Better Management of EU Borders through Cooperation, 2011 (CORE1114)

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Summary: This report by the Center for the Study of Democracy investigates existing forms of cooperation between Border Guards and customs administrations in the European Union. The study highlights obstacles to cooperation and proposes solutions and best practices for overcoming them. The study finds that despite the common policy interest on border agency cooperation and the associated pan-European standardisation efforts, the individual Member states decide the extent and forms of customs-border guard co-operation on their own. As a result, the current state of border agency collaboration and potential for improvements differ substantially between the member states. The main differences arise from the institutional set-up (e.g., number and roles of border control agencies), powers and competencies of the border control agencies, and the legislative basis (especially legal differences in terms of privacy, data protection and confidentiality of trade information). Download the report here: http://ec.europa.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: The study concludes with a large number of recommendations for the European Union, the member states, and for the customs and border guards. The European Union should generate political will to act upon remaining challenges of border agency cooperation by creating awareness through public debates, communications and impact assessments. The EU bodies should act mediators to reconcile institutional interests of different border control agencies. The EU could also commission pilot projects on border agency cooperation, encourage joint training and increase funding of related research and development activities. Also the mandate of Frontex could be expanded to cover customs cooperation.

The individual member states should, according to the report, also mediate negotiations between border control agencies to overcome possible conflicts of interest. The member states should also evaluate impacts of various forms of customs-border guard cooperation.

The border guards and customs administrations themselves should identify and exchange best practices for strengthening their mutual collaboration. The agencies, the report recommends, should take responsibility for the pilot projects and for evaluating outcomes of the different forms of cooperation. To further improve the cooperation across the entire EU customs union, the customs and border control agencies should use Frontex more as their platform to conduct joint operations at the EU’s external border.

Reference: Center for the Study of Democracy, (2011), “Better Management of EU Borders through Cooperation”, Study to Identify Best Practices on the Cooperation Between Border Guards and Customs Administrations Working at the External Borders of the EU

 

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A Decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight, 2015 (CORE1113)

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Summary: The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent government watchdog organization that has been publishing many reports on the US government’s supply chain security initiatives over the past ten years. This article reviews 25 most relevant GAO’s reports that discuss strengths, weaknesses and future challenges of the US policies and regulations on supply chain security. The review findings reveal interesting facts about similarities and differences of the US and the EU approaches to supply chain security. This comparison opens new venues for further Transatlantic benchmarking as well as harmonisation and mutual recognition of supply chain security programs. This review was conducted as part of European FP7-Project CORE.  The reviewed document is available for download here: https://hicl.org. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: The GAO reports suggest that the US administration has been struggling with effective performance monitoring and auditing of its supply chain security initiatives. The reports indicate that there is some confusion about costs of security initiatives for the government and for the business community. There is also a lack of common understanding about the actual benefits of many of these programs. The GAO reports also urge US government officials to adopt risk-based approach to supply chain security, for example to use information and intelligence to assess risk levels of specific shipments, people, trading companies, and other entities, and then employ security solutions that are commensurate to the risk level. The GAO reports also emphasize the importance of involving the industry in the process of defining new policies and regulations.

Altogether, the review team found that the GAO documents are not only highly relevant for SCS management and governance but also of high quality. The study concludes that it might be useful for the EU to establish a quality-assurance organization similar to the US GAO. This new EU body would oversee spending of the EU and its member states on supply chain security programs and projects and this way improve efficiency of such investments.

Reference: Männistö, T., and Hintsa J., (2015), “A Decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight,” Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference in Logistics (HICL), September 24-25, 2015, Hamburg

 

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SIECA delegation visiting Europe in June 2015

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I had a great pleasure to be the lead host for a 12 person SIECA delegation visit to Europe in June 2015. We spent two days in the Netherlands, one day in Belgium and two days in Switzerland in an action-packed tour, visiting several border areas, governmental offices and beyond.

The idea to organize a one-week customs and international trade visit tour to Europe first came when Mr. Roman Stoll from the Federal Customs Administration of Switzerland and I paid a four-day visit at the SIECA Secretariat in Guatemala City in March 2015. There we had several meetings and discussions on World Trade Organization´s Trade Facilitation Agreement, WTO TFA, implementation plans with the SIECA management – Ms. Carmen Gisela Vergara Mas and Mr. Javier Gutierrez; with Customs management and experts from all the six SIECA member countries; and with representatives of the Intra-American Development Bank. Some weeks after the Guatemala-visit, SIECA and IDB confirmed the willingness to come over to Europe, to learn about good practices in international trade, supply chain and border management in the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. And after couple of hundreds of emails and phone calls – myself acting as the focal point in arranging the visit – we were ready to welcome the SIECA Delegation to Europe between Monday 1 June and Friday 5 June, 2015.

blog 22.03.20161Monday-Tuesday we had a full agenda in the Netherlands. Monday started by presentations on Dutch Customs in general, and Schiphol Customs in specific, focusing on risk management, coordinated border management, and the SmartGate solutions at the Schiphol Airport. This was followed by a roundtable discussion with representatives from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs, as well as with an expert from the air cargo industry. During Monday the SIECA delegation gained firsthand knowledge for example on One-Stop Shop (OSS) implementation steps in the Netherlands: Step 1. Information exchange; 2. Joint inspections; 3. Training specialists; 4. Joint risk analysis by both inspections and selection by Customs; and Step 5. One inspection inspects for the other. The program on Tuesday consisted of a tour in Port of Rotterdam, at the APM 2 Container terminal; as well as a visit to the Central command post of nuclear detection and an X-ray container scanner. In between we had a typical “Dutch sandwich” lunch, kindly offered by the hosts. The delegation enjoyed seeing the ultimate high level of automation at the new container terminal, as well as visiting a pragmatic “one stop inspection room”, where multiple border agencies work together inspecting containers flagged for manual inspections.

Wednesday was spent in Brussels, Belgium. In the morning, the trade representatives of the SIECA Delegation went to the European Commission, DG TRADE, for EU-SIECA related discussions. In the afternoon, most of the delegation visited the World Customs Organization, where the meeting started with discussions with the WCO Secretary General Dr. Kunio Mikuriya and the WCO Deputy Secretary General Mr. Sergio Mujica. This was followed by a presentation on WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and the linked WCO Instruments, by Ms. Heike Barczyk, the Deputy Director of Compliance and Facilitation Directorate at the WCO. Lastly, we had a brief presentation and roundtable discussions on the European Flagship Supply Chain Security Research, Development and Demonstrations project called FP7-CORE. This discussion was joined by Mr. Nik Delmeire, the Secretary General of the European Shippers Council; Ms. Nicolette van der Jagt, the Secretary General of CLECAT, the European association for forwarding, transport, logistics and customs services; and myself, Dr. Juha Hintsa, Founder of the Cross-border Research Association. After the meeting at WCO, it was time to fly from Brussels to Basel, Switzerland.

blog 22.03.20162Thursday-Friday we had a packed program in Switzerland. Despite some “navigation challenges” with our three-car convoy, we arrived on time from Basel to Bern at the Directorate General of the Federal Customs Administration. We heard several interesting presentations focusing on performance mandate, tasks and strategy of Swiss Customs; on international affairs section and it’s relevant international cooperation program; on shifts from traditional revenue collection to environmental and incentive taxes; and on strategy and challenges regarding future customs clearance systems and platforms – all this by three top experts from Swiss Customs. I presented the outcomes of Swiss Customs and Cross-border Research Association -visit to SIECA in March 2015, suggesting some specific areas and priorities for future co-operation activities. Next, the Delegation visited the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, where the discussions focused on Swiss foreign policy in Central America and bilateral cooperation Switzerland – Central America; as well as on political and economic regional integration in Central America. After a quick photo session on the Bundeshaus terrace facing over River Aare, our journey continued towards the Swiss Customs facilities at the Zurich Airport. Again, there were some “logistics challenges” on the way to Zurich, when one of our three cars suddenly lost all engine coolant – fortunately a gas station was close by, and a road service company (car + mechanic) happened to be there. At the Zurich Airport, the SIECA Delegation learned a lot of details about Swiss Customs operations with air cargo and passenger flows. And as the last agenda item, we met a cute black Labrador retriever, who together with his trainer showed how effortlessly he finds illicit goods hidden in air cargo boxes and pallets…

On Friday morning – last day of the journey – we had again an early wake-up call at our hotel in Basel. We were warmly welcomed by Swiss Customs Officers at the Basel/Weil- Motorway border-crossing point – the highest volume customs clearance point in Switzerland. First the hosts explained about facts and figures on Basel/Weil, topped with interesting information on customs risk management processes and IT-systems. Now we all know that on average 3500 trucks cross the Basel/Weil border per day, and that around 600 million CHF is collected annually as indirect taxes at that border crossing point. After that we took a rooftop view over the border area premises, discussing further Import/Export/Transit -procedures, as well as visited the Swiss Transito-Cabins / Checkpoints. From the motorway we drove to the Swiss Customs House at the Basel Port, visiting the famous tri-border-point between Switzerland, Germany and France. There the Delegation learned about the barge traffic on River Rhine – the same river we saw three days earlier at Port of Rotterdam. From the Basel Port, we drove again to Bern, this time to visit the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, SECO. Lively discussions took place on the SECO rooftop meeting room on topics including EFTA – Central American FTA, as well as Bilateral Economic Relations Switzerland – Central America. And after lunch kindly offered by SECO, we headed towards Geneva for the final meeting of the week: World Economic Forum, WEF, where we all arrived just in time to learn about the organization and the key activities of WEF, including: the work of the WEF in Latin America, with updates from the Latin American Summit; and, the work of the WEF on trade and investment policy and implementation, including Policy Directions, Enabling Trade Index, Enabling Trade implementations. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, UNECE, was kind enough to explain about latest developments and trends in single window projects and implementations. And lastly, I shared briefly select work on trade facilitation and supply chain security research and education materials by the Cross-border Research Association and HEC University of Lausanne.  I highlighted the important developments taking place within the FP7-CORE project – referring naturally to our meeting two days earlier at the World Customs Organization.

This concludes the brief summary of the SIECA week in Europe, and now I would like to thank all the SIECA Delegation members for coming over and spending the five days with us, here on the old continent:

  • Costa Rica: Mr. Jhon Fonseca, Vice Minister Foreign Trade; and Mr. Luis Fernando Vasquez Castillo, Costa Rica Customs.
  • El Salvador: Mrs. Luz Estrella Rodriguez, Vice Minister Foreign Trade
  • Guatemala: María Luisa Flores Villagran, Vice Minister Foreign Trade; and Mrs. Maria Elisa Chang, Guatemala Customs.
  • Honduras: Jeronima Urbina, Director of Economic Integration
  • Nicaragua: Eddy Aldolfo Artola Garciá, Director Risk Management of Nicaragua Customs.
  • Panama: Melitón Arrocha. Minister Foreign Trade; Mrs. Diana Salazar, Vice Minister Foreign Trade; and Mr. José Gómez Núnez DG of Panama Customs.
  • SIECA Secretariat: Carmen Gisela Vergara Mas, Secretary General
  • Intra-American Development Bank: Mr. Jaime Granados

And last but not least, warmest thanks to all the local hosts: Dutch Customs Administration; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs; European Commission DG TRADE; World Customs Organization; Federal Customs Administration of Switzerland; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland; State Secretariat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland; and World Economic Forum.

CBRA Blog by Juha Hintsa

blog 22.03.20163PS. If your country / region would be interested on a similar European field visit, please contact us – we could organize the practical details for the next delegation, possibly every 1-2 years (of course the actual hosts need to agree to the visit in the first place, that goes without saying…). And one final note: next time a bus and a professional driver need to be rented, please!

 

Revisiting the Yemen bomb plot of 2010

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blog_070316This CBRA blog revisits the Yemen bomb plot from 2010, the most decisive turning point in modern air cargo security. More than five years after the events, this blog discusses the plot’s implications to the contemporary air cargo security and outlines CBRA’s recommendations for future security work. Parts of this blog text have already been published in the doctoral thesis of CBRA researcher Toni Männistö.

Two explosive devices aboard passenger planes: The series of events, that we call the Yemen bomb plot, took place on 29 October in 2010. On that day, al-Qaeda terrorists almost destroyed two passenger airplanes with a pair of express courier parcels, each enclosing plastic explosives hidden inside a printer toner cartridge. The explosive parcels where sent to Chicago from the capital of Yemen, Sana’a, via two different express courier operators.

Both parcel bombs were eventually intercepted and defused, without fatalities or injuries. But before the interception, the bombs had already travelled onboard multiple air freighters and passenger planes. Many people flew that day with a fully functional explosive device under their seat! Though the parcels were addressed to Chicago, officials think that terrorists wanted to detonate the bombs mid-air, just before landing using cell phone timer alarms.

A Lockerbie-style mayhem was slightly avoided, largely thanks to a timely piece of intelligence. The bomb plot started to uncover when a suspected double agent tipped Saudi-Arabian intelligence that al-Qaeda terrorists had shipped two parcel bombs from Yemen to the US via the express courier service. The Saudi intelligence forwarded the tracking numbers of the suspected explosive devices to their US and German colleagues and told them to look for printer toner cartridges.

The first parcel was intercepted in Dubai, and the second one at the East Midlands airport, nearly 200 km to the northwest from London. In the UK, a bomb squad did not first recognize anything suspicious when they screened the suspected parcel. “It looked like a printer cartridge – there were no wires or anything,” one of CBRA’s contacts at World Customs Organization (WCO) recounts. “But of course, what the cartridge did contain was explosive that current technologies couldn’t detect.” Later laboratory tests revealed that each parcel contained 300 to 400 grams of PETN, military grade plastic explosive, wirings, and a detonator hidden inside a printer’s toner cartridge. The bombs were so meticulously concealed that they had not only passed the standard air cargo and safety screening but also the special screening of the bomb squad.

Aftermaths: The Yemen incident was rude reminder of the vulnerability of the air cargo logistics to terrorism. Sure, the day was saved by old-school, field intelligence work and prompt government response. But before interception, the first parcel travelled aboard three different flights: Sana’a – Dubai, Dubai – Cologne, and Cologne – East Midlands Airport. The second explosive parcel flew first from Sana’a to Doha and then to Dubai where it was intercepted.

In the immediate aftermaths of the events, aviation security authorities in the US and many European countries stopped accepting freight shipments from Yemen. Germany also cancelled all passenger flights from Yemen for more than two weeks. “As often happens in these situations,” the WCO’s air cargo specialist remarks, “the first reaction was stopping anything coming from this part of the world – any plane for any reason.” The new security rules changed the air cargo operations virtually overnight, seriously disrupting the air cargo and mail service. Delays were widespread and lengthy, but the worst aspect of the disruption was that no one knew when the new apparently transient security regime was to be revoked.

Eventually, once the precautionary stoppage was ended, new unprecedentedly stringent security requirements entered into force, disrupting the air cargo and mail service further. The US Transportation Security Administration, TSA, introduced the most stringent rules: any mail originating or transiting through Somalia or Yemen was banned, as well as printers or printer toner cartridges from high-risk locations. Moreover, parcels originating from any business partners had to be screened up to high-risk screening standards, piece by piece, if such shipment did not accompany a tendering statement, a document assuring that cargo comes from a known and trusted shipper. The new regime disrupted seriously international air cargo logistics, causing air cargo shippers worldwide to accumulate huge backlogs of US-bound shipments. Annoyed and surprised about the turn of events, the air cargo industry reacted to the US rules with a barrage of criticism, calling the measures superfluous and impractical. Over the following weeks, the reactive security rules were gradually relaxed to enable clearing of the backlog of US-bound air cargo.

In the long term, the Yemen events put air cargo security into a spotlight, securing political commitment and spurring further reforms for years to come. The International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, for example, included advanced security, concepts such as the “secure supply chain” principle, the concept of high-risk cargo and mail, and the consignment security declaration, CSD, into the new edition of the Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention. Also the European Union expanded the EU air cargo regime to cover airlines operating into the EU aviation security area – EU-28 plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland – from third country airports. The amendment also specified criteria for identifying and screening high-risk cargo and mail, known as HRCM.

CBRA considerations for future air cargo security: The modern air cargo security has taken major leaps since the Yemen incident, but the work towards higher air cargo security still continues. The CBRA research team considers that, like in any other area of supply chains, it is crucial both to facilitate cross-border logistics and to ensure adequate security. This classic dilemma of striking the balance between trade facilitation and supply chain security is not easy to solve, but we believe that there are some promising ways to promote logistics-friendly air cargo security.

Governments should normally consult the air cargo industry before introducing new security rules. New security rules should avoid reducing speed, on-time reliability, or cost-efficiency of the air cargo service. There are often ways to integrate new security requirements seamlessly into the sequence of day-to-day logistics activities, but this requires close government-business coordination.

One promising way forward is to improve capabilities of pre-loading risk assessment, so that the riskiest air cargo shipments can be identified early on and subjected to a more stringent screening. Many projects on this matter are under way, most notably the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) in the US and Pre-loading Consignment Information for Secure Entry
 (PRECISE) in the European Union. The CBRA team applauds these efforts of advancing risk assessment and reminds of the importance of proactive updating of risk-scoring algorithms.

EU’s decision of forcing flights from third countries into EU to comply with EU’s air cargo security regime makes also good sense. It is reasonable to secure air cargo up to an adequate standard sooner rather than later, preferably before the first flight. More global capacity building – especially training and funds for modern screening equipment – are needed in developing countries. Also, auditing activities in third countries would benefit from further resources.

Harmonization and mutual recognition is another key theme for years to come. In the EU, civil aviation and customs authorities might find some synergies if they harmonized their respective Known Consignor (KC) and Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programs. Air cargo companies would also benefit if types and performance requirements of screening methods would be uniform across the members of the European Union.

Bibliography:

BBC, Q&A: Air freight bomb plot, 2 November 2010

European Commission, Regulation 173/2012, amending 185/2010

International Civil Aviation Organization, Chicago convention, Annex 17, 9th edition

Koolloos M.F.J., Männistö T., van der Jagt O.C., Jezierska M.M., Hintsa J., Kähäri P. and Tsikolenko V. (2015), Security Screening for the Air Express Cargo Industry, Final Report, Brussels, Belgium.

Männistö, T., 2015. Mitigating Crime and Security Risks in the International Logistics Network: the Case of Swiss Post. Doctoral thesis, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL).

CBRA Blog by Dr. Toni Männistö

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – Examinations of High- Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed, GAO, January 2008 (CORE1010)

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Summary: This report reviews the progress that the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) – a program for screening US-bound high-risk shipping containers in foreign ports with X-ray and radiation detection solutions – since the latest 2005 GAO review. The report discusses how the CBP’s CSI efforts have (1) contributed to the long-term, strategic planning on the US supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI activities worldwide and (3) established means to evaluate performance of the CSI activities. The report recommends CBP to develop its data collection practices that are related to the CSI team performance and the host government’s inspections of the US-bound containers. This report provides relevant information for CORE demonstrations that deal with US-bound maritime logistics and commerce. Also the risk cluster might benefit from the descriptions of the US risk-based supply chain security scheme – Automated Targeting System (AST), 24-hour rule and the importer security filing 10+2 – that the report elaborates in detail. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08187.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO report elaborates the status and challenges of the US Container Security Initiative, but it also provides a comprehensive outlook on the US maritime supply chain security. This information is likely to be relevant for the CORE’s demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that deal with US-bound container traffic. The report is a good reference document for those CORE work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain and that are producing relevant training material on supply chain security. The CORE’s risk and IT clusters benefit from the information the report offers on risk-based security solutions that use advance cargo information to calculate risk scores for US-bound shipments by the aid of automatic risk assessment algorithms.

Cross-references:

  • Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
  • Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.
  • Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2004.
  • Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
  • Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
  • Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003.

Additional keywords: Container Security Initiative (CSI), counter-terrorism, homeland security, maritime supply chain security

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain, GAO, August 2008 (CORE1009)

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Summary: This report discusses how the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has (1) contributed to international supply chain security standards and (2) promoted mutual recognition in the customs security area and (3) how the agency expects to implement the 100% scanning requirement of the containerized US-bound maritime cargo. The report provides a detailed outlook on the US customs supply chain security scheme, and it highlights challenges and problems that the US government faces in promoting its supply chain security strategy internationally. The development and the implementation of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards, a suite of best practices on customs security, is a central theme throughout this GAO report. Because of its broad scope, the customs-related supply chain security, this document contains information that is likely to be useful for all CORE work packages, and especially for those that involve customs administrations. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279730.pdf.

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Full review: This document provides a detailed outlook on customs-centric supply chain security from the US government’s perspective. This unique view on the customs security is going to be useful for the CORE’s early work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain security. The information is also useful for the CORE demonstrations, in which customs administrations are involved. In particular, the demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that are about US-bound trade and logistics benefit from the detailed description of the customs security initiatives that the US government has introduced since the 9/11 tragedy.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008.
  • Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the SAFE Port Act. GAO-08-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation’s Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. April 26, 2007.
  • Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce Planning and Accountability. GAO-07-529. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007.
  • Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
  • Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.

Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, 100% scanning legislation, SAFE framework of standards, World Customs Organizations, Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) programs, Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism

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AVIATION SECURITY – Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO, April 2007 (CORE1008)

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Summary: This GAO reports reviews the current state and future challenges of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) and the Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) efforts for enhanced security of foreign origin US-bound air cargo. The report also discusses how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reached out to the air cargo industry and foreign authorities in order to strengthen the international air cargo security. The GAO report recommends that the DHS would establish a risk-based air cargo security strategy, improve interagency communication nationally, to step up compliance monitoring for the air cargo industry’s stakeholders and to assess the foreign authorities’ intent and capabilities to meet US expectations on the air cargo security that is the foundation for mutual recognition and international harmonization of regulatory frameworks on the air cargo security. This GAO report is going to be useful for the CORE risk and education cluster as well as for all the demonstrations that involve shipping of air cargo by air. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590789.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO report provides a comprehensive picture of the air cargo security in the US, in a country that is no doubt the leading force in supply chain security in general, and in air cargo security in particular. All CORE work that is related to air transport might benefit from the insights and information this GAO report offers. The DHL demonstration, that involves transport of parts for military aircraft from the US to Spain, is the most obvious work detail in CORE that can directly benefit from this GAO report. In addition, the CORE’s risk cluster can use the description of the US approach to risk-based air cargo security as a starting point when designing the CORE-specific risk-based strategies. Given that the report is very detailed and informative, the CORE’s education cluster can benefit from the report’s analysis and learn from its conclusions.

Cross-references:

  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).

Additional keywords: Air cargo security, mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, screening, advance cargo information, and counterterrorism

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Border Agency Cooperation, Part 3 of 3

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The last blog in our three-part series on Border Agency Cooperation introduces a conceptual framework capturing the essential dimensions of Border Agency Coordination: three levels of collaboration, four areas of integration and four objects for sharing. We hope that the framework helps the customs and other border agency communities to see all levels of Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) so that they can move from isolated coexistence towards more active cooperation at the borders. Higher levels of cooperation are likely to translate into higher levels of trade facilitation, control over cross-border cargo flows and resource efficiency, simultaneously. Compared with the previous BAC Blog Part 2, this BAC Blog Part 3 intends to present a comprehensive framework surrounding BAC ambitions, plans, implementations and monitoring activities – while the previous BAC Bloc 2 focused purely on a set of 15 key BAC actions, grouped according to the main beneficiary groups. This final BAC Blog has been written by Dr. Toni Männistö of CBRA.

Let’s start by first presenting the BAC diagram: Conceptual framework on Border Agency Cooperation (source: Männistö, T., and Hintsa J., 2015; inspired by Polner, 2011 and by Institute of Policy Studies, 2008)

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Levels of cooperation

Intra-agency cooperation is about aligning goals and work within one organization, either horizontally between departments or vertically between headquarters and local branches, in particular border-crossing offices / stations. Ways to foster horizontal intra-agency cooperation include development of intranet networks, cross-training, inter-departmental rotation of staff, and establishment of joint task forces that tackle multifaceted challenges like transnational terrorism. Ideally, the vertical cooperation would be bi-directional: headquarters would define priorities and objectives and then communicate them to local branches. The branches would, reciprocally, send back status reports and suggest improvements to the general policies. Solving intra-agency cooperation lays a basis for broader cooperation: it’s hard for any organization to cooperate efficiently with external stakeholders if it struggles with internal problems. The logical first step in coordinated border management is therefore breaking departmental silos and building a culture of cooperation within boundaries of one organization.

Inter-agency cooperation, at the operational level, concerns relationships among a broad range of border agencies that play a role in controlling cross-border trade and travel. In many countries, primary agencies present at the borders include customs, border guards, immigration authorities and transport security agencies. However, also police organizations, health authorities, and phytosanitary and veterinary controllers, among others, take part in border management. According to a recent study, typical areas of customs- border guard inter-agency cooperation can include strategic planning, communication and information exchange, coordination of workflow of border crossing points, risk analysis, criminal investigations, joint operations, control outside border control points, mobile units, contingency/emergency, infrastructure and equipment sharing, and training and human resource management (CSD, 2011). Governmental inter-agency cooperation occurs between border control agencies and ministries and policy making bodies that are responsible for oversight and financing of border management activities.

International cooperation may take place locally at both sides of a border. One Stop Border Posts, OSBPs – border crossings managed jointly by two neighboring countries – are prime examples of such cooperation. One Stop Border Posts can involve various forms of collaboration: harmonization of documentation, shared maintenance of the infrastructure, joint or mutually recognized controls, exchange of data and information and common investments in infrastructure and so forth. Operational arrangements between the Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish customs illustrate advanced international cross-border cooperation that save time and money of border control authorities and trading companies. The cooperation builds on division of labor, where the national border authorities of each country are allowed to provide services and exercise legal powers of their home country and neighboring countries. For instance, when goods are exported from Norway, all paperwork related to both exports and imports may be attended by either Swedish, Finnish or Norwegian customs office (Norwegian Customs, 2011). At the political level, this requires international cooperation between authorities and policy makers in two or more countries. Operational cooperation (e.g., mutual recognition of controls or regional Single Window), often bringing tangible trade facilitation benefits, usually follows from political, supranational decisions (e.g., the WCO’s Revised Kyoto Convention and SAFE Framework of Standards).

Areas of integration

Technical integration often entails improving connectivity and interoperability of information and communication technology systems within and across organizations. Single Window solutions are typical outcomes of technical cooperation as they enable automatic exchange of electronic trade information among border control agencies. The UN Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, UN/CEFACT, is an important international organization helping to build connectivity across countries and between business and governmental stakeholders. UN/CEFACT, for instance, develops and maintains globally recognized standards for EDI messages.

Operational integration is largely about coordination of inspection and auditing activities among border control agencies. Benefits of synchronized activities are evident: organizing necessary controls at one place and at the same time reduces delays and administrative burden that trading companies and travelers face at borders. A simple and powerful example of operational integration is coordination of opening hours and days of customs offices at the both sides of a border. Operational integration also covers provision of mutual administrative assistance, joint criminal investigations and prosecution, and sharing of customs intelligence and other information.

Legislative integration seeks to remove legal barriers and ambiguities that prevent border control agencies from exchanging information, sharing responsibilities or otherwise deepening their cooperation. Essentially, most forms of Border Agency Coordination require some degree of legislative harmonization and political commitment. For example, Article 8 of the WTO/TFA to the WTO Members requires that national authorities and agencies responsible for border controls and dealing with the importation, exportation and transit of goods must cooperate with one another and coordinate their activities in order to facilitate trade.

Institutional integration is about restructuring roles and responsibilities of border controls agencies. An example of a major restructuring is the annexing of US border control agencies – including the US Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration and Coast Guard – into the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, a body that took over the key governmental functions involved in the US non-military counter-terrorism efforts in the aftermaths of the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Objects of sharing

Sharing of information – data, knowledge and intelligence – reduce duplicate work (e.g., sharing of audit findings), enable operational coordination (e.g., synchronized border controls) and facilitate development of common agenda for future border agency coordination. At the global level, the WCO’s Customs Enforcement Network CEN is an example of a trusted communication system for exchanging information and intelligence, especially seizure records, between customs officials worldwide. Another WCO initiative, the Globally Networked Customs, analyzes potential to further “rationalize, harmonize and standardize the secure and efficient exchange of information between WCO Members” (WCO 2015).

Resource sharing involves multi-agency joint investments in equipment, facilities, IT systems, databases, expertise and other common resources. The joint investment activities are likely to result in higher resource utilization and bulk purchasing discounts. For example, national and regional Single Window solutions are often outcomes of joint development and investment activities of various government agencies.

Sharing of work is mostly about rationalization of overlapping border control activities, controls and formalities. If two border control agencies, for instance, agree to recognize each other’s controls, there is no need to control the same goods more than once. Combining forces to investigate and prosecute crime also often help border control agencies to use their limited resources more efficiently.

Sharing of responsibilities is about coordinating and streamlining administrative and control tasks among border control agencies. Norway, again, sets a good example of sharing the responsibilities. The Norwegian customs represents all other border control agencies – except the veterinary office – at the frontier. Customs officers are responsible for routine border formalities, and they summon representatives of other border control agencies as and when the officers need assistance. Internationally, the Norwegian customs cooperates closely with Swedish and Finnish border control authorities at the Northern Scandinavian border posts. Bilateral agreements between its neighbors allow Norwegian customs officers authority to perform most customs checks and formalities for and on behalf of their Swedish and Finnish colleagues. The coordination decreases border-crossing times and lowers administrative costs for trading companies and the border control agencies in the three countries.

This concludes now our three-part series on Border Agency Cooperation. In Part 1, we shared an illustrative worst case example on how complex, slow and expensive a cross-border supply chain execution comes when no cooperation takes place between relevant government agencies, neither nationally nor internationally. In Part 2, we presented a conceptual BAC model with 15 key actions to improve the degree of cooperation in a given country or region – for the direct benefit of supply chain companies, or government agencies, or both. And in this Part 3, we finally presented our comprehensive BAC framework, which hopefully helps government policy makers and border agencies to design, implement and monitor their future BAC programs and initiatives in an effective and transparent manner. Toni Männistö and Juha Hintsa.

Bibliography:

Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), 2011. “Better Management of EU Borders through Cooperation”, Study to Identify Best Practices on the Cooperation Between Border Guards and Customs Administrations Working at the External Borders of the EU.

Institute of Policy Studies 2008, Better connected services for Kiwis: a discussion document for managers and front-line staff on better joining up the horizontal and vertical, Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, NZ.

Männistö, T., and Hintsa J., “Theory of Border Agency Cooperation”, CBRA working paper 2015, Lausanne, Switzerland.

Norwegian Customs, 2011. Case Study on Border Agency Cooperation Submitted by Norway for the November Symposium.

Polner, M. (2011). Coordinated border management: from theory to practice. World Customs Journal, 5(2), 49-61.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2011 Border Agency Coordination”, UNCTAD Trust Fund for Trade Facilitation Negotiations Technical Note No. 14.

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System, GAO, October 2012 (CORE1014)

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Summary: The US maritime security strategy uses advance cargo information to assess risk levels of US-bound maritime shipping containers. This GAO report reviews how the Automated Targeting System, a web-based computer program that calculates risk scores for the containers, support the US Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) targeting efforts. The report argues that CBP could improve its targeting program by establishing sound procedures and criteria for assessing the performance of the targeting activity. This GAO report contains information about the US risk-based shipment targeting solution that benefit the CORE’s risk and IT clusters. The US-related demonstrations may also find the report’s information useful. The report is available at: http://gao.gov/assets/650/649695.pdf

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Full review: The risk targeting systems are part of governments’ supply chain security programs worldwide. The GAO reports gives unparalleled, detailed information about the principles that the US authorities follow to collect and analyse data about cargo movements that allow them to calculate risk scores for US-bound maritime shipping containers. The CORE’s risk cluster should pay attention to this information and learn how risk-based screening and examination of maritime shipping containers has been organized in the US, in the leading country of supply chain security. The report reveals useful information about IT infrastructure that support the risk targeting system, therefore providing a sound reference material for the CORE’s IT cluster. Project partners engaged in the CORE’s demonstrations – logistics operators, authorities and technology providers – benefit from the report’s description of the US automated targeting system (ATS) that play an important security role in the US-bound maritime trade and logistics.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning. GAO-12-422T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010.

CORE1014

Additional keywords: Terrorism, automated targeting system (ATS), 24-hour rule, the importer security filing and additional carrier requirements (10 + 2 rule)

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO, September 2012 (CORE1013)

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Summary: This GAO report reviews how the US government has advanced maritime security since the introduction of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 2002 and what kind of challenges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies have encountered in translating the Act’s requirements into practice. The report describes in detail the character, progress and future vision of main US maritime security programs, which, according to the report, fall into four domains: (1) security planning, (2) port and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information exchange and (4) international supply chain security. The report points out that the US maritime security scheme calls for further improvements in the areas of (1) program management and implementation, (2) partnerships and collaboration, (3) resources, funding, and sustainability as well as (4) performance measures.  This report describes the entire field of US maritime security, and this information is very useful for CORE demonstrations that involve shipping into, through or out of the US ports. The report is available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647999.pdf

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Full review: This scope of this GAO document is broad as it covers the entire US maritime security, its many themes from funding to practical initiatives and risk assessment. CORE’s demonstrations that involve US-related maritime shipping can use this document to get a comprehensive and detailed information about the status and future challenges of the US maritime security scheme. Also the CORE’s risk cluster can use this document to analyze how the US government has established a risk-based, layered security system to protect the seaborne trade and logistics from terrorism, smuggling and other criminal activities. Because of the complete description of the US maritime security scheme, the report is excellent reference material for producing training material and educational contents in the CORE training cluster.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010. See pages 10-11.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. See pages 15-19.
  • Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
  • Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning. GAO-12-422T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012. See pages 13-14.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009. See pages 41-43.
  • Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2008.

CORE1013

Additional keywords: Maritime Transportation Security Act, Secure Freight Initiative, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI), risk assessment, container screening, counter-terrorism, maritime security

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