Strategic goods - Cross-border Research Association

Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks (CORE1204)

November 11, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Analytic, Coordinated border management, CORE-Observatory, Customs, Customs risks, Dangerous goods, Demo-cluster, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, Global, High-taxed goods, Investigations, Organized crime groups, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Restricted goods, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scanning, Scientific, Screening, Socio-economic impacts, Strategic goods, Supply chain, Supply chain security, Trafficking, WCO, WP1, WP3 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: The requirement for 100% container scanning has been a burning topic, since U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the initiative in order to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destructions into the U.S. The paper explores how much it is reasonable to come down from the 100% inspection rate, if deterrence and cost of retaliation are considered in the model. Deterrence means the power to dissuade an attacker from attempting to smuggle weapons as opposite to use coerce or compel. Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred by an attacker e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network. It is assumed the defender discloses in advance how many containers are inspected. The paper can be viewed here: https://www.researchgate.net.

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Full review: The study provides an economical model based on the game theory to estimate the optimal inspection rates in order to deter perpetrators from smuggling weapons into the U.S. The model assumes the customs or Border agency aims at minimizing the expected damages and cost of inspections while perpetrators are simultaneously trying to maximize their rewards. The used parameters are number of attackers, estimated damages, the cost of inspecting a container, the cost of a smuggling attempt, the cost of retaliation and the probability of detecting weapons. Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network. Cost of a smuggling attempt are the costs of acquiring, developing or manufacturing the weapons, and any logistical costs required to smuggle them into the U.S. It is assumed the government agency announces publicly the inspection level and set of retaliation policies. Retaliation policy must pose a credible threat that means the governmental agency would retaliate even if that were not economically justified.

The study has four main limitations. First, the paper does not describe under what conditions the model works well or poorly. The quality of strategic and tactical intelligence, the efficiency of criminal investigation and prosecution processes, the extent of inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, the degree of private sector involvement and successfulness of awareness campaigns on retaliation policies are probably factors that influence on the model and its parameters. Second, the study does not provide numerical estimates to the parameters such as detection rates and cost of retaliation. Third, it is very unlikely that weapons of mass destructions are transported in containers into the U.S., what makes it difficult to assess the usefulness of the model in real life cases. Forth, costs of retaliation are not calculated and published by law enforcement agencies, thus criminals cannot make decision based on financial risks.

Despite of these limitations the CORE project can adapt the game theory and benefit from the paper. Traditionally law enforcement agencies highlight the number of seizures, arrests and successful prosecutions to measure operations and their impacts. The presented model brings two interesting components, a cost of crime attempt and a cost of retaliation. If criminal activities are financed and managed based on the same principles like legal ones, expected losses due to seizures of illicit goods or drugs are very likely calculated in the criminal business models. Consequently, making criminal business unprofitable is key to stop criminal activities. The approach enables to model the dynamic between costs and rewards from viewpoints of both law enforcement and criminal actors. In the other words, the model makes possible to study two dimensions in the Innovation Agenda, societal costs and friction costs caused by implemented security measures.

Reference: Bier, Vicki M. & Haphuriwat, N. (2011). Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks. Annals of Operations Research, 187(1), 137–158.

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Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

October 26, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Analytic, BMT, Capacity building, CBRA, CLECAT, Consulting, CORE-Observatory, CPT, Customs, Dangerous goods, DCA, Demo-cluster, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, ESC, Exporter, Express courier, Freight forwarder, Global, High-taxed goods, High-value goods, ILS, Importer, INTERPOL, IRU, ISL, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Perishable goods, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Resilience, Restricted goods, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scientific, Shipper, Strategic goods, Supply chain, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Time-critical goods, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, TUD, Warehouse keeper, WCO, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP6 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: Supply chain security culture (SCSC) is as an overall organizational philosophy embracing norms and values that keep employees vigilant when performing supply chain security practices. The article presents a scale that makes possible to gauge supply chain security culture and its correlation to organization’s ability to respond to unexpected disruptions. Employees are asked to assess two topics: security strategy of the company and impacts of significant supply chain breech to business operations. According the study improved supply chain security culture makes company more resilient against major disruptions. This research helps executives to justify their expenditures on security efforts. The reviewed document can be purchased here: http://dx.doi.org.

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Full review: Researchers have stressed the importance of having an organizational culture that highlights proactivity and vigilance toward supply chain security breaches. In security-focused supply chain management environment workers are empowered to detected and handle supply chain security threats without seeking formal permission from supervisors and managers. Company security strategy gives specific attention how SCS concepts are embedded into firm processes and procedures. Alignment with organizational culture and business or corporate-level strategies is believed to result in enhanced organizational performance. In addition, organization culture encompasses supply chain continuity management. The paper presents a scale for measuring supply chain security culture defined as the overall organizational philosophy that creates supply chain security as a priority among its employees through embracing and projecting norms and values to support secure activities and to be vigilant with security efforts.

The study makes possible to assess how implemented FP7-CORE security technologies, tools and practices influence on supply chain resilience based on the perception of company managers and employees. The article gives also guidelines how to develop survey forms and protocols in order to assess the influence of implemented security measures on other KPIs such as supply chain visibility and reliability. The survey tools based on perceived operational and organizational changes complete toolbox to measure impacts of introduced security interventions.

Reference: Zachary Williams, Nicole Ponder, Chad W. Autry, “Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation”, The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 20 Iss: 2, pp.243 – 260

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Interview with Ms. Sarma on the US CSP-program

June 28, 2016/0 Comments/in Africa, All transport modes, CBRA, Compliance management, Counter-terrorism, Dangerous goods, Demo-cluster, Dual-use goods, Hijacking, Interviews, Middle-East, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Safety, Strategic goods, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, USA, WP16, WP19, WP6 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

28.6.2016: Today’s CBRA Interview with Ms. Dace Sarma from CRDF Global focuses on the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program

Hi Dace, and thanks for joining CBRA Interview. Can you please tell first a bit of your background and what you do today?

I work at CRDF Global, an independent nonprofit organization that promotes international scientific and technical collaboration through grants, technical resources, training and services. At CRDF Global, I work in partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program, CSP in short, on programming collaborating with government, security, academic, and industrial communities around the world to strengthen their ability to thwart chemical attacks. Prior to working with CSP, I supported and implemented the Department of State’s Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, WMDT in short, projects within the scope of CRDF Global support for the WMDT.

Thanks for sharing that. Can you explain more about CRDF Global and the Chemical Security Program, CSP, by the US State Department?

CSP works with a number of implementing partners, including CRDF Global, to promote chemical security through sponsorship of projects designed to identify and address chemical security vulnerabilities and prevent chemical attacks.

CSP collaborates with diverse stakeholders, including partner governments, subject matter experts, and international organizations, to enhance chemical security through capacity building workshops, and trainings.

I had the pleasure to join twice the CRDF Global workshops in 2015: first to Hurghada, Egypt, in March 2015, and second to Istanbul, Turkey, in December 2015. The former workshop was targeted for the Egyptian government and chemical industry, and the latter one for the Iraqi government and chemical industry. Extremely interesting 3-4 days in both workshops, with great audiences and co-speakers / co-facilitators. In both workshops I gave presentations e.g. on FP7-project CORE / dangerous goods tracking, and on Dow Chemical supply chain security – thanks again to Ms. Antonella Di Fazio of Telespazio and Dr. Toni Mannisto of CBRA for co-producing these presentations. What is the current status of CSP regarding these countries today, if I may ask?

Thank you again for your participation in these workshops, Juha. We all appreciated you sharing your experience in chemical supply chain and transportation security.

We have continued work with our partners in Egypt on chemical supply chain security. CRDF Global, the Federation of Egyptian Industries’ Environmental Compliance Office (FEI-ECO) and the Federation of Egyptian Industries’ Chamber of Chemical Industries (CCI) held an event in December, also sponsored by CSP, which convened 170 government, industry and academia representatives from Egypt’s chemical sector to highlight Egypt’s achievements in securing the chemical supply chain and identify further steps required to secure their chemicals in transit. FEI-ECO and CCI are also working to provide technical guidance and support for Egyptian chemical companies to adopt Responsible Care®, an international voluntary chemical management initiative developed by the chemical industry to help chemical companies operate safely, securely and profitably.

In Iraq, CRDF Global and CSP have continued to work closely with a variety of partners from across the chemical and security communities. Most recently in April, with sponsorship from CSP, CRDF Global implemented the 1^st National Chemical and Biological Security Coordination Conference in Baghdad. The conference convened Iraqi government, security, industrial, and academic sectors to discuss national efforts, interagency coordination, and best practices to counter chemical and biological proliferation in Iraq.

Any plans in 2016 to organize similar workshops in the MENA region?

We will continue to work with our international partners, including in the MENA region, in 2016. As the world becomes more connected, we will continue to focus on securing the chemical supply chain. Many of our partners have also identified chemical ground transportation security as an area of particular interest. We look forward to working with technical experts like CBRA and leaders from chemical communities worldwide to enhance global chemical security.

Thanks a lot Dace for this interview – and hope to meet you soon again, at one the upcoming missions / workshops! Juha

Hold on, before blaming it on the OGAs!

April 27, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Analytic, Blog, CBRA, Coordinated border management, Counterfeiting, Customs, Cybercrime, Dangerous goods, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, Environmental crime, Exporter, Global, High-taxed goods, Importer, Other-cluster, Perishable goods, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Restricted goods, Risk-cluster, Strategic goods, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Trafficking, Transport security agency, WP19 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

It is common since many years already that the global customs community is pointing their “blaming finger” to other government agencies – OGAs – when it comes to identifying root causes behind too long cargo release times at sea ports and other border crossing points, high costs for importers and exporters to conduct international trade, and so forth. Now, without denying this as a plausible scenario, the CBRA research team proposes to take one step backwards, by first building a solid framework for analyzing and deeply understanding what is actually happening at the borders with Customs and all the other agencies, before rushing to conclusions on “who is to be blamed for poor / expensive cross-border performance…”. Therefore – for both educational purposes (FP7-CORE, work package 19.1) and for analytical purposes (Border Agency Cooperation study with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, OIC), we have produced the following “universal border control task list” – naturally understanding that a perfect single universal list cannot exist. The list is first exploited during April-May 2016 in the OIC Embassy survey (here in Switzerland), to explore who is responsible for specific cross-border controls in various OIC member countries, and to what extent customs is performing tasks on behalf of other (border) agencies. Later, we plan to use the this as a “de-facto border agency control check-list” in our future studies, across the globe.

Again, the first step before analyzing which agencies to blame, is all about understanding what are the typical cross-border control tasks all about, considering all three task categories:

Border control tasks which typically cover all commodities;
Border control tasks which typically focus on specific commodities; and
Other border agency control areas.

Now, lets go through all three of them, starting with the first one, and followed by the other two:

Border control tasks which typically cover all commodities:

Calculation and collection of indirect border taxes:
- customs duties
- sales / value added taxes
- excise taxes
Calculation and collection of other import/ transit/ export fees and taxes (e.g. environmental fee at export)
Compilation of trade statistics

Border control tasks which typically focus on specific commodities:

Control of import quota restricted products
Calculation and granting of export subsidies
Control of product safety / conformity of goods / trading standards (please separate agencies per product category, if necessary)
Control of food, drinks, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals (including for general health and safety purposes)
Control of energy related materials / products (e.g. oil and coal, could be for export taxation purposes etc.)
Enforcement of intellectual property rights / fight against copyright infringements / anti-counterfeit
Control of plant diseases, pests and extraneous species (i.e., phytosanitary controls)
Animal quarantine and controls (i.e. veterinary controls, including pet controls)
Control of any biohazards (including deliberate ones)
Control of CITES protected species (i.e. endangered fauna and flora)
Control of natural resources under license requirements, harvesting quotas etc. (including specific fish, wood, minerals, diamonds etc.)
Control of cultural artifacts (stolen / looted, and/or illicitly traded)
Control of any stolen goods (including vehicles, machinery, cargo etc.)
Fight against drugs / illicit narcotics trafficking (including pre-cursors)
Control of waste flows (including those in the Basel Convention on transboundary movements)
Control of dual use / strategic goods
Control of dangerous goods / hazardous materials
Control of explosives and weapons:
- explosives (including pre-cursors)
- small arms and light weapons
- defense / war materials
Control of nuclear and radioactive materials

Other border agency control areas:

Conveyance / cargo transport security and safety controls:
- for maritime, including sea ports
- for aviation, including airports
- other modes: road, rail, inland waterways etc.
Traveler, crew and immigration controls:
- visa and passport controls
- trafficking of human beings and people smuggling
- asylum seekers
- passenger cars and vehicles in terms of temporary admission
Control of weight of cargo (including for road safety purposes)
Cash controls (cash smuggling and counterfeit currency)
Cyber security (customs and supply chain IT systems, critical infrastructure IT etc.)

Dear CBRA Blog and CBRA Monthly readers: we kindly invite your inputs to make the list more comprehensive / better in the future, so please send us an email with your ideas, to cbra@cross-border.org . And thanks already now to the multiple experts from national Customs administrations and international organizations for your valuable help so far– it has been great working with you on all these studies, keeping them as pragmatic as possible… (detailed acknowledgements will be published later). And it goes without saying that soon we will start looking on the next-step aspects on customs versus other government agencies, in the context cross-border supply chain costs and delays – please stay tuned for more!

A Decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight, 2015 (CORE1113)

April 22, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, All transport modes, Authorized Economic Operator, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Corruption, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Data quality, Data sharing, Document forgery, Dual-use goods, EU, GAO, ISO28000, IT, Known Consignor, Mutual Recognition Agreement, Optimization, Police, Prohibited goods, Regulated Agent, Restricted goods, Risk management, Scanning, Scientific, Screening, Strategic goods, Supply chain security, TAPA, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Tracking, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, Transport security agency, Trusted Trader, USA, Violence, WP1, WP17, WP19, WP2 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent government watchdog organization that has been publishing many reports on the US government’s supply chain security initiatives over the past ten years. This article reviews 25 most relevant GAO’s reports that discuss strengths, weaknesses and future challenges of the US policies and regulations on supply chain security. The review findings reveal interesting facts about similarities and differences of the US and the EU approaches to supply chain security. This comparison opens new venues for further Transatlantic benchmarking as well as harmonisation and mutual recognition of supply chain security programs. This review was conducted as part of European FP7-Project CORE. The reviewed document is available for download here: https://hicl.org. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: The GAO reports suggest that the US administration has been struggling with effective performance monitoring and auditing of its supply chain security initiatives. The reports indicate that there is some confusion about costs of security initiatives for the government and for the business community. There is also a lack of common understanding about the actual benefits of many of these programs. The GAO reports also urge US government officials to adopt risk-based approach to supply chain security, for example to use information and intelligence to assess risk levels of specific shipments, people, trading companies, and other entities, and then employ security solutions that are commensurate to the risk level. The GAO reports also emphasize the importance of involving the industry in the process of defining new policies and regulations.

Altogether, the review team found that the GAO documents are not only highly relevant for SCS management and governance but also of high quality. The study concludes that it might be useful for the EU to establish a quality-assurance organization similar to the US GAO. This new EU body would oversee spending of the EU and its member states on supply chain security programs and projects and this way improve efficiency of such investments.

Reference: Männistö, T., and Hintsa J., (2015), “A Decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight,” Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference in Logistics (HICL), September 24-25, 2015, Hamburg

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Integrated Border Management Strategy in Croatia, April 2005 (CORE2012)

March 30, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, Analytic, CBRA, Coordinated border management, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Data sharing, Demo-cluster, Dual-use goods, EU, Hijacking, Human trafficking, International governmental organization, Prohibited goods, Restricted goods, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Strategic goods, Supply chain security, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, WCO, WP1, WP10, WP11, WP2, WP3 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: An Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy was written in Croatia in accordance with the guidelines of the European Union and in collaboration with international experts. This strategy and its implementation action plan was adopted by the Croatian government on the 21 April 2005. The reviewed document is available for download at: Strategy for Integrated Border Management (Croatia).

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Full review: The main objective of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy is to provide effective support for economic development of the country and to raise the standard of living of citizens. The strategy also seeks to protect life and health of people and their property from cross-border crime. Integrated Border Management requires participation of many government agencies, including border police, customs, border veterinary service, border phytosanitary service, border sanitary service and the state inspectorate. Many times also state authorities in charge of culture, mining and radiation protection contribute to the IBM Strategy formulation and implementation.

As part of the Strategy, the Croatian government created a new interdepartmental working group. The primary objective was to facilitate cross-border traffic through reduction overlapping border control activities. The working group eliminated duplicate processes by aligning responsibilities of border control agencies and by exploiting the time of the relevant synergies between relevant governmental bodies. The working group launched initiatives in following areas:

Delegation of power from one border control authority;
Information sharing (apart from Single Window);
Coordination of passenger and crew movements;
Joint controls Joint controls (including joint examinations); and
Coordination of law enforcement activities.

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FP7-CORE Education – Two new diagrams

March 10, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, Blog, CBRA, Corruption, Counterfeiting, Customs, Customs risks, Cybercrime, Demo-cluster, Document forgery, Dual-use goods, Environmental agency, Environmental crime, Exporter, Express courier, Fraud, Freight forwarder, Global, Hijacking, Human trafficking, Identity theft, Importer, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Money laundry, Other-cluster, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Prohibited goods, Restricted goods, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Shipper, Socio-economic impacts, Strategic goods, Supply chain security, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, Violence, Warehouse keeper, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP3, WP4, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Today’s CBRA Blog presents two new diagrams which have been recently designed and developed in the context of FP7-CORE Education and training work (Work package 19.1). The information visualized in the diagram is based on CBRA’s supply chain security research work since year 2001, particularly from the past 5-6 years.

Some background information on the first diagram of crime types in global supply chains has been presented before for example in CBRA’s Blog of 13 October 2014 – Crime taxonomies from Athens. In the center of this diagram we list the crime types – including document fraud and cybercrime – which in the supply chain criminal context are performed in order to succeed with the actual economic or ideological crime, e.g. cargo theft or terrorism.

The left area of the circle lists four examples of crime types, which typically are of primary concern for supply chain companies: cargo theft, sabotage, parallel trade and product specification fraud. With such crime types it is commonly up to the companies to prevent, to detect and to react – of course, law enforcement agencies can be called for any time there is reasonable suspicion of such activities (and naturally in certain cases the government agencies may even be the first ones to detect and react, e.g. in case of armed robberies and truck hijackings).

The right area of the circle deals with supply chain incidents where the authorities typically focus on prevention, detection and reaction: fraud in indirect border taxes; trafficking / violations in cross-border restrictions and prohibitions; human trafficking; and exploitation of illicit labor. From supply chain perspective one can characterize them as “a priori non-disruptive illegal activities – only if / after authorities detect the violations, the supply chain is disrupted and the involved supply chain companies can get in trouble”.

Lastly, on the bottom area of the circle, we list four supply chain crime areas where the prevention typically is in strong interest of both supply chain companies and governmental agencies – and, the detection and (instant) reaction varies on case-by-case basis: counterfeiting, sales channel violations, sea piracy and terrorism. Counterfeiting hits revenues on both sides of the equation, and, with many products can also be health damaging or even lethal. Not having proper sales licenses, and/or selling to unauthorized buyers – for example cigarettes and alcohol, dual use and strategic goods etc. – can again harm both the involved companies and the society as a whole. And of course, sea pirates hijacking cargo ships; bombs exploding and bringing planes down; and terrorists attacking critical supply chain infrastructures, all are in the best interest of both companies and government agencies to prevent, to detect, and to react – in the fastest and most effective possible manner.

The second new educational diagram below depicts the negative socio-economic impact areas – six in total – caused by twelve typical smuggling and trafficking activities. The data behind it has been presented before e.g. in CBRA’s Blog of 14 January 2015 – Socio-economic damages. Inside the square we present the six societal impact areas – the larger the area, the more links there are between the trafficking activities and the negative impacts. As an example of a “big area”, seven different types of trafficking typically lead into increasing market place distortions and/or unfair competition. In the other extreme, only trafficking in stolen cultural products leads to losses in cultural heritage.

That’s all for the CBRA Blog today – please let us know if you see this type of visualization as beneficial when teaching and learning about the big picture of supply chain security! Thanks, Juha Hintsa ( email: cbra@cross-border.org )

Criminalization of global supply chains, by Mr. Hamon

February 4, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, CBRA, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Cybersecurity, Dual-use goods, Global, Interviews, Manufacturer, Money laundry, Organized crime groups, Other-cluster, Police, Prohibited goods, Restricted goods, Risk-cluster, Shipper, Strategic goods, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, Violence, WP17, WP3, WP4 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Hi David, and thanks for joining a CBRA Interview – can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I served in the US Army as a logistician, served with the United Nations Peacekeeping Department as well as work with the UN humanitarian organizations. I recently retired from a not-for-profit government contractor to pursue more creative work. Whilst at the latter position I was seconded to the US Defense Department, first in African Affairs, and then as Research and Studies Director for a strategic studies office within a US Defense Agency. I currently work, mostly independently, on a great many things related to future threats and re-defining of security/stability as it pertains and impacts diplomacy, development, defense, society, and economics/finance.

We met first time in Lausanne, Switzerland, around 2005 – what was that roundtable event again about?

Many years before cyber based terror threats were on the radar, we launched an inquiry into what we termed “Economic/Financial Terrorism” and whether security threats emanating from terrorism in the future would take the form of attacks on the Western system of finance and the economy. We brought in a host of experts from the US and Europe to debate the changing face of terrorism and likely goals of future terror groups. We examined everything from evolving ideology, motivation and intent, culture and identity to strategy, tactics, targets, weapons, and groups. It was an extremely interesting event with industry admitting – at the time – they were not prepared for this phenomenon and governments largely split on the issue. Additionally, experts and think tanks disagreed on whether economic terrorism was tangible. It was very forward-looking for its time. All participants came away with greater awareness on the subject as we went above and beyond what is currently called “financial crimes,” exploring potential kinetic based threats terror groups would use against the economic and financial machinery that included physical attacks on the supply chain, tourist industry, psychological undermining of the Western economic system to disrupt the normal provision of goods and services.

Can you tell more about your views on ´criminalization of global supply chains´?

I take similar views on the subject as Dr. Moisés Naim, in his 2005 book ‘Illicit: How smugglers, traffickers, and copycats are hijacking the global economy.’ He addresses several tenants that remain true today including the role of governments, technology, the Illicit traders mimicking licit trade and logistics actors – while simultaneously collaborating with many of them, and criminal groups seek high-profit opportunities as opposed to any other attribution (see CBRA Blog 21 October 2014). Terror groups care less about profit but when thinking about logistics networks, what if the two groups collaborated? Today logistics systems are more complex and move faster than ever in history, have less margin to fail, are far less ‘hands-on’ and offer many ways and places to hide illegal activity. Detection and interdiction of this activity isn’t exclusively in the realm of governments. Industry has a role to play if it wishes to minimize new regulations, taxes, deter corruption, and other drains on efficiency and profit. Experts, both public and private, rarely take a systems approach to detecting criminal activity with much throughput going undetected. Both parties want to specialize on one aspect and miss the big picture. A good example was the AQ Khan network. How long has it been since industry has undertaken an assessment of whether there is a new “Khan” network out there? Do trade organizations war-game with governments on criminality within supply chains?

Interesting! What are your views on ‘multi-commodity trafficking / crime portfolios’?

At the last corporate organization where I worked my team did some analysis on unregulated, illegal fishing as a security threat to Pacific Island nations. In the course of this analysis, we discovered it was the same actors doing the illegal fishing as doing illegal dumping, illegal smuggling, illegal trafficking, among other illicit activities. The criminality was only one aspect of the supply chain as the “demand” side as well as the delivery side was entirely legal and within businesses who conduct practically all business legally. The same boats as platforms – and their crews – were used to conduct all activity legal and illegal and to the local authorities – as well as donor nations attempting to help – it was impossible to project accurately when the activity would switch between licit and illicit. We couldn’t analyze if this was a regional or global phenomena but I guess it was a widely copied practice. As Anthony Barone has pointed out, border management and controls are not the panacea of containment but need to be part of a larger practice (see CBRA Interview 18 December 2015). Criminals use technology just as effectively! His idea of assembling a group of independent experts to rethink new approaches to border management – and I might add, redefining the meaning of borders and how thinking differently about borders per se – is a good start. Using strategic foresight come up with several alternative futures to present to a dedicated [supply chain] private-public partnership empowered to make changes would be my overarching recommendation

Sounds that the global supply chain community is facing increasingly more threats and risks! Any other suggestions on how to improve the situation, both short term and long term?

In the short term, as I mentioned, conduct a public-private-partnership exercise to rethink the concept supply chain surveillance for illicit activity and anticipating new and emerging illicit activity. In the long run, we don’t give enough thought to knowledge as a part of the supply chain. Using the supply chain for illicit activity begins with motivation and intent getting out in front of those who may do harm. To address alternative futures will take some innovation and creativity, but the stakes are high. The next AQ Khan Network may bring very bad things into Europe (and beyond!) compliments of ISIS. We don’t know what knowledge the current refugee population possesses that may be part of some future attack on the financial and economic system of the EU or if some refugees worked on chemical or biological programs in their countries of origin.

Thanks David for this interview – and let´s start working towards a joint project on these topics of common professional and research interest!

Web-links:

https://www.cross-border.org/2014/10/21/dr-naim-on-illicit-trade/

https://www.cross-border.org/interviews/new-approaches-to-border-management/

Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks (CORE1204)

Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

Interview with Ms. Sarma on the US CSP-program

Hold on, before blaming it on the OGAs!

FP7-CORE Education – Two new diagrams

Criminalization of global supply chains, by Mr. Hamon

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