AVIATION SECURITY – Progress Made, but Challenges Persist in Meeting the Screening Mandate for Air Cargo, GAO, March 2011 (CORE1062)

Summary: This GAO report reviews the recent progress of the US air cargo security scheme. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the main agency responsible for the US air cargo security, has been working towards the implementation of the 100% screening requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. So far TSA has set up a voluntary Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) to allow trusted logistics operators to screen air cargo outside congested airports, launched a program for testing technologies for air cargo screening and expanding its program for approving explosive detection dog teams. The main obstacle in meeting the 100% screening requirement is that TSA has no reliable mechanism for verifying screening data from domestic foreign screening operators, which self-report the data. TSA also struggles in finding resources to employ as many transport security inspectors as it is required to oversee the Certified Cargo Screening Program. The report also points out that the current technologies that TSA has approved for cargo screening cannot screen large cargo units – pallets or unit loading devices (ULDs) – and this incapability reduces speed and cost-efficiency of air cargo screening. Overall, this GAO document provides a general outlook on state and challenges the US air cargo security regime, and therefore those CORE demonstrations that focus on the US-bound or US-origin air transport should consider the report as a key source material. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/130/125678.pdf.

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Full review: This document is relevant for the CORE demonstrations that involve air transportation into or through or from the US. Especially the DHL demo, that concentrates on shipping of military aircraft parts from the US to Spain, is affected by the TSA’s programs and initiatives that the report analyses. The report is very concise and informative, so it might be beneficial to the CORE’s educational and training activities.

Cross-references:

  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).

Additional keywords: Air cargo security, 100% screening, Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress Made, but further actions needed to secure the maritime energy supply, GAO, August 2011 (CORE1061)

Summary: The GAO report discusses actions the US Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have taken to strengthen security of energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure – that produces, transports, or receives oil and natural gas – from terrorist attacks. The report’s key recommendation is that the Coast Guard need to assess risks to all offshore facilities in the US territorial waters, to improve emergency response plans in case of oil spills and to design performance measures for emergency response activities. This GAO document focuses on a rather narrow field of critical infrastructure, the US maritime energy infrastructure, which is not in the CORE’s scope. The CORE’s risk cluster might consider useful the description how the Coast Guard has applied its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) to determine risk of the US maritime energy infrastructure. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d11883t.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO document is not very relevant to CORE because of its topic (the US maritime energy infrastructure) that is not within the CORE’s scope. Even so, the risk cluster, the IT cluster and the demonstrations on maritime transport might consider useful of the insight this report offers on security risk assessment.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan And Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
  • Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed. GAO-11-153R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Additional keywords: Critical infrastructure protection (CIP), maritime security and security of supply

 

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PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM, Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO, November 2011 (CORE1060)

Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has granted almost 1.7 billion USD to port security through the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The program is administered by a component agency of DHS, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This GAO reports highlights some problems that the grant program has encountered. The first issue is that the risk assessment the FEMA uses to assess risk levels and assign grants to different ports does not take into account how security improvements affect the vulnerability of the ports to terrorist attacks. The report recommends the FEMA to design a vulnerability index that accounts for security improvement and to coordinate with the Coast Guard to get access to the most accurate vulnerability and threat information. The second issue with the grant program is that much of the grant money does not get used and translate into practical port security projects. The GAO report proposes acceleration of the grant granting process with updated administrative procedures and with more administrative staff.  Finally, this GAO report recommends the FEMA to develop performance metrics to assess its administration in relation to the Port Security Grant Program. The contents of this GAO report is not very relevant to CORE because no US seaports are partners in the project. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf.

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Full review: This document has only a limited relevance for CORE because the consortium does not involve any US seaport operators. The demonstrations of WP9 and WP14 that cover shipping of goods from and into the US through local seaports might find it useful to learn about how US ports can apply for funds to improve the security. Otherwise, other demonstrations do not benefit much of this information. However, the CORE’s risk cluster can benefit from the rather detailed description of the risk analysis model in the report’s Appendix II.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan And Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
  • Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed. GAO-11-153R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Additional keywords: Critical infrastructure protection (CIP), maritime security and security of supply, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)

 

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Needs to Enhance Its Guidance and Oversight of High-Risk Maritime Cargo Shipments, GAO, January 2015 (CORE1059)

Summary: The report reviews the US Customs and Border Protection’s (CPB) approach to risk assessment and targeting of maritime shipping containers. The report’s highlights that CPB does not have clear decision rules and reporting procedures to monitor percentage of containers that the risk assessment system flags high-risk and that get eventually examined. The source of this problem is that the CPB’s officials (targeters) may waive examination of the high-risk containers if the container (i) falls within a predetermined category (standard exception), or (ii) the targeters can articulate why the shipment should not be considered high risk. The targeting units have currently differing definitions of “standard exceptions” and differing views on what constitutes the “articulate reasons.” The GAO report recommends the CPB to clarify, harmonize and enforce the rules and the procedures for waiving the high-risk containers from examination. As for CORE, this report provides a detailed and recent outlook on the US maritime risk assessment and targeting scheme, and this information is going to support work of the CORE’s risk cluster and the demonstrations that involve shipping of sea containers into the US. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/670/668098.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO reports contains crucial information about the US risk assessment and container targeting systems that benefit the CORE’s risk cluster. The report outlines principles, procedures, datasets and scanning methods that constitute the world’s most advanced risk assessment system for maritime shipping containers. The CORE’s IT cluster might also benefit from the report’s description of the CPB’s Automated Targeting System (ATS) that is used to compute risk scores for shipping containers and flag the ones with the highest score as high-risk. Regarding the CORE demonstrations, the GM demon (WP19) must comply with data requirements (24-hour rule and the “10+2” rule) that enable the US risk assessment and targeting system. Also the demos involving customs controls, especially WP11.2 and WP10.1, may learn something from the ways how the US border control authorities are assessing risk levels of incoming containers.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System. GAO-13-9. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.
  • Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders. GAO-14-196T. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2013.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.

Additional keywords: Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements (known as the 10+2 rule), 24-hour rule, risk assessment

 

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TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING – Stakeholder Satisfaction Varies; TSA Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Efforts, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1020)

Summary: This report presents and discuses findings of a survey on stakeholders’ satisfaction to the US Transportation Security Administration’s security-related activities and to the way the TSA disseminates information about its activities. The survey’s scope is the overall US transportation system, covering aviation, rail, and highway modalities and transport of passengers and freight. Given the broad scope and the US-centricity of the survey, this report is not very relevant for CORE. The education and training cluster could anyhow learn how security-related user satisfaction surveys are done and how to establish a mechanism for collecting regular user feedback. The report is available for download at: http://gao.gov/assets/670/664350.pdf.

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Full review: The scope of the report is very broad and the information about cargo security is limited, so the CORE project cannot much benefit from this report. However, the project’s educational and training cluster might use the report’s information to design ways administer end-user surveys: what questions to ask, which stakeholders to survey and how to report the findings. Some demonstrations adopt some of the report’s ideas and methods to collect high-quality user requirements.

Additional keywords: Transportation security, aviation security

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security Programs, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1019)

Summary: The report provides a comprehensive review of progress and challenges of various port security activities and programs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has carried out since 9/11. In essence, the report is a summary and an update of a number of more detailed GAO reports on maritime supply chain security. The report states that needs to strengthen further its efforts on maritime domain awareness through intensified communication among maritime stakeholders. Regarding the US domestic port security, the report recommends DHS to reassess its Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) that allows ports to request funds for security projects and to improve quality of vulnerability assessment in US ports. The report also urges DHS to overcome challenges of risk-based targeting and scanning of US-bound shipping containers.  The findings and recommendations of this report help CORE consortium understand the current state of the US maritime security regime. This understanding benefits particularly the demonstrations of WP9 and WP14. Also educational and training as well as risk clusters of CORE may find the report’s information useful. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/670/663784.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO document summarizes the US maritime supply chain security and provides useful information for the CORE project across its work packages. This information most obviously benefits WP9 and WP14 that involve US-bound maritime trade lanes. However, also the CORE’s risk cluster can find useful insight in the report, for example about challenges and opportunities of risk-based container targeting and screening approaches. This summary GAO document caters the needs of state-of-the-art work packages and the CORE’s educational and training cluster that aims to produce relevant and up-to-date material about supply chain security for a variety of stakeholders.

Cross-references:

  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18,
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System, GAO-13-9. October 25, 2012.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), risk-based controls, targeting, container scanning

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders, GAO, November 2013 (CORE1018)

Summary: This report is a summary of previous GAO reports on US maritime supply chain security and border controls. The report focuses on progress and challenges in four main areas of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) activity on the maritime security. The report highlights that DHS and its component Coast Guard agency could improve its maritime domain awareness through increased information sharing and more advanced vessel-tracking systems. The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in turn could step up its role in securing US-bound container traffic by conducting more frequent risk assessment audits in key foreign ports that ship cargo into the US and by fostering more close relationship with foreign authorities. The GAO report also recommends the Coast Guard to rethink its maritime surveillance, interdiction and security operations because current protection and support is not adequate in high priority locations. The report also calls for more collaboration and coordination among maritime authorities, port operators and ocean carriers. Finally, the report encourages the DHS to develop performance metrics and data collection procedures the agency uses to assess and monitor its maritime security programs and activities. This report gives a recent update on the US maritime security activities that might be helpful for CORE demonstrations and clusters. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/660/659087.pdf.

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Full review: This summary GAO documents provides detailed background material about the US maritime security programs. This information is very relevant for the CORE demonstrations WP9 and WP14 that involve shipping cargo from and into the US. The information this document offers also help the CORE’s risk and IT clusters to learn lessons from the US approach to risk-based maritime security and security-related IT integration.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security. GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports. GAO-13-764. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2013.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, maritime surveillance, risk-based controls, targeting, container scanning

 

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EU logistics security – an interesting decade

I had a great pleasure to work intensively on the European surface transport security standardization efforts, some years ago – this CBRA Blog aims to summarize the main work done, and the key objectives achieved.

 

Couple of years after the US 9/11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the European Commission Directorate General of Transport and Energy, EC DG TREN, started to prepare a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing cargo surface transport security. In the meanwhile, 9/11 was already triggering an avalanche of new customs, aviation and maritime supply chain security regulations, programs and standards, in the US, Europe and across the globe. But when it came specifically to surface transport security for road and rail cargo (and inland waterways, to that matter) in Europe, nothing was cooking before the DG TREN initiative “Secure Operator”, first announced in 2004. By 2006, the main goal of the EC proposal for a regulation on enhancing supply chain security (SCS) in the EU was shaped as to achieve greater protection of the European freight transport system against possible terrorist attacks. The specific objectives of the draft regulation were defined as: (i) to increase the level of security along the supply chain without impeding the free flow of trade; (ii) to establish a common framework for a systematic European approach without jeopardizing the common transport market and existing security measures; and (iii) to avoid unnecessary administrative procedures and burdens at European and national levels. In addition, the draft regulation related to the need to prevent a patchwork of various supply chain security standards and solutions across EU.

blog2105162However, it quickly became clear that there was no common sense of urgency in supply chain security regulations across EU Member States, particularly in the context of threat of terrorism to surface (cargo) transport. One was lacking a commitment towards an integrated approach, which would urge everybody to look at the holistic supply chain picture. The countries and especially stakeholder (or, lobby) organizations clearly focused on their specific interests on a part of the supply chain, thus appearing uncomfortable when trying to identify the “big picture”. Ultimately, the draft regulation was blocked in the European legislative process and finally officially withdrawn by the Commission, in 2010.

 

 

In the meanwhile, already in 2005, an expert group in supply chain security was formed under the umbrella of European Committee for Standardization (CEN) – and that’s when Cross-border Research Association started to play a role in the “EU land transport security regulations and standards play”, first as the rapporteur for the expert group, and later as the research party for the technical committee in supply chain security. The expert group was formed technically under the CEN working group “Protection and Security of the Citizen” (CEN/BT/WG161), and the (pre)standardization work was partly based on the Logistics Action Plan of the EC that indicated the need for standardization in the transport security domain for the whole logistic chain.

blog2105163Following the conclusions and recommendations by the expert group, the CEN Technical Committee in Supply Chain Security (CEN/TC 379) was established in 2008, producing ultimately three tangible outputs: Supply Chain Security Feasibility Study (in 2010); CEN Technical Report “Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators” (in 2012, CEN/TR 16412:2012); and, a European Standard: Logistics – Specifications for reporting crime incidents (in 2013, EN 16352:2013-06). The first of the outcomes is available for free (ask by email:  cbra@cross-border.org ), and the latter two you can purchase e.g. from your national standardization institute web shop. All in all, great project experience behind us, couple of good publications, and many new contacts and even few friends for lifetime – thus, no regrets, and if asked, would become rapporteur and lead researcher on these important topics, again and again!

 

 

 

 

And finally, when it comes to the future of SCS regulation and standardization work in Europe – in particular in the land transport security sector (e.g. the LANDSEC expert group, Commission Decision 2012/286/EU): do not be shy in exploiting the tangible outcomes of a decade of our joint work, in particular the Euronorm EN 16352:2013-06, “Logistics: specifications for reporting crime incidents” – no reason to reinvent the wheel!

 

CBRA Blog by Dr. Juha Hintsa on 21.5.2016

 

Summarizing the main milestones of the surface transport security 2004-2014 regulatory and standardization process tracks:

A) Regulatory process -track was largely driven by the European Commission Directorate General for Transport and Energy (EC DG TREN), comprising of the following five sequential steps:
A1. Preparation of the Secure Operator legislation at EC DG TREN (2004-2006)
A2. Publication of the legislative proposal (EC, 2006a)
A3. Publication of an impact assessment study (EC, 2006b)
A4. Announcements and debates at European Parliament and Council (2006-2009)
A5. Withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission, (18.9.2010)

B) Standardization process -track – for which the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) was responsible – consisting of the following seven, chronologically ordered steps:
B1. Establishment of an Expert group in supply chain security, under CEN/BT/WG161, “Protection and Security of the Citizen” (2005)
B2. Publication of the final report of the Expert group, approved by CEN/BT/WG161 (14.11.2006)
B3. Establishment of the CEN Technical Committee in Supply Chain Security, CEN/TC 379 (2008)
B4. Publication of Supply Chain Security Feasibility Study (15.1.2010)
B5. Publication of the CEN Technical Report, CEN/TR 16412:2012 “Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators” (2012)
B6. Publication of a European Standard: Logistics – Specifications for reporting crime incidents, EN 16352:2013-06 (2013)
B7. Closure of the CEN Technical Committee in Supply Chain Security, CEN/TC 379 (2014).

 

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Main references / bibliography:

  • CEN (2013), “Logistics: specifications for reporting crime incidents”, EN 16352:2013-06
  • CEN (2012), “Supply chain security (SCS): Good practice guide for small and medium sized operators”, CEN/TR 16412:2012
  • CEN (2006), “Expert group: Supply chain security”, approved by CEN/BT/WG161, 14.1.2006
  • EC (2012), “Commission Staff Working Document on Transport Security”, SWD(2012), 143 final.
  • EC (2006a), COM(2006)79 final, 2006/0025(COD), COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on enhancing supply chain security Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on enhancing supply chain security, (SEC(2006)251)
  • EC (2006b), SEC(2006)251 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Annex to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on enhancing supply chain security and Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on enhancing supply chain security – IMPACT ASSESSMENT – {COM(2006)79 final}
  • Hintsa, J., Ahokas, J., Männistö, T. and Sahlstedt, J. (2010), “CEN supply chain security (SCS) feasibility study”, CEN/TC 379 Supply Chain Security, Final report, 15.12010

 

 

Interview with Mr. Warwick on global security profession

20.5.2016: CBRA had the pleasure to interview Mr. Roger Warwick, who has over 40 years of hands on experience in the European and global security industry.

Hi Roger, and thanks for joining a CBRA interview. Can you first tell a bit about yourself, and your professional background?

I have been active in corporate security for over forty years with a background in both fraud investigations and security consulting.  I studied economic crime investigative techniques at Jesus College, Cambridge annual workshops from 1990 to 1995 and certified CPP – protecting people, property and information – in 1999. I am British but for most of my career I have been based in Italy providing services to international corporations with business interests in Italy and Italian organisations operating in other countries.   I am a frequent speaker at international security conferences on security and investigations topics.

We first met around 2005 in a CEN, European Committee for Standardization, supply chain security expert group – under CEN/BT/WG161, Protection and Security of the Citizen. I think you joined as the representative of UNI, the Italian Organization for Standardization – do you recall the good old days?

I certainly do. We were discussing a European response to the US C-TPAT and similar supply chain security programs in an attempt to find a unifying, user friendly system, for the secure international flow of goods – beyond the Customs driven EU AEO program.  Following that I did more work regarding standards and qualified with RabQsa, now trading as Exemplar Global, as a Lead Auditor for security management systems, including ISO28000 and then as a certified Skill Examiner. By the way I audited, for ISO 28000, the DP World port in Peru. In 2013, on behalf of the Italian Government I developed a Critical Infrastructure Organisational Resilience standard that was later published by UNI.

You are also active in international security organizations and associations, including ASIS International. Can you tell bit more about them?

ASIS is a worldwide association of security professionals, first launched in the US in 1955. It has today over 38,000 members around the globe of which 3,000 in Europe.  I put in a lot of work with the ASIS to get the association on the quality management standards track. I am a member of the Standards and Guidelines Commission which has already developed a number of security and organisational resilience standards, which are ISO compliant, including PSC1, Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations, which has been adopted by ICoCA, the International Code of Conduct Association for private security operations. We will soon begin to work on a Security Awareness -standard. My role in ASIS in Europe, is to the Chair of the EC Liaison Sub Committee, our aim being the promotion and consolidation of the voice of the security profession and security professionals within the EU.

Your main day job is with Pyramid International and with the TEMI Group, is that correct? Can you tell more about these companies, and the services you offer to your clients?

I am the CEO of Pyramid International ( www.pyramid.it ) which has been based in Italy for over 30 years. It is a corporate security and investigations organisation, which caters mainly for multinational corporations. We have grown to become the security point of reference for corporations trading in southern Europe. In 2008 I formed, together with long term colleagues and friends, each operating in their own jurisdiction around the world, Temi Group ( www.temigroup.com ), which has grown to be what we call the World’s furthest reaching security partnership.  Recently we set up TGI, the Temi Group International Verein in Geneva, of which I am proud to be the Chairman.  Our individual companies are each members of TGI and each is specialised in various security sectors and geographical areas.  Pyramid International, together with Temi Group partners, is the coordinator of our Travel Risk Management services which are now active across the world, in particular Africa and Asia.  We provide both management assistance and protective services.  Our motto is “Safety for staff abroad means peace of mind for management at home.” We are founder members of ICoCA and have rapidly become a market leader for European companies; our customers are amongst Europe’s largest engineering corporations.  They are well aware of the importance of duty of care and operating with organisations, such as ours, that not only are experienced and competent but are also certified and appropriately insured.

Well, good catching up with you Roger, and thanks a lot for the interview. Maybe we could start looking for opportunities regarding joint projects in the future, what do you think?

Thank you Juha very much for the opportunity.  That would be great.  Although we have moved on from protecting goods in the supply chain to the protection of people travelling and working abroad there are many affinities and I am sure that there are many projects we could work on together, in our usual productive manner!

 

Web resources:

CPP: https://www.asisonline.org

Exemplar Global: www.exemplarglobal.org

UNI Critical Infrastructure Organisational Resilience standard: http://catalogo.uni.com

ICoCA, the International Code of Conduct Association for private security operations: http://icoca.ch/

Pyramid International: www.pyramid.it

Temi Group: www.temigroup.com

Interview with Mr. Bautista on PICARD2016

10.5.2016: CBRA Interview with Mr. Samuel Bautista from the Philippines

Hi Sam, and thanks for joining CBRA interview – and stopping by here in Geneva. Can you please first tell a bit of you and what you do in the Philippines?

First of all, let me thank you for inviting me for this interview with CBRA today. I am a customs broker in the Philippines, focusing my work mostly in the academia, teaching in the university and managing the Academy of Developmental Logistics that offers training for customs and logistics professionals. In October 2015, I was asked to join the technical team of the Customs Commissioner to help in the modernization and reform programs, as well as in the preparation for the Philippines’ hosting of the WCO PICARD 2016 Conference in Manila.

We know each other since many years from the WCO PICARD – customs-academia partnership program – conferences. Would you recall in which conference we met the first time?

I learned about the WCO PICARD conferences through my academic associations, although I registered but missed the 2010 Conference in Abu Dhabi. Luckily, my paper on customs-academia partnership was selected for presentation during the 2011 PICARD in Geneva, where I first met you and the CBRA team. Since then – except for the 2012 Conference in Morocco – I have been regularly attending the annual conference. I also remember that it was in Geneva when we first expressed our invitation for the participants to come to the Philippines.

That’s correct, you did mention in Geneva about your interest to organize the PICARD conference one day – and now, five years later, you are in the organizing team of the 11th PICARD conference, to be held in Manilla, the Philippines, September this year – congratulations on that! Where do you stand with the conference organizations at the moment?

Thank you for supporting our bid to host the conference. We are putting everything in place and took preliminary steps for the preparation. For this reason, we visited the WCO in Brussels few weeks ago and met with the team of Mr. Robert Ireland to discuss and firm up important details for the Conference. We also had the opportunity to sit down briefly with the Secretary General Kunio Mikuriya for some key points he stressed about the Conference.  I know that it would be a great challenge for us but we are also reviewing and following the best practices taken in the past PICARD conferences. With the guidance of the WCO Research team, the Scientific Committee for WCO and the PICARD Advisory Group, we are confident about the steps we are taking.

Yes, I know from the experience that incredible number of details must be properly managed, starting from 12 months before the conference, all the way to the opening day – and, beyond… But, you think you will manage to take all steps on time?

As I personally experienced in 2011, despite the limited number of CBRA staff you had, I believe that you did a great job then!  Every year is an exciting experience for all of us – PICARD attendees, and we would like to pick up from there. We are following a very strict timeline in coordination with Mr. Ireland of WCO and our team in the Philippine Customs. We also tapped the support and expertise of our colleagues in the academia and the business community and we believe that working together could help us deliver our commitment in hosting the PICARD conference.

Great! And what are your main expectations regarding the outcomes of the 11th PICARD conference?

When we first expressed our intention to host the conference, we would like to show to the global customs community not just the rich history of our culture and heritage, but also the progress that the academia, the business community and customs have initiated and put together in moving forward to a modern and efficient customs management. It is also very important to note that the Philippine legislature recently passed the Customs Modernization and Tariff Act and we are expecting the President to sign this into law very soon.

Excellent! Please let me and my colleagues know if we can be of any further help… And looking forward to seeing you again – by the way, this will be my first time in the Philippines! Thanks again Sam for the interview!  Juha.

I feel excited seeing all of you in the Philippines and for first-time visitors like you Juha, we would make sure that you will surely be afforded the Filipino hospitality we are known of! Let me thank you again for the warm welcome you gave in 2011 and today. Mabuhay!