AVIATION SECURITY – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO 2008 (CORE1067)

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Summary: This GAO report discusses the impact of the 26 billion USD that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent on aviation security since 2004. The report focuses especially on the current status and the future challenges of passenger screening, air cargo security and passenger watch-list matching program known as Secure Flight. The air cargo security discussion is the report’s most relevant section from the CORE’s viewpoint. The information in the report, that has been published as early as July 2008, is anyhow largely outdated: it discusses challenges that TSA and the air cargo community need to overcome before starting the 100% screening of air cargo that flies on board passenger planes, a legal requirement that become into force in August 2010 and that was set by the Implementing Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (aka the 9/11 Act). The report also recommended strengthening the security of US-bound foreign air cargo (into the US from the rest of the world), to bring it on a par with outbound air cargo security (from the US to rest of the world). More recent regulations and initiatives have corrected this weakness in the US air cargo security: today, third country air carriers must screen cargo up to US standards (or national standards if the country of origin and the US recognize each other’s air cargo regimes) before loading cargo on US-bound planes. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1024T.

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Full review: This GAO report provides useful background information about the US air cargo security regime. This information is going to be useful for the CORE demonstration 17.1 that is about time-critical express shipping of military aircraft parts from the US to Spain. In the demonstration, the express operator DHL ships the parts by plane, and thus compliance with the US air cargo security requirements is one of the key themes of this demo. Also WP 1 might use this GAO report to describe evolution of the US air cargo regime over the years. But though this analysis would be interesting, it is not going to be the essential content in the deliverable of the WP1.

 Cross-references:

  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
  • G_A_O_, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Aviation Security – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs.

CORE1067

Additional keywords: Air cargo security, Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO (October 2009, CORE1066)

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Summary: The document provides a comprehensive outlook on the past and recent US initiatives on container security. The report focuses on the challenges that prevent global implementation of the 100% scanning of US-bound containers in foreign ports with both non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection devices, as mandated by the SAFE Port Act and the 9/11 Acts. The 100% scanning is believed to deter and detect terrorist attempts of smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States inside a cargo container. The reports dates back to late 2009, so the description of the current state of the US container security it provides is not necessarily no longer accurate. The report anticipates that the implementation of the 100% scanning requirement will be delayed due to various problems that were identified during the precursory Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilots. These problems are related mainly to port logistics (routing of containers through scanning sites), employee safety (radiation of screening equipment) and technical constraints (equipment failures and poor quality of scanning images). Today, we know that the US authorities have deferred the implementation already twice, first to 2014 and for the second time until 2016. Altogether, this GAO report describes in detail the challenges of the 100% scanning law and elaborates some ongoing alternative risk-based approaches to container security: (1) the strategic trade lane strategy that aims to establish 100% scanning only in high terrorist risk foreign sea ports and (2) the “10 + 2” data requirements that importers and ocean carriers must submit to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to a container is loaded aboard a US-bound vessel so that the US authorities can calculate more precise risk for each shipping container. This report includes relevant information for all the CORE’s demonstrations that involve US-bound maritime transportation. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-12.

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Full review: The GAO document provides interesting insights on the evolution of the US container security regulations over the years. This is useful supportive information for CORE demonstrations that involve maritime shipping of containers into the US. The GM demonstration of the WP9 for example covers exports of automobile parts from the EU into the US by transatlantic ocean transport. If the US Congress does not repeal or defer the 100% scanning requirement, the port of Felixstove that participates in the demonstration, need to start scanning also all GM’s US-bound containers. Likewise, the FALACUS demo (WP14), which is about shipping of ceramic tiles from Italy to the US, must take into consideration the possible effects of the 100% scanning requirement. This demonstration is particularly interesting from the 100% scanning requirement standpoint because some ceramic tiles are naturally radioactive, and thus they tend to trigger false alarms in the radiation controls. Also the P&G demonstrator in the WP17, that focuses on shipping of consumer goods into the US, the possible impact of the 100% scanning regulation.

Besides the demonstrations, the CORE’s risk cluster might benefit from the detailed analysis of the risk-based approaches to the US container security, such as the strategic trade lane strategy and the “10 + 2” data requirement. All demonstrations might benefit from lessons learnt how GAO has advises DHS and CBP to carry out cost-benefit analyses for the US container security programs (especially the Secure Freight Initiative).

Cross-references:

  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
  • Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
  • Bakshi, N., Flynn, S. E., & Gans, N. (2011). Estimating the operational impact of container inspections at international ports. Management Science, 57(1), 1-.‐‑20.

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2009. Supply Chain Security Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers.

CORE1066

Additional keywords: Ocean transportation, counter-terrorism, non-intrusive inspection

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Review on “MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION – DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity”, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, United States Government Accountability Office, June 2014 (CORE1098)

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CORE1098-Summary: Actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and two of its component agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as other federal agencies, to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment have been limited. Report is available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663828.pdf

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Full review: While the Coast Guard initiated a number of activities and coordinating strategies to improve physical security in specific ports, it has not conducted a risk assessment that fully addresses cyber-related threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Coast Guard officials stated that they intend to conduct such an assessment in the future, but did not provide details to show how it would address cybersecurity. Until the Coast Guard completes a thorough assessment of cyber risks in the maritime environment, the ability of stakeholders to appropriately plan and allocate resources to protect ports and other maritime facilities will be limited.

Maritime security plans required by law and regulation generally did not identify or address potential cyber-related threats or vulnerabilities. This was because the guidance issued by Coast Guard for developing these plans did not require cyber elements to be addressed. Officials stated that guidance for the next set of updated plans, due for update in 2014, will include cybersecurity requirements. However, in the absence of a comprehensive risk assessment, the revised guidance may not adequately address cyber-related risks to the maritime environment.

The degree to which information-sharing mechanisms (e.g., councils) were active and shared cybersecurity-related information varied. Specifically, the Coast Guard established a government coordinating council to share information among government entities, but it is unclear to what extent this body has shared information related to cybersecurity. In addition, a sector coordinating council for sharing information among nonfederal stakeholders is no longer active, and the Coast Guard has not convinced stakeholders to reestablish it. Until the Coast Guard improves these mechanisms, maritime stakeholders in different locations are at greater risk of not being aware of, and thus not mitigating, cyber-based threats.

Under a program to provide security-related grants to ports, FEMA identified enhancing cybersecurity capabilities as a funding priority for the first time in fiscal year 2013 and has provided guidance for cybersecurity-related proposals. However, the agency has not consulted cybersecurity-related subject matter experts to inform the multi-level review of cyber-related proposals—partly because FEMA has downsized the expert panel that reviews grants. Also, because the Coast Guard has not assessed cyber-related risks in the maritime risk assessment, grant applicants and FEMA have not been able to use this information to inform funding proposals and decisions. As a result, FEMA is limited in its ability to ensure that the program is effectively addressing cyber-related risks in the maritime environment.

Why GAO Did This Study? U.S. maritime ports handle more than $1.3 trillion in cargo annually. The operations of these ports are supported by information and communication systems, which are susceptible to cyber-related threats. Failures in these systems could degrade or interrupt operations at ports, including the flow of commerce. Federal agencies—in particular DHS—and industry stakeholders have specific roles in protecting maritime facilities and ports from physical and cyber threats. GAO’s objective was to identify the extent to which DHS and other stakeholders have taken steps to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment. GAO examined relevant laws and regulations; analyzed federal cybersecurity-related policies and plans; observed operations at three U.S. ports selected based on being a high-risk port and a leader in calls by vessel type, e.g. container; and interviewed federal and nonfederal officials.

What GAO Recommends? GAO recommends that DHS direct the Coast Guard to (1) assess cyber-related risks, (2) use this assessment to inform maritime security guidance, and (3) determine whether the sector coordinating council should be reestablished. DHS should also direct FEMA to (1) develop procedures to consult DHS cybersecurity experts for assistance in reviewing grant proposals and (2) use the results of the cyber-risk assessment to inform its grant guidance. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

Full citation:  “MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION – DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity”, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, United States Government Accountability Office, June 2014.

CORE1098

Keywords: Maritime Security, Port Security, Cyber – Security, CBP U.S. – Customs and Border Protection, Coast Guard U.S., DHS-Department of Homeland Security, FEMA-Federal Emergency Management Agency, ISAC-information sharing and analysis center, IT-information technology, MTSA-Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, NIPP-National Infrastructure Protection Plan, AFE Port Act-Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, TSA-Transportation Security Administration

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Review on Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, International Maritime Organization (CORE1097)

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Summary: The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code sets new standards for security for ships at sea as well as port facilities around the world. It aims to make shipping activities more secure against threats of terrorism, piracy and smuggling. Security at sea has been a concern to governments, shipping lines, port authorities and importers and exporters for years. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, provided the catalyst for formalizing tough new security measures. In December of 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) organized a conference to discuss issues related to security at sea. At this conference, representatives from 150 nations (the Contracting Governments) participated in drafting amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, and the ISPS Code was adopted. Changes to the SOLAS Convention include amendments to Chapters V and XI, and Chapter XI was divided into Chapters XI-1 and XI-2. The new Chapter XI-2 provides the umbrella ISPS regulations. The Code itself is divided into two parts. Part A presents mandatory requirements, Part B contains guidance regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the Code. Source document is available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/bestpractices/32.pdf

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Full review: The Code aims, among other things, to establish an international framework for co-operation between Contracting Governments, government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade and to establish relevant roles and responsibilities at the national and international level. ISPS provisions relating to port facilities relate solely to the ship/port interface. Also, ISPS provisions do not extend to the actual response to attacks or to any necessary clear-up activities after such an attack. In addition, for each ship and port authority affected, the ISPS Code requires:

  • The implementation of a Ship Security Plan (SSP),
  • The implementation of a Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP),
  • The appointment of a Ship Security Officer (SSO),
  • The appointment of a Company Security Officer (CSO),
  • The appointment of a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO),
  • The installation of ship alarms, and
  • The installation of shipboard Automatic Identification Systems (AIS).

Enforcement Date: The ISPS Code went into effect on July 1, 2004.

Full citation:   Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, International Maritime Organization. SOLAS/CONF.5/32. 12 December 2002

CORE1097

Keywords: Maritime Security, Port Security, Ship Security Plan (SSP), Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), Ship Security Officer (SSO), Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).

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Review on“Contributing to shipping container security: can passive sensors bring a solution?” G. Janssens-Maenhout a, F. De Roob, W. Janssens, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 2009 (CORE1096)

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Summary: Illicit trafficking of fissionable material in container cargoes is recognized as a potential weakness in Nuclear Security. Triggered by the attacks of 11 September 2001, measures were undertaken to enhance maritime security in extension to the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention and in line with the US Container Security Initiatives. Effective detection techniques are needed that allow the inspector to intercept illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons components or components of other nuclear explosive devices. Report abstract is available at (one can ask for the full report e.g. vie ResearchGate): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/38053693_Contributing_to_shipping_container_security_can_passive_sensors_bring_a_solution

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Full review: Many security measures focus on active interrogation of the container content by X-ray scan, which might be extended with the newly developed tagged neutron inspection system. Both active interrogation techniques can, with the current huge volume of container traffic, only be applied to a limited number of selected containers. The question arises whether a passive detection technique can offer an alternative solution.

This study investigates if containers equipped with a small passive detector will register during transport the neutron irradiation by fissionable material such as plutonium in a measurable way. In practice, 4/5 of the containers are about 1/8 filled with hydrogenous material and undergo a typical 2 months route. For this reference case, it was found that the most compatible passive detector would be an activation foil of iridium. Monte-Carlo simulations showed that for the reference case the activity of a 250 μm thin foil with 6 cm2 cross-section would register 1.2 Bq when it is irradiated by a significant quantity of Reactor-Grade PuO2. However this activity drops with almost two orders of magnitude for other fillings and other isotopic compositions and forms of the Pu-source. The procedure of selecting the target material for Pu detection is detailed with the theoretical methods, in order to be useful for other applications. Moreover the value of such additional passive sensors for securing maritime container transport is situated within the global framework of the First, Second and Third Line of Defense against illicit trafficking.

Full citation:   G. Janssens-Maenhout a, F. De Roob, W. Janssens (2009). Contributing to shipping container security: can passive sensors bring a solution?” Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 101(2):95-105 · OCTOBER 2009.

Keywords: Nuclear illicit trafficking, Maritime container transport, Passive detection technique

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Introduction to Supply Chain Management (CASSANDRA Compendium Chapter 2, CORE2007a)

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Summary

The second chapter of the CASSANDRA compendium gives a general outlook on the theory and practice of modern supply chain management. Written in lay-man’s language, the text explains a broad range of strategies for managing supply chains, from lean management to agile and responsive logistics. The chapter also defines fundamental supply chain terminology and discusses current trends in the logistics, including synchromodality, use of 4PL logistics service providers, and green logistics. The chapter introduces several supply chain reference frameworks that illustrate a series of interdependent activities and stakeholders involved in the international transport of cargo. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download here.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

The compendium summarizes the SCOR and UN/CEFACT supply chain models, that may be the two most used logistics reference frameworks in the world. The document also discusses less known academic conceptual models that seek to simplify the complexity of supply chain management by categorizing and explaining management strategies, activities, stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities. The section on the future trends in logistics offers a great outlook on the most likely changes and driving forces in the logistics industry. The outlook suggests that for example synchromodality (increased flexibility in transport mode selection), green logistics (less emissions), use of 4PL logistics service providers (outsourced supply chain management), and continuously increasing ship and port sizes will reshape the cross-border logistics over the years. The document also explains key CASSANDRA concepts and their impacts on international supply chain management. For instance, the Data Pipeline, a pivotal CASSANDRA concept, seeks to enhance sharing of information across supply chain stakeholders, in particularly from business operators to customs and other border control authorities. Most importantly, the Data Pipeline would allow customs officers to access commercial information, that normally is exchanged only between buyers and sellers, early in the upstream supply chain at the consignment completion point (CCP). This accurate, early commercial information would enable the customs and other border control agencies to assess security and other risks of cargo early on.

All in all, the document provides a crash refresher course on basic and advanced logistics terminology that would be beneficial for many the CORE consortium, especially for those partners whose expertise is mainly outside the logistics industry. The CORE demonstrators benefit from descriptions of CASSANDRA innovations that support information exchange and improve visibility across the supply chain. The demos might choose to reuse some of these CASSANDRA innovations or their components. The CASSANDRA compendium also contains a great deal of material that could be reused for education and training purposes in CORE (WP19). Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations that are relevant also for CORE. The chapter recommends, for example, that because of broad variety of international supply chains, CASSANDRA solutions should be adaptable for different contexts.

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapter 2

CORE2007

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Chemical Security in Istanbul

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2015-12-15 09.02.08I had the most interesting week in Istanbul with the Iraqi government representatives, chemical sector companies and the US State Department Chemical Security Program, CSP.

Security in the chemical supply chain is a major challenge for government agencies and chemical supply chain companies across the globe, including those in the Middle-East and North African (MENA) region. Theft, diversion, trafficking, export violations, counterfeit chemicals, sabotage and terrorism – among other criminal threats – keep the agencies and companies constantly on their toes when considering how to best tackle the vulnerabilities and threats in their respective chemical supply chains.

This was my second time to join as an external expert in a Chemical Security Program (CSP) event in the MENA region. The first time was in Hurghada, Egypt, in March 2015 – thanks again to Professor Andrew Thomas, the Chief Editor of the Journal of Transportation Security, for hooking me up with CRDF Global and the US State Department on this. Now the four day event targeted for the relevant Iraqi government agencies as well as the Iraqi chemical sector companies was held in Istanbul, Turkey, on 14-17 December 2015.

We had a fully packed agenda: Day 1 consisted of several introductory and state-of-play speeches by the workshop facilitators and by Iraqi experts, the latter group sharing key governmental, industry and academic perspectives to the chemical security progress in Iraq.  Day 2 started with a case study presentation on “Post-2001 supply chain security developments at Dow Chemicals”, followed by private-public partnership considerations in chemical supply chain security. During the afternoon of day 2, two more presentations were given on potential threats to materials of interest, as well as on site-physical security. Day 3 started with presentations on international transport of dangerous goods and security rules, followed later by presentations on export control and border security issues, as well as risk assessment methodological aspects.

Interactive sessions, group exercises and other discussions were vivid throughout the four days. On day 1, the main interactive session was about government-industry coordination. On day 2, the focus shifted to identifying key players in Iraqi chemical supply chain security, as well as exploring private sector specific chemical security issues. On day 3, a major interactive session took place to recognize existing vulnerabilities and threats in the chemical supply chain, as well as to identify appropriate countermeasures and other possible means of improvement. And finally, on day 4, a draft table of content for a potential “Iraqi chemical supply chain security master plan and implementation roadmap” was produced in a highly interactive manner, followed ultimately by drafting some actual planning content in areas including chemical transport security and raising security awareness.

The actual workshop outcomes and possible follow-up actions will be worked upon later by the organizing team and some key participants. In the meanwhile, I want to express my warmest thanks for this opportunity and great on-site collaboration in Istanbul to: Ms. Shawn Garcia from the U.S. Department of State, Chemical Security Program (DOS/CSP); Ms. Pelin Kavak and Mr. Nidal Abu Sammour from CRDF Global, US / Jordan; and Dr. Caner Zanbak and Mr. Mustafa Bagan from the Turkish Chemical Manufacturers Association (TCMA). Hope to meet you again in 2016 in Iraq, Algeria and possibly other locations in the MENA region!

 

Cheers, Juha Hintsa

P.S. We also tested two CBRA frameworks / models – CBRA SCS15/16, and CBRA-BAC-Actions and beneficiaries – with the audience during the Istanbul week. Both of them were well perceived, and will be topics for CBRA Blog during the coming couple of months. (SCS = Supply Chain Security, and BAC = Border Agency Cooperation).

PPS. Last but not least I would like to thank Ms. Antonella Di Fazio of Telespazio, Italy, and FP7-project CORE, for excellent inputs on transport of dangerous goods, traceability and monitoring solutions, demonstrators, and practical experiences.

Trade and money laundering uncontained (the Economist, May 2014, CORE2006)

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Summary

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls.

The new methods for cross-border money laundering and tax evasion concern most CORE demonstrations, especially those involving international cargo movements. The emerging risk of trade-based money laundering calls for new and more effective enforcement of trade transactions. CORE is developing new solutions (e.g., data pipeline and system-based supervision) for capturing and sharing trade information across logistics operators and law enforcement agencies. The new solutions likely improve law enforcement’s capability to detect suspicious trade transactions that may have something to do with the trade-based money laundering. However, building such capability requires IT integration (e.g., interoperability), risk awareness and education and training. CORE consortium addresses these complementary activities in work carried out in risk, IT and educational clusters.

Reference

Trade and money laundering uncontained, the Economist, May 3rd 2014

CORE2006

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Drug trafficking in the Caribbean – the Full circle (the Economist May 2014, CORE2005)

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Summary

Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route to the strengthened enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. The South American cocaine smuggling routes have displaced several times over the years due, and now again the Caribbean route is the same one than traffickers used two decades ago. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.

The drug traffickers move significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes, sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route strengthened law enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. Because traffickers prefer smuggling routes that offer the highest profit-to-risk ratios, the South American cocaine smuggling networks are evolving constantly. Routes have displaced several times over the years, and now the route is again the same than two decades ago.

Today, traffickers move again significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes and sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe.  The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.

Trends of international drug trafficking often influence intensity of law enforcement efforts in global supply chains. Thus, changes in South American drug trafficking may affect also the two CORE trade lanes that import goods from the region into Europe, (1) imports of fresh cut flowers from Colombia to the Netherlands (WP11) and (2) imports of coffee and cocoa beans from South America to Europe (WP13). These trade lanes may become subject to more intense anti-drug controls over the following years. Besides the CORE demo cluster, also the CORE risk cluster benefit from the insight this article provides on the recent trends in routes, volumes and methods of the South American drug trafficking. This information may be useful for CORE’s activities that are developing educational and training material.

Reference

Drug trafficking in the Caribbean – the Full circle, the Economist, May 24th 2014

CORE2005

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Punta Cana Resolution, Resolution of the Policy Commission of the World Customs Organization on the Role of Customs in the Security Context, WCO 2015 (CORE2004)

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The new Punta Cana Resolution sets guidelines for customs’ security roles in the combat against the new wave of terrorism, as manifested by recent attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, France and Mali. The resolution highlights that the customs authorities are typically the first line of defense against transnational crime, terrorism and extremism: the customs control cross-border movements of people, cargo, money and modes of transport and thus protect communities against terrorists that may exploit international supply chains to move materials, funds or operatives across borders. Building on the previous WCO instruments and agreements, especially on the WCO Security Programme, the Punta Cana resolution is the customs community’s action plan and renewed pledge of solidarity that provides a diplomatic backdrop for further counterterrorism activities. More information at: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2015/december/wco-issues-the-punta-cana-resolution.aspx

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Full review

The new Punta Cana Resolution sets guidelines for customs’ security roles in the combat against the new wave of terrorism, as manifested by recent attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, France and Mali. The resolution highlights that the customs authorities are typically the first line of defense against transnational crime, terrorism and extremism: the customs control cross-border movements of people, cargo, money and modes of transport and thus protect communities against terrorists that may exploit international supply chains to move materials, funds or operatives across borders. Building on the previous WCO instruments and agreements, especially on the WCO Security Programme, the Punta Cana resolution is the customs community’s action plan and renewed pledge of solidarity that provides a diplomatic backdrop for further counterterrorism activities.

The Punta Cana resolution encourages customs administrations worldwide to intensify collaboration within the customs community and with other border control agencies, both domestically and internationally. In case of missing or obsolete counter-terrorism strategy, the resolution urges customs to add new security roles in their mandates and activities. The Punta Cana document also recommends customs to pay close regard to the WCO’s previous agreements and instruments, such as the WCO Compliance and Enforcement Package, SAFE Framework of Standards and the WCO Security Programme. At more practical level, the resolution promotes the use of the full range of modern detection and investigation techniques, especially advance risk profiling on the basis of Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). The resolution also calls governments from around the world to provide necessary financial and human support so that their national customs administrations can contribute towards the goals of the WCO Security Programme.

The Punta Cana Resolution informs CORE consortium about the changing risk landscape where the threat of transnational terrorism is high again. The Resolution also reminds the CORE’s risk cluster of the three cornerstones of effective border security management: collaboration, technology and human resources. The Punta Cana document also gives an overlook on the customs’ security priorities over the following years. For example, the global customs community will likely invest a great deal of time and money to develop new risk profiling systems that tap into new data sources such as the Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). The same trend towards better risk profiling is likely to define also the future cargo security efforts at the borders.

Reference: WCO, 2015. Punta Cana Resolution, Resolution of the Policy Commission of the World Customs Organization on the Role of Customs in the Security Context.

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