Supply Chain Security: Survey on Law Enforcement Agencies’ Training Needs, 2015 (CORE1112)

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

Summary: In a recent study, a joint CBRA-INTERPOL research team investigates what kind of training material would help law enforcement agencies to fight crime in the context of global supply chains. The team conducted a pilot survey at the LE TrainNet Meeting (Networking Meeting of the Law Enforcement training institutions) which took place in Baku, Azerbaijan, 28- 29 April 2015. Findings of the pilot survey will be used to launch a large EU-wide survey on law enforcement agencies’ training needs regarding supply chain security. The survey findings also guide production of new training and educational material that the FP7 CORE is currently producing. The reviewed document is available for download here: https://hicl.org. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

[s2If is_user_logged_in()]

Full review: The article concludes that law enforcement agencies generally recognise supply chain security training as a worthwhile investment for their organisations. In partuclar, the law enforcement agencies call for new supply chain related training material especially regarding narcotics and drug precursor trafficking, corruption financial crimes and tax evasion, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in counterfeit goods, terrorism and cybercrime. They advocate increasing use of modern training techniques and tools, such as e-learning, case-based teaching, and role-playing exercises.

Other findings show that law enforcement agencies consider it very useful to develop new training and educational material that would help them to enable and encourage multi-agency collaboration, for example data sharing between police agencies and customs.  The survey respondents also expressed their interest in new training material that would focus on human factors of transnational crime (e.g., motives and underlying social dynamics) and intelligence-led policing.

It is important to notice that only 16 people responded to the Baku pilot survey. The response rate was 23.2%, given there were 69 delegates registered for the LEA TrainNet meeting. The relatively low number of respondents and the relatively low response rate indicate that there is a definite need for a larger EU-wide follow-up survey.

Reference: Hintsa, J., Ahokas, J., Gallagher, R., and Männistö, T., (2015), ”Supply Chain Security: Survey on Law Enforcement Agencies’ Training Needs”, Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL), September 24-25, 2015, Hamburg.

 

CORE1112

[/s2If]

Transit electronic platform in Central America, December 2010 (CORE2013a and 2013b)

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

Summary: The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that more than 95% of commercial goods in the Mesoamerican region are transported overland using the Pacific Corridor. This traffic represents approximately 6 billion USD worth of goods on a highway which runs from Puebla, Mexico to Panama and crosses six national borders. The problem with the Pacific Corridor is with unreliable, inefficient and substandard infrastructure. In 2008, to upgrade the inadequate infrastructure, the IDB launched a ambitious project called International Goods in Transit. According to the report, the results of the project were outstanding: average time to cross a border was reduced from 62 minutes to eight. The project also succeeded to reduce the number of documents that traders needed to submit to border control agencies.  The two reviewed files are available for download at: Interoperability at the Border: Coordinated Border Management Best Practices & Case Studies and Automating the Control of Goods in International Transit: Implementing the TIM in Central America.

[s2If is_user_logged_in()]

Full review: The solution, that the International Goods in Transit project produced, is basically an electronic system for managing and controlling the movement of goods in transit. The system builds on three main pillars that unlock better services at border crossing:

  1. Process reengineering: the system harmonizes multiple paper-based declarations into an electronic document. This digital file stores all data that customs, migration, and phytosanitary agencies need.
  2. Information technology: the project created a new intranet system that features state- of-the-art risk analysis and cargo control systems.
  3. Cooperation: the project promoted cooperation within the country and between the different agencies operating at border crossings in the Mesoamerican Region.

Important lessons learned from the project include the following:

  • Political support for harmonizing regulations and processes is critical. Real and full commitment from the highest authorities in every participating country contributes to a cooperative environment based on mutual trust. In the case of this project, the IDB supported the decision of governments to include the project as one of the priorities highlighted in the Joint Declaration of Chiefs of State at the Presidential Summit of Tuxtla in 2008. The choice of the project coordinator is also critical for the success of the project. The coordinator must have good relationships with top government officials and have the support of the participating countries, and naturally of the IDB.
  • The project involved large number of stakeholders that have their unique characteristics and interests and operate within their legal remits. The IDB project was designed in a way that changes in national laws and regulations were not necessary.
  • All relevant agencies should participate in the coordination and harmonization process.
  • Information technology should be flexible and open to modifications.

CORE2013a

CORE2013b

[/s2If]

Integrated Border Management Strategy in Croatia, April 2005 (CORE2012)

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

Summary: An Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy was written in Croatia in accordance with the guidelines of the European Union and in collaboration with international experts. This strategy and its implementation action plan was adopted by the Croatian government on the 21 April 2005. The reviewed document is available for download at: Strategy for Integrated Border Management (Croatia).

[s2If is_user_logged_in()]

Full review: The main objective of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy is to provide effective support for economic development of the country and to raise the standard of living of citizens. The strategy also seeks to protect life and health of people and their property from cross-border crime. Integrated Border Management requires participation of many government agencies, including border police, customs, border veterinary service, border phytosanitary service, border sanitary service and the state inspectorate. Many times also state authorities in charge of culture, mining and radiation protection contribute to the IBM Strategy formulation and implementation.

As part of the Strategy, the Croatian government created a new interdepartmental working group. The primary objective was to facilitate cross-border traffic through reduction overlapping border control activities. The working group eliminated duplicate processes by aligning responsibilities of border control agencies and by exploiting the time of the relevant synergies between relevant governmental bodies. The working group launched initiatives in following areas:

  • Delegation of power from one border control authority;
  • Information sharing (apart from Single Window);
  • Coordination of passenger and crew movements;
  • Joint controls Joint controls (including joint examinations); and
  • Coordination of law enforcement activities.

CORE2012

[/s2If]

Cooperation experiences of the Canada Border Services Agency, July 2012 (CORE2011)

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

Summary: The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has a dual mandate (1) to facilitate cross-border movements of cargo and people and (2) to protect security and safety of the Canadian people. The agency seeks to provide integrated border services, by closely cooperating with other Canadian border control agencies as well as with foreign customs administrations. The reviewed document is available for download here: Customs Cooperation Case Study for Canada.

[s2If is_user_logged_in()]

Full review: Forms of cooperation depend on needs of the partner agencies, but the cooperation typically includes:

  1. Participation in and cooperation with international organizations: CBSA participates and cooperates in various committees and working groups, especially as part of the WCO, WTO and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
  1. Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (TACB): The CBSA is an active contributor to least-developed countries and global capacity building such as the Columbus Programme from the WCO. CBSA´s TACB focuses on two areas: (i) senior decision makers seeking to modernize their border administration and (ii) technical level design for operational and field personnel.
  1. CBSA Liaison Officers: Canada has over 60 liaison officers in more than 40 countries around the world, who are in charge of cooperation-related tasks including training transport personnel and combating fraud.
  1. CBSA Science and Engineering Directorate (Lab): Multilaterally, the Lab helps to disseminate information and intelligence on new trends in critical areas including narcotics. Bilaterally, CBSA Lab expertise and best practices have contributed to contraband detection, while supporting multiple countries in exploiting new instruments and technologies.
  1. Customs Cooperation with the United States: After the September 11, 2001 event, Canada and US increased security and compliance measures that obviously slowed down cross-border trade and travel. To reduce such negative impacts, both countries signed the Smart Border Declaration in 2001, and engaged in the Security and Prosperity Partnership in 2005. The CBSA and the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed the Framework for Co-operative Border Management, that aimed to enhance facilitation while maintaining security, and managing risk by dealing with threats as close to the point of origin as possible. Other US-Canadian cooperation forms have been developed with the objective of expanding and enhancing the benefits of trusted trader and traveller programs; coordinating investments in infrastructure and technology; simplifying business reporting requirements; enhancing screening of cargo and travellers at the perimeter to improve facilitation within the both countries; improving information sharing between both governments; and eliminating double inspections for air cargo and passenger baggage.

CORE2011

[/s2If]

SIECA delegation visiting Europe in June 2015

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

I had a great pleasure to be the lead host for a 12 person SIECA delegation visit to Europe in June 2015. We spent two days in the Netherlands, one day in Belgium and two days in Switzerland in an action-packed tour, visiting several border areas, governmental offices and beyond.

The idea to organize a one-week customs and international trade visit tour to Europe first came when Mr. Roman Stoll from the Federal Customs Administration of Switzerland and I paid a four-day visit at the SIECA Secretariat in Guatemala City in March 2015. There we had several meetings and discussions on World Trade Organization´s Trade Facilitation Agreement, WTO TFA, implementation plans with the SIECA management – Ms. Carmen Gisela Vergara Mas and Mr. Javier Gutierrez; with Customs management and experts from all the six SIECA member countries; and with representatives of the Intra-American Development Bank. Some weeks after the Guatemala-visit, SIECA and IDB confirmed the willingness to come over to Europe, to learn about good practices in international trade, supply chain and border management in the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. And after couple of hundreds of emails and phone calls – myself acting as the focal point in arranging the visit – we were ready to welcome the SIECA Delegation to Europe between Monday 1 June and Friday 5 June, 2015.

blog 22.03.20161Monday-Tuesday we had a full agenda in the Netherlands. Monday started by presentations on Dutch Customs in general, and Schiphol Customs in specific, focusing on risk management, coordinated border management, and the SmartGate solutions at the Schiphol Airport. This was followed by a roundtable discussion with representatives from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs, as well as with an expert from the air cargo industry. During Monday the SIECA delegation gained firsthand knowledge for example on One-Stop Shop (OSS) implementation steps in the Netherlands: Step 1. Information exchange; 2. Joint inspections; 3. Training specialists; 4. Joint risk analysis by both inspections and selection by Customs; and Step 5. One inspection inspects for the other. The program on Tuesday consisted of a tour in Port of Rotterdam, at the APM 2 Container terminal; as well as a visit to the Central command post of nuclear detection and an X-ray container scanner. In between we had a typical “Dutch sandwich” lunch, kindly offered by the hosts. The delegation enjoyed seeing the ultimate high level of automation at the new container terminal, as well as visiting a pragmatic “one stop inspection room”, where multiple border agencies work together inspecting containers flagged for manual inspections.

Wednesday was spent in Brussels, Belgium. In the morning, the trade representatives of the SIECA Delegation went to the European Commission, DG TRADE, for EU-SIECA related discussions. In the afternoon, most of the delegation visited the World Customs Organization, where the meeting started with discussions with the WCO Secretary General Dr. Kunio Mikuriya and the WCO Deputy Secretary General Mr. Sergio Mujica. This was followed by a presentation on WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and the linked WCO Instruments, by Ms. Heike Barczyk, the Deputy Director of Compliance and Facilitation Directorate at the WCO. Lastly, we had a brief presentation and roundtable discussions on the European Flagship Supply Chain Security Research, Development and Demonstrations project called FP7-CORE. This discussion was joined by Mr. Nik Delmeire, the Secretary General of the European Shippers Council; Ms. Nicolette van der Jagt, the Secretary General of CLECAT, the European association for forwarding, transport, logistics and customs services; and myself, Dr. Juha Hintsa, Founder of the Cross-border Research Association. After the meeting at WCO, it was time to fly from Brussels to Basel, Switzerland.

blog 22.03.20162Thursday-Friday we had a packed program in Switzerland. Despite some “navigation challenges” with our three-car convoy, we arrived on time from Basel to Bern at the Directorate General of the Federal Customs Administration. We heard several interesting presentations focusing on performance mandate, tasks and strategy of Swiss Customs; on international affairs section and it’s relevant international cooperation program; on shifts from traditional revenue collection to environmental and incentive taxes; and on strategy and challenges regarding future customs clearance systems and platforms – all this by three top experts from Swiss Customs. I presented the outcomes of Swiss Customs and Cross-border Research Association -visit to SIECA in March 2015, suggesting some specific areas and priorities for future co-operation activities. Next, the Delegation visited the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, where the discussions focused on Swiss foreign policy in Central America and bilateral cooperation Switzerland – Central America; as well as on political and economic regional integration in Central America. After a quick photo session on the Bundeshaus terrace facing over River Aare, our journey continued towards the Swiss Customs facilities at the Zurich Airport. Again, there were some “logistics challenges” on the way to Zurich, when one of our three cars suddenly lost all engine coolant – fortunately a gas station was close by, and a road service company (car + mechanic) happened to be there. At the Zurich Airport, the SIECA Delegation learned a lot of details about Swiss Customs operations with air cargo and passenger flows. And as the last agenda item, we met a cute black Labrador retriever, who together with his trainer showed how effortlessly he finds illicit goods hidden in air cargo boxes and pallets…

On Friday morning – last day of the journey – we had again an early wake-up call at our hotel in Basel. We were warmly welcomed by Swiss Customs Officers at the Basel/Weil- Motorway border-crossing point – the highest volume customs clearance point in Switzerland. First the hosts explained about facts and figures on Basel/Weil, topped with interesting information on customs risk management processes and IT-systems. Now we all know that on average 3500 trucks cross the Basel/Weil border per day, and that around 600 million CHF is collected annually as indirect taxes at that border crossing point. After that we took a rooftop view over the border area premises, discussing further Import/Export/Transit -procedures, as well as visited the Swiss Transito-Cabins / Checkpoints. From the motorway we drove to the Swiss Customs House at the Basel Port, visiting the famous tri-border-point between Switzerland, Germany and France. There the Delegation learned about the barge traffic on River Rhine – the same river we saw three days earlier at Port of Rotterdam. From the Basel Port, we drove again to Bern, this time to visit the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, SECO. Lively discussions took place on the SECO rooftop meeting room on topics including EFTA – Central American FTA, as well as Bilateral Economic Relations Switzerland – Central America. And after lunch kindly offered by SECO, we headed towards Geneva for the final meeting of the week: World Economic Forum, WEF, where we all arrived just in time to learn about the organization and the key activities of WEF, including: the work of the WEF in Latin America, with updates from the Latin American Summit; and, the work of the WEF on trade and investment policy and implementation, including Policy Directions, Enabling Trade Index, Enabling Trade implementations. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, UNECE, was kind enough to explain about latest developments and trends in single window projects and implementations. And lastly, I shared briefly select work on trade facilitation and supply chain security research and education materials by the Cross-border Research Association and HEC University of Lausanne.  I highlighted the important developments taking place within the FP7-CORE project – referring naturally to our meeting two days earlier at the World Customs Organization.

This concludes the brief summary of the SIECA week in Europe, and now I would like to thank all the SIECA Delegation members for coming over and spending the five days with us, here on the old continent:

  • Costa Rica: Mr. Jhon Fonseca, Vice Minister Foreign Trade; and Mr. Luis Fernando Vasquez Castillo, Costa Rica Customs.
  • El Salvador: Mrs. Luz Estrella Rodriguez, Vice Minister Foreign Trade
  • Guatemala: María Luisa Flores Villagran, Vice Minister Foreign Trade; and Mrs. Maria Elisa Chang, Guatemala Customs.
  • Honduras: Jeronima Urbina, Director of Economic Integration
  • Nicaragua: Eddy Aldolfo Artola Garciá, Director Risk Management of Nicaragua Customs.
  • Panama: Melitón Arrocha. Minister Foreign Trade; Mrs. Diana Salazar, Vice Minister Foreign Trade; and Mr. José Gómez Núnez DG of Panama Customs.
  • SIECA Secretariat: Carmen Gisela Vergara Mas, Secretary General
  • Intra-American Development Bank: Mr. Jaime Granados

And last but not least, warmest thanks to all the local hosts: Dutch Customs Administration; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs; European Commission DG TRADE; World Customs Organization; Federal Customs Administration of Switzerland; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland; State Secretariat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland; and World Economic Forum.

CBRA Blog by Juha Hintsa

blog 22.03.20163PS. If your country / region would be interested on a similar European field visit, please contact us – we could organize the practical details for the next delegation, possibly every 1-2 years (of course the actual hosts need to agree to the visit in the first place, that goes without saying…). And one final note: next time a bus and a professional driver need to be rented, please!

 

Interview with Dr. Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

CBRA Interview with Dr. Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia, Program Coordinator with the Emerging Crimes Unit at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, UNICRI, Torino, Italy.

Hi Vittoria, and thanks for joining a CBRA Interview – can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I am the Programme Coordinator of the UNICRI Emerging Crimes Unit. Since joined the U.N. in 2001, I have been in charge of the coordination of a number of applied-research programmes in the field of illicit trafficking and emerging crimes, including environmental crimes, cybercrimes, counterfeiting, and organized crime in general.  I am UNICRI Focal Point for Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management, SAICM, as well as UNICRI Focal Point within the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Human Trafficking, ICAT.

Can you explain us bit more about UNICRI, including the governance model and the research areas?

UNICRI is a United Nations entity created by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, ECOSOC, in 1967 to assist Intergovernmental, Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations in formulating and implementing improved policies in the field of criminal justice. The Institute is part of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program, which report annually through the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, CCPCJ, to the ECOSOC.

UNICRI is involved in research projects and capacity building activities in a broad number of areas, ranging from environmental crimes; human trafficking; trafficking in goods and products – including precious metals, pesticides, counterfeiting as well as chemicals, biological, radiological and nuclear risks; terrorism and foreign fighters; hate crimes and hate speech; cyber-security; urban security; violence against women; and, maritime piracy.

UNICRI, CBRA and other partners have just finished a 2-year FP7-project called CWIT, focusing on identifying and quantifying criminal and non-compliance problems and proposing solutions against illicit trade and logistics in electronic waste materials. What was the biggest thing you learned during the project, and which of our recommendations you find as most important when moving to the future?

The CWIT project has been a great experience from a personal as well as professional point of view, as gave me the possibility to work side by side with a number of wonderful professionals from the WEEE industry, enforcement agencies, international organisations, lawyers, academia and consultants specialised in supply chain security.

The objectives of the project were quite ambitious, as CWIT aimed at identifying the policy, regulatory, procedural and technical gaps as observed in today’s business environment, and at suggesting tangible improvements. The CWIT team produced set of recommendations to support the European Commission, law enforcement authorities and industry practitioners in countering the illegal trade of WEEE in and from Europe.

With regards to the recommendations which I consider particularly important are the ones related to the necessity of establishing robust and uniform legal framework and relevant implementation. As mentioned in the final CWIT report, without a clear and comprehensive legislative base, enforcers and prosecutors are powerless to address illegal WEEE flows. At the very minimum, a clear and global definition of what constitutes WEEE is the basis for improving detection, inspection, and enforcement and sentencing rates related to illegal WEEE trade.

In parallel, harmonisation and enhancement of penalty system is needed to increase the effectiveness of the existing legal framework.  In fact, penalties for the illegal trade in e-waste vary greatly in terms of monetary fines and prison durations. Today, the participation in WEEE illegal activities does not appear risky to offenders due to the low probability of being prosecuted and sentenced. Even when successfully prosecuted, penalties foreseen in legislation and penalties applied in court decisions are typically very low. For these reasons, it is important to also enhance prosecuting and sentencing, so that WEEE trade and environmental crimes in general are not considered a low- priority/low sentenced area.

UNICRI kindly invited CBRA to Torino last October to join a 2-day workshop on “Illicit Pesticides, Organized Crime and Supply Chain Integrity”. Can you elaborate on this emerging supply chain crime area, including about the estimated size and the negative socio-economic consequences of the problem?

Illicit pesticides cover a wide variety of products, including obsolete pesticides, unauthorized imports, counterfeit or fake pesticides; re- or up-labelled pesticides and refilled containers. Estimates of the illicit pesticides penetration of the legal market range from 10 to 25% – both in the EU and at international level-, representing several billion annually (USD 6-10 billion at global level and USD 1.1 billion at European level).

Besides the evident risks for human safety and health and environmental risks, illicit pesticides also pose serious threats to the economies and security. The agricultural market is extremely important for a large number of countries and companies and might be jeopardize by the introduction of illicit pesticides which can deeply affect the local and national economies. The economic losses have multiple sources and victims and long-term consequences, in particular possible loss of harvest/crop, soil and water contamination affecting the cultivable lands, decrease in innovation, reputation challenges with a decrease of exports, etc. The penetration of the pesticides market by criminal actors, including organised crime groups attracted by high profits and low risk of detection, prosecution and sentencing is another worrying trend.

Do you foresee opportunities for future research projects in the field of illicit pesticides?

Many national and international actors are becoming more and more aware of the threats posed by illicit pesticides to the legal supply chain. The attention and awareness of the problem is increasing at international level. In particular, the World Customs Organisation and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are becoming increasingly active in the field and it would be interesting to establish joint actions so as to raise awareness, capacities and response to secure the legal supply chain of such products. Indeed, through this research, we realised that the issue of illicit pesticide is neither well acknowledged nor well-documented. Our study is one of the first detailing the mechanisms and trends in the trafficking of illicit pesticides, the involvement of criminal actors, networks and organised crime groups and related criminal activities, as well as identifying the risks for the supply chain and pesticide markets.

UNICRI is very interested in continue working with partners, including CBRA, on this issue. The report details a number of initiatives which UNICRI stands ready to launch supporting countries in addressing the challenges of illicit pesticides, in particular research, raising stakeholders’ awareness, training and technical assistance programmes, supporting in capacity building activities and reinforcing national and international cooperation.

Thanks Vittoria for this interview – and we are of course more than willing to join a project-team on this highly important illicit pesticides trade and supply chains -topic

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO, September 2013 (CORE1007)

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

Summary: This GAO report reviews maritime supply chain security programs that the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies – mainly the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard – have implemented since 2001. The report examines (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed risk levels of foreign ports and allocated security resources accordingly and (2) activities DHS has taken to monitor and improve efficiency and effectiveness of its security initiatives. Drawing on numerous interviews of key stakeholders and examination of key documents, the report recommends CBP to consider expansion of its Container Security Initiative (CSI) into new ports based on a periodic risk assessment of foreign ports. The report also highlights opportunities for further harmonization of the US maritime security initiatives with their foreign counterparts through mutual recognition agreements. Since this report contains fundamental information about the US maritime security programs, many CORE work packages are likely to benefit from the insights this report provides. Especially, the demonstrations, which involve ocean shipping, as well as the risk cluster, can use this information to support and guide their work. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657893.pdf (accessed 13.3.2016)

[s2If is_user_logged_in()]

Full review: The report provides a comprehensive outlook on the US maritime supply chain security initiatives that the DHS and its component agencies – mainly CBP and Coast Guard – have implemented since 2001. The report features some interesting figures that map the security initiatives on the global supply chain and that illustrate current solutions the US government employs to screen and examine US-bound shipping containers. The CORE’s demonstrations that involve maritime shipping are likely to benefit from the information this report provides. Also the risk cluster can use the information, and especially the mapping of the US maritime security initiatives over the global supply chain, to design risk-based, layered approaches to maritime supply chain security. The education cluster can also reuse the contents of this report to produce relevant and informative training material for various supply chain stakeholders that are involved in the seaborne trade and logistics.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act. GAO-12-1009T. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2012.
  • Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning. GAO-12-422T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012.
  • Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2011.
  • Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record. GAO-11-140R. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended. GAO-10-887. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010.

Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, Customs-trade partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI), maritime security, counter-terrorism

CORE1007

[/s2If]

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, GAO, February 2012 (CORE1005)

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

Summary: This GAO document analyses the progress and challenges of the US maritime supply chain security initiatives. The document puts a special emphasis on (1) the advance cargo information (ACI) schemes that enable the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to assess risk levels of US-bound cargo containers, (2) technologies to track, monitor and screen the shipping containers for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other contraband, and (3) to evaluate the progress towards the 100-percent scanning of the US-bound containerized cargo. As the overarching theme, the report addresses the current state of the partnerships the component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have been fostering with the private sector and foreign governments. Besides the demonstrations, which deal with the US-related maritime logistics, the CORE’s risk and educational clusters can benefit from the insight and information this report offers. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588253.pdf (accessed 12.3.2016)

[s2If is_user_logged_in()]

Full review: This report provides a general outlook on the US maritime supply chain security initiatives, but the contents of this document largely overlaps with other, reviewed GAO documents. However, this report offers some fresh perspectives on the US maritime security – particularly the best updates available on the advanced cargo information programs –, and therefore the CORE’s partners, which are engaged in demonstrations on maritime security, might benefit from studying this GAO document. Moreover, the CORE risk, educational and IT clusters might learn from this document how the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented its supply chain security philosophy in the maritime context. In particular, the risk cluster may use the description of the US risk-based approach to cargo inspections as a starting point for the related CORE solutions. The IT cluster may learn from the ways how the US government has organized its IT processes and infrastructure that support the maritime security initiatives. Finally, the educational cluster can use the material of this report to produce meaningful training material for CORE’s stakeholders that are engaged in maritime supply chain security.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended. GAO-10-887. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography System to Detect Nuclear Materials. GAO-10-1041T. Washington D.C.: September 15, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors. GAO-09-804T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2009.

Additional keywords: Importer Security Filing (10+2 rule), Advanced Targeting System (ATS), 24-hour rule, 100-percent scanning requirement

CORE1005

[/s2If]

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION – Progress and Challenges Faced in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs, GAO, March 2012 (CORE1004)

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , /by

Summary: The report discusses status and future challenges of the Transportation Security Administration’s three key security programs: The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. The two earlier programs are related to the passenger security, which not in the scope of the CORE project. The third TWIC program – an initiative for vetting backgrounds of maritime workers that require access to regulated maritime facilities and vessels – is the only program on supply chain security. The report recommends that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would improve its internal procedures (e.g., enrolment practices, background checking and quality control) and define and measure performance criteria for assessing the TWIC program’s efficiency and effectiveness. This GAO report discusses mainly passenger security programs that are not interesting for the CORE and for most of the project partners. However, learning about the TWIC program might be useful for at least those CORE demonstrations on maritime supply chain security. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589587.pdf (accessed 12.3.2016)

[s2If is_user_logged_in()]

Full review: This GAO report has only a limited use in the CORE project because of its emphasis on passenger security programs (the Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC) program is the only program discussed in the report that has something to do with supply chain security). The CORE’s maritime demonstrations may find it useful to learn about the US way for managing credentials and access to regulated maritime facilities and vessels. The CORE’s risk cluster might learn something about conducting risk-based background checks for logistics workers, and the CORE’s educational cluster might use the description of CWIT, that this report provides, to produce training material and guidebooks on how to implement and maintain access control schemes.

CORE1004

[/s2If]

FP7-CORE Education – Two new diagrams

/0 Comments/in , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , /by

Today’s CBRA Blog presents two new diagrams which have been recently designed and developed in the context of FP7-CORE Education and training work (Work package 19.1). The information visualized in the diagram is based on CBRA’s supply chain security research work since year 2001, particularly from the past 5-6 years.

Some background information on the first diagram of crime types in global supply chains has been presented before for example in CBRA’s Blog of 13 October 2014 – Crime taxonomies from Athens. In the center of this diagram we list the crime types – including document fraud and cybercrime – which in the supply chain criminal context are performed in order to succeed with the actual economic or ideological crime, e.g. cargo theft or terrorism.

The left area of the circle lists four examples of crime types, which typically are of primary concern for supply chain companies: cargo theft, sabotage, parallel trade and product specification fraud. With such crime types it is commonly up to the companies to prevent, to detect and to react – of course, law enforcement agencies can be called for any time there is reasonable suspicion of such activities (and naturally in certain cases the government agencies may even be the first ones to detect and react, e.g. in case of armed robberies and truck hijackings).

The right area of the circle deals with supply chain incidents where the authorities typically focus on prevention, detection and reaction: fraud in indirect border taxes; trafficking / violations in cross-border restrictions and prohibitions; human trafficking; and exploitation of illicit labor. From supply chain perspective one can characterize them as “a priori non-disruptive illegal activities – only if / after authorities detect the violations, the supply chain is disrupted and the involved supply chain companies can get in trouble”.

Lastly, on the bottom area of the circle, we list four supply chain crime areas where the prevention typically is in strong interest of both supply chain companies and governmental agencies – and, the detection and (instant) reaction varies on case-by-case basis: counterfeiting, sales channel violations, sea piracy and terrorism. Counterfeiting hits revenues on both sides of the equation, and, with many products can also be health damaging or even lethal. Not having proper sales licenses, and/or selling to unauthorized buyers – for example cigarettes and alcohol, dual use and strategic goods etc. – can again harm both the involved companies and the society as a whole. And of course, sea pirates hijacking cargo ships; bombs exploding and bringing planes down; and terrorists attacking critical supply chain infrastructures, all are in the best interest of both companies and government agencies to prevent, to detect, and to react – in the fastest and most effective possible manner.

blog10.03.161

The second new educational diagram below depicts the negative socio-economic impact areas – six in total – caused by twelve typical smuggling and trafficking activities. The data behind it has been presented before e.g. in CBRA’s Blog of 14 January 2015 – Socio-economic damages. Inside the square we present the six societal impact areas – the larger the area, the more links there are between the trafficking activities and the negative impacts. As an example of a “big area”, seven different types of trafficking typically lead into increasing market place distortions and/or unfair competition. In the other extreme, only trafficking in stolen cultural products leads to losses in cultural heritage.

blog10.03.162

That’s all for the CBRA Blog today – please let us know if you see this type of visualization as beneficial when teaching and learning about the big picture of supply chain security!  Thanks, Juha Hintsa ( email: cbra@cross-border.org )