WP9 - Cross-border Research Association

Border Agency Cooperation, Part 3 of 3

February 20, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, Blog, CBRA, Coordinated border management, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Data sharing, Demo-cluster, Environmental agency, Exporter, Freight forwarder, Global, Human trafficking, Importer, IT-cluster, Manufacturer, Mutual Recognition Agreement, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scanning, Screening, Shipper, Single window, Supply chain security, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP2, WP3, WP6, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

The last blog in our three-part series on Border Agency Cooperation introduces a conceptual framework capturing the essential dimensions of Border Agency Coordination: three levels of collaboration, four areas of integration and four objects for sharing. We hope that the framework helps the customs and other border agency communities to see all levels of Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) so that they can move from isolated coexistence towards more active cooperation at the borders. Higher levels of cooperation are likely to translate into higher levels of trade facilitation, control over cross-border cargo flows and resource efficiency, simultaneously. Compared with the previous BAC Blog Part 2, this BAC Blog Part 3 intends to present a comprehensive framework surrounding BAC ambitions, plans, implementations and monitoring activities – while the previous BAC Bloc 2 focused purely on a set of 15 key BAC actions, grouped according to the main beneficiary groups. This final BAC Blog has been written by Dr. Toni Männistö of CBRA.

Let’s start by first presenting the BAC diagram: Conceptual framework on Border Agency Cooperation (source: Männistö, T., and Hintsa J., 2015; inspired by Polner, 2011 and by Institute of Policy Studies, 2008)

Levels of cooperation

Intra-agency cooperation is about aligning goals and work within one organization, either horizontally between departments or vertically between headquarters and local branches, in particular border-crossing offices / stations. Ways to foster horizontal intra-agency cooperation include development of intranet networks, cross-training, inter-departmental rotation of staff, and establishment of joint task forces that tackle multifaceted challenges like transnational terrorism. Ideally, the vertical cooperation would be bi-directional: headquarters would define priorities and objectives and then communicate them to local branches. The branches would, reciprocally, send back status reports and suggest improvements to the general policies. Solving intra-agency cooperation lays a basis for broader cooperation: it’s hard for any organization to cooperate efficiently with external stakeholders if it struggles with internal problems. The logical first step in coordinated border management is therefore breaking departmental silos and building a culture of cooperation within boundaries of one organization.

Inter-agency cooperation, at the operational level, concerns relationships among a broad range of border agencies that play a role in controlling cross-border trade and travel. In many countries, primary agencies present at the borders include customs, border guards, immigration authorities and transport security agencies. However, also police organizations, health authorities, and phytosanitary and veterinary controllers, among others, take part in border management. According to a recent study, typical areas of customs- border guard inter-agency cooperation can include strategic planning, communication and information exchange, coordination of workflow of border crossing points, risk analysis, criminal investigations, joint operations, control outside border control points, mobile units, contingency/emergency, infrastructure and equipment sharing, and training and human resource management (CSD, 2011). Governmental inter-agency cooperation occurs between border control agencies and ministries and policy making bodies that are responsible for oversight and financing of border management activities.

International cooperation may take place locally at both sides of a border. One Stop Border Posts, OSBPs – border crossings managed jointly by two neighboring countries – are prime examples of such cooperation. One Stop Border Posts can involve various forms of collaboration: harmonization of documentation, shared maintenance of the infrastructure, joint or mutually recognized controls, exchange of data and information and common investments in infrastructure and so forth. Operational arrangements between the Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish customs illustrate advanced international cross-border cooperation that save time and money of border control authorities and trading companies. The cooperation builds on division of labor, where the national border authorities of each country are allowed to provide services and exercise legal powers of their home country and neighboring countries. For instance, when goods are exported from Norway, all paperwork related to both exports and imports may be attended by either Swedish, Finnish or Norwegian customs office (Norwegian Customs, 2011). At the political level, this requires international cooperation between authorities and policy makers in two or more countries. Operational cooperation (e.g., mutual recognition of controls or regional Single Window), often bringing tangible trade facilitation benefits, usually follows from political, supranational decisions (e.g., the WCO’s Revised Kyoto Convention and SAFE Framework of Standards).

Areas of integration

Technical integration often entails improving connectivity and interoperability of information and communication technology systems within and across organizations. Single Window solutions are typical outcomes of technical cooperation as they enable automatic exchange of electronic trade information among border control agencies. The UN Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, UN/CEFACT, is an important international organization helping to build connectivity across countries and between business and governmental stakeholders. UN/CEFACT, for instance, develops and maintains globally recognized standards for EDI messages.

Operational integration is largely about coordination of inspection and auditing activities among border control agencies. Benefits of synchronized activities are evident: organizing necessary controls at one place and at the same time reduces delays and administrative burden that trading companies and travelers face at borders. A simple and powerful example of operational integration is coordination of opening hours and days of customs offices at the both sides of a border. Operational integration also covers provision of mutual administrative assistance, joint criminal investigations and prosecution, and sharing of customs intelligence and other information.

Legislative integration seeks to remove legal barriers and ambiguities that prevent border control agencies from exchanging information, sharing responsibilities or otherwise deepening their cooperation. Essentially, most forms of Border Agency Coordination require some degree of legislative harmonization and political commitment. For example, Article 8 of the WTO/TFA to the WTO Members requires that national authorities and agencies responsible for border controls and dealing with the importation, exportation and transit of goods must cooperate with one another and coordinate their activities in order to facilitate trade.

Institutional integration is about restructuring roles and responsibilities of border controls agencies. An example of a major restructuring is the annexing of US border control agencies – including the US Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration and Coast Guard – into the Depart ment of Homeland Security, DHS, a body that took over the key governmental functions involved in the US non-military counter-terrorism efforts in the aftermaths of the September 11^th, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Objects of sharing

Sharing of information – data, knowledge and intelligence – reduce duplicate work (e.g., sharing of audit findings), enable operational coordination (e.g., synchronized border controls) and facilitate development of common agenda for future border agency coordination. At the global level, the WCO’s Customs Enforcement Network CEN is an example of a trusted communication system for exchanging information and intelligence, especially seizure records, between customs officials worldwide. Another WCO initiative, the Globally Networked Customs, analyzes potential to further “rationalize, harmonize and standardize the secure and efficient exchange of information between WCO Members” (WCO 2015).

Resource sharing involves multi-agency joint investments in equipment, facilities, IT systems, databases, expertise and other common resources. The joint investment activities are likely to result in higher resource utilization and bulk purchasing discounts. For example, national and regional Single Window solutions are often outcomes of joint development and investment activities of various government agencies.

Sharing of work is mostly about rationalization of overlapping border control activities, controls and formalities. If two border control agencies, for instance, agree to recognize each other’s controls, there is no need to control the same goods more than once. Combining forces to investigate and prosecute crime also often help border control agencies to use their limited resources more efficiently.

Sharing of responsibilities is about coordinating and streamlining administrative and control tasks among border control agencies. Norway, again, sets a good example of sharing the responsibilities. The Norwegian customs represents all other border control agencies – except the veterinary office – at the frontier. Customs officers are responsible for routine border formalities, and they summon representatives of other border control agencies as and when the officers need assistance. Internationally, the Norwegian customs cooperates closely with Swedish and Finnish border control authorities at the Northern Scandinavian border posts. Bilateral agreements between its neighbors allow Norwegian customs officers authority to perform most customs checks and formalities for and on behalf of their Swedish and Finnish colleagues. The coordination decreases border-crossing times and lowers administrative costs for trading companies and the border control agencies in the three countries.

This concludes now our three-part series on Border Agency Cooperation. In Part 1, we shared an illustrative worst case example on how complex, slow and expensive a cross-border supply chain execution comes when no cooperation takes place between relevant government agencies, neither nationally nor internationally. In Part 2, we presented a conceptual BAC model with 15 key actions to improve the degree of cooperation in a given country or region – for the direct benefit of supply chain companies, or government agencies, or both. And in this Part 3, we finally presented our comprehensive BAC framework, which hopefully helps government policy makers and border agencies to design, implement and monitor their future BAC programs and initiatives in an effective and transparent manner. Toni Männistö and Juha Hintsa.

Bibliography:

Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), 2011. “Better Management of EU Borders through Cooperation”, Study to Identify Best Practices on the Cooperation Between Border Guards and Customs Administrations Working at the External Borders of the EU.

Institute of Policy Studies 2008, Better connected services for Kiwis: a discussion document for managers and front-line staff on better joining up the horizontal and vertical, Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, NZ.

Männistö, T., and Hintsa J., “Theory of Border Agency Cooperation”, CBRA working paper 2015, Lausanne, Switzerland.

Norwegian Customs, 2011. Case Study on Border Agency Cooperation Submitted by Norway for the November Symposium.

Polner, M. (2011). Coordinated border management: from theory to practice. World Customs Journal, 5(2), 49-61.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2011 Border Agency Coordination”, UNCTAD Trust Fund for Trade Facilitation Negotiations Technical Note No. 14.

Mr. Mike Ellis, INTERPOL, on illicit trade and counterfeiting

February 10, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, Capacity building, CBRA, Counter-terrorism, Counterfeiting, Customs, Customs risks, Fraud, Global, High-taxed goods, High-value goods, INTERPOL, Interviews, Manufacturer, Organized crime groups, Police, Safety, Shipper, Socio-economic impacts, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Trafficking, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP3, WP4, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Today’s CBRA Interview is with Mr. Mike Ellis who is the Assistant Director of Illicit Trade and Anti-counterfeit Sub-crime Directorate at INTERPOL, Lyon, France.

Hi Mike, can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I am the Assistant Director for Police Services at INTERPOL, based in Lyon France. INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization. Our role is to assist law enforcement agencies in our 190 member countries to combat all forms of transnational crime. We work to help police across the world meet the growing challenges of crime in the 21st century by providing a high-tech infrastructure of technical and operational support. Our services include targeted training, expert investigative support, specialized databases and secure police communications channels. I am responsible for the coordination of all activities related to illicit trade, smuggling of illicit goods and counterfeiting for the organization and police forces within our 190 member countries. I lead a team of expert officers who are engaged in training, capacity building, and operational support who operate along with my analytical support who manage risk awareness and intelligence handling.

From your perspective, how bad is the current situation with counterfeit and other illicit trade in global supply chains? Can one for example see links between illicit trade and transnational organized crime groups; or, even terrorist organizations?

For many years the clear link has been established between the trafficking of illicit goods and transnational organized crime. Criminal organizations are attracted by the lucrative profits involved in trading counterfeit or fake goods, or in trading legitimate goods through illicit channels. The criminals involved manufacture and trade illicit goods on a regional and increasingly global scale. It is well documented that they use the profits to fund other criminal activities such as drug trafficking and people smuggling, and for investment into funding subversive political groups. Selling fake or counterfeit products is one aspect of illicit trade, as is selling genuine goods on the black market to avoid paying taxes. By avoiding regulatory controls, the criminals behind these activities peddle dangerous and illicit goods with a complete disregard for the health and safety of consumers. The phenomenon has grown to an unprecedented level, posing tremendous risks to society and the global economy. Counterfeiting harms businesses which produce and sell legitimate products, governments lose tax revenue from products manufactured or sold on the black market, and consumers are at risk from substandard products.

By the way, we met first time about one year ago in Lyon at an INTERPOL workshop linked to FP7-Project CORE. One of the main objectives of CORE-project is to develop leading edge education and training materials on supply chain security – for the benefit of law enforcement agencies, supply chain practitioners, and academics alike. Can you share your views about law enforcement – academia – industry cooperation in education material development, as well as in the broader field of supply chain security management?

One of our principle functions is capacity building and training. At INTERPOL we recognize that capacity building brings with it raised identification of the impact of illicit cross-border trade and counterfeiting and all our new operations, or established operations in new regions, are preceded by a capacity building workshop. The public domain is represented by police, customs, border control officials, and prosecutors, as well as representatives from various regulatory bodies including trading standards. In addition, INTERPOL TIGC, the Trafficking in Illicit Goods and Counterfeiting program which I am heading, has developed a Mentoring Program which aims to increase cross-border, cross-industry law enforcement operational interventions by: strengthening capacity to deal with all types of cross-border trafficking in illicit and counterfeit products. We have also developed an online International Intellectual Property Crime Investigator’s College and have built already a robust network of over 10.000 law enforcement officers, and partner stakeholders with specialist knowledge and skillset. This online training course provides specialist knowledge on transnational organized crime. It is aimed at all law enforcement officials, regulatory authorities and private sector investigators who are committed in the fight against illicit trade and intellectual property crime. We aim to provide crime professionals with specialist awareness and learning on the subject of transnational organized intellectual property, IP, crime, and illicit trade, by delivery of leading-edge training that meets international standards and allows crime investigators from any discipline to quickly identify other certified investigators. Through this learning platform we also facilitate cooperation between the public and private sectors in the fight against IP crime, and ensure all public and private sector crime investigators have a common understanding of the problems facing them, while being aware of each other’s competencies and roles. We seek to promote knowledge on what intervention strategies and tactics work, in order that all stakeholders are better able to work together in partnership in enforcement operations.

Thank you Mike for this highly interesting interview. It complements well our previous interviews on similar themes – with non-law enforcement experts including Mr. David Hamon and Mr. Tony Barone. CBRA and the whole FP7-CORE consortium, around 70 partners in total, wishes to continue the great cooperation in research and education material development with INTERPOL, throughout the CORE-project, until April 2018 – and beyond! Juha.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY – Action Needed to Strengthen TSA’s Security Threat Assessment Process, GAO, 2013 (CORE1015)

February 8, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, Analytic, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Data quality, Data sharing, Demo-cluster, Document forgery, Exporter, Freight forwarder, GAO, Government, Identity theft, Importer, IT, IT-cluster, Manufacturer, Retailer, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Safety, Shipper, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Transport carrier, USA, Warehouse keeper, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP2, WP3, WP4, WP5, WP6, WP7, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: The GAO report is about measuring the performance of the Adjudication Centre that is a department within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsible for administering background checks for people who need access to secure facilities unescorted. The centre issues the access credentials based on a through vetting of the applicant’s criminal history, immigration status, and connections to terrorist groups, among other checks. The report argues that the Adjunction Centre could improve the efficiency of the background checks – the individual security threat assessment – by improving its performance measurement system through better data and indicators. Although this GAO report focuses on a rather narrow topic, management of the background checking process, the report’s insights could benefit the CORE’s risk management cluster and those demonstrations that deal with access control matters. The report is available at: http://gao.gov/assets/660/656051.pdf

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Full review: This GAO document is closely related to the work the CORE’s risk cluster. The report describes problems the TSA’s Adjudication Centre faces when it manages the background checking process of the US-based transportation worker identification credentials (TWIC), hazardous materials endorsements (HME) and Aviation Worker (AV) authorization programs. Moreover, since access control is a central security solution in nearly all CORE demonstrators, the demonstrations might benefit from tips and guidance this report offers. At the final stages of the project, this GAO report might prove a useful document when the project consortium produces training materials on how to manage access control systems and how to administer background checks.

Cross-references:

Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could Advance DHS’s Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other Infrastructure. GAO-13-11. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.

CORE1015

Additional keywords: Terrorism, background checks

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO, September 2012 (CORE1013)

February 8, 2016/0 Comments/in Analytic, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Exporter, Freight forwarder, GAO, Government, Importer, Manufacturer, Maritime, Organized crime groups, Resilience, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scanning, Screening, Sea port, Shipper, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Tracking, Trade facilitation, Transport carrier, Transport security agency, USA, WP10, WP11, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP2, WP3, WP4, WP6, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This GAO report reviews how the US government has advanced maritime security since the introduction of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 2002 and what kind of challenges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies have encountered in translating the Act’s requirements into practice. The report describes in detail the character, progress and future vision of main US maritime security programs, which, according to the report, fall into four domains: (1) security planning, (2) port and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information exchange and (4) international supply chain security. The report points out that the US maritime security scheme calls for further improvements in the areas of (1) program management and implementation, (2) partnerships and collaboration, (3) resources, funding, and sustainability as well as (4) performance measures. This report describes the entire field of US maritime security, and this information is very useful for CORE demonstrations that involve shipping into, through or out of the US ports. The report is available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647999.pdf

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Full review: This scope of this GAO document is broad as it covers the entire US maritime security, its many themes from funding to practical initiatives and risk assessment. CORE’s demonstrations that involve US-related maritime shipping can use this document to get a comprehensive and detailed information about the status and future challenges of the US maritime security scheme. Also the CORE’s risk cluster can use this document to analyze how the US government has established a risk-based, layered security system to protect the seaborne trade and logistics from terrorism, smuggling and other criminal activities. Because of the complete description of the US maritime security scheme, the report is excellent reference material for producing training material and educational contents in the CORE training cluster.

Cross-references:

Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010. See pages 10-11.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. See pages 15-19.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning. GAO-12-422T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012. See pages 13-14.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009. See pages 41-43.
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2008.

CORE1013

Additional keywords: Maritime Transportation Security Act, Secure Freight Initiative, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI), risk assessment, container screening, counter-terrorism, maritime security

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Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration 2015 (CORE2010)

February 5, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, CBP, Coordinated border management, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Counterfeiting, Customs, Customs risks, Data sharing, Document forgery, Fraud, Government, Optimization, Organized crime groups, Policy, Resilience, Risk management, Screening, Supply chain security, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, USA, WP14, WP17, WP18, WP2, WP3, WP4, WP6, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary

This document sets a vision of the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the primary border control agency present at the US borders, for year 2020. The vision builds on four general goals and associated objectives that aim to improve safety, security and prosperity of the American people. Collaboration, risk management as well as exchange and exploitation of information and intelligence are in the heart of the vision document and integral elements of its goals and objectives. The vision document is available at: http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

The vision’s first goal is to counter transnational terrorism and crime at and beyond the US borders. Keys to effective counter-terrorism and anti-crime efforts are understanding of threat landscape as well as interagency and international coordination on border management. The second goal is about promoting a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to border security and management, in order to exploit complementary capabilities of various border control agencies to the fullest extent. Specific objectives underpinning this goal are “situational awareness of the air, land and maritime borders”, “detection, interdiction and disruption of illegal border activities” and “strengthening comprehensive trade enforcement. Here the key is to collect information and intelligence about trade flows and carry out risk assessment to identify and target high-risk cargo movements and facilitate low-risk traffic. Other objectives are strengthening processes to conduct out-bound enforcement and interdiction of travelers and cargo as well as advance a comprehensive, predictive targeting strategy to identify threats as early as possible.

The third goal is about enhancing the US economic competitiveness by facilitating lawful trade and travel. The goal consists of objectives that seek to reduce cost of trade and travel by streamlining customs processes. Other objectives are to harmonize procedures throughout US government agencies and to develop risk-segmentation for better facilitation of low-risk trade and travel. Agility and adaptability of the CBP organization is the fourth goal. Sub-goals, or objectives, include optimization of CBP’s organizational structure, strengthening organizational structure and advance CBP’s effectiveness through technologies and business innovations. The vision document concludes with a presentation of principles and process of risk management in the customs context.

This vision document contains lots of relevant information for many CORE work packages, especially for those that deal with US-bound supply chains (WP9, WP14 and WP17. Certainly, also work packages dealing with risk assessment and educational material benefit from this material. Altogether, revealing strategic priorities of the CBP, the document reflects the trends of customs-centric supply chain security worldwide, and this information is very valuable for CORE and its work packages.

Reference

US CBP, 2015. Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration

CORE2010

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Updates on Customs brokers, by Ms. Carol West

January 30, 2016/0 Comments/in All transport modes, CBRA, Compliance management, Coordinated border management, Customs, Customs risks, Demo-cluster, EU, Exporter, Freight forwarder, Global, Importer, Interviews, Other-cluster, Shipper, Supply chain security, Trade facilitation, USA, WP1, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP19, WP6, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Hi Carol, and thanks for joining a CBRA Interview – can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I am the President of the Canadian Society of Customs Brokers and the Secretary of the International Federation of Customs Brokers Associations, IFCBA. My office is in Ottawa, Canada. I have spent my professional life in the world of Customs, border management and trade facilitation. I am an advocate for the value and importance of customs brokers and I am passionate about the possibilities of Customs-business partnership, in Canada and worldwide. I believe strongly that building knowledge, investing in technology and managing relationships are critical to effective border management.

IFCBA and CBRA produced jointly the first survey study on future roles of customs brokers around 2004-2005. Looking now, in 2016, at the study outcomes: do you see that anything has changed or evolved in the “world of customs brokers” the way we anticipated a decade ago?

It is difficult to generalize as the role of a customs broker still differs so much between countries. The regulatory framework for licensing customs brokers and their scope of practice may be different, and the level of automation of a country’s Customs administration may influence the role of customs brokers in effective border management. Having said that, I believe that in the last decade the role of a customs broker as a trade facilitator has been even more effective than we had anticipated. Both importers and Customs recognize that knowledgeable, regulated customs brokers not only provide expedited navigation through and compliance with complex Customs requirements, they are widely used by businesses looking to reach new markets, with a minimum of cost and delay.

With Customs administrations automating their systems for risk management and implementing coordinated border management processes, there is also more focus on gathering information on the goods being imported prior to arrival, for admissibility and security purposes. In this context, the automation of carrier and cargo information is more important than it was ten years ago. With that in mind, the role of a customs broker is even more crucial today as the broker acts as a hub for all the data relating to a client’s transaction, ensuring its accuracy and compliance with Customs requirements.

Ten years ago, we thought that, by now, we would have made more progress with consistency of data requirements globally. There has been great work done by the World Customs Organization with its data model, but we still find that data requirements are not as harmonized or standardized as they could or should be.

From a business process standpoint, where licensed customs brokers exist they are used by the majority of importers – large multinational companies as well as small to medium enterprises. In a competitive marketplace, customs brokers are seeing more emphasis on performance measurement and key performance indications during the procurement process as well as in standard operations. Today, there is greater uncertainty in the business environment and increased complexity of the global supply chain. We think this also reflects the maturation of the brokerage industry where business managers focus on continuing improvements to their processes to reach maximum efficiencies in delivering value to clients.

By the way, are you aware of any recent research focusing on customs brokers, either on global or on national level?

The World Customs Organization, WCO conducted a survey of its members in 2015 on the subject of customs broker regulation and had an outstanding response rate. With many models of customs broker regulatory regimes among the WCO members, from no regulation to the mandatory use of a licensed customs broker, the results of the survey point to some opportunities for cooperation between Customs administrations and customs brokers, and, based on existing best practices, suggests considerations for a model for establishing a broker licensing system, particularly valuable where none exists today. It also offers ideas on engagement with customs brokers and other private sector players to enhance compliance and trade facilitation. We see this as a positive indicator of interest in issues that are of critical importance to the international customs broker community, and a sign that there is value in doing some additional work in this area.

From a customs broker’s perspective, which areas of global trade facilitation and supply chain security do you see as most important in 2016? What about the most difficult or challenging ones?

A very important development that might impact global trade is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TTP. I say might because coming into force depends on the US Congress ratification of the agreement, and currently the rhetoric coming from Washington shows little support for it. I guess we’ll have to wait and see what happens. But assuming the TPP is ratified by the 12 signatories, even though it means elimination of tariffs and tariff barriers, it also means a more complex environment to navigate the multiple free trade agreements for the multi-national importers. Customs brokers as experts in rules of origin and compliance, in general will continue playing a very important role in the trade chain.

Looking a bit further out, one of the most challenging issues of the next 5 years will be the immense growth in e-commerce globally, and the pressure put on governments world-wide by online retailers to increase the de-minimis thresholds. It is projected that the online sales will reach US $3.5 trillion by 2020. That represents a lot of import duties that may not be collected and remitted if the de-minimis thresholds are increased or standardized. We expect that the impact of this will be seen differently depending on positions taken by national administrations given their own economic situations and pressures for competitiveness. Customs brokers will no doubt integrate any such changes into their compliance models and service offerings, keeping their clients’ interests and obligations foremost.

We can’t speak of challenges without mentioning the global trade slowdown we’ve experienced since the 2008 global financial crisis. Many factors seem to be contributing to the continued sluggishness which some consider cyclical others structural in nature. Regardless, governments have to remember that trade can be a powerful tool in their policy toolkit and customs brokers are natural allies in promoting its growth.

Any other greetings you would like to send to the CBRA Interview and Blog readers?

IFCBA will be holding its next World Conference in Shanghai 17-21 May, 2016, and the theme is “Facilitating Trade Through the Customs-Business Connection”. Hundreds of delegates from all regions of the world will be in attendance representing national customs brokers associations, international customs organizations such as the WCO, freight forwarding firms, shipping companies, cross-border e-commerce associations, world logistics enterprises, and many more. Our conferences are held only every two years, and we are very excited about sharing ideas and strategies for success with business and government colleagues from around the world.

Thanks a lot Carol for this concluding note – we just added the IFCBA World Conference to CBRA´s Events calendar – and thanks for the whole interview; maybe we can explore bit later this year on joint research, training or other project opportunities…!

Web-resources:

http://ifcba.org/

http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/resources/~/~/media/234D5143B2344B918496C93F24B48586.ashx

https://www.internetretailer.com/2015/07/29/global-e-commerce-set-grow-25-2015

http://bruegel.org/2015/08/the-global-trade-slowdown-puzzle/

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres15_e/pr752_e.htm

https://globalconnections.hsbc.com/global/en/tools-data/trade-forecasts/global

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/update/01/pdf/0116.pdf

Related CBRA studies:

Gutierrez, X., Hintsa, J., Wieser, P. and Hameri, A.P. (2005), “New roles for customs brokers in international supply chain”, Proceedings of First International Conference on Transportation Logistics (T-LOG), July 27-29, 2005, Singapore.

Hintsa, J., Mohanty, S., Tsikolenko, V., Ivens, B., Leischnig, A., Kähäri, P., Hameri, A.P., and Cadot, O. (2014), The import VAT and duty de-minimis in the European Union – Where should they be and what will be the impact? Final Report, Brussels, Belgium.

Border Agency Cooperation, Part 2 of 3

January 29, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, Authorized Economic Operator, Blog, CBRA, Compliance management, Coordinated border management, Customs, Customs risks, Data sharing, EC, EU, Exporter, Global, Importer, Investigations, Latin America, Maritime, Other-cluster, Perishable goods, Phytosanitary agency, Police, Risk-cluster, Scanning, Sea port, Single window, Supply chain security, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, Transport security agency, WCO, WP10, WP11, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP19, WP6, WP7, WP8, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Our second blog on Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) focuses on a conceptual model developed by CBRA. We have crafted this “CBRA-BAC15” diagram to visualize a set of key BAC actions and primary beneficiaries, with contributions by Dr. Toni Männistö (supply chain security post-doc researcher at CBRA), Mr. Gerwin Zomer (TNO, technical manager for the FP7-CORE project) and by Ms. Susana Wong Chan (education and training materials developer at CBRA).

The diagram is cut to three sectors: on left side, the supply chain companies are the primary beneficiaries of BAC actions; on the right side, the government agencies form the primary beneficiary group; and on the bottom area, both supply chain companies as well as government agencies benefit from BAC actions. Each of these three sectors contains five examples of concrete border agency cooperation actions – 15 in total – explained in a moment by using real examples, whenever available in the literature or by expert suggestions. In the center of the diagram lies a circle with the more generic “smart cross-border improvement actions”, applicable to virtually any work in global trade facilitation.

The diagram should not be considered exhaustive, when it comes to all optional actions to improve BAC in a given country or region or globally. Some of the 15 key actions may be strongly interconnected, or, partially overlapping. Some of them may apply mainly on national multi-agency environment, and some of them mainly on international e.g. customs-to-customs environment. Also, the division of the key actions into the three beneficiary groups can and should be challenged, by the interested audiences. But, let´s start now by listing and illustrating the key 15 BAC actions:

Supply chain companies as the primary beneficiary (left sector in the diagram). The following five BAC actions can bring immediate benefits to the companies operating in supply chains, in terms of saving administrative costs and speeding up the supply chain – less work dealing with various certifications and audit visits, less variation and IT costs with import/export data filing and less waiting times at the borders.

Harmonized ´trusted trader´ & other certification programs: In the European Union, the European Commission´s implementing regulation (No. 889/2014) updates the references to the aviation security legislation in force, including recognition of the Known Consignor (KC) status and its relevance to Authorized Economic Operator (AEO), and framing the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programs.
Coordinated company visits & audits: Closely linked to the previous BAC-action, in the Netherlands, the Dutch Customs executes joint audits on AEO security (customs) and known consignor/regulated agent (air cargo) with the Dutch Immigration and air-police agency – during the application phase, as well as during periodical audits.
Harmonized data filing requirements: Despite a global, harmonized data model, harmonized tariff codes and standards on clearance procedures, there are many differences in operational import, export and transit procedures and information requirements between countries. This results in additional complexity of IT systems for globally operating traders and logistic service providers. An example is the pre-arrival security declarations, where harmonization would be most useful e.g. between the Importer Security Filing, “10+2” in the US and the Entry Summary Declaration in Europe – Multiple Filing, supported by Standard Trader Interface, under development within the Union Customs Code, UCC.
Synchronized border interventions & inspections: The Article 4 of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Cross Border Transport Agreement on Facilitation of Border Crossing Formalities calls upon the contracting parties to progressively adopt measures to simplify and expedite border formalities by carrying out joint and simultaneous inspection of goods and people by respective competent authorities of agencies such as customs, immigration, trade, agriculture, and health. It further provides for single-stop inspection and urges the national authorities of adjacent countries to carry out joint and simultaneous inspections.
Harmonized operating hours: This applies particularly in the context of two neighboring country customs offices – having same opening hours across the border helps to maximize the daily throughput volumes. As the Article 8 of the World Trade Organization´s Trade Facilitation Agreement puts it, “Each Member shall, to the extent possible and practicable, cooperate on mutually agreed terms with other Members with whom it shares a common border with a view to coordinating procedures at border crossings to facilitate cross-border trade. Such cooperation and coordination may include: … alignment of working days and hours … “. In the ASEAN region, the Article 7 of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit urges the contracting parties to “coordinate working hours of the adjacent border posts”.

Government agencies themselves as the primary beneficiary (right sector in the diagram). The following five BAC actions can provide instant benefits for the cooperating government agencies, in terms of cost savings and improved efficiency – in other words, identifying more violations and catching more bad guys with less total spending.

Sharing of agency intelligence, information & data: Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements (CMAAS), signed bilaterally by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and eight counterparties during years 1979-2010 (European Community, France, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, South Africa, South Korea and the United States) provide Canada with a legal basis to share customs information to prevent, investigate and combat customs offences, particularly customs fraud, and to provide reciprocal mutual assistance to ensure the proper application of customs laws. Under CMAAs Canada may share customs information pertaining to: persons, goods and means of transport; activities planned, on-going, or completed, that constitute or appear to constitute a customs offence in the territory of the country requesting the data; proven law enforcement techniques; new and emerging trends, means or methods of committing customs offences; and facilitation of risk assessment activities, within the mandate and authority of the CBSA.
Joint investments in common resource pools (equipment, facilities etc.): In Finland the Customs Administration and the Border Guard share common premises and equipment. Each authority has a designated role in the servicing and maintenance of the equipment. X-ray machines are largely the responsibility of Customs. Road-testing equipment, such as lorry brake-testing pads, is also maintained by Customs. All equipment can be shared and operated by each agency upon request. Thus, although the equipment belongs to one agency, it can be easily relocated to the other agency, enabling smoother processing of the workflow without unnecessary and lengthy administrative procedures, thereby reducing costs.
Joint teams: In the Netherlands, “HARC” – Hit and Run Cargo Rotterdam team, is a joint operation of Dutch Maritime Police, Dutch Customs, the Fiscal and Economic Crime Agency and the Ministry of Justice collaborating operationally in narcotics enforcement. Joint teams differ from Joint operations below by being a long-term / permanent set-up; while Joint operations “come and go”.
Joint operations: A joint operation Meerkat, (23-27 July 2012) involving the World Customs Organization and INTERPOL against the illicit trafficking of cigarettes, tobacco and alcohol in East and Southern Africa, resulted in the seizure of tons of illicitly traded products in seven countries. Operation Meerkat saw Customs and police authorities carry out some 40 raids at seaports, inland border crossing points, markets and shops in Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. More than 32 million cigarettes – equivalent to 1.6 million packets, 134 tons of raw tobacco and almost 3,000 liters of alcohol were seized, resulting in national authorities initiating a number of administrative investigations into tax evasion and other potential criminal offences.
Collaborative criminal investigations & prosecutions: In the United States the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) units gather officers from more than 100 different law enforcement agencies under one roof. The objective is to identify, investigate, disrupt and dismantle transnational organizations posing the greatest threat to border security, public safety and national security, by employing the full range of federal, state, local, tribal and international law enforcement resources. Over the years, the BEST has become a successful interagency law enforcement collaboration model that’s keeping the US safer.

Both supply chain companies as well as government agencies as beneficiaries (bottom sector). The five BAC actions can bring instant benefits to all parties in cross-border supply chains, in terms of lowering costs and improving performance, from supply chain company and from governmental agency perspectives.

‘Single window’ -type import/ export/ transit data submissions: In the Netherlands, the authorities have designed Digipoort, the government’s ‘electronic post office’ for businesses. It provides the communication infrastructure for the exchange of digital information between companies and government authorities. Digipoort enables companies to submit import and export information at a single entry point aimed at multiple government authorities.
Common risk indicators, risk profiles & targeting systems: In Finland, common databases are linked to the different agencies’ operational and risk management databases, leading to a common approach when a ‘signal’ is recorded. Some control and enforcement officers have access to each other’s systems on a need-to-know basis, with levels of restricted access determined by rank and functional responsibility.
Mutual recognition of supply chain inspection procedures & outcomes: As part of the European Union funded research and development project FP7-CORE ( http://www.coreproject.eu/ ), the phytosanitary and customs administrations in Kenya and the Netherlands are working towards mutual recognition of controls carried out by Kenyan authorities, as well as the exploitation of digital phytosanitary certificates and other trade documents, between the two countries. Outside of the research world, mutual recognitions (MR) of customs inspections are being explored in the context of EU MR Agreements, for example with Japan.
Cross-training and empowering manpower: In Finland, Customs officers have been trained by the Border Guard to inspect identification documents and visas, among other procedures. Border guards have, in turn, received basic Customs training, which includes the search of vehicles and the recognition of prohibited and restricted goods, such as drugs, alcohol, and counterfeit items.
Joint public-private partnership arrangements, training sessions etc.: In 2011 in Hong Kong, the Customs and Excise Department established a Joint Liaison Group with the representatives of shippers, freight forwarders and truck drivers for exchanging operational views and comments on the Road Cargo System “ROCARS”. Moreover, Customs also launched an extensive publicity program and established outreach teams to assist the industry stakeholders to get used to the ROCARS. Following other government departments are listed on the ROCARS web-site http://www.rocars.gov.hk/ : Commerce and Economic Development Bureau, Census and Statistics Department, and Transport Department.

Finally, the center circle of the CBRA-BAC15 diagram highlights the basic, classical principles of trade facilitation – naturally in the context of multiple agencies dealing with cross-border regulations, procedures, IT-systems and data requirements:

Simplification & Harmonization: agencies work together with the first aim to streamline certification requirements and procedures, to minimize the number of data elements required from traders etc.; and the second aim to unify the rules and requirements facing supply chain companies.
Interoperability & Synchronization: agencies invest in improving interoperability between their inspection technologies, IT-systems etc.; they also work together to better synchronize their supervision and control processes, particularly for the benefit of supply chain companies.
Transparency & Predictability: agencies keep each other well informed of their current regulations, procedures, operations etc., as well as planned future changes – such proactive approach helps to minimize surprises and related hassles.

This concludes the second of three parts of our Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) blog. In Part 3 – to be published sometime in February – we focus on the overarching institutional arrangements on Border Agency Cooperation, including establishment of single border agencies (e.g. in the US and Australia); creation of one-stop border posts, OSBPs (multiple examples across the world); carrying work permanently on behalf of other agencies etc. We also plan to discuss bit more on the benefits and costs of BAC, as well as the main challenges and obstacles in BAC-projects across the globe. Talk to you again in February, Juha Hintsa.

Bibliography / sources for the examples and cases attached to the 15 BAC key actions:

Harmonized ´trusted trader´ & other certification programs: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 of 14 August 2014 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, as regards recognition of the common security requirements under the regulated agent and known consignor programme and the Authorised Economic Operator programme.
Coordinated company visits & audits: Email exchange with a Dutch Customs expert
Harmonized data filing arrangements: Interview with a Dutch supply chain and trade facilitation expert (29 January 2016); and AnNa Master Plan Extended Collaboration Project Book, December 2015. Available for download at: http://www.annamsw.eu/
Synchronized border interventions & inspections: Jain, S.R. (2012), “Coordinated Border Management: The Experience of Asia and the Pacific Region”, World Customs Journal, Vol. 6 No.1. (CBM25).
Harmonized operating hours: Article 8 (Border Agency Cooperation) of the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation of 15 July 2014; and Jain, S.R. (2012), “Coordinated Border Management: The Experience of Asia and the Pacific Region”, World Customs Journal, Vol. 6 No.1.
Sharing of agency intelligence, information & data: “Customs Cooperation Case Study for Canada”, paper submitted by Canada (Canada Border Services Agency – CBSA) for the July 2012 WTO Symposium on Trade Facilitation.
Joint investments in common resource pools (equipment, facilities etc.): “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76.
Joint teams: “Customs find cocaine buried in cocoa bean shipment”, NL Times 25.5.2015, Available online at: http://www.nltimes.nl/2015/05/25/customs-finds-cocaine-buried-in-cocoa-bean-shipment/ (accessed 28 January 2016).
Joint operations: “WCO and INTERPOL joint operation against illicit trafficking in Africa leads to tobacco and alcohol seizures”, WCO Press Release, 27 August 2012. Available online at: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2012/august/operation-meerkat.aspx (accessed 28 January 2016).
Collaborative criminal investigations & prosecutions: “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76
‘Single window’ –type import/ export/ transit data submissions: “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76.
Common risk indicators, risk profiles & targeting systems: “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76.
Mutual recognition of supply chain inspection procedures & outcomes: The Consistently Optimised REsilient ecosystem, CORE FP7 project, EU. See online at: http://www.coreproject.eu/ (accessed 28 January 2016).
Cross-training and empowering manpower: “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76.
Joint public-private partnership arrangements, training sessions etc.: “Road Cargo System (ROCARS) (Hong Kong China)”. Available online at: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/wco-implementing-the-wto-atf/atf/border-agency-cooperation.aspx (accessed 28 January 2016).

Border Agency Cooperation, Part 1 of 3

January 21, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, Authorized Economic Operator, Blog, CBRA, Compliance management, Coordinated border management, Customs, Customs risks, Data sharing, EC, EU, Exporter, Global, Importer, Investigations, Latin America, Maritime, Other-cluster, Perishable goods, Police, Risk-cluster, Scanning, Sea port, Single window, Supply chain security, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, Transport security agency, WCO, WP10, WP11, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP19, WP6, WP7, WP8, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

“A beloved child has many names”, goes an old Finnish proverb. This saying applies quite well in the context of ´smart cooperation between multiple agencies when dealing with cross-border supply chains, goods movements and transports´. The World Customs Organization talks about Coordinated Border Management (CBM); the European Union about Integrated Border Management (IBM); the World Bank about Collaborative Border Management (CBM); and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe about Comprehensive Border Management (CBM). Cross-border Research Association is aligning with a fifth term: Border Agency Cooperation (BAC), a term used in the Trade Facilitation Agreement of the World Trade Organization. Despite minor differences in scope, priorities, underlying principles and philosophies among these five terms (and possibly even more), one can easily agree that the work carried out under any and all of them aims to coordinate activities across and within various border control agencies, for the benefit of both governmental agencies themselves as well as supply chain companies.

Our first blog on Border Agency Cooperation, BAC, provides an illustrative worst case example on how complex, slow and expensive a cross-border supply chain execution comes when no cooperation takes place between relevant government agencies, neither nationally nor internationally. The illustration is about meat export from Latin America (Country X) to the European Union (Country Y), with maritime transport in reefer containers.

A well-known beef producer in country X– also the first Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) beef producing company in the region – has just signed an annual contract with a beef importer and distributor in country Y. As this is the producer ‘s first export deal to the EU, the producer needs to ensure that all licenses and certificates are up to the EU standard. Organizing health certificates, certificates of origin, sanitary certificates, export licenses – and what have we – takes weeks and weeks of time. There is no communication or procedures in place between the various agencies and officials to facilitate the process, no coordinated company visits or audits, no sharing of information, and no mutual recognition of inspections.

When all documents are finally in place, and regular exports can start, the beef producer and it´s forwarding agent face the burden of filing export data to customs, to sanitary agencies, and to national security agencies – with somewhat similar datasets, but with no single-window filing opportunity. And when export controls and inspections take place – which happens often – there is no synchronization of inspection times between the different agencies. One agency might come to inspect the reefer container on Monday noon, second one on Wednesday morning, and third on Friday afternoon – another week lost in the beef supply chain lead-time.

Once the consignment is happily on board towards the EU, one continues to experience lost BAC opportunities: no data is passed from country X customs or sanitary agencies to their counterparties in country Y, to enable pre-arrival compliance control and risk assessment. In case of criminal suspicions – e.g. when supply chain insiders exploit beef shipments for cocaine smuggling – no intelligence is shared between police and customs, from country X to country Y. The option of joint law enforcement operations between country X and Y police and customs agencies has never been even considered. Even on national level, both in country X and Y, the agencies are not co-operating neither on risk profiling and targeting systems, nor during criminal investigations and prosecutions – what a waste of resources when it comes to catching and convicting the bad guys…

In the meanwhile, some ten days later, the ship arrives at a major sea port in country Y. For the importer, there is no option for single-window data filing; instead, import data must be transferred separately to all different agencies in country Y. As the customs administration in country Y has no Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) in place with country X customs – neither when it comes to AEO certificates nor when it comes to recognizing inspections carried out at export – it treats the import as a “medium to high risk” one, calling for physical inspections. And as the sanitary agency does not share any common resources with the customs administration – particularly no joint inspection facilities and equipment, including x-ray machines – and even the daily opening hours are different from the customs hours, the sanitary agency carries out their own inspections only two days after the customs intervention. And finally, improving the situation does not seem likely, as there are no joint public-private partnerships, and no export/import compliance training sessions or similar in place, neither in country Y nor in country X.

This concludes the first of three parts of our Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) blog. In Part 2 – to be published next week – we will present CBRA´s conceptual model (Hintsa J., Dec.2015) on BAC key actions and beneficiaries: which key actions to take in order to speed up the logistics chain, to save costs with all actors, to increase overall predictability, and to improve government agency performance e.g. in terms of number of seizures and convictions. In the BAC Blog Part 2, we plan to present some preliminary experiences and real-life results from FP7-project CORE. Please stay tuned!

Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended, GAO, 2010 (CORE1068)

January 21, 2016/0 Comments/in All-clusters, Analytic, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Customs, GAO, Government, IT, Maritime, Multi-modal, Risk management, Scanning, Screening, Sea port, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Tracking, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, Transport security agency, USA, WP10, WP11, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP19, WP2, WP22, WP6, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This report reviews container security technologies that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has evaluated and tested between 2004 and 2009. These container security technologies aim to (1) detect and report unauthorized intrusions into the shipping containers and (2) to track the movement of the containers through the supply chain. As of 2009, DHS has funded and tested four different container security technologies. So far, none of the candidate technologies meet all desired functional requirements: main problems are high false alarm rates, low detection probability, and difficult installation and calibration. Besides the unsatisfactory test results, the report points out problems of conducting the phase II practical “trade lane” testing in the context of the maritime transport only. The report recommends to test the technologies “across all operational scenarios,” considering contextual differences across different modes of transport. Once the technologies would pass this extended trade lane testing, the DHS should (1) obtain support from the trade industry and international partners, (2) develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for using the technology, and (3) certify the container security technologies for use. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-887.

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Full review: This GAO document describes in detail the four container security technologies that DHS has tested since 2004, and one of these technologies happens to be the very same “composite security container” that the WP22 CORE demonstration studies. The report discusses in details the problems that the previous tests and pilots of container security technologies have encountered. Being aware of the past problems help the CORE demonstrations to avoid past mistakes. In addition to the WP22 demonstration, the other demonstrations that involve tracking & tracing of intermodal containers benefit from the information of this GAO report. For instance, the GM demonstration on maritime shipping of automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven (WP9) might use this GAO document to evaluate available technical solutions for tracking the shipping containers. The demonstrations in work packages 14-17 involve tracking and tracing and therefore may use the detailed analysis this GAO report offers on available container security technologies.

Cross-references:

Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended.

CORE1068

Additional keywords: Container security, maritime logistics, container security device, tracking & tracing
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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO (October 2009, CORE1066)

January 21, 2016/0 Comments/in Analytic, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Customs, Customs risks, Demo-cluster, Global, Government, Maritime, Other-cluster, Resilience, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Scanning, Screening, Sea port, Socio-economic impacts, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Trade facilitation, Transport security agency, USA, WP10, WP11, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP19, WP2, WP22, WP6, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: The document provides a comprehensive outlook on the past and recent US initiatives on container security. The report focuses on the challenges that prevent global implementation of the 100% scanning of US-bound containers in foreign ports with both non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection devices, as mandated by the SAFE Port Act and the 9/11 Acts. The 100% scanning is believed to deter and detect terrorist attempts of smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States inside a cargo container. The reports dates back to late 2009, so the description of the current state of the US container security it provides is not necessarily no longer accurate. The report anticipates that the implementation of the 100% scanning requirement will be delayed due to various problems that were identified during the precursory Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilots. These problems are related mainly to port logistics (routing of containers through scanning sites), employee safety (radiation of screening equipment) and technical constraints (equipment failures and poor quality of scanning images). Today, we know that the US authorities have deferred the implementation already twice, first to 2014 and for the second time until 2016. Altogether, this GAO report describes in detail the challenges of the 100% scanning law and elaborates some ongoing alternative risk-based approaches to container security: (1) the strategic trade lane strategy that aims to establish 100% scanning only in high terrorist risk foreign sea ports and (2) the “10 + 2” data requirements that importers and ocean carriers must submit to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to a container is loaded aboard a US-bound vessel so that the US authorities can calculate more precise risk for each shipping container. This report includes relevant information for all the CORE’s demonstrations that involve US-bound maritime transportation. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-12.

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Full review: The GAO document provides interesting insights on the evolution of the US container security regulations over the years. This is useful supportive information for CORE demonstrations that involve maritime shipping of containers into the US. The GM demonstration of the WP9 for example covers exports of automobile parts from the EU into the US by transatlantic ocean transport. If the US Congress does not repeal or defer the 100% scanning requirement, the port of Felixstove that participates in the demonstration, need to start scanning also all GM’s US-bound containers. Likewise, the FALACUS demo (WP14), which is about shipping of ceramic tiles from Italy to the US, must take into consideration the possible effects of the 100% scanning requirement. This demonstration is particularly interesting from the 100% scanning requirement standpoint because some ceramic tiles are naturally radioactive, and thus they tend to trigger false alarms in the radiation controls. Also the P&G demonstrator in the WP17, that focuses on shipping of consumer goods into the US, the possible impact of the 100% scanning regulation.

Besides the demonstrations, the CORE’s risk cluster might benefit from the detailed analysis of the risk-based approaches to the US container security, such as the strategic trade lane strategy and the “10 + 2” data requirement. All demonstrations might benefit from lessons learnt how GAO has advises DHS and CBP to carry out cost-benefit analyses for the US container security programs (especially the Secure Freight Initiative).

Cross-references:

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Bakshi, N., Flynn, S. E., & Gans, N. (2011). Estimating the operational impact of container inspections at international ports. Management Science, 57(1), 1-.‐‑20.

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2009. Supply Chain Security Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers.

CORE1066

Additional keywords: Ocean transportation, counter-terrorism, non-intrusive inspection

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Mr. Mike Ellis, INTERPOL, on illicit trade and counterfeiting

MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO, September 2012 (CORE1013)

Updates on Customs brokers, by Ms. Carol West

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO (October 2009, CORE1066)

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