Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions. Barka, H., B., 2012 (CORE2009)

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Summary

Pan-African economic integration has progressed over past years, producing a broad range of regional trade agreements and economic communities that seek to harmonise policies, develop common infrastructure and remove barriers to intra-African trade. Against expectations, however, this increased integration has not translated into strong economic growth in Africa. This article discusses how sub-Saharan countries can overcome trade barriers that undermine the African economic integration. The article’s focus is on border posts and customs procedures that play a key role in facilitating cross-border traffic.

According to the article, the problems of international trade in Africa are largely explained by inadequate infrastructure that creates congestion and limits connectivity, delays that stem from complex and manual customs procedures, corruption and by illicit trade. One-stop-border-posts are a promising approach to streamline customs procedures and curb corruption. The joint border post may bring trade facilitation benefits as significant as costly investments on roads, ports, bridges and other transport infrastructure. The articles highlights the Chirundu One-Stop Border Post between Zambia and Zimbabwe as a successful case of border agency cooperation. Previous Observatory review (CORE2008, 20 January 2016) describes the Chirundu border crossing in more detail.

The paper concludes by suggesting One-Stop-Border-Post as a promising way towards higher trade facilitation and African integration. To organise one-stop-border-post, the first thing to do is to analyse roles and procedures of different border control agencies. The task of high-level governance is to define how responsibilities across the various border control agencies are harmonised, coordinated and delegated. Metrics and statistics should underpin the design, as numerical data into traffic flows and clearance times are likely to reveal the major bottlenecks in the cross-border traffic. Finally, the article proposes extended exchange of information and data across government agencies, domestically and internationally. The article is available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE_INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE.pdf

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

The discussion on one-stop-border-posts in the African context is closely related to the CORE project and its many work packages. Especially the WP12, the demonstrator Schipol, that deals with imports of fresh cut flowers from Kenya to the Netherlands, benefits from the insights into African bureaucratic practices at many African borders. The demonstrator should consider the set of recommendations for higher border agency cooperation that the article proposes. Besides the demonstrators, the article provides a concise and informative outlook on international in Africa. At least CORE’s WP19, should consider the African perspective on cross-border trade when developing training material.

Reference

Barka, H., B., 2012. Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions. African Development Bank

CORE2009

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Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended, GAO, 2010 (CORE1068)

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Summary: This report reviews container security technologies that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has evaluated and tested between 2004 and 2009. These container security technologies aim to (1) detect and report unauthorized intrusions into the shipping containers and (2) to track the movement of the containers through the supply chain. As of 2009, DHS has funded and tested four different container security technologies. So far, none of the candidate technologies meet all desired functional requirements: main problems are high false alarm rates, low detection probability, and difficult installation and calibration. Besides the unsatisfactory test results, the report points out problems of conducting the phase II practical “trade lane” testing in the context of the maritime transport only. The report recommends to test the technologies “across all operational scenarios,” considering contextual differences across different modes of transport. Once the technologies would pass this extended trade lane testing, the DHS should (1) obtain support from the trade industry and international partners, (2) develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for using the technology, and (3) certify the container security technologies for use. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-887.

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Full review: This GAO document describes in detail the four container security technologies that DHS has tested since 2004, and one of these technologies happens to be the very same “composite security container” that the WP22 CORE demonstration studies. The report discusses in details the problems that the previous tests and pilots of container security technologies have encountered. Being aware of the past problems help the CORE demonstrations to avoid past mistakes. In addition to the WP22 demonstration, the other demonstrations that involve tracking & tracing of intermodal containers benefit from the information of this GAO report. For instance, the GM demonstration on maritime shipping of automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven (WP9) might use this GAO document to evaluate available technical solutions for tracking the shipping containers. The demonstrations in work packages 14-17 involve tracking and tracing and therefore may use the detailed analysis this GAO report offers on available container security technologies.

 Cross-references:

  • Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
  • Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended.

CORE1068

Additional keywords: Container security, maritime logistics, container security device, tracking & tracing
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AVIATION SECURITY – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO 2008 (CORE1067)

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Summary: This GAO report discusses the impact of the 26 billion USD that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent on aviation security since 2004. The report focuses especially on the current status and the future challenges of passenger screening, air cargo security and passenger watch-list matching program known as Secure Flight. The air cargo security discussion is the report’s most relevant section from the CORE’s viewpoint. The information in the report, that has been published as early as July 2008, is anyhow largely outdated: it discusses challenges that TSA and the air cargo community need to overcome before starting the 100% screening of air cargo that flies on board passenger planes, a legal requirement that become into force in August 2010 and that was set by the Implementing Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (aka the 9/11 Act). The report also recommended strengthening the security of US-bound foreign air cargo (into the US from the rest of the world), to bring it on a par with outbound air cargo security (from the US to rest of the world). More recent regulations and initiatives have corrected this weakness in the US air cargo security: today, third country air carriers must screen cargo up to US standards (or national standards if the country of origin and the US recognize each other’s air cargo regimes) before loading cargo on US-bound planes. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1024T.

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Full review: This GAO report provides useful background information about the US air cargo security regime. This information is going to be useful for the CORE demonstration 17.1 that is about time-critical express shipping of military aircraft parts from the US to Spain. In the demonstration, the express operator DHL ships the parts by plane, and thus compliance with the US air cargo security requirements is one of the key themes of this demo. Also WP 1 might use this GAO report to describe evolution of the US air cargo regime over the years. But though this analysis would be interesting, it is not going to be the essential content in the deliverable of the WP1.

 Cross-references:

  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
  • G_A_O_, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Aviation Security – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs.

CORE1067

Additional keywords: Air cargo security, Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO (October 2009, CORE1066)

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Summary: The document provides a comprehensive outlook on the past and recent US initiatives on container security. The report focuses on the challenges that prevent global implementation of the 100% scanning of US-bound containers in foreign ports with both non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection devices, as mandated by the SAFE Port Act and the 9/11 Acts. The 100% scanning is believed to deter and detect terrorist attempts of smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States inside a cargo container. The reports dates back to late 2009, so the description of the current state of the US container security it provides is not necessarily no longer accurate. The report anticipates that the implementation of the 100% scanning requirement will be delayed due to various problems that were identified during the precursory Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilots. These problems are related mainly to port logistics (routing of containers through scanning sites), employee safety (radiation of screening equipment) and technical constraints (equipment failures and poor quality of scanning images). Today, we know that the US authorities have deferred the implementation already twice, first to 2014 and for the second time until 2016. Altogether, this GAO report describes in detail the challenges of the 100% scanning law and elaborates some ongoing alternative risk-based approaches to container security: (1) the strategic trade lane strategy that aims to establish 100% scanning only in high terrorist risk foreign sea ports and (2) the “10 + 2” data requirements that importers and ocean carriers must submit to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to a container is loaded aboard a US-bound vessel so that the US authorities can calculate more precise risk for each shipping container. This report includes relevant information for all the CORE’s demonstrations that involve US-bound maritime transportation. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-12.

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Full review: The GAO document provides interesting insights on the evolution of the US container security regulations over the years. This is useful supportive information for CORE demonstrations that involve maritime shipping of containers into the US. The GM demonstration of the WP9 for example covers exports of automobile parts from the EU into the US by transatlantic ocean transport. If the US Congress does not repeal or defer the 100% scanning requirement, the port of Felixstove that participates in the demonstration, need to start scanning also all GM’s US-bound containers. Likewise, the FALACUS demo (WP14), which is about shipping of ceramic tiles from Italy to the US, must take into consideration the possible effects of the 100% scanning requirement. This demonstration is particularly interesting from the 100% scanning requirement standpoint because some ceramic tiles are naturally radioactive, and thus they tend to trigger false alarms in the radiation controls. Also the P&G demonstrator in the WP17, that focuses on shipping of consumer goods into the US, the possible impact of the 100% scanning regulation.

Besides the demonstrations, the CORE’s risk cluster might benefit from the detailed analysis of the risk-based approaches to the US container security, such as the strategic trade lane strategy and the “10 + 2” data requirement. All demonstrations might benefit from lessons learnt how GAO has advises DHS and CBP to carry out cost-benefit analyses for the US container security programs (especially the Secure Freight Initiative).

Cross-references:

  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
  • Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
  • Bakshi, N., Flynn, S. E., & Gans, N. (2011). Estimating the operational impact of container inspections at international ports. Management Science, 57(1), 1-.‐‑20.

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2009. Supply Chain Security Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers.

CORE1066

Additional keywords: Ocean transportation, counter-terrorism, non-intrusive inspection

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Review on “MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION – DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity”, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, United States Government Accountability Office, June 2014 (CORE1098)

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CORE1098-Summary: Actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and two of its component agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as other federal agencies, to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment have been limited. Report is available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663828.pdf

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Full review: While the Coast Guard initiated a number of activities and coordinating strategies to improve physical security in specific ports, it has not conducted a risk assessment that fully addresses cyber-related threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Coast Guard officials stated that they intend to conduct such an assessment in the future, but did not provide details to show how it would address cybersecurity. Until the Coast Guard completes a thorough assessment of cyber risks in the maritime environment, the ability of stakeholders to appropriately plan and allocate resources to protect ports and other maritime facilities will be limited.

Maritime security plans required by law and regulation generally did not identify or address potential cyber-related threats or vulnerabilities. This was because the guidance issued by Coast Guard for developing these plans did not require cyber elements to be addressed. Officials stated that guidance for the next set of updated plans, due for update in 2014, will include cybersecurity requirements. However, in the absence of a comprehensive risk assessment, the revised guidance may not adequately address cyber-related risks to the maritime environment.

The degree to which information-sharing mechanisms (e.g., councils) were active and shared cybersecurity-related information varied. Specifically, the Coast Guard established a government coordinating council to share information among government entities, but it is unclear to what extent this body has shared information related to cybersecurity. In addition, a sector coordinating council for sharing information among nonfederal stakeholders is no longer active, and the Coast Guard has not convinced stakeholders to reestablish it. Until the Coast Guard improves these mechanisms, maritime stakeholders in different locations are at greater risk of not being aware of, and thus not mitigating, cyber-based threats.

Under a program to provide security-related grants to ports, FEMA identified enhancing cybersecurity capabilities as a funding priority for the first time in fiscal year 2013 and has provided guidance for cybersecurity-related proposals. However, the agency has not consulted cybersecurity-related subject matter experts to inform the multi-level review of cyber-related proposals—partly because FEMA has downsized the expert panel that reviews grants. Also, because the Coast Guard has not assessed cyber-related risks in the maritime risk assessment, grant applicants and FEMA have not been able to use this information to inform funding proposals and decisions. As a result, FEMA is limited in its ability to ensure that the program is effectively addressing cyber-related risks in the maritime environment.

Why GAO Did This Study? U.S. maritime ports handle more than $1.3 trillion in cargo annually. The operations of these ports are supported by information and communication systems, which are susceptible to cyber-related threats. Failures in these systems could degrade or interrupt operations at ports, including the flow of commerce. Federal agencies—in particular DHS—and industry stakeholders have specific roles in protecting maritime facilities and ports from physical and cyber threats. GAO’s objective was to identify the extent to which DHS and other stakeholders have taken steps to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment. GAO examined relevant laws and regulations; analyzed federal cybersecurity-related policies and plans; observed operations at three U.S. ports selected based on being a high-risk port and a leader in calls by vessel type, e.g. container; and interviewed federal and nonfederal officials.

What GAO Recommends? GAO recommends that DHS direct the Coast Guard to (1) assess cyber-related risks, (2) use this assessment to inform maritime security guidance, and (3) determine whether the sector coordinating council should be reestablished. DHS should also direct FEMA to (1) develop procedures to consult DHS cybersecurity experts for assistance in reviewing grant proposals and (2) use the results of the cyber-risk assessment to inform its grant guidance. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

Full citation:  “MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION – DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity”, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, United States Government Accountability Office, June 2014.

CORE1098

Keywords: Maritime Security, Port Security, Cyber – Security, CBP U.S. – Customs and Border Protection, Coast Guard U.S., DHS-Department of Homeland Security, FEMA-Federal Emergency Management Agency, ISAC-information sharing and analysis center, IT-information technology, MTSA-Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, NIPP-National Infrastructure Protection Plan, AFE Port Act-Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, TSA-Transportation Security Administration

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CORE Information Observatory

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cbra_blog_post_040116Please visit FP7-CORE Information Observatory . If you find it useful for your work, please consider registering to become a regular CORE Observatory user and to receive the CBRA Monthly Newsletter!

On behalf of the whole CBRA-team – Sangeeta, Susana, Susan, Phan Hien, Toni, Vladlen, Duayner, Perttu, Matti, Ari-Pekka, Ninoslav, Peter, Andrew, Harri x 2, and David x 2 (https://www.cross-border.org/team/ ) – I would like to wish you the best of success for the year 2016, in your professional as well as private life. In the context of global supply chains, we are ready to work with you towards faster and more predictable global logistics, naturally combined with low crime rates and with high compliance rates. One great tool to support such “common industry-government-academia global supply chain mission” is our new media platform – the recently launched FP7-CORE Information Observatory, which you can find at: https://www.cross-border.org/core-observatory/core-observatory-full-list/

CORE Observatory gives you 10-20 regular reviews and updates per month on supply chain security and trade facilitation policies, regulations, standards, good practices, roadmaps, research papers etc. – for the benefit of FP7-CORE partners, and beyond. Our primary focus is currently on European Union and its main trading partners – global expansion is possible later, depending on user needs and priorities. Each CORE Observatory entry has a title and a summary, visible to every user. At the end of the summary we provide a URL for the source document, whenever an electronic version is available in public domain. Starting 1 January 2016, the title and summary are also translated to Spanish. New languages (e.g. French, Arabic or Russian) may be offered later in 2016 depending on user preferences. The full review text is available only for the registered users, who will also receive the CBRA Monthly Newsletter, tailored to their personal information needs and interests. The CORE Observatory entries are listed in chronological order, the latest entry appearing on the top of the list. Any user – registered or not – can search CORE Observatory entries either via pre-defined keywords and tags (most common ones listed on the right side of the web page), or via free text search.

Again, Happy New Year 2016 everyone – and looking forward to having many new visitors at the FP7-CORE Information Observatory!

Yours, Juha