Using business complexity to handle supply chain risk: Dealing with borders of cargo liability (CORE1209)

Summary: The dominant part of the academic literature on supply chain management assumes that decisions are based on objectivity, determinism and rational choices. They consider seldom complexity of the networks and casting defects that are due to deviating organizational structures and information systems. In order to manage complex risks companies may be willing to make decisions that reduce their own risks at the expense of other supply chain partners. That is an old maid game. The paper presents two cases, where logistics actors confine one-sided own liabilities instead of reducing risks in the whole network. The paper can be viewed here: http://www.intechopen.com.

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Full review: Rational reasoning and responsibilities stated in agreements and contracts are assumed to create baseline for decisions in supply chain management. If contracts do not give clear answers, we assume partners can be brought into a fair and impartial agreement.  In general, cooperation and information sharing are seen to produce long-term benefits for all stakeholders. These assumptions hide situations where logistics partners are prone to make opportunistic and subjective decisions.

In real life managers must be able to dynamically adapt logistics processes to unexpected harmful events, last-minute changes and rearrangements with very limited information about the situation and consequences of their decisions. One-sided simplifications are natural responses to reduce responsibilities of the company. The paper presents two cases where logistics risks are transferred at the expense of other supply chain partners. In the first case logistic company implements a camera surveillance system in own warehouses in order protect the company against inappropriate security claims (e.g. due to damages during transportation). In the second case a leading wholesaler creates strict rules how suppliers are allowed to deliver shipments in warehouses and how the wholesaler penalizes non-compliant deliveries. In both cases risk transferring strategy leads old maid game, not to mitigation of overall supply chain risks. The strategies may even increase risk and reduce motivation to collaborate in the supply chain network.

The paper illuminates possible unexpected and unwanted outcomes in the CORE project. Simplifications and narrow approaches are known to reduce supply chain resilience. First, they may lead to the loss of crucial information. Second, partners may be prone to pay more attention to own tasks and less to interdependencies with other partners. The CORE work packages that produce only technological solutions to meet minimum legislative data sharing requirements are vulnerable to the risk. The same vulnerability concerns organizational designs, where a focal company acts as a supply chain orchestrator and defines one-sided technical specifications for other trading partners. The comprehensive approach would increase visibility in the whole end-to-end supply chain and increase motivation for collaboration between partners.

Reference: D. Ekwall, F. Nilsson, 2008 “Using business complexity to handle supply chain risk: Dealing with borders of cargo liability”. In proceedings of Nofoma 2008, Helsinki

 

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Managing the Unexpected – Sustained Performance in a Complex World (CORE1208)

Summary: The book highlights characteristics of organizations that are capable to improve efficiency and manage their risk in challenging operative environments. According to the writers these high reliable organizations pay especially attention to small failures, real-time operations, alternative pathways to keep going and mobilization of expertise. The book presents how quality and continuous improvement philosophy eroded in manufacturing company causing a recall of 10 million vehicles and how they recovered from the crisis. The book can be purchased here www.wiley.com.

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Full review: Logistics networks are prone to disruptions and inefficiencies due to inconsistencies in organizational structures and cultures, human nature to searching simplified answers to complex problems and lack of collective commitment and competence necessary to sustain performance under trying conditions. The book describes characteristics of mindful organizations that are capable to perform reliably in complex environment. These organizations have unique culture, capabilities for self-design, networks build on expertise, hybrid structures with special attention to redundancy and continuity, special training and routines to maintain situational awareness, mind-sets to make sense out of emerging patterns, relational strategies to adapt to local environment and efficient information processing.

The CORE project aims at utilizing real-time data in order to increase visibility over movements of shipments. This is expected to improve abilities to re-plan resources if required due to detected risks or unexpected disruptions. The paper give advises how to create an infrastructure that supports sense making, continuous organizing and adaptive management in complex environment. The infrastructure make possible to convert observations of anomalies into explicit event types, categories, routines, instructions and roles. During the process abstract management concepts get refined organization specific meanings. However, sense making, continuous organizing and adaptive management prerequisite honesty and transparency in reporting and willingness to base actions on them. Besides, observations must be integrated into reports without underestimating or belittling observations that have no immediate explanations. The book can be used as user manual how organization can make most use of new data in order to respond earlier and adapt to unexpected situations.

The CORE project itself is a complex project comprising over 60 partners, 22 work packages and hundreds of interrelated tasks. The CORE management pays special attention to ensure sustained performance. First, consortium members work with concepts that enable them to cluster observations from real-time case and identify emerging patterns (sustained awareness). Second, partners have a variety of technological and operational expertise from academic, governmental and private sector. Respectful interaction and heedful interrelating support creation of shared understanding in non-obvious cases and their explanations (sustained surfacing). Third, ambiguity is implicitly or even explicitly acknowledged and accepted to be part of the project. However, ambiguity does not stop the work. It is an active part of problem solving (sustained organizing). Forth, when the CORE demonstrations progress, new details and nuances are discovered. Concepts and case studies are continuously updated (sustained updating). Fifth, tasks and problems are ambiguous, that creates often discomfort among partners. That creates a strong propensity to simplify problems and find or even create traditional solutions. CORE Management team avoids making rigid decisions, but they give directions, which by definition are dynamic, open to improvement, self-correcting, responsive and transparently reasoned (sustained agency). Sixth, human beings tend to simplify their interpretations and underestimate how much crucial information is then lost. In addition, we tend to pay more attention to own tasks and less to interconnected tasks of other partners. CORE partners are experienced to align tasks in a way that they maximize common good (sustained variety). Seventh, the CORE project highlight continuing adaption that reduces need to make radical changes. The CORE management team encourages partners to update their conceptions through paying closer attention to demonstrations. Bsides, management team facilitates respectful interaction through workshops.

Reference: Weick, Karl E. & Sutcliffe, Kathleen M. (2015). Managing the Unexpected: Sustained Performance in Complex World. 3rd Edition.

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Towards Trusted Trade-lanes (CORE1207)

Summary: The paper explores the concept of trusted trade-lane. In trusted trade-lanes operators implement an internal control system that makes possible to detect, handle and report dubious events in a way that meet requirements of customs agencies. Writers identify three essential characteristics of trusted trade-lanes: single partners are considered reliable and trustworthy, collaboration is based on long-term partnerships powered by viable business opportunities and managed by a clear decision-making mechanism, and control systems ensures integrity of traded goods and transferred data. In addition, the paper presents three alternative scenarios how the trusted partnerships can be designed in cross-border trade. The paper can be viewed here: https://pure.uvt.nl.

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Full review: The paper present recent developments in designing forms of partnerships that make possible to manage, predict and reconstruct supply chain operations and events. Customs agencies can use the control system to complete law enforcement and administrative tasks in a way they can reduce or even refrain from physical inspections and checks. The trading partners that have adopted the common control system and expanded it to the needs of regulatory bodies form trusted trade-lanes. Writers identify three essential characteristics of a trusted trade-lane. First, all partners operate transparently, reliable and trustworthy in their business relationships.  Second, partners are committed in long-term collaboration that gives all partners opportunities to succeed. The government structure has clear decision making mechanisms and selected legal representative. Third, partners must implement and manage a control system that ensures integrity of transported goods and transformed data within the partners and to the authorities.

The writers design three alternatives how partnerships can evolve into trusted trade-lanes. First, a focal company can act as a supply chain orchestrator and provider technical infrastructure for use of trading partners and logistics operators. The focal company lodges customs declarations and risk information to customs administrations on behalf of the trusted trade-lane partners. In the second alternative, a service provider manages a peer-to-peer information platform that supply chain operators use to communicate between each other and with customs agencies. Data on the platform is reused for both commercial and regulatory purposes (piggy packing). Partners can join and leave the platform as they see appropriate. The platform uses open standards and database management systems. Third, a service provider offers additional ‘assurance’ services for legally independent companies of a specific industrial area. The service provider acts as a trusted trader and defines common rules and requirements for the membership.

The paper demonstrates preliminary results in the CORE project. The project partners adapt trusted trade-lane concept in their own concrete business and logistics processes as well as in their information systems. The models and scenarios are further amended and developed during the project.

Reference: Hulstijn, J., Hofman, W., Zomer, G., & Tan, Y-H. (2016). Towards trusted trade-lanes. In H. J. Scholl, O. Glassey, M. Janssen, & E. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 15th IFIP E-Government conference (EGOV 2016): Electronic Government. (pp. 299-311). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9820). Guimaraes, Portugal: Springer International Publishing.

 

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Integrating carrier selection with supplier selection decisions to improve supply chain security (CORE1206)

Summary: The paper describes a collaborative decision making process that makes possible to select optimal combination of suppliers and carriers that meet both business operational and security requirements. Security information is quantified in order to create a pool of qualified suppliers and logistics providers. Quantification enables to incorporate security with other business criteria such as price, delivery and quality into an optimization model. Logistics and purchasing managers can use the model to analyze the tradeoff between these criteria. The paper can be viewed here: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.

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Full review: Different managers typically carry out security assessments and selections for logistics providers and suppliers separately. The study presents a mechanism for quantifying and measuring supply chain security that justifies removing of suppliers and carriers from further consideration if they fail to meet the minimum required security performance. In the next phase security is incorporated into an optimization model that minimize procurement and quality costs caused by late and rejected deliveries. The optimization model allows selecting a combination of suppliers and logistics providers that best suits their individual situation defined by risks and operational requirements. The study demonstrates how the tradeoff between security and cost can be assessed parallel in a way that the process leads to the better solutions than if assessed separately.

The paper presents a dynamic optimization tool that can be considered both revolutionary and easy to implement in practice. There are security-rating systems that set minimum requirements for suppliers and carriers such as TAPA Facility Security and Trucking Requirements that enable to create a pool of qualified service providers for transportation of high-value goods. However, several manufacturing and logistics companies are outside the TAPA system, because the goods produced and transported are not prone to thefts and hold-ups. For them it is a matter of internal management coordination when choosing suppliers and carriers and willingness to carry out necessary steps to minimize the cost of providing a secure supply chain. It is also a strategic decision, if company aims at minimizing internal costs by managing suppliers and carriers by contracts or operation management principles. Several international companies have chosen the first option by selecting one or two main service providers instead of issuing regularly quotations for materials and transportation services. The paper proves it is more a question of company practices to select suppliers and carries than minimizing internal management costs.

The paper brings very interesting viewpoint to the CORE project. The CORE project focus on managing risks and unexpected events through additional sensors and information systems. However, commercialization and selling of the CORE technologies and data management platforms requires understanding procurement processes in private and public organizations.  The presented model embeds security into the selection process of suppliers and carriers. It is essential the CORE project can identify decision-making moments that give opportunity to introduce new technologies and practices and improve collaboration in supply chain network. Only collaboration between logistics managers and purchasing managers as well as among buyers, suppliers, and carriers can result in improved supply chain security performance in the whole network.

Reference: Meixell, M. J., & Norbis, M. (2012). Integrating carrier selection with supplier selection decisions to improve supply chain security. International Transactions in Operational Research, 19(5), 711–732.

 

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Assessing the drivers of change for cross-border supply chains (CORE1205)

Summary: This paper explores the main global change drivers and how they impact on international supply chain management in the next two decades. The Delhi method is adapted to structure communication, to produce well-grounded opinions and counter-arguments, and to find consensus among selected experts. The results highlight efficient networking and business-to-business and business-to-government collaboration as core supply chain management competences. The paper can be viewed here: http://www.emeraldinsight.com.

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Full review: The study aims at identifying the main change drivers that make companies to prioritize specific indicators and metrics in order to manage their operations. The experts concluded to the following eight key drivers: internet and e-commerce, new technologies for managing movements of goods and materials, versatility of customer demands, continuing chase after low cost labor in manufacturing, tighter security regulations, emerging role of ethics in corporate decision-making, increasing security and environmental concerns, and fluctuation of energy prices. Delivery performance and perfect order fulfillment will be the most important supply chain management indicators and metrics in the future. Customers will demand more tailored products to meet their individual needs what forces companies to manage material flows with an increasing number of stock keeping units.

While companies are required to offer wide product portfolio, they are also expected to have tools to manage harmful events and risks in their supply chain network. Unforeseen threats such as natural disasters, epidemics and customs inspections must be considered when structuring supply chain networks and selecting partners in the future. Consequently, companies must share more supply chain risk related information between business and governmental actors almost in real-time.  Automated data management with streamlined system interfaces between customs and companies will be the key for real time information sharing and networking. Current data exchange and compliance initiatives have already created a foundation for automation and faster flow of customs clearance documents. In addition, better relationship management between trade operators and customs are highlighted in the study.

The CORE concepts, technologies and services are very well aligned with findings in the study. Trusted trade lanes, system based approach and data pipelines reduce need for customs inspections at international borders. Visibility tools create an integrated solution to share information and collaborate between government agencies and privates supply chain stakeholders. Over 40 experts representing customs agencies, manufacturing companies, logistics operators, technology providers and insurance sector took part in the study. The study provides good arguments that help readers to sell supply chain security initiatives, technologies and services for both private and governmental operators.

Reference: Hameri, A.-P., & Hintsa, J. (2009). Assessing the drivers of change for cross-border supply chains. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 39(9), 741–761.

 

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Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks (CORE1204)

Summary: The requirement for 100% container scanning has been a burning topic, since U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the initiative in order to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destructions into the U.S. The paper explores how much it is reasonable to come down from the 100% inspection rate, if deterrence and cost of retaliation are considered in the model. Deterrence means the power to dissuade an attacker from attempting to smuggle weapons as opposite to use coerce or compel.  Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred by an attacker e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network. It is assumed the defender discloses in advance how many containers are inspected. The paper can be viewed here: https://www.researchgate.net.

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Full review: The study provides an economical model based on the game theory to estimate the optimal inspection rates in order to deter perpetrators from smuggling weapons into the U.S. The model assumes the customs or Border agency aims at minimizing the expected damages and cost of inspections while perpetrators are simultaneously trying to maximize their rewards. The used parameters are number of attackers, estimated damages, the cost of inspecting a container, the cost of a smuggling attempt, the cost of retaliation and the probability of detecting weapons. Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network.  Cost of a smuggling attempt are the costs of acquiring, developing or manufacturing the weapons, and any logistical costs required to smuggle them into the U.S.  It is assumed the government agency announces publicly the inspection level and set of retaliation policies. Retaliation policy must pose a credible threat that means the governmental agency would retaliate even if that were not economically justified.

The study has four main limitations. First, the paper does not describe under what conditions the model works well or poorly. The quality of strategic and tactical intelligence, the efficiency of criminal investigation and prosecution processes, the extent of inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, the degree of private sector involvement and successfulness of awareness campaigns on retaliation policies are probably factors that influence on the model and its parameters. Second, the study does not provide numerical estimates to the parameters such as detection rates and cost of retaliation. Third, it is very unlikely that weapons of mass destructions are transported in containers into the U.S., what makes it difficult to assess the usefulness of the model in real life cases. Forth, costs of retaliation are not calculated and published by law enforcement agencies, thus criminals cannot make decision based on financial risks.

Despite of these limitations the CORE project can adapt the game theory and benefit from the paper. Traditionally law enforcement agencies highlight the number of seizures, arrests and successful prosecutions to measure operations and their impacts. The presented model brings two interesting components, a cost of crime attempt and a cost of retaliation. If criminal activities are financed and managed based on the same principles like legal ones, expected losses due to seizures of illicit goods or drugs are very likely calculated in the criminal business models. Consequently, making criminal business unprofitable is key to stop criminal activities. The approach enables to model the dynamic between costs and rewards from viewpoints of both law enforcement and criminal actors. In the other words, the model makes possible to study two dimensions in the Innovation Agenda, societal costs and friction costs caused by implemented security measures.

Reference: Bier, Vicki M. & Haphuriwat, N. (2011). Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks. Annals of Operations Research, 187(1), 137–158.

 

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Conflict resolution in supply chain security, 2009 (CORE1202)

Summary: The paper presents a mathematical tool for conflict resolution based on conflict modeling theories. Decision and policy making on supply chain security is sensitive to technical, political, environmental, ethical and economical aspects. What aspects are emphasized depends on whom we ask. Consequently, broadly endorsed decisions and policies require balancing between these dimensions.  The presented conflict resolution approach identifies involved decision makers, their individual and collective goals and gives options how to agree on security interventions. A case study on trade facilitation and security enforcement illuminates the approach. The article can be purchased at: http://www.inderscienceonline.com.

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Full review: Conflicts are preprogrammed in supply chain security management, because different operators such as customs, port authorities, manufacturing companies, logistics providers and financial institutes collaborate with conflicting goals. For  example, a purchasing manager can be interested in ordering products manufactured in high-risk country due to lower cost while security manager might assess risks related to the seller exceeding the potential benefits. Port operation manager aims at loading and unloading cargo swiftly and safely to and from vessels under time pressure, while port security dislikes the idea of expediting shipments at the cost of inspections. Supply chain security is a multidisciplinary issue that can be addressed efficiently only through agreeing about decision-making and policy-making mechanisms.

The paper focuses on resolution of strategic conflicts that result from the interaction of different stakeholders that collaborate with different emphases in global supply chains. The approach enables conflicting parties to focus on critical aspects of the conflict resolution process. It identifies the roles of involved decision makers, individual preferences and collective goals, underlying causes of conflict and options to achieve conflict resolution. In other words, it provides bases for cooperation and collaboration between involved parties. In addition, the paper introduces a mathematical tool for conflict resolution based on conflict modeling theories.

Decision supporting tools and port security management systems are developed in the CORE project, but they do not take into consideration possible conflicting goals in the decision-making. The CORE technologies and tools assist to mitigate identified negative threats and their consequences. However, negative effects have a threshold that must be exceeded to make different actors convinced about necessity of mitigation actions and controls. For example, estimated 0.2% annual profit loss due to possible security breach may give or not a reason to risk-profile suppliers or invest in container tracking systems. Especially when the questions are more strategic than operational the related decisions are prone to have conflicting interests. The CORE project does not try to address this problematic.

Reference: Lara Gracia, M. A., & Nof, S. Y. (2009). Conflict resolution in supply chain security. International Journal of Value Chain Management, 3(2), 168–186.

 

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The effect of supply chain security management on security performance in container shipping operations, 2012 (CORE1201)

Summary: The study creates a supply chain security framework that can be adapted on assessing how security management measures affect on safety and customs clearance performance in container shipping firms. Security management interventions are clustered in four categories: facility and cargo management, accident prevention and processing, information management, and partner relationship management. Findings indicated that container shipping firms that mainly focus on facility and cargo management and less on partner relationship management are generally more dissatisfied with their company’s customs clearance performance than companies that prioritize partnerships with governmental and commercial companies. The governmental agencies and commercial actors can employ supply chain security management framework, its attributes and dimensions in order to assess the supply chain security performance of container shipping firms.  The reviewed document is available at: http://dx.doi.org.

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Full review:  Several authors have clustered supply chain security measures into different categories, but only few authors have provided statistical models to test how well these categories can be used to assess benefits of security measures. The study establishes four security categories/dimensions: facility and cargo management, accident prevention and processing, information management, and partner relationship management. The results imply that partner relationship management is positively related to customs clearance performance. Further, information management and partner relationship management are positively related to safety performance. However, facility and cargo management and accident prevention and processing were not found to have substantial positive impacts on security performance what is controversial to many safety studies. Improved access control, material handling, information processing and reporting of anomalies are clearly factors that are positively related to safety performance based on several work place safety studies. The difference is probably due to questions that defined safety performance: the study addressed accidents and property damages while safety studies measure often near misses and their reporting.

The FP7 CORE project utilizes key performance Indicators (KPIs) to assess and monitor organization’s performance at the operational level. Two CORE KPI’s measure address safety and customs clearance performance, consequently the supply chain security framework can well be adapted on the CORE context. Improved access control, cargo handling, shipping information processing and reporting of anomalies can be measured by using the construct for ‘facility and cargo management’. CORE Training and education can be embedded into the factor ‘accident prevention and processing’ that captures documenting and disseminating of security information. ‘Partner relationship management’ can be tested as a mediating factor that controls how strongly implemented CORE interventions influence on organizational performance indicators in specific demonstrations. Customs agencies can consider using four dimensions of supply chain security as criteria for assessing security performance in container shipping firms. Finally the dimensions and attributes of the framework provide a tool to analyse qualitative data in the project where getting reliable quantitative data is challenging.

Reference: Ching‐Chiao Yang, Hsiao‐Hsuan Wei, “The effect of supply chain security management on security performance in container shipping operations”, Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 18 Iss: 1, pp.74 – 85

 

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Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

Summary: Supply chain security culture (SCSC) is as an overall organizational philosophy embracing norms and values that keep employees vigilant when performing supply chain security practices. The article presents a scale that makes possible to gauge supply chain security culture and its correlation to organization’s ability to respond to unexpected disruptions. Employees are asked to assess two topics: security strategy of the company and impacts of significant supply chain breech to business operations. According the study improved supply chain security culture makes company more resilient against major disruptions. This research helps executives to justify their expenditures on security efforts. The reviewed document can be purchased here: http://dx.doi.org.

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Full review: Researchers have stressed the importance of having an organizational culture that highlights proactivity and vigilance toward supply chain security breaches. In security-focused supply chain management environment workers are empowered to detected and handle supply chain security threats without seeking formal permission from supervisors and managers. Company security strategy gives specific attention how SCS concepts are embedded into firm processes and procedures. Alignment with organizational culture and business or corporate-level strategies is believed to result in enhanced organizational performance. In addition, organization culture encompasses supply chain continuity management. The paper presents a scale for measuring supply chain security culture defined as the overall organizational philosophy that creates supply chain security as a priority among its employees through embracing and projecting norms and values to support secure activities and to be vigilant with security efforts.

The study makes possible to assess how implemented FP7-CORE security technologies, tools and practices influence on supply chain resilience based on the perception of company managers and employees. The article gives also guidelines how to develop survey forms and protocols in order to assess the influence of implemented security measures on other KPIs such as supply chain visibility and reliability. The survey tools based on perceived operational and organizational changes complete toolbox to measure impacts of introduced security interventions.

Reference: Zachary Williams, Nicole Ponder, Chad W. Autry, “Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation”, The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 20 Iss: 2, pp.243 – 260

 

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Enhancing security through efficiency focus- Insights from a multiple stakeholder pilot implementation (Sternberg et al. 2012)

Summary

Efficiency and security are said to be opposing goals of logistics operations: when security goes up, efficiency decreases, and vice versa. Yet, it is suggested that information technologies could improve efficiency and security simultaneously. Sternberg et al. (2012) investigate this hypothesis: whether and to what extent increased attention to efficiency results in improved security in carrier operations in a seaport context. In a longitudinal case study, they research carrier operations in connection with port terminals carrying out Roll-in Roll-out (RoRo) operations on trailers at the port of Gothenburg. They find that investments in new ICT solutions, in fact, remove some of the barriers to higher efficiency and improve security against cargo theft and terrorism. In particular, they report that ICT investments increased efficiency in terms of reduced waiting times and increased ability to plan port operations (pre-arrival notification) and fast positioning of trailers in a port. The new ICT solutions also increased security in terms of more secure document handling (decreases the risk that sensitive information falls into the hands of criminals), better anomaly detection (helps customs identify trailers that are most likely tampered in-transit) and increased visibility. The abstract is available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

This article is relevant for CORE demonstrations that focus on sea port operations (WP10-11 and WP13-15 and WP17). The research shows how a ‘common information sharing platform’ – an electronic and highly automated communication network among LSPs, carriers, ferry operators, port operators and authorities – increases logistics efficiency and security performance simultaneously. The main components of this platform include information sharing through a common information area, real-time geographical position of truck and trailer, identification technology in truck, RFID tags on transport units and RFID readers mounted on terminals, electronic manifest, and electronic container seals. More specifically, Sternberg et al. (2012) observed that adoption of a set of IT-enabled SCS solutions eliminated logistics efficiency and security issues simultaneously:

  • Real-time geo-positioning of trucks and trailers enabled the port operator to allocate a vacant spot for a trailer prior to its arrival, which reduced the waiting time at the port entrance. The real-time information enabled also customs to detect anomalies in shipping schedules and routings that would imply a heightened risk of smuggling.
  • RFID-based identification of drivers, trucks, and trailers automated and accelerated the access formalities at the port entrance and increased reliability of driver authentication.
  • Digitalization of cargo manifests eliminated the time-consuming manual document handling and reduced the risk of unauthorised access to confidential information.
  • E-seals enabled customs officers to identify intact containers and spare them from time- consuming inspections.

Reference

Sternberg, H., Nyquist, C., & Nilsson, F. (2012). Enhancing Security Through Efficiency Focus—  Insights from a Multiple Stakeholder Pilot Implementation. Journal of Business Logistics, 33(1), 64-73.

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