Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks (CORE1204)

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Summary: The requirement for 100% container scanning has been a burning topic, since U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the initiative in order to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destructions into the U.S. The paper explores how much it is reasonable to come down from the 100% inspection rate, if deterrence and cost of retaliation are considered in the model. Deterrence means the power to dissuade an attacker from attempting to smuggle weapons as opposite to use coerce or compel.  Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred by an attacker e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network. It is assumed the defender discloses in advance how many containers are inspected. The paper can be viewed here: https://www.researchgate.net.

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Full review: The study provides an economical model based on the game theory to estimate the optimal inspection rates in order to deter perpetrators from smuggling weapons into the U.S. The model assumes the customs or Border agency aims at minimizing the expected damages and cost of inspections while perpetrators are simultaneously trying to maximize their rewards. The used parameters are number of attackers, estimated damages, the cost of inspecting a container, the cost of a smuggling attempt, the cost of retaliation and the probability of detecting weapons. Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network.  Cost of a smuggling attempt are the costs of acquiring, developing or manufacturing the weapons, and any logistical costs required to smuggle them into the U.S.  It is assumed the government agency announces publicly the inspection level and set of retaliation policies. Retaliation policy must pose a credible threat that means the governmental agency would retaliate even if that were not economically justified.

The study has four main limitations. First, the paper does not describe under what conditions the model works well or poorly. The quality of strategic and tactical intelligence, the efficiency of criminal investigation and prosecution processes, the extent of inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, the degree of private sector involvement and successfulness of awareness campaigns on retaliation policies are probably factors that influence on the model and its parameters. Second, the study does not provide numerical estimates to the parameters such as detection rates and cost of retaliation. Third, it is very unlikely that weapons of mass destructions are transported in containers into the U.S., what makes it difficult to assess the usefulness of the model in real life cases. Forth, costs of retaliation are not calculated and published by law enforcement agencies, thus criminals cannot make decision based on financial risks.

Despite of these limitations the CORE project can adapt the game theory and benefit from the paper. Traditionally law enforcement agencies highlight the number of seizures, arrests and successful prosecutions to measure operations and their impacts. The presented model brings two interesting components, a cost of crime attempt and a cost of retaliation. If criminal activities are financed and managed based on the same principles like legal ones, expected losses due to seizures of illicit goods or drugs are very likely calculated in the criminal business models. Consequently, making criminal business unprofitable is key to stop criminal activities. The approach enables to model the dynamic between costs and rewards from viewpoints of both law enforcement and criminal actors. In the other words, the model makes possible to study two dimensions in the Innovation Agenda, societal costs and friction costs caused by implemented security measures.

Reference: Bier, Vicki M. & Haphuriwat, N. (2011). Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks. Annals of Operations Research, 187(1), 137–158.

 

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Global supply chain design considerations: Mitigating product safety and security risks (Speier et al. 2011)

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Summary

There is a broad consensus among supply chain professionals that supply chain disruptions are very bad for business: supply chain glitches commonly lower operational performance and reduce shareholder value. Regardless of this, there is surprisingly little research on supply chain design strategies that have the highest potential to mitigate the risk of disruptions. Based on interviews with 75 US-based managers, an industry survey and a case study, Speier et al. (2011) identify types of SCS strategies and examine how contextual factors influence business managers to select a set of SCS design strategies. They argue that the depth and breadth of security initiatives depend mainly on top management mindfulness, operational complexity, product risk and coupling. The abstract is available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

The paper of Speier et al. (2011) is quite theoretical and it has therefore only a limited impact on CORE work. It is useful for people for the CORE demonstrators to be aware of various supply chain design strategies and factors that support their selection. All in all, the paper introduces an interesting table that shows what supply chain factors typically affect selection of certain supply chain design strategies (see table below). The paper also includes a useful discussion about the nature of supply chain security risks. The authors point out that supply chain security covers risks of contamination, damage and destruction of products or other supply chain assets, and that these risks may arise from intentional or unintentional activities.

coreobservatory300620162

Reference

Speier, C., Whipple, J. M., Closs, D. J., & Voss, M. D. (2011). Global supply chain design considerations: mitigating product safety and security risks. Journal of Operations Management, 29(7), 721-736.

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Controlling access to pick-up and delivery vans: the cost of alternative measures (Haelterman et al. 2012)

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Summary

The situational crime prevention theory suggests that preventive security measures often backfire. For this reason, it is problematic that many managers do not have a holistic picture which kind of considerations should precede selection of implementation of security measures. A paper by Haelterman et al. (2012) tests the practical feasibility of a new management model that is designed to highlight the most promising preventive security measures given a set of preconditions and costs. The authors apply this model in the context of pick-up and delivery van operations at a Belgian branch of a major express courier company. Such transport operations are subject to risk of theft and terrorism, especially if unauthorized people managed break into pick-up and delivery vans. To test the management model, the authors collect views of of supply chain practitioners in two expert panels and through a survey. Their analysis covers a broad array of preventive security measures including key card, audible alarm, silent alarm + GPS, notification on vehicles, awareness training, no company logos, formal instructions / compliance checks & sanctioning, double drivers, over security escorts. The abstract is available at: http://link.springer.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

The research of Haelterman et al. (2012) sets a solid theoretical basis for practical supply chain security work. All CORE work packages that cover aspects of road transport benefit from the analysis of this research paper. The research shows that a set of preconditions influence outcomes of preventive security measures: availability (legal, infrastructure), practicability (perceived), required knowledge, required expertise, user awareness, user belief, use commitment (anticipated), and co-operation. Security measures also incur different kinds of costs: financial costs, ethical/social cost (labeling, distrust, civil liberties, inequalities), aesthetical cost. Finally, as the theory on situational crime prevention suggests, security measures may result into various reverse effects, including crime displacement (geographical, temporal, target, tactical, crime types), escalating effects (e.g., use of violence), creative adaptation, and enticement effects.

Reference

Haelterman, H., Callens, M., & Vander Beken, T. (2012). Controlling access to pick-up and delivery vans: the cost of alternative measures. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 18(2), 163-182.

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The displacement effect in cargo theft (Ekwall 2009)

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Summary

Cargo theft has always been a problem for shippers and logistics service providers. Even so, regardless of the persistent efforts to reduce cargo theft, crime continues to strive. This classic supply chain security paper by Daniel Ekwall analyzes and explains why cargo theft continues to occur in the transport network despite all implemented countermeasures. Focusing on Swedish transport and logistics facilities, the Ekwall’s research builds on interviews with six subject matter experts, survey with four terminal operators, and macro-statistics from TAPA (Transported Asset Protection Association). The paper finds some evidence on crime displacement in terms of method (modus operandi): cargo thieves target increasingly cargo in-transit because logistics facilities are nowadays better protected. However, displacement is likely to be partial in contrast to complete displacement. This means that absolute theft risk can be reduced. Download the abstract here: http://www.emeraldinsight.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

The Ekwall’s research gives an interesting overview on criminological theories underpinning supply chain security research. The theoretical outlook provides the foundation for the CORE work and all CORE work packages can therefore benefit from the analytical discussion and findings of this research paper. The main lesson is that criminals and terrorists are calculating antagonists who adapt their behavior in response to information on risks and rewards of crime opportunities. More specifically, Ekwall argues that professional cargo thieves seem to target increasingly “cargo on wheels” instead of warehoused goods. He explains this shift in the behavior with the fact that, facility security has improved relatively more than in-transit security over the past decade. However, he stresses that it is hard to establish a causal relationship between security interventions and changes in criminal behavior. He holds further that if displacement occurs, it is likely to be partial rather than complete.

Reference

Ekwall, D. (2009b). The displacement effect in cargo theft. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 39(1), 47-62.

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Interview with Mr. Thorsten Neumann on TAPA EMEA

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21.6.2016: Today’s CBRA Interview is with Mr. Thorsten Neumann, from TAPA EMEA and Microsoft.

Hey Thorsten, can you first tell a bit about yourself and what you do?

Hey Juha, thanks for the opportunity to give an interview for the CBRA. First of all, my name is Thorsten Neumann, and I’m the chair of the Transport Assets Protection Association TAPA Europe, Middle East and Africa. I’m leading the board of directors in EMEA and I am the representative in the TAPA Worldwide Council. Furthermore, I’m the director for channel security management at Microsoft within the ANTIPIRACY services department, and I’m leading all our risk management-related Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and Volume Licensing (VL) efforts inside our company. I’m in charge of business resilience, as well.

Can you tell more on TAPA EMEA: What are your main activities in the field of supply chain security?

Since TAPA was founded in 1997 in the US by four major global manufacturing companies, the organization has transformed into a completely new business model. And what we mainly do is, that we connect the dots within the end-to-end supply chain security world. In TAPA EMEA, we have people who are experts in various technologies, industries and countries. If you take a look what we’ve achieved in the last ten to twenty years, you can see that our security certification model has been very successful. It is today one of the most important pillars within the TAPA organization globally. The certification program covers mainly the Freight Security Requirements (FSR) and the Truck Security Requirements (TSR). We are now also working on new Parking Security Requirements (PSR). We also offer a lot of other services and systems, like the Incident Information Service (IIS) that provide tremendous benefits to our members. TAPA is involved in regulatory affairs, as well: we are interacting with the European Commission, the United Nations, the World Customs Organization and other great institutions – they all see us as the leading industry association fighting cargo theft in the global supply chain.

How would you describe both the benefits and challenges of conducting industry-academia research in the field of supply chain security?

Considering the ongoing TAPA-CBRA work, I think increased transparency and the opportunity to identify and fix the weakest security links in the supply chain are the main benefits. I do strongly believe in proactive partnerships with research experts who are capable of identifying and analysing return on investment linked to the great work we are doing as an association. I trust on CBRA’s professional skills and their outstanding network. I’m convinced that, with inputs from TAPA members, CBRA will build the most robust model possible for estimating the total cost of cargo theft. From the study point of view, I’m looking forward to work with you guys.

Can you elaborate a bit on the “Total Cost of Cargo Theft” study background and the expected outcomes of it?

In the first kick-off phase, we try to estimate the total cost of cargo theft in all three TAPA regions – EMEA, Americas and APAC. This study gives us a unique, global overview on the total cost of cargo theft and estimates on various cost components that account for the total cost. I’m proud to work together with CBRA, the Borås University in Sweden and Texas A&M in the US. The plan is also to engage the Singapore Institute for Materials Management (SIMM) in the study.

The background and motive of this study is the following: we are operating in a very competitive business environment, and therefore security managers need to justify and explain budget that they spend on cargo security. With this study, we could underline how dramatic impact cargo theft has not only on company profits but also on the entire economy of a country. If you take a look on what is happening right now for example in Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France, but also in South Africa, Brazil, Malaysia and so forth, you realize the seriousness of modern cargo crime. The study would give us the analytical background and results we need to sell what we do also to the government, to our own companies, to the CEO, CFO, but also of course the WCO, as one of the driving factors of fight against criminals within the supply chain.

Thanks a lot for this interview, Thorsten! By the way, HEC University of Lausanne Executive MBA students learn every spring about the latest & greatest in supply chain security management, including from “TAPA activists” like our buddy Gilad…. Maybe next year you could also join as a guest lecturer at the UNIL eMBA class?

I would be really happy and proud to be a guest lecturer at your university. This fits quite nicely my current activities as I’m already running lectures at the University in Bremen. Count me in and see you in the class room next year. Thanks!

New survey on European postal security

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PostEurop and Cross-border Research Association have launched a new online survey on postal security management to promote further development and implementation of best security practices in the postal sector. The survey is part of the ongoing SAFEPOST project that the European Commission is co-funding under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). SAFEPOST project going to finish in the end of July after four years of work towards higher postal security in the European Union.

The survey studies the current state of postal security management among PostEurop members, 52 postal operators in 49 European countries. The goal is to collect responses mainly from security and safety managers of the PostEurop members, but also postal expert familiar with sorting and distribution processes are welcome to provide their inputs. The first part of the survey focuses on security implementation and security performance, and the second part studies postal managers’ expectations and concerns regarding the following six main SAFEPOST innovations:

Common Postal Security Space:

SAFEPOST has created an online platform for sharing security-related information between postal operators. This Common Postal Security Space provides a digital track record of security controls and related evidence (for example X-ray images) that a postal parcel has encountered over its journey, and facilitates an easy and controlled way to exchange information both with other operators as well as the authorities.

D-tube drug screening station:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated a new screening solution, D-tube, that can be fully integrated into the sorting process. The D-Tube’s prototype detects illegal substances, such as narcotics and explosives, at high accuracy.

Explosive detection system:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated a Raman spectroscopy screening device for detecting trace amounts of explosives and explosive precursors on the outside of postal items. The device is designed to be seamlessly integrated, at the same level as X-ray machines already used today, in the sorting process and detect the explosive threats at a high accuracy and at a low false alarm rate (≈ 1 %).

Image recognition system:

SAFEPOST has developed an Image Recognition solution that photographs five visible sides of a postal parcel at one or more locations in the postal network. The solution compares these images to detect signs of tampering or damage (≈ 92% detection rate). The current solution functions properly when the conveyor belt moves no faster than 0.5 m/s.

Radiological screening:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated detection of radiation in moving parcels, that can be fully integrated into the sorting process. The current version of the detector is able to detect any harmful level of radiation, and identify the radioactive isotope, and when possible to consider effects of possible attempts of hiding the radioactivity with lead or other shielding material by detecting neutron radiation.

Security standard and certificate:

SAFEPOST project is working towards a new European security standard for the postal operators that would give recommendations about use of security inspection technologies, exchange of security-related information, cyber security, and key security performance indicators. This standard would pave the road towards a voluntary security certification program that would help the postal operators to show their commitment to security.

This survey research is expected to produce interesting new insights about postal security activities and security performance among the PostEurop members. If the response rate is high, the survey findings will set a basis for pan-European benchmarking of security activities. The findings would also contribute to smart policy making, legislation, and standardisation in the field of postal security.

Finally, depending on the response rate, CBRA is going to publish an academic journal paper based on the results. Building on solid theory on supply chain security risk management, the journal paper would provide new empirical about how supply chain security implementation is associated operational and security performance. We expect that collaborative security measures improve both on-time delivery performance (a proxy for operational performance) and supply chain security performance simultaneously. Collaborative security measures include survey items such as “we coordinate security activities with our business customers” and “we exchange customs declaration information with customs authorities electronically [for example, ITMATT or CUSITM messages]”. Another hypothesis is that, on the one hand, non-collaborative security contributes to supply chain security performance but decrease on-time delivery performance on the other hand. Examples of such non-collaborative measures include “we use tamper-evident mail bags to transport high-value postal items” and “We perform security controls also on non-airmail items to detect explosives.” The figure below summarises the theory and hypotheses of the research paper.

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Figure 1 Theoretical framework of the SAFEPOST survey paper

The survey findings will be presented in the final SAFEPOST meeting in Madrid 5-6 July 2016. After the meeting, we hope that we can expand the scope of the survey to cover the rest of the world, as well. The next step would be to contact representatives of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and coordinate distribution of the survey into the organisations’ 192 member countries.

 

CASSANDRA compendium. Technologies for supply chain visibility and security (Ch. 8)

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Summary: Chapter 8 of the CASSANDRA compendium reviews current and future technologies that help managers to improve visibility and security over global end-to-end supply chains. The supply chain visibility technologies, in essence, provide logistics managers with a variety of information – shipment data, performance metrics, inventory levels, production / delivery schedules and sales forecast, for example – in or close to real time. The chapter’s review on supply chain security technologies focus mainly on security sensors (e.g., motion detectors), container seals, biometric user authentication devices (e.g., fingerprints), and non-intrusive inspection equipment (e.g., X-ray screening stations). The section also elaborates modern ways for sharing information among stakeholders that are concerned about security of the supply chain. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: Chapter 8 includes some interesting details and insights about modern visibility and security technologies, many of which are relevant especially for CORE demonstrations but also for other work packages such as WP2 (SCS controls), WP7 (CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment) and WP8 (CORE Ecosystem).

Many large logistics operators have developed own supply chain visibility systems to coordinate and organise logistics operations. A large logistics service provider, Kühne+Nagel uses its KN login visibility system that allows the company to optimise its complex global operations in terms of speed, time-certainty, security and cost-efficiency and many other relevant metrics. DHL, a German-based international express courier and logistics company, uses its LOGIS software for its operations. Previous EU projects have also developed visibility systems, for example Smart CM SICIS (Shared Intermodal Container Information System).

These visibility systems enable fast response to most operational contingencies that are about cause deviations from original plans. For instance, if a shipper got instant information about a stolen container, a new delivery could be quickly arranged and the consignee could be informed as soon as possible about the reshipment. Moreover, the visibility systems often interface ITC systems of other key stakeholders in the international supply chains. Customs, for example, receive advance cargo information (ACI) automatically from these systems.

The second part of the chapter 8 focuses exclusively on security technologies. The review starts with description of security sensors that are designed to detect tampering, unplanned detours, and other suspicious events in the supply chain. The modern sensor technologies sense at least changes in lighting, acceleration, location (geo-fencing functionality), motion and CO2 levels (used, e.g., to detect stowaways inside shipping containers). The chapter introduces modern user authentication technologies (e.g., fingerprints, face, retina, hand geometry and other unique biometric characteristics). Some information is provided regarding non-intrusive screening solutions that are often considered to be necessary for fast and secure screening operations. The rest of the chapter discusses various technical and institutional solutions for exchanging security-relevant information among supply chain operators and relevant government agencies. Especially interoperability of ICT systems seems to be crucial for effective security efforts in the global supply chains. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapter 8

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CASSANDRA compendium. Private sector perspectives on risk management (Ch. 5) and crime prevention and security management in supply chains (Ch. 6)

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Summary: Chapters 5 & 6 of the CASSANDRA compendium provide a general overview on supply chain security risk management from the private sector perspective. Explaining the essentials of supply chain risk management, Chapter 5 introduces commonly used risk management models and tools (e.g., risk matrices and risk registers), discusses various classifications of supply chain risks, and elaborates current trends of risks and risk management in the supply chain context. Chapter 6 focuses on specific challenges of supply chain security risks – the risks that arise from intentional, man-made criminal activities such as terrorism, theft, trafficking, and sabotage. The chapter explains a few early classifications of supply chain security risks (e.g., motive-based typology and taxonomies based on private sector perspectives). Following the classifications of security risks, the chapter puts forth a few models for managing security risks in the supply chain context (e.g., the 8-layer model for supply chain security management). The chapter concludes with a detailed case study on security management of an international security company and a comparison of supply chain security management and the total quality management (TQM) management philosophy. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: Previous observatory entries have already shown the relevance of the CASSANDRA compendium to the community of supply chain management professionals. The compendium’s chapters 5 & 6 give a brief summary of risk management and security risk management in the context of international supply chains. The contents of the chapters are relevant and useful for people involved in FP7 CORE project, especially for those involved in work packages 3 (Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis Suite) and 4 (SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps).

Chapter 5 elaborates a set of common supply chain risk management tools. The model of Waters (2007) summarises rather obvious three steps of the risk management process: identifying risks, analysing risks and responding to risks. The model proposes, for example, that managers can identify supply chain risks through analysis of past events, collection of opinions, and through operational analysis. The model also calls for managerial attention to prerequisites of successful risk management – mutual trust, cooperation and information exchange among relevant stakeholders involved in supply chain management – and highlights importance of continuous monitoring and controlling the risk management process. The chapter concludes with the four classic approaches to risk management: risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer (e.g., insurance and contractual agreements), and acceptance. The classifications of supply chain risks include typologies focusing on risk sources (natural hazards operational failure and terrorism), risk consequences (e.g., risk to operations, risk to reputation and risk to profits), and objects of vulnerability (e.g., information, materials, personnel and financial flows).

The chapter on crime prevention and security management (Ch. 6) in supply chains provides a concise summary on supply chain security management from the private sector perspective. The chapter starts by describing some early classifications of supply chain security risks. A motive-based taxonomy classifies such risks into the three categories: economic crime (profit as motive), other crime types (ideological, emotional and other reasons as motive) and facilitating crime that covers activities that do not bring direct crime benefits but help committing other rewarding crime crimes later on. (e.g., document fraud, bribery and use of intimidation). The chapter’s next section elaborates ways to mitigate security risks in the global supply chains, highlighting the key ideas of the so-called 8-layer model for supply chain security management (the model incorporates multiple aspects of risk assessment, hands-on design and planning, implementation of a variety of technologies, procedures, and incentives as well as preparation for dealing with the consequences of supply chain crime). The chapter provides also a case study with an international tobacco company that runs high security risk supply chain operations. The section also contrasts, rather interestingly, principles of security management against the fundaments of the total quality management (TQM) management philosophy. The chapter continues with a brief review of regulations (e.g., EU customs security and aviation security regulations) and standards on supply chain security management (World Customs Organization’s SAFE framework of standards, and industry standards of the Transported Asset Protection Association).

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapters 5 & 6

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PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM, Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO, November 2011 (CORE1060)

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Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has granted almost 1.7 billion USD to port security through the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The program is administered by a component agency of DHS, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This GAO reports highlights some problems that the grant program has encountered. The first issue is that the risk assessment the FEMA uses to assess risk levels and assign grants to different ports does not take into account how security improvements affect the vulnerability of the ports to terrorist attacks. The report recommends the FEMA to design a vulnerability index that accounts for security improvement and to coordinate with the Coast Guard to get access to the most accurate vulnerability and threat information. The second issue with the grant program is that much of the grant money does not get used and translate into practical port security projects. The GAO report proposes acceleration of the grant granting process with updated administrative procedures and with more administrative staff.  Finally, this GAO report recommends the FEMA to develop performance metrics to assess its administration in relation to the Port Security Grant Program. The contents of this GAO report is not very relevant to CORE because no US seaports are partners in the project. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf.

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Full review: This document has only a limited relevance for CORE because the consortium does not involve any US seaport operators. The demonstrations of WP9 and WP14 that cover shipping of goods from and into the US through local seaports might find it useful to learn about how US ports can apply for funds to improve the security. Otherwise, other demonstrations do not benefit much of this information. However, the CORE’s risk cluster can benefit from the rather detailed description of the risk analysis model in the report’s Appendix II.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan And Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
  • Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed. GAO-11-153R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Additional keywords: Critical infrastructure protection (CIP), maritime security and security of supply, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)

 

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Needs to Enhance Its Guidance and Oversight of High-Risk Maritime Cargo Shipments, GAO, January 2015 (CORE1059)

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Summary: The report reviews the US Customs and Border Protection’s (CPB) approach to risk assessment and targeting of maritime shipping containers. The report’s highlights that CPB does not have clear decision rules and reporting procedures to monitor percentage of containers that the risk assessment system flags high-risk and that get eventually examined. The source of this problem is that the CPB’s officials (targeters) may waive examination of the high-risk containers if the container (i) falls within a predetermined category (standard exception), or (ii) the targeters can articulate why the shipment should not be considered high risk. The targeting units have currently differing definitions of “standard exceptions” and differing views on what constitutes the “articulate reasons.” The GAO report recommends the CPB to clarify, harmonize and enforce the rules and the procedures for waiving the high-risk containers from examination. As for CORE, this report provides a detailed and recent outlook on the US maritime risk assessment and targeting scheme, and this information is going to support work of the CORE’s risk cluster and the demonstrations that involve shipping of sea containers into the US. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/670/668098.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO reports contains crucial information about the US risk assessment and container targeting systems that benefit the CORE’s risk cluster. The report outlines principles, procedures, datasets and scanning methods that constitute the world’s most advanced risk assessment system for maritime shipping containers. The CORE’s IT cluster might also benefit from the report’s description of the CPB’s Automated Targeting System (ATS) that is used to compute risk scores for shipping containers and flag the ones with the highest score as high-risk. Regarding the CORE demonstrations, the GM demon (WP19) must comply with data requirements (24-hour rule and the “10+2” rule) that enable the US risk assessment and targeting system. Also the demos involving customs controls, especially WP11.2 and WP10.1, may learn something from the ways how the US border control authorities are assessing risk levels of incoming containers.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System. GAO-13-9. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.
  • Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders. GAO-14-196T. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2013.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.

Additional keywords: Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements (known as the 10+2 rule), 24-hour rule, risk assessment

 

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