumes the customs or Border agency aims at minimizing the expected damages and cost of inspections while perpetrators are simultaneously trying to maximize their rewards. The used parameters are number of attackers, estimated damages, the cost of inspecting a container, the cost of a smuggling attempt, the cost of retaliation and the probability of detecting weapons. Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network. Cost of a smuggling attempt are the costs of acquiring, developing or manufacturing the weapons, and any logistical costs required to smuggle them into the U.S. It is assumed the government agency announces publicly the inspection level and set of retaliation policies. Retaliation policy must pose a credible threat that means the governmental agency would retaliate even if that were not economically justified.

The study has four main limitations. First, the paper does not describe under what conditions the model works well or poorly. The quality of strategic and tactical intelligence, the efficiency of criminal investigation and prosecution processes, the extent of inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, the degree of private sector involvement and successfulness of awareness campaigns on retaliation policies are probably factors that influence on the model and its parameters. Second, the study does not provide numerical estimates to the parameters such as detection rates and cost of retaliation. Third, it is very unlikely that weapons of mass destructions are transported in containers into the U.S., what makes it difficult to assess the usefulness of the model in real life cases. Forth, costs of retaliation are not calculated and published by law enforcement agencies, thus criminals cannot make decision based on financial risks.

Despite of these limitations the CORE project can adapt the game theory and benefit from the paper. Traditionally law enforcement agencies highlight the number of seizures, arrests and successful prosecutions to measure operations and their impacts. The presented model brings two interesting components, a cost of crime attempt and a cost of retaliation. If criminal activities are financed and managed based on the same principles like legal ones, expected losses due to seizures of illicit goods or drugs are very likely calculated in the criminal business models. Consequently, making criminal business unprofitable is key to stop criminal activities. The approach enables to model the dynamic between costs and rewards from viewpoints of both law enforcement and criminal actors. In the other words, the model makes possible to study two dimensions in the Innovation Agenda, societal costs and friction costs caused by implemented security measures.

Reference: Bier, Vicki M. & Haphuriwat, N. (2011). Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks. Annals of Operations Research, 187(1), 137–158.

CORE1204

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Progress in combating cigarette smuggling: controlling the supply chain (CORE1203)

November 9, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All actors, All partners, All transport modes, Analytic, Consulting, Coordinated border management, CORE-Observatory, Customs risks, Demo-cluster, Global, High-taxed goods, Investigations, Judicial system, Negligence, Organized crime groups, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Socio-economic impacts, Standard, Supply chain, Supply chain security, Tax evasion /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: The paper presents cases how government agencies have reduced illicit tobacco trade by making the industry liable for controlling their supply chains. Tobacco companies were required to monitor the movement of lawfully manufactured tobacco products in their supply chains, and even retrospectively track the route taken when products were seized due to suspected excise fraud. According the paper illicit trade was substantially reduced, if manufacturers stopped delivering lawfully manufactured tobacco products in amounts that exceeded the tobacco market in the countries with lower excise duties. The criminal market dried out due to unavailability of illicit tobacco products that had been smuggled to the countries of higher excise duties by organized criminal groups. The document can be viewed at: http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com.

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Full review: The paper focuses on excise fraud and organized smuggling of originally legally produced tobacco products to the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. Based on internal company documents and court judgments the authors summarize evidence how the tobacco industry was involved directly and indirectly in the large-scale excise fraud. First, the companies delivered intentionally large quantities of tobacco products to the countries of low excise tax rates and uncontrolled distribution network. Then organized criminal groups shipped the purchased tobacco products illegally through their smuggling networks into the countries of higher excise duties.

The cutting off the tobacco supply to the illicit market is the key to intervene in large-scale organized tobacco smuggling. According the article by means of legislative and punitive interventions tobacco industry was forced to implement new export polices and practices. Tobacco companies invested in tracking and tracing systems that helped to identify points where shipped tobacco products diverted from the legal supply chain to the illicit markets. The companies implemented security processes in order to clearly identify they business partners and ensure business partners had no criminal records. Government agencies increased information sharing and inter-agency cooperation on a national and international level. The interventions led to a substantial fall in customs seizures and a rise in legal sales.

CORE project can learn two things in the article. First, the global scope and multifaceted nature of the illicit tobacco trade requires visibility over shipment processes and efficient collaboration between governmental agencies and private sector. Second, the study implies risk to investigations and punitive damages made tobacco companies to pay attention in which markets their products finally end up. In other words, enforceable measures not voluntary agreements made industry liable for controlling their end-to-end supply chain and reduce societal risk.

Reference: Lara Joossens, L., & Raw, M. (2008). Progress in combating cigarette smuggling: controlling the supply chain. Tobacco Control, 17(6), 399–404.

CORE1203

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Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

October 26, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Analytic, BMT, Capacity building, CBRA, CLECAT, Consulting, CORE-Observatory, CPT, Customs, Dangerous goods, DCA, Demo-cluster, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, ESC, Exporter, Express courier, Freight forwarder, Global, High-taxed goods, High-value goods, ILS, Importer, INTERPOL, IRU, ISL, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Perishable goods, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Resilience, Restricted goods, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scientific, Shipper, Strategic goods, Supply chain, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Time-critical goods, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, TUD, Warehouse keeper, WCO, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP6 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: Supply chain security culture (SCSC) is as an overall organizational philosophy embracing norms and values that keep employees vigilant when performing supply chain security practices. The article presents a scale that makes possible to gauge supply chain security culture and its correlation to organization’s ability to respond to unexpected disruptions. Employees are asked to assess two topics: security strategy of the company and impacts of significant supply chain breech to business operations. According the study improved supply chain security culture makes company more resilient against major disruptions. This research helps executives to justify their expenditures on security efforts. The reviewed document can be purchased here: http://dx.doi.org.

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Full review: Researchers have stressed the importance of having an organizational culture that highlights proactivity and vigilance toward supply chain security breaches. In security-focused supply chain management environment workers are empowered to detected and handle supply chain security threats without seeking formal permission from supervisors and managers. Company security strategy gives specific attention how SCS concepts are embedded into firm processes and procedures. Alignment with organizational culture and business or corporate-level strategies is believed to result in enhanced organizational performance. In addition, organization culture encompasses supply chain continuity management. The paper presents a scale for measuring supply chain security culture defined as the overall organizational philosophy that creates supply chain security as a priority among its employees through embracing and projecting norms and values to support secure activities and to be vigilant with security efforts.

The study makes possible to assess how implemented FP7-CORE security technologies, tools and practices influence on supply chain resilience based on the perception of company managers and employees. The article gives also guidelines how to develop survey forms and protocols in order to assess the influence of implemented security measures on other KPIs such as supply chain visibility and reliability. The survey tools based on perceived operational and organizational changes complete toolbox to measure impacts of introduced security interventions.

Reference: Zachary Williams, Nicole Ponder, Chad W. Autry, “Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation”, The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 20 Iss: 2, pp.243 – 260

CORE1200

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Hold on, before blaming it on the OGAs!

April 27, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Analytic, Blog, CBRA, Coordinated border management, Counterfeiting, Customs, Cybercrime, Dangerous goods, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, Environmental crime, Exporter, Global, High-taxed goods, Importer, Other-cluster, Perishable goods, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Restricted goods, Risk-cluster, Strategic goods, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Trafficking, Transport security agency, WP19 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

It is common since many years already that the global customs community is pointing their “blaming finger” to other government agencies – OGAs – when it comes to identifying root causes behind too long cargo release times at sea ports and other border crossing points, high costs for importers and exporters to conduct international trade, and so forth. Now, without denying this as a plausible scenario, the CBRA research team proposes to take one step backwards, by first building a solid framework for analyzing and deeply understanding what is actually happening at the borders with Customs and all the other agencies, before rushing to conclusions on “who is to be blamed for poor / expensive cross-border performance…”. Therefore – for both educational purposes (FP7-CORE, work package 19.1) and for analytical purposes (Border Agency Cooperation study with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, OIC), we have produced the following “universal border control task list” – naturally understanding that a perfect single universal list cannot exist. The list is first exploited during April-May 2016 in the OIC Embassy survey (here in Switzerland), to explore who is responsible for specific cross-border controls in various OIC member countries, and to what extent customs is performing tasks on behalf of other (border) agencies. Later, we plan to use the this as a “de-facto border agency control check-list” in our future studies, across the globe.

Again, the first step before analyzing which agencies to blame, is all about understanding what are the typical cross-border control tasks all about, considering all three task categories:

Border control tasks which typically cover all commodities;
Border control tasks which typically focus on specific commodities; and
Other border agency control areas.

Now, lets go through all three of them, starting with the first one, and followed by the other two:

Border control tasks which typically cover all commodities:

Calculation and collection of indirect border taxes:
- customs duties
- sales / value added taxes
- excise taxes
Calculation and collection of other import/ transit/ export fees and taxes (e.g. environmental fee at export)
Compilation of trade statistics

Border control tasks which typically focus on specific commodities:

Control of import quota restricted products
Calculation and granting of export subsidies
Control of product safety / conformity of goods / trading standards (please separate agencies per product category, if necessary)
Control of food, drinks, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals (including for general health and safety purposes)
Control of energy related materials / products (e.g. oil and coal, could be for export taxation purposes etc.)
Enforcement of intellectual property rights / fight against copyright infringements / anti-counterfeit
Control of plant diseases, pests and extraneous species (i.e., phytosanitary controls)
Animal quarantine and controls (i.e. veterinary controls, including pet controls)
Control of any biohazards (including deliberate ones)
Control of CITES protected species (i.e. endangered fauna and flora)
Control of natural resources under license requirements, harvesting quotas etc. (including specific fish, wood, minerals, diamonds etc.)
Control of cultural artifacts (stolen / looted, and/or illicitly traded)
Control of any stolen goods (including vehicles, machinery, cargo etc.)
Fight against drugs / illicit narcotics trafficking (including pre-cursors)
Control of waste flows (including those in the Basel Convention on transboundary movements)
Control of dual use / strategic goods
Control of dangerous goods / hazardous materials
Control of explosives and weapons:
- explosives (including pre-cursors)
- small arms and light weapons
- defense / war materials
Control of nuclear and radioactive materials

Other border agency control areas:

Conveyance / cargo transport security and safety controls:
- for maritime, including sea ports
- for aviation, including airports
- other modes: road, rail, inland waterways etc.
Traveler, crew and immigration controls:
- visa and passport controls
- trafficking of human beings and people smuggling
- asylum seekers
- passenger cars and vehicles in terms of temporary admission
Control of weight of cargo (including for road safety purposes)
Cash controls (cash smuggling and counterfeit currency)
Cyber security (customs and supply chain IT systems, critical infrastructure IT etc.)

Dear CBRA Blog and CBRA Monthly readers: we kindly invite your inputs to make the list more comprehensive / better in the future, so please send us an email with your ideas, to cbra@cross-border.org . And thanks already now to the multiple experts from national Customs administrations and international organizations for your valuable help so far– it has been great working with you on all these studies, keeping them as pragmatic as possible… (detailed acknowledgements will be published later). And it goes without saying that soon we will start looking on the next-step aspects on customs versus other government agencies, in the context cross-border supply chain costs and delays – please stay tuned for more!

Mr. Mike Ellis, INTERPOL, on illicit trade and counterfeiting

February 10, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, Capacity building, CBRA, Counter-terrorism, Counterfeiting, Customs, Customs risks, Fraud, Global, High-taxed goods, High-value goods, INTERPOL, Interviews, Manufacturer, Organized crime groups, Police, Safety, Shipper, Socio-economic impacts, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Trafficking, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP3, WP4, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Today’s CBRA Interview is with Mr. Mike Ellis who is the Assistant Director of Illicit Trade and Anti-counterfeit Sub-crime Directorate at INTERPOL, Lyon, France.

Hi Mike, can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I am the Assistant Director for Police Services at INTERPOL, based in Lyon France. INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization. Our role is to assist law enforcement agencies in our 190 member countries to combat all forms of transnational crime. We work to help police across the world meet the growing challenges of crime in the 21st century by providing a high-tech infrastructure of technical and operational support. Our services include targeted training, expert investigative support, specialized databases and secure police communications channels. I am responsible for the coordination of all activities related to illicit trade, smuggling of illicit goods and counterfeiting for the organization and police forces within our 190 member countries. I lead a team of expert officers who are engaged in training, capacity building, and operational support who operate along with my analytical support who manage risk awareness and intelligence handling.

From your perspective, how bad is the current situation with counterfeit and other illicit trade in global supply chains? Can one for example see links between illicit trade and transnational organized crime groups; or, even terrorist organizations?

For many years the clear link has been established between the trafficking of illicit goods and transnational organized crime. Criminal organizations are attracted by the lucrative profits involved in trading counterfeit or fake goods, or in trading legitimate goods through illicit channels. The criminals involved manufacture and trade illicit goods on a regional and increasingly global scale. It is well documented that they use the profits to fund other criminal activities such as drug trafficking and people smuggling, and for investment into funding subversive political groups. Selling fake or counterfeit products is one aspect of illicit trade, as is selling genuine goods on the black market to avoid paying taxes. By avoiding regulatory controls, the criminals behind these activities peddle dangerous and illicit goods with a complete disregard for the health and safety of consumers. The phenomenon has grown to an unprecedented level, posing tremendous risks to society and the global economy. Counterfeiting harms businesses which produce and sell legitimate products, governments lose tax revenue from products manufactured or sold on the black market, and consumers are at risk from substandard products.

By the way, we met first time about one year ago in Lyon at an INTERPOL workshop linked to FP7-Project CORE. One of the main objectives of CORE-project is to develop leading edge education and training materials on supply chain security – for the benefit of law enforcement agencies, supply chain practitioners, and academics alike. Can you share your views about law enforcement – academia – industry cooperation in education material development, as well as in the broader field of supply chain security management?

One of our principle functions is capacity building and training. At INTERPOL we recognize that capacity building brings with it raised identification of the impact of illicit cross-border trade and counterfeiting and all our new operations, or established operations in new regions, are preceded by a capacity building workshop. The public domain is represented by police, customs, border control officials, and prosecutors, as well as representatives from various regulatory bodies including trading standards. In addition, INTERPOL TIGC, the Trafficking in Illicit Goods and Counterfeiting program which I am heading, has developed a Mentoring Program which aims to increase cross-border, cross-industry law enforcement operational interventions by: strengthening capacity to deal with all types of cross-border trafficking in illicit and counterfeit products. We have also developed an online International Intellectual Property Crime Investigator’s College and have built already a robust network of over 10.000 law enforcement officers, and partner stakeholders with specialist knowledge and skillset. This online training course provides specialist knowledge on transnational organized crime. It is aimed at all law enforcement officials, regulatory authorities and private sector investigators who are committed in the fight against illicit trade and intellectual property crime. We aim to provide crime professionals with specialist awareness and learning on the subject of transnational organized intellectual property, IP, crime, and illicit trade, by delivery of leading-edge training that meets international standards and allows crime investigators from any discipline to quickly identify other certified investigators. Through this learning platform we also facilitate cooperation between the public and private sectors in the fight against IP crime, and ensure all public and private sector crime investigators have a common understanding of the problems facing them, while being aware of each other’s competencies and roles. We seek to promote knowledge on what intervention strategies and tactics work, in order that all stakeholders are better able to work together in partnership in enforcement operations.

Thank you Mike for this highly interesting interview. It complements well our previous interviews on similar themes – with non-law enforcement experts including Mr. David Hamon and Mr. Tony Barone. CBRA and the whole FP7-CORE consortium, around 70 partners in total, wishes to continue the great cooperation in research and education material development with INTERPOL, throughout the CORE-project, until April 2018 – and beyond! Juha.

Trade and money laundering uncontained (the Economist, May 2014, CORE2006)

January 6, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Demo-cluster, Document forgery, Fraud, Global, High-taxed goods, High-value goods, News agency, Organized crime groups, Police, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Socio-economic impacts, Tax evasion, Trafficking, WP1, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP2, WP3, WP4, WP5, WP6, WP7, WP8, WP9 /by Susan Wilander

Summary

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls.

The new methods for cross-border money laundering and tax evasion concern most CORE demonstrations, especially those involving international cargo movements. The emerging risk of trade-based money laundering calls for new and more effective enforcement of trade transactions. CORE is developing new solutions (e.g., data pipeline and system-based supervision) for capturing and sharing trade information across logistics operators and law enforcement agencies. The new solutions likely improve law enforcement’s capability to detect suspicious trade transactions that may have something to do with the trade-based money laundering. However, building such capability requires IT integration (e.g., interoperability), risk awareness and education and training. CORE consortium addresses these complementary activities in work carried out in risk, IT and educational clusters.

Reference

Trade and money laundering uncontained, the Economist, May 3^rd 2014

CORE2006

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Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks (CORE1204)

Progress in combating cigarette smuggling: controlling the supply chain (CORE1203)

Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

Hold on, before blaming it on the OGAs!

Mr. Mike Ellis, INTERPOL, on illicit trade and counterfeiting

Trade and money laundering uncontained (the Economist, May 2014, CORE2006)

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