MARITIME SECURITY – Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, GAO, March 2009 (CORE1065)

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Summary: The US government considers identification and tracking of vessels at the US coastal areas, inland waterways and ports important for protecting the US homeland and economy from maritime terrorism. The US coastal guards use a range of identification and tracking solutions to detect any anomalies in maritime traffic that might suggest terrorist activity, such as transportation of weapons of mass destruction, use of explosive-laden boats as weapons, smuggling of weapons, drugs, people or other contraband. This GAO report reviews the US Coast Guards’ current and future solutions for monitoring the maritime traffic: long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), long-range automatic identification system (AIS) and various radar and camera systems. The report elaborates strengths and weaknesses of these identification and tracking solutions and proposes a roadmap for further strengthening of the US coastal security. The future advancements should pay particular attention to tracking of small and non-commercial vessels and to reconsider ways to collect and analyze data that is relevant for coastal surveillance.  Offering background information about vessel-level tracking and tracing of maritime cargo movements, the report is a relevant source document for those CORE demonstrations that involve shipping of containers from, through and into the US. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf.

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Full review: CORE demonstrations of WP9 and WP14 benefit from the background information this GAO document offers on identification and tracking of vessels because these two demos involve US seaports and shipping at the US territorial waters. Also the CORE’s risk and IT clusters might find the information of this GAO document useful. The information that the identification and tracking provide allow the coastal guards to assess risk-levels of individual vessel movements and decide when it is reasonable to intervene and check anomalies. The vessel tracking and identification involves also a great deal of IT integration because it currently involves many technical components and synthetizes data collected from many different sources.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
  • Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), long-range automatic identification system (AIS), track & trace

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security, GAO, July 2010 (CORE1064)

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Summary: This GAO report analyses the progress the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in maritime supply chain security over the past five to ten years. The report raises problems that the DHS and its component agencies – the Coast Guard and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) – have encountered regarding improvement of risk management, reduction of the vulnerability to threats of small vessels, implementation of security assessment in foreign ports, and the overall progress in supply chain security.  The report states that so far the Coast Guard has carried out risk assessments, but their results do not allow effective comparison and prioritization of risks across ports. The Coast guard has also identified points of vulnerability related to waterside attacks by small vessels, reached out to the general public to encourage recreational sailors to report anomalies, started tracking of small vessel, tested equipment to screen small vessels for nuclear material and conducted security maneuvers such as vessel escorts. Nevertheless, resource constraints and technical problems prevent the Coast Guard to protect the US coastline and maritime infrastructure from small-vessel threats effectively. Moreover, the Coast Guard has been assessing security in foreign ports, but the lack of the agency’s resources and certain countries’ reluctance to collaborate with the US authorities have slowed down the global security assessment. Finally, as for the general supply chain security, the DHS has been running the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) in foreign ports to test the feasibility of the 100% scanning of US-bound shipping containers with non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection equipment. The findings of the SFI pilots indicate that the 100% scanning is not a feasible policy because it would disrupt port logistics, damage international trade and raise healthy concerns, among other things. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/660/659087.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO review concentrates on the US maritime supply chain security. The document provides important information for people who are working for the CORE demonstrations of WP1 and WP14 because these demos involve maritime transportation into and from the US mainland. Those demonstrations that test tracking & tracking solutions might benefit from the document’s update on small-vessel identification and tracking systems.

Cross-references:

  • Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational Benefits, but Challenges Remain. GAO-10-433R. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
  • Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C., June 12, 2008.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, supply chain security, 100% scanning and track & trace

 

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PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM, Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO, November 2011 (CORE1060)

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Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has granted almost 1.7 billion USD to port security through the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The program is administered by a component agency of DHS, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This GAO reports highlights some problems that the grant program has encountered. The first issue is that the risk assessment the FEMA uses to assess risk levels and assign grants to different ports does not take into account how security improvements affect the vulnerability of the ports to terrorist attacks. The report recommends the FEMA to design a vulnerability index that accounts for security improvement and to coordinate with the Coast Guard to get access to the most accurate vulnerability and threat information. The second issue with the grant program is that much of the grant money does not get used and translate into practical port security projects. The GAO report proposes acceleration of the grant granting process with updated administrative procedures and with more administrative staff.  Finally, this GAO report recommends the FEMA to develop performance metrics to assess its administration in relation to the Port Security Grant Program. The contents of this GAO report is not very relevant to CORE because no US seaports are partners in the project. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf.

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Full review: This document has only a limited relevance for CORE because the consortium does not involve any US seaport operators. The demonstrations of WP9 and WP14 that cover shipping of goods from and into the US through local seaports might find it useful to learn about how US ports can apply for funds to improve the security. Otherwise, other demonstrations do not benefit much of this information. However, the CORE’s risk cluster can benefit from the rather detailed description of the risk analysis model in the report’s Appendix II.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan And Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
  • Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed. GAO-11-153R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Additional keywords: Critical infrastructure protection (CIP), maritime security and security of supply, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security Programs, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1019)

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Summary: The report provides a comprehensive review of progress and challenges of various port security activities and programs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has carried out since 9/11. In essence, the report is a summary and an update of a number of more detailed GAO reports on maritime supply chain security. The report states that needs to strengthen further its efforts on maritime domain awareness through intensified communication among maritime stakeholders. Regarding the US domestic port security, the report recommends DHS to reassess its Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) that allows ports to request funds for security projects and to improve quality of vulnerability assessment in US ports. The report also urges DHS to overcome challenges of risk-based targeting and scanning of US-bound shipping containers.  The findings and recommendations of this report help CORE consortium understand the current state of the US maritime security regime. This understanding benefits particularly the demonstrations of WP9 and WP14. Also educational and training as well as risk clusters of CORE may find the report’s information useful. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/670/663784.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO document summarizes the US maritime supply chain security and provides useful information for the CORE project across its work packages. This information most obviously benefits WP9 and WP14 that involve US-bound maritime trade lanes. However, also the CORE’s risk cluster can find useful insight in the report, for example about challenges and opportunities of risk-based container targeting and screening approaches. This summary GAO document caters the needs of state-of-the-art work packages and the CORE’s educational and training cluster that aims to produce relevant and up-to-date material about supply chain security for a variety of stakeholders.

Cross-references:

  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18,
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System, GAO-13-9. October 25, 2012.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), risk-based controls, targeting, container scanning

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders, GAO, November 2013 (CORE1018)

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Summary: This report is a summary of previous GAO reports on US maritime supply chain security and border controls. The report focuses on progress and challenges in four main areas of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) activity on the maritime security. The report highlights that DHS and its component Coast Guard agency could improve its maritime domain awareness through increased information sharing and more advanced vessel-tracking systems. The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in turn could step up its role in securing US-bound container traffic by conducting more frequent risk assessment audits in key foreign ports that ship cargo into the US and by fostering more close relationship with foreign authorities. The GAO report also recommends the Coast Guard to rethink its maritime surveillance, interdiction and security operations because current protection and support is not adequate in high priority locations. The report also calls for more collaboration and coordination among maritime authorities, port operators and ocean carriers. Finally, the report encourages the DHS to develop performance metrics and data collection procedures the agency uses to assess and monitor its maritime security programs and activities. This report gives a recent update on the US maritime security activities that might be helpful for CORE demonstrations and clusters. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/660/659087.pdf.

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Full review: This summary GAO documents provides detailed background material about the US maritime security programs. This information is very relevant for the CORE demonstrations WP9 and WP14 that involve shipping cargo from and into the US. The information this document offers also help the CORE’s risk and IT clusters to learn lessons from the US approach to risk-based maritime security and security-related IT integration.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security. GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports. GAO-13-764. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2013.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, maritime surveillance, risk-based controls, targeting, container scanning

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit From Agency Assessments, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1017)

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Summary: This GAO report explains how the US government agencies have fought sea piracy around the Horn of Africa and at the Gulf of Guinea since 2010. The report also describes the current state of sea piracy threats in these two areas, and it urges US government agencies to reconsider their resource allocations, strategies and tactics related to the counterpiracy efforts. The report points out that the number of annual piracy incidents at the Gulf of Guinea has surpassed the yearly incidents off the Horn of Africa. This shift in pirate attacks prompt changes in the US counterpiracy operations. However, as the report points out, the US government agencies responsible for the counterpiracy activities have not recently conducted reassessments of their actions, despite the changing conditions. The report therefore recommends the US government agencies to re-evaluate the counterpiracy efforts, especially at the Gulf of Guinea that is becoming the most important hotspot of the international sea piracy. This GAO report provides information about modern sea piracy from which CORE’s maritime demonstrations might benefit. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/670/664268.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO report delivers a comprehensive analysis of the current state of sea piracy at the two African hotspots and the US government’s counterpiracy efforts. This information benefits those CORE demonstrations that involve maritime shipping. The detailed description of the US counterpiracy efforts might also inspire the risk cluster to find effective and efficient risk-based solutions to protect maritime logistics and transport from sea piracy.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, sea piracy

 

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Review of TAPA TACSS – Air Cargo Security Standards, 2012 (CORE1045)

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Summary: TAPA TACSS – Air Cargo Security Standards (TACSS) is a certifiable security program for the air cargo industry to close down, as much as possible, all risks for high value freight whilst being handled and transported on the ground. Available to General Public at the TAPA Website, this standard is hyperlinked here: https://www.tapaemea.com

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Full review: The Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) is a self-funded industry group comprising of manufacturers, shippers, logistics providers and law enforcement agencies that share the objective to eliminate loss of product by criminal act. The theft of high value, high risk products moving in supply chains in Europe costs businesses in excess of € 8.2 billion a year.

Although the focus of TAPA is to stop the unauthorized removal of items from the logistics chain, many of the methods used by criminals to achieve this are entirely relevant to the other security threats seen within the industry. E.g. unauthorized entry, deception techniques, tampering of shipments etc.  TAPA has created a number of certifiable security standards:

  • FSR (Freight Security Requirements)
  • TSR (Trucking Security Requirements)
  • PSR (Parking Security Requirements)
  • TACSS (TAPA Air Cargo Security Standards)

The latter one, TACSS is a set of security standards designed specifically for Air Cargo Handling Facilities. It takes into account the mode of operation of such terminals often having open doors, and yet often operating inside a secure area within an airport, behind a fence. By providing comprehensive requirements and a certification scheme for the protection of air cargo whilst being transported on the ground, TAPA hopes to provide its own members and industry partners with viable options for improving and/or maintaining an effective air cargo security program.

There are two levels to the Standard. Level 1 & Level 2, with 1 being the higher level of security, and the decision of which Level to certify against is decided by risk assessment which takes into account the geographical location of the facility and crime levels in the area. Certification is by Independent Validator against a checklist and valid for 2 years.

Detailed analysis of relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. Among all Work Packages of the project, some are directly impacted by the project, while others are solely primarily or secondarily contributed. Among these Work Packages, the CORE demonstrators will validate the applicability and benefits of the CORE approach in representative operating scenarios characteristic of the global supply chain. They will specifically show the way towards a Global Secure Supply Chain. The overriding goal is to demonstrate substantial gains in security and facilitation covering every major facet of the supply chain security sector.

The following Work Packages are directly impacted by the TACSS initiative:

  • WP7: CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment – provide an integrated set of tools for developing solutions for the Demonstrators in line with SCSRF utilizing results from reference projects particularly e-Freight and ICargo.
  • WP12: Demonstrator Schiphol – apply global data pipeline concept to air cargo supply chains, managing air freight specific trade compliance requirements, and offering supply chain visibility in dashboards. Trade lanes with e.g. Africa, involving multiple inspection authorities.
  • WP17: DHL Demonstrator – managing airfreight trade compliance requirements EU-US in the context of fast supplying of parts. In this demonstrator, TAPA TACSS and mutual recognition with the US will become evident.

The following Work Packages are primarily affected by TAPA TACSS, as airfreight is part of global supply chain:

  • WP14: Demonstrator FALACUS – FastLAne through CUStoms – implement an extensive supply chain of ceramics products along international corridors between Italy and USA.
  • WP15: Decathlon Demonstrator – operational and security related Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) within the CORE framework will be applied to monitor the overall level of security within the supply chain for different supply chain actors Taiwan to retail shop destinations across Europe implementation of this new transit modality and the impact it would have on the overall performance of the supply chain.
  • WP19: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development – Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasizing international co-operation to promote harmonization of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.

The TACSS Initiative could also help with the following Work Packages, with the following secondary effects:

  • WP3: Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis (MTVA) Suite
  • WP4: SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps
  • WP5: Real-time Lean Agile Resilient Green Optimized (LARG+O) SC
  • WP16: ENI Demonstrator
  • WP22: Analysis and Testing of a Secure Hybrid Composite Container

CORE Impact anticipation: CORE seeks to give consolidated solutions and develop the resilience, optimization and interoperability of the global supply chain, including Port, Container, Post, Truck, Rail, Maritime and Air. Air freight is thence a part of the global vision of CORE. TAPA TACCS contributes thence directly to CORE vision. Impact?

Cross-references: Air Cargo World on TAPA TACSS and air cargo crimes: www.aircargoworld.com

Full citation: TAPA EMEA Website, TACSS Page, accessed 23 September 2014: https://www.tapaemea.com

 

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Review of IATA E-Freight – an air cargo industry initiative facilitated by IATA, to remove paper from the supply chain, 2014 (CORE1044)

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Summary: Launched by IATA in 2006 as part of the StB program, E-Freight became an industry-wide initiative involving carriers, freight forwarders, ground handlers, shippers and customs authorities. The roadmap to 100% E-Freight outlines a shared end-to-end industry approach with clear leadership roles, around three core components, or “pillars”:

  • Pillar I: Engaging regulators and governments worldwide to create an ‘e-freight route network’ with fully electronic customs procedures and where regulations support paperless shipments.
  • Pillar II: Working collaboratively within the cargo supply chain to digitize the core industry transport documents, starting with the air waybill.
  • Pillar III: Developing a plan to digitize the commercial and special cargo documents typically accompanying airfreight today, in or outside of the ‘Cargo pouch’ 2014 targets.

Year 2014 target was to grow global e-AWB penetration to 22%. Available to General Pubic at the IATA Website, this standard is hyperlinked here: http://www.iata.org

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Full review: Benefits: E-freight will bring following benefits to the air cargo industry:

  • Operational – shorter transit times, less paperwork (no copying/ printing/data-capturing)
  • Quality – improved transparency, reduced chance of data errors, no missing documents
  • Security – improved control of distribution of shipment details
  • Environmental – reduced paper consumption

Two key challenges of implementation: The first is that the ‘Contract of Carriage’ is printed on the reverse side of the paper Air Waybill. Without this, it is imperative that this ‘Contract’ is secured by other means. With this in mind, IATA has created a standard multilateral agreement that can be signed by Carrier and Agent / Forwarder as appropriate. The multi-lateral agreement was released in 2013, and will improve the numbers of e-freight shipments considerably. The second challenge is relevant to CORE and that is the electronic shipment data. This exists in two forms: FHL at House Air waybill level, and FWB at Master Air waybill level. Here the challenge is to get ‘first time right’ data. Without the correct data, any congruence checks made with the physical shipment will not align, and the shipment cannot be shipped. It is almost like turning up at the airport as a passenger with your brother’s passport.

Detailed analysis of relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. Among all Work Packages of the project, some are directly impacted by the project, while others are solely primarily or secondarily contributed. Among these Work Packages, the CORE demonstrators will validate the applicability and benefits of the CORE approach in representative operating scenarios characteristic of the global supply chain. They will specifically show the way towards a Global Secure Supply Chain. The overriding goal is to demonstrate substantial gains in security and facilitation covering every major facet of the supply chain security sector.

Data is relevant in the CORE project as it could be an enabler of some data screening, either to assess for cargo deemed to be more of a risk (like the ACAS trial running in North America), or even to specifically identify and target a specific shipment.

The following CORE Work Packages are directly impacted by the E-Freight initiative:

  • WP7: CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment – provide an integrated set of tools for developing solutions for the Demonstrators in line with SCSRF utilizing results from reference projects particularly e-Freight and iCargo.
  • WP12: Demonstrator Schiphol – apply global data pipeline concept to air cargo supply chains, managing air freight specific trade compliance requirements, and offering supply chain visibility in dashboards. Trade lanes with e.g. Africa, involving multiple inspection authorities.
  • WP17: DHL Demonstrator – managing airfreight trade compliance requirements EU-US in the context of fast supplying of parts. In this demonstrator, Cargo 2000 and mutual recognition with the US will become evident.

The following Work Packages are primarily contributed by E-Freight, as airfreight is part of global supply chain:

  • WP14: Demonstrator FALACUS – FastLAne through CUStoms – implement an extensive supply chain of ceramics products along international corridors between Italy and USA.
  • WP15: Decathlon Demonstrator – operational and security related Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) within the CORE framework will be applied to monitor the overall level of security within the supply chain for different supply chain actors Taiwan to retail shop destinations across Europe implementation of this new transit modality and the impact it would have on the overall performance of the supply chain.
  • WP19: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development – Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasizing international co-operation to promote harmonization of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.

The E-Freight Initiative could also help with the following Work Packages, which are secondarily affected:

  • WP3: Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis (MTVA) Suite
  • WP4: SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps
  • WP5: Real-time Lean Agile Resilient Green Optimised (LARG+O) SC
  • WP16: ENI Demonstrator
  • WP22: Analysis and Testing of a Secure Hybrid Composite Container

CORE Impact anticipation: CORE seeks to give consolidated solutions and develop the resilience, optimization and interoperability of the global supply chain, including Port, Container, Post, Truck, Rail, Maritime and Air. E-Freight contributes thence directly to the CORE vision.

Cross-references: WCO News Magazine: http://www.wcoomd.org

Full citation: IATA Website, E-Freight Page, accessed 23 September 2014: http://www.iata.org

 

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Review of Cargo 2000, C2K – an IATA interest group with the mission of creating and implementing quality standards for the worldwide air cargo industry, 2015 (CORE1043)

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Summary: Cargo 2000 is the quality standard for the tracking, measuring general air cargo shipments. It is a project commenced in 1997 and is supported by a self-funded group of the world’s leading Airlines, Forwarders, Ground Handling Agents and specialist IT providers. IATA then provides oversight, administration and facilitation on behalf of the Membership. Cargo 2000 (C2K) uses standard recognized IATA Cargo-IMP (Interline Message Procedures) already used within the air cargo industry to provide reference points for measurement. These are known as FSU (Freight Status Update) messages. The key metrics under C2K are NFD (Notified for Delivery), in which case the destination has received both the physical cargo shipment and the information (paper or electronic) is available for collection by the Agent of the Consignee, and FAP, Flown as planned. In this case, the service delivered matches that which was promised to the customer in terms of timings and flights. In order to simplify and standardize the various processes that support C2K, as it is used by multiple stakeholders in a live environment, the C2K Master Operating Plan (MOP) was completely revised in 2012. The result is a very visual process description that allows every stakeholder to clearly see the part they play in the overall end-to-end routing of the shipment. The visual nature of the schematics, also allows the assessment of any new legislation, processes or procedures to be predicted both up and down the chain. Available to General Pubic at the IATA Website, this standard is hyperlinked here: http://www.iata.org

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Full review: Relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. Among all Work Packages of the project, some are directly impacted by the project, while others are solely primarily or secondarily contributed. Among these Work Packages, the CORE demonstrators will validate the applicability and benefits of the CORE approach in representative operating scenarios characteristic of the global supply chain. They will specifically show the way towards a Global Secure Supply Chain. The overriding goal is to demonstrate substantial gains in security and facilitation covering every major facet of the supply chain security sector.

The following CORE Work Packages are directly impacted by the C2K Industry Standards:

  • WP7: CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment – provide an integrated set of tools for developing solutions for the Demonstrators in line with SCSRF utilising results from reference projects particularly e-Freight and iCargo.
  • WP12: Demonstrator Schiphol – apply global data pipeline concept to air cargo supply chains, managing air freight specific trade compliance requirements, and offering supply chain visibility in dashboards. Trade lanes with e.g. Africa, involving multiple inspection authorities.
  • WP17: DHL Demonstrator – managing airfreight trade compliance requirements EU-US in the context of fast supplying of parts. In this demonstrator, Cargo 2000 and mutual recognition with the US will become evident.

The following CORE Work Packages are primarily contributed by C2K:

  • WP14: Demonstrator FALACUS – FastLAne through CUStoms – implement an extensive supply chain of ceramics products along international corridors between Italy and USA.
  • WP15: Decathlon Demonstrator – operational and security related Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) within the CORE framework will be applied to monitor the overall level of security within the supply chain for different supply chain actors Taiwan to retail shop destinations across Europe implementation of this new transit modality and the impact it would have on the overall performance of the supply chain.
  • WP19: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasising international co-operation to promote harmonisation of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.

The C2K Standard will have the secondary effects on the following Work Packages:

  • WP3: Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis (MTVA) Suite
  • WP4: SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps
  • WP5: Real-time Lean Agile Resilient Green Optimised (LARG+O) SC
  • WP16: ENI Demonstrator
  • WP22: Analysis and Testing of a Secure Hybrid Composite Container

CORE Impact Anticipation: CORE seeks to give consolidated solutions and develop the resilience, optimisation and interoperability of the global supply chain, including Port, Container, Post, Truck, Rail, Maritime and Air. Cargo 2000 contributes thence directly to CORE vision.

Cross References: Introduction to Cargo 2000 by IATA, http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/cargo2000/Documents/c2k-introduction.pdf

Full Citation: IATA Website, Cargo 2000 Page, accessed 22 September 2014: http://www.iata.org

 

CORE1043

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FP7-CORE Education – Two new diagrams

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Today’s CBRA Blog presents two new diagrams which have been recently designed and developed in the context of FP7-CORE Education and training work (Work package 19.1). The information visualized in the diagram is based on CBRA’s supply chain security research work since year 2001, particularly from the past 5-6 years.

Some background information on the first diagram of crime types in global supply chains has been presented before for example in CBRA’s Blog of 13 October 2014 – Crime taxonomies from Athens. In the center of this diagram we list the crime types – including document fraud and cybercrime – which in the supply chain criminal context are performed in order to succeed with the actual economic or ideological crime, e.g. cargo theft or terrorism.

The left area of the circle lists four examples of crime types, which typically are of primary concern for supply chain companies: cargo theft, sabotage, parallel trade and product specification fraud. With such crime types it is commonly up to the companies to prevent, to detect and to react – of course, law enforcement agencies can be called for any time there is reasonable suspicion of such activities (and naturally in certain cases the government agencies may even be the first ones to detect and react, e.g. in case of armed robberies and truck hijackings).

The right area of the circle deals with supply chain incidents where the authorities typically focus on prevention, detection and reaction: fraud in indirect border taxes; trafficking / violations in cross-border restrictions and prohibitions; human trafficking; and exploitation of illicit labor. From supply chain perspective one can characterize them as “a priori non-disruptive illegal activities – only if / after authorities detect the violations, the supply chain is disrupted and the involved supply chain companies can get in trouble”.

Lastly, on the bottom area of the circle, we list four supply chain crime areas where the prevention typically is in strong interest of both supply chain companies and governmental agencies – and, the detection and (instant) reaction varies on case-by-case basis: counterfeiting, sales channel violations, sea piracy and terrorism. Counterfeiting hits revenues on both sides of the equation, and, with many products can also be health damaging or even lethal. Not having proper sales licenses, and/or selling to unauthorized buyers – for example cigarettes and alcohol, dual use and strategic goods etc. – can again harm both the involved companies and the society as a whole. And of course, sea pirates hijacking cargo ships; bombs exploding and bringing planes down; and terrorists attacking critical supply chain infrastructures, all are in the best interest of both companies and government agencies to prevent, to detect, and to react – in the fastest and most effective possible manner.

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The second new educational diagram below depicts the negative socio-economic impact areas – six in total – caused by twelve typical smuggling and trafficking activities. The data behind it has been presented before e.g. in CBRA’s Blog of 14 January 2015 – Socio-economic damages. Inside the square we present the six societal impact areas – the larger the area, the more links there are between the trafficking activities and the negative impacts. As an example of a “big area”, seven different types of trafficking typically lead into increasing market place distortions and/or unfair competition. In the other extreme, only trafficking in stolen cultural products leads to losses in cultural heritage.

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That’s all for the CBRA Blog today – please let us know if you see this type of visualization as beneficial when teaching and learning about the big picture of supply chain security!  Thanks, Juha Hintsa ( email: cbra@cross-border.org )