MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO, September 2012 (CORE1013)

Summary: This GAO report reviews how the US government has advanced maritime security since the introduction of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 2002 and what kind of challenges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies have encountered in translating the Act’s requirements into practice. The report describes in detail the character, progress and future vision of main US maritime security programs, which, according to the report, fall into four domains: (1) security planning, (2) port and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information exchange and (4) international supply chain security. The report points out that the US maritime security scheme calls for further improvements in the areas of (1) program management and implementation, (2) partnerships and collaboration, (3) resources, funding, and sustainability as well as (4) performance measures.  This report describes the entire field of US maritime security, and this information is very useful for CORE demonstrations that involve shipping into, through or out of the US ports. The report is available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647999.pdf

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Full review: This scope of this GAO document is broad as it covers the entire US maritime security, its many themes from funding to practical initiatives and risk assessment. CORE’s demonstrations that involve US-related maritime shipping can use this document to get a comprehensive and detailed information about the status and future challenges of the US maritime security scheme. Also the CORE’s risk cluster can use this document to analyze how the US government has established a risk-based, layered security system to protect the seaborne trade and logistics from terrorism, smuggling and other criminal activities. Because of the complete description of the US maritime security scheme, the report is excellent reference material for producing training material and educational contents in the CORE training cluster.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010. See pages 10-11.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. See pages 15-19.
  • Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
  • Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning. GAO-12-422T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012. See pages 13-14.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009. See pages 41-43.
  • Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2008.

CORE1013

Additional keywords: Maritime Transportation Security Act, Secure Freight Initiative, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI), risk assessment, container screening, counter-terrorism, maritime security

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Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration 2015 (CORE2010)

Summary

This document sets a vision of the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the primary border control agency present at the US borders, for year 2020. The vision builds on four general goals and associated objectives that aim to improve safety, security and prosperity of the American people. Collaboration, risk management as well as exchange and exploitation of information and intelligence are in the heart of the vision document and integral elements of its goals and objectives. The vision document is available at: http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

The vision’s first goal is to counter transnational terrorism and crime at and beyond the US borders. Keys to effective counter-terrorism and anti-crime efforts are understanding of threat landscape as well as interagency and international coordination on border management. The second goal is about promoting a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to border security and management, in order to exploit complementary capabilities of various border control agencies to the fullest extent. Specific objectives underpinning this goal are “situational awareness of the air, land and maritime borders”, “detection, interdiction and disruption of illegal border activities” and “strengthening comprehensive trade enforcement. Here the key is to collect information and intelligence about trade flows and carry out risk assessment to identify and target high-risk cargo movements and facilitate low-risk traffic. Other objectives are strengthening processes to conduct out-bound enforcement and interdiction of travelers and cargo as well as advance a comprehensive, predictive targeting strategy to identify threats as early as possible.

The third goal is about enhancing the US economic competitiveness by facilitating lawful trade and travel. The goal consists of objectives that seek to reduce cost of trade and travel by streamlining customs processes. Other objectives are to harmonize procedures throughout US government agencies and to develop risk-segmentation for better facilitation of low-risk trade and travel. Agility and adaptability of the CBP organization is the fourth goal. Sub-goals, or objectives, include optimization of CBP’s organizational structure, strengthening organizational structure and advance CBP’s effectiveness through technologies and business innovations. The vision document concludes with a presentation of principles and process of risk management in the customs context.

This vision document contains lots of relevant information for many CORE work packages, especially for those that deal with US-bound supply chains (WP9, WP14 and WP17. Certainly, also work packages dealing with risk assessment and educational material benefit from this material. Altogether, revealing strategic priorities of the CBP, the document reflects the trends of customs-centric supply chain security worldwide, and this information is very valuable for CORE and its work packages.

Reference

US CBP, 2015. Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration

CORE2010

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Criminalization of global supply chains, by Mr. Hamon

Hi David, and thanks for joining a CBRA Interview – can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I served in the US Army as a logistician, served with the United Nations Peacekeeping Department as well as work with the UN humanitarian organizations.  I recently retired from a not-for-profit government contractor to pursue more creative work.  Whilst at the latter position I was seconded to the US Defense Department, first in African Affairs, and then as Research and Studies Director for a strategic studies office within a US Defense Agency.  I currently work, mostly independently, on a great many things related to future threats and re-defining of security/stability as it pertains and impacts diplomacy, development, defense, society, and economics/finance.

We met first time in Lausanne, Switzerland, around 2005 – what was that roundtable event again about?

Many years before cyber based terror threats were on the radar, we launched an inquiry into what we termed “Economic/Financial Terrorism” and whether security threats emanating from terrorism in the future would take the form of attacks on the Western system of finance and the economy.  We brought in a host of experts from the US and Europe to debate the changing face of terrorism and likely goals of future terror groups.  We examined everything from evolving ideology, motivation and intent, culture and identity to strategy, tactics, targets, weapons, and groups.  It was an extremely interesting event with industry admitting – at the time – they were not prepared for this phenomenon and governments largely split on the issue.  Additionally, experts and think tanks disagreed on whether economic terrorism was tangible.  It was very forward-looking for its time.  All participants came away with greater awareness on the subject as we went above and beyond what is currently called “financial crimes,” exploring potential kinetic based threats terror groups would use against the economic and financial machinery that included physical attacks on the supply chain, tourist industry, psychological undermining of the Western economic system to disrupt the normal provision of goods and services.

Can you tell more about your views on ´criminalization of global supply chains´?

I take similar views on the subject as Dr. Moisés Naim, in his 2005 book ‘Illicit: How smugglers, traffickers, and copycats are hijacking the global economy.’ He addresses several tenants that remain true today including the role of governments, technology, the Illicit traders mimicking licit trade and logistics actors – while simultaneously collaborating with many of them, and criminal groups seek high-profit opportunities as opposed to any other attribution (see CBRA Blog 21 October 2014).  Terror groups care less about profit but when thinking about logistics networks, what if the two groups collaborated?  Today logistics systems are more complex and move faster than ever in history, have less margin to fail, are far less ‘hands-on’ and offer many ways and places to hide illegal activity.  Detection and interdiction of this activity isn’t exclusively in the realm of governments. Industry has a role to play if it wishes to minimize new regulations, taxes, deter corruption, and other drains on efficiency and profit.  Experts, both public and private, rarely take a systems approach to detecting criminal activity with much throughput going undetected.  Both parties want to specialize on one aspect and miss the big picture.  A good example was the AQ Khan network.  How long has it been since industry has undertaken an assessment of whether there is a new “Khan” network out there?  Do trade organizations war-game with governments on criminality within supply chains?

Interesting! What are your views on ‘multi-commodity trafficking / crime portfolios’?

At the last corporate organization where I worked my team did some analysis on unregulated, illegal fishing as a security threat to Pacific Island nations.  In the course of this analysis, we discovered it was the same actors doing the illegal fishing as doing illegal dumping, illegal smuggling, illegal trafficking, among other illicit activities.  The criminality was only one aspect of the supply chain as the “demand” side as well as the delivery side was entirely legal and within businesses who conduct practically all business legally.  The same boats as platforms – and their crews – were used to conduct all activity legal and illegal and to the local authorities – as well as donor nations attempting to help – it was impossible to project accurately when the activity would switch between licit and illicit.  We couldn’t analyze if this was a regional or global phenomena but I guess it was a widely copied practice.  As Anthony Barone has pointed out, border management and controls are not the panacea of containment but need to be part of a larger practice (see CBRA Interview 18 December 2015). Criminals use technology just as effectively!  His idea of assembling a group of independent experts to rethink new approaches to border management – and I might add, redefining the meaning of borders and how thinking differently about borders per se – is a good start.   Using strategic foresight come up with several alternative futures to present to a dedicated [supply chain] private-public partnership empowered to make changes would be my overarching recommendation

Sounds that the global supply chain community is facing increasingly more threats and risks! Any other suggestions on how to improve the situation, both short term and long term?

In the short term, as I mentioned, conduct a public-private-partnership exercise to rethink the concept supply chain surveillance for illicit activity and anticipating new and emerging illicit activity.  In the long run, we don’t give enough thought to knowledge as a part of the supply chain.  Using the supply chain for illicit activity begins with motivation and intent getting out in front of those who may do harm.  To address alternative futures will take some innovation and creativity, but the stakes are high.  The next AQ Khan Network may bring very bad things into Europe (and beyond!) compliments of ISIS.  We don’t know what knowledge the current refugee population possesses that may be part of some future attack on the financial and economic system of the EU or if some refugees worked on chemical or biological programs in their countries of origin.

Thanks David for this interview – and let´s start working towards a joint project on these topics of common professional and research interest!

Web-links:

https://www.cross-border.org/2014/10/21/dr-naim-on-illicit-trade/

https://www.cross-border.org/interviews/new-approaches-to-border-management/

Trade and money laundering uncontained (the Economist, May 2014, CORE2006)

Summary

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls.

The new methods for cross-border money laundering and tax evasion concern most CORE demonstrations, especially those involving international cargo movements. The emerging risk of trade-based money laundering calls for new and more effective enforcement of trade transactions. CORE is developing new solutions (e.g., data pipeline and system-based supervision) for capturing and sharing trade information across logistics operators and law enforcement agencies. The new solutions likely improve law enforcement’s capability to detect suspicious trade transactions that may have something to do with the trade-based money laundering. However, building such capability requires IT integration (e.g., interoperability), risk awareness and education and training. CORE consortium addresses these complementary activities in work carried out in risk, IT and educational clusters.

Reference

Trade and money laundering uncontained, the Economist, May 3rd 2014

CORE2006

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