Review on Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, International Maritime Organization (CORE1097)

Summary: The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code sets new standards for security for ships at sea as well as port facilities around the world. It aims to make shipping activities more secure against threats of terrorism, piracy and smuggling. Security at sea has been a concern to governments, shipping lines, port authorities and importers and exporters for years. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, provided the catalyst for formalizing tough new security measures. In December of 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) organized a conference to discuss issues related to security at sea. At this conference, representatives from 150 nations (the Contracting Governments) participated in drafting amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, and the ISPS Code was adopted. Changes to the SOLAS Convention include amendments to Chapters V and XI, and Chapter XI was divided into Chapters XI-1 and XI-2. The new Chapter XI-2 provides the umbrella ISPS regulations. The Code itself is divided into two parts. Part A presents mandatory requirements, Part B contains guidance regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the Code. Source document is available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/bestpractices/32.pdf

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Full review: The Code aims, among other things, to establish an international framework for co-operation between Contracting Governments, government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade and to establish relevant roles and responsibilities at the national and international level. ISPS provisions relating to port facilities relate solely to the ship/port interface. Also, ISPS provisions do not extend to the actual response to attacks or to any necessary clear-up activities after such an attack. In addition, for each ship and port authority affected, the ISPS Code requires:

  • The implementation of a Ship Security Plan (SSP),
  • The implementation of a Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP),
  • The appointment of a Ship Security Officer (SSO),
  • The appointment of a Company Security Officer (CSO),
  • The appointment of a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO),
  • The installation of ship alarms, and
  • The installation of shipboard Automatic Identification Systems (AIS).

Enforcement Date: The ISPS Code went into effect on July 1, 2004.

Full citation:   Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, International Maritime Organization. SOLAS/CONF.5/32. 12 December 2002

CORE1097

Keywords: Maritime Security, Port Security, Ship Security Plan (SSP), Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), Ship Security Officer (SSO), Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).

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Dr. Federico Magalini on waste logistics crime

Hi Federico, and thanks for agreeing to join a CBRA Interview, as the first expert in year 2016 – can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

Thank you for the opportunity of sharing some of the past experiences and projects done, including those with CBRA and looking ahead into the next years. I’m a mechanical engineer as background, with a PhD in Management, Economical and Industrial Engineers and I am working as Associate Programme Officer at United Nations University – Vice-Rectorate in Europe. I’m in particular working for SCYCLE, SCYCLE operating unit of the UN University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability.

Can you explain more on what is the United Nations University, UNU?

UNU is, despite the name, not a classical university as many might think. The United Nations University (UNU) is a global think tank and postgraduate teaching organization headquartered in Japan. The mission of the UN University is to contribute, through collaborative research and education, to efforts to resolve the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations, its Peoples and Member States. We work a lot with leading universities and research institutes in various countries, functioning as a bridge between the international academic community and the United Nations system. Our operating unit SYCLE is particularly devoted to research in the field of electronic waste.

UNU, INTERPOL, CBRA and other partners finished few months ago a 2-year research project on electronic waste crime and non-compliance, the FP7-CWIT –project. From your perspective, what were the most important outcomes of that project?

The CWIT project contributed in my opinion to increase the general understanding of volumes of electronic waste annually arising in different EU Member States and the fate of the disposed equipment. Knowing the baseline of products annually discarded by EU citizens is a first, fundamental step to allow policymakers and stakeholders at large to develop a strategy to ensure proper collection and treatment. In addition to that the project described the main drivers behind the flows diverted from the actual take back and recycling systems across the EU.

A second important outcome of the project is the analysis and identification of the main crime patterns that are typical of such an Industry: in the illegal trade of WEEE, there is a varying degree of compliance and criminality that spans across a continuum ranging from minor unintentional violations or non-compliance by individuals to deliberate illegal activities following a criminal business model. The organisational structure differs by country and region, from individual traders to structured criminal groups.

The combination of those two elements – knowledge of the market and understanding of criminal behaviours – allowed drawing a roadmap for future improvement in compliance and enforcement.

Do you believe that some of the CWIT outcomes will have practical positive impacts to reduce future crime and non-compliance, in the broader context of e-waste handling and management?

I sincerely hope so. And I am sure this will happen. To which extent is hard to predict but in the second part of the project we really focused on how to derive practical recommendations for the various actors involved along the entire value chain. And we broadly discussed the ideas, in many cases deriving from real cases and best practices, with various stakeholders; I hope this will increase the likelihood of having some of the recommendations actually implemented.

We committed ourselves to disseminate the recommendations beyond the project duration and we have seen already some results, with the project findings being discussed in various fora, conferences and public events, including some internal meeting with EC officials. And we have seen official request from some Members of the EU Parliament, who quizzed the EC on the consequences of the CWIT project, challenging here to take concrete actions.

Now we are launching a new project called DOT.COM WASTE – with several CWIT partners, and few new partners. You are the project manager for this “CWIT follow-up” –project, congratulations on that. Can you please explain what this new project aims to achieve?

I am really happy of the DOT.COM waste project as combines some of the results of the CWIT project, particularly the recommendation on the need of better training of enforcement and prosecutors in one of the main areas of my personal interest and work at UNU: capacity building. The DOT.COM WASTE project seeks to increase the capabilities of law enforcement agencies, customs and port authorities, environmental agencies and prosecutors to fight cross-border waste crime more cost-effectively. To achieve this objective, the project aims to increase the stakeholders’ understanding of current waste crime trends and to identify and share good practices for detecting, investigating and prosecuting waste crime activities.

Which aspect of the DOT.COM WASTE project you see as the most challenging one?

I see two main challenges ahead for the DOT.COM WASTE project. The first one is related to the scope of the project itself: there are many waste streams and the challenges of different streams are different. As a consequence also the tools to tackle illegal activities might vary: we will have to identify the priorities in order to be effective.

The second one is related to the duration of the project; the project will translate the knowledge gained into training material and tools and will promote training sessions to help key stakeholders integrate good practices into their day-to-day operations. The project’s underlying objective is to intensify international collaboration through development and implementation of new mechanisms for information exchange, technology transfer and operational coordination. But I really hope that all those efforts will produce effects that will last longer than the two years of the project itself.

I sincerely hope that we will be able to make the difference here!

Thanks a lot Federico for this interview – and talk to you soon at the DOT.COM WASTE kick-off meeting.

Chemical Security in Istanbul

2015-12-15 09.02.08I had the most interesting week in Istanbul with the Iraqi government representatives, chemical sector companies and the US State Department Chemical Security Program, CSP.

Security in the chemical supply chain is a major challenge for government agencies and chemical supply chain companies across the globe, including those in the Middle-East and North African (MENA) region. Theft, diversion, trafficking, export violations, counterfeit chemicals, sabotage and terrorism – among other criminal threats – keep the agencies and companies constantly on their toes when considering how to best tackle the vulnerabilities and threats in their respective chemical supply chains.

This was my second time to join as an external expert in a Chemical Security Program (CSP) event in the MENA region. The first time was in Hurghada, Egypt, in March 2015 – thanks again to Professor Andrew Thomas, the Chief Editor of the Journal of Transportation Security, for hooking me up with CRDF Global and the US State Department on this. Now the four day event targeted for the relevant Iraqi government agencies as well as the Iraqi chemical sector companies was held in Istanbul, Turkey, on 14-17 December 2015.

We had a fully packed agenda: Day 1 consisted of several introductory and state-of-play speeches by the workshop facilitators and by Iraqi experts, the latter group sharing key governmental, industry and academic perspectives to the chemical security progress in Iraq.  Day 2 started with a case study presentation on “Post-2001 supply chain security developments at Dow Chemicals”, followed by private-public partnership considerations in chemical supply chain security. During the afternoon of day 2, two more presentations were given on potential threats to materials of interest, as well as on site-physical security. Day 3 started with presentations on international transport of dangerous goods and security rules, followed later by presentations on export control and border security issues, as well as risk assessment methodological aspects.

Interactive sessions, group exercises and other discussions were vivid throughout the four days. On day 1, the main interactive session was about government-industry coordination. On day 2, the focus shifted to identifying key players in Iraqi chemical supply chain security, as well as exploring private sector specific chemical security issues. On day 3, a major interactive session took place to recognize existing vulnerabilities and threats in the chemical supply chain, as well as to identify appropriate countermeasures and other possible means of improvement. And finally, on day 4, a draft table of content for a potential “Iraqi chemical supply chain security master plan and implementation roadmap” was produced in a highly interactive manner, followed ultimately by drafting some actual planning content in areas including chemical transport security and raising security awareness.

The actual workshop outcomes and possible follow-up actions will be worked upon later by the organizing team and some key participants. In the meanwhile, I want to express my warmest thanks for this opportunity and great on-site collaboration in Istanbul to: Ms. Shawn Garcia from the U.S. Department of State, Chemical Security Program (DOS/CSP); Ms. Pelin Kavak and Mr. Nidal Abu Sammour from CRDF Global, US / Jordan; and Dr. Caner Zanbak and Mr. Mustafa Bagan from the Turkish Chemical Manufacturers Association (TCMA). Hope to meet you again in 2016 in Iraq, Algeria and possibly other locations in the MENA region!

 

Cheers, Juha Hintsa

P.S. We also tested two CBRA frameworks / models – CBRA SCS15/16, and CBRA-BAC-Actions and beneficiaries – with the audience during the Istanbul week. Both of them were well perceived, and will be topics for CBRA Blog during the coming couple of months. (SCS = Supply Chain Security, and BAC = Border Agency Cooperation).

PPS. Last but not least I would like to thank Ms. Antonella Di Fazio of Telespazio, Italy, and FP7-project CORE, for excellent inputs on transport of dangerous goods, traceability and monitoring solutions, demonstrators, and practical experiences.

Trade and money laundering uncontained (the Economist, May 2014, CORE2006)

Summary

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls.

The new methods for cross-border money laundering and tax evasion concern most CORE demonstrations, especially those involving international cargo movements. The emerging risk of trade-based money laundering calls for new and more effective enforcement of trade transactions. CORE is developing new solutions (e.g., data pipeline and system-based supervision) for capturing and sharing trade information across logistics operators and law enforcement agencies. The new solutions likely improve law enforcement’s capability to detect suspicious trade transactions that may have something to do with the trade-based money laundering. However, building such capability requires IT integration (e.g., interoperability), risk awareness and education and training. CORE consortium addresses these complementary activities in work carried out in risk, IT and educational clusters.

Reference

Trade and money laundering uncontained, the Economist, May 3rd 2014

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Drug trafficking in the Caribbean – the Full circle (the Economist May 2014, CORE2005)

Summary

Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route to the strengthened enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. The South American cocaine smuggling routes have displaced several times over the years due, and now again the Caribbean route is the same one than traffickers used two decades ago. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.

The drug traffickers move significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes, sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route strengthened law enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. Because traffickers prefer smuggling routes that offer the highest profit-to-risk ratios, the South American cocaine smuggling networks are evolving constantly. Routes have displaced several times over the years, and now the route is again the same than two decades ago.

Today, traffickers move again significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes and sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe.  The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.

Trends of international drug trafficking often influence intensity of law enforcement efforts in global supply chains. Thus, changes in South American drug trafficking may affect also the two CORE trade lanes that import goods from the region into Europe, (1) imports of fresh cut flowers from Colombia to the Netherlands (WP11) and (2) imports of coffee and cocoa beans from South America to Europe (WP13). These trade lanes may become subject to more intense anti-drug controls over the following years. Besides the CORE demo cluster, also the CORE risk cluster benefit from the insight this article provides on the recent trends in routes, volumes and methods of the South American drug trafficking. This information may be useful for CORE’s activities that are developing educational and training material.

Reference

Drug trafficking in the Caribbean – the Full circle, the Economist, May 24th 2014

CORE2005

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New approaches to border management

Today we discuss with Mr. Anthony Barone how to modernize border management techniques. Mr. Barone is a writer and adjunct professor. He has served at the WCO and American Federal Advisory bodies and held senior positions in both the industrial and logistics industries most recently at Pfizer.

Tony, it seems that we are living in a fairly dangerous world today. Threats to society arise from globalized terrorism, organized crime and individual criminal acts, such as the commission of fraud. How do border management techniques address these threats?

Not very well, I’m afraid. Border management techniques that are used today to identify and interdict criminal activities are based on technologies and concepts that are out of date. They cause unpredictability in supply chains, discriminate against smaller companies and opportune official corruption.

The absence of real time information exchange between countries, and even within countries among different departments of border management, is complicating the inherent challenges faced by border management authorities. Unfortunately crime has globalized, but law enforcement has not.

The supply chains are internationalizing rapidly, so all nations need to find ways that facilitate legitimate trade and simultaneously disrupt criminal activity hidden in commercial supply chains. Can emerging technologies be the solution?

Newly emerging technologies present both new threats and new opportunities. Threats arise from the criminal use of new technologies such as the use of social media by terror organizations and bitcoin money exchange by drug cartels. Opportunities to leverage technology arise from the ubiquitous use of integrated supply chain technology within the private sector, relatively inexpensive cloud based processing capabilities and a variety of hardware developments, such as Machine to Machine data processing or Internet of Things.

Emerging technologies may make it possible to accomplish the dual goals of facilitation and security, but certain prerequisites must be addressed in order for such solutions to succeed. The innovations must benefit both the private sector and governments in several different ways. There must be real economic value in transformative strategies. Political leadership must see a match to public policy goals and developers must see profit opportunity in the development of tools.

As you said, various public and private stakeholders may have different interests and priorities, and on top of this private citizens have increasing and legitimate privacy concerns. What should we do that real issues are accommodated despite these potentially contradictory goals?

The importance of engaging the private sector as agents of change cannot be understated. Both goods shippers and logistics service providers must find benefit through significantly reduced costs. And those savings must outweigh out-of-pocket investments that are needed to achieve them.

Articulating possible solutions faces significant headwinds. Among these are the investments made in current practices on both the private and public side. Reluctance to change is further bolstered by financial considerations including possible costs of transformation and the loss of revenue derived from existing systems.

Additionally, authorities charged with these responsibilities may feel threatened by criticism of programs they administer. Importers and exporters may fear reprisal from authorities. Trade associations may be too dependent on access to authorities to seriously challenge extant programs. Without a political constituency and given these challenges, introducing and implementing game changing ideas will be difficult.

So, what would you propose to modernize border management techniques? It seems to require radically transformative ideas.

I propose that we get together a group of independent experts who are willing to explore radically new approaches to border management. They would be tasked to investigate how supply chain facilitation as an open source capability could simultaneously block criminal activity and reduce the costs of border administration. They should consider both private and public sector effects and have a global focus so that all nations can benefit from their work.

Thank you, Tony, for the interview. CBRA team is interested to join the group of independent experts you suggested – hopefully we can get together on this, already during the first couple of months in 2016!