Global supply chain design considerations: Mitigating product safety and security risks (Speier et al. 2011)

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Summary

There is a broad consensus among supply chain professionals that supply chain disruptions are very bad for business: supply chain glitches commonly lower operational performance and reduce shareholder value. Regardless of this, there is surprisingly little research on supply chain design strategies that have the highest potential to mitigate the risk of disruptions. Based on interviews with 75 US-based managers, an industry survey and a case study, Speier et al. (2011) identify types of SCS strategies and examine how contextual factors influence business managers to select a set of SCS design strategies. They argue that the depth and breadth of security initiatives depend mainly on top management mindfulness, operational complexity, product risk and coupling. The abstract is available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

The paper of Speier et al. (2011) is quite theoretical and it has therefore only a limited impact on CORE work. It is useful for people for the CORE demonstrators to be aware of various supply chain design strategies and factors that support their selection. All in all, the paper introduces an interesting table that shows what supply chain factors typically affect selection of certain supply chain design strategies (see table below). The paper also includes a useful discussion about the nature of supply chain security risks. The authors point out that supply chain security covers risks of contamination, damage and destruction of products or other supply chain assets, and that these risks may arise from intentional or unintentional activities.

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Reference

Speier, C., Whipple, J. M., Closs, D. J., & Voss, M. D. (2011). Global supply chain design considerations: mitigating product safety and security risks. Journal of Operations Management, 29(7), 721-736.

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Supply chain efficiency and security: Coordination for collaborative investment in technology (Lee et al. 2011)

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Summary

Information technologies often provide significant benefits for companies in terms of better logistics efficiency and security. But despite of this fact, many companies in the logistics sector have not adopted such technologies to a high extent as one would expect. In their research paper, Lee et al. (2011) investigate coordination problems and related incentive mechanisms between manufacturers and retailers in a two-echelon supply chain, when companies are investing in ICT technologies that have potential to improve both logistics efficiency and security. Using mathematical modeling, they find that relative strengths of efficiency and security concerns result in different coordination problems when implementing a technology. To increase overcome coordination problems and reach the optimal level of ICT investments, the authors propose imposing penalties on parties, that are responsible for security breaches, and introducing tax incentives. They conclude that IT-based supply chain security solutions have a high potential for increasing both security and logistics performance through higher supply chain visibility. The abstract is available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

Lee et al. (2011) consider the SCS performance rather narrowly as the organization’s ability to locate and eliminate the source of a product contamination. This is a rather unorthodox approach: scholars commonly consider SCS performance in terms of capability to prevent, detect and recover from crime that takes place in the supply chain context. But regardless of the narrow scope, the paper provides useful information how about to protect cargo from hostile tampering cost-effectively. This is particularly relevant for the CORE demonstrator with fast-moving consumer goods of Procter & Gamble (WP17). Also partners involved in the development of educational and training material are going to benefit from the findings of this research paper.

Reference

Lee, J., Palekar, U. S., & Qualls, W. (2011). Supply chain efficiency and security: Coordination * for collaborative investment in technology. European Journal of Operational Research, 210(3), 568-578.

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Controlling access to pick-up and delivery vans: the cost of alternative measures (Haelterman et al. 2012)

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Summary

The situational crime prevention theory suggests that preventive security measures often backfire. For this reason, it is problematic that many managers do not have a holistic picture which kind of considerations should precede selection of implementation of security measures. A paper by Haelterman et al. (2012) tests the practical feasibility of a new management model that is designed to highlight the most promising preventive security measures given a set of preconditions and costs. The authors apply this model in the context of pick-up and delivery van operations at a Belgian branch of a major express courier company. Such transport operations are subject to risk of theft and terrorism, especially if unauthorized people managed break into pick-up and delivery vans. To test the management model, the authors collect views of of supply chain practitioners in two expert panels and through a survey. Their analysis covers a broad array of preventive security measures including key card, audible alarm, silent alarm + GPS, notification on vehicles, awareness training, no company logos, formal instructions / compliance checks & sanctioning, double drivers, over security escorts. The abstract is available at: http://link.springer.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

The research of Haelterman et al. (2012) sets a solid theoretical basis for practical supply chain security work. All CORE work packages that cover aspects of road transport benefit from the analysis of this research paper. The research shows that a set of preconditions influence outcomes of preventive security measures: availability (legal, infrastructure), practicability (perceived), required knowledge, required expertise, user awareness, user belief, use commitment (anticipated), and co-operation. Security measures also incur different kinds of costs: financial costs, ethical/social cost (labeling, distrust, civil liberties, inequalities), aesthetical cost. Finally, as the theory on situational crime prevention suggests, security measures may result into various reverse effects, including crime displacement (geographical, temporal, target, tactical, crime types), escalating effects (e.g., use of violence), creative adaptation, and enticement effects.

Reference

Haelterman, H., Callens, M., & Vander Beken, T. (2012). Controlling access to pick-up and delivery vans: the cost of alternative measures. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 18(2), 163-182.

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Estimating the Operational Impact of Container Inspections at International Ports (Bakshi et al. 2011)

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Summary

The US government is pushing a new 100 % screening regime for US-bound containers in foreign ports to mitigate the risk of weapons of mass destruction entering US soil. The 100 % regime, however, is a major concern for foreign port operators because the current Container Security Initiative (CSI) regime seems not to be scalable for high inspection rates. The paper of Bakshi et al. (2011) simulate impacts of two container inspection regimes (the CSI and a new one) in terms of port congestion, handling cost and dwell time. To carry out the simulation, the authors use discrete event queuing network simulation with real container movement data from two of the world’s busiest container terminals. The analysis shows that cargo inspections many times disrupt optimized logistics processes at seaports. In particular, inspections extend the transportation leadtime because shipments lose time as they (i) are moved to an inspection site, (ii) queue for inspection to start, (iii) pass inspections themselves. Download the abstract here: http://pubsonline.informs.org.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

This paper is highly relevant for CORE demonstrations that involve screening in seaports (WP10-11 and WP13-15 and WP17). The research illustrates the impact of the security integration on speed, cost, and predictability of the seaport logistics. Bakshi et al. (2011) observe that security inspection at port entrances (quayside for ships and city-side for trucks) with drive-through inspection portals, does not delay nor divert the routine container handling process, in which a crane unloads a container from a ship or a truck and deposits it to a stack where the container waits until it is its time to leave the port. But if a container is inspected a few hours prior its scheduled departure, as is currently done under the US Container Security Initiative (CSI) regime, the routine handling process gets disrupted, (see Figure 6). Remarkably, the only value-adding security activity “non-intrusive inspection” (11) requires three preceding activities (8P10) and another three following activities (12-14), none of which add value from security or service standpoints. Other valueless activities, which do not appear in the illustration, include searching of the shipment selected for screening and verification of its documentation. The extra activities consume time and money but add no value to the shipping service. The first approach with drive-through portals eliminates the non-value adding supportive logistics activities (8-10 and 12-14) and therefore enhances logistics speed and efficiency without necessarily lowering the security level.


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Reference

Bakshi, N., Flynn, S. E., & Gans, N. (2011). Estimating the operational impact of container inspections at international ports. Management Science, 57(1), 1-20.

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Interview with Ms. Sarma on the US CSP-program

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28.6.2016: Today’s CBRA Interview with Ms. Dace Sarma from CRDF Global focuses on the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program

 

Hi Dace, and thanks for joining CBRA Interview. Can you please tell first a bit of your background and what you do today?

I work at CRDF Global, an independent nonprofit organization that promotes international scientific and technical collaboration through grants, technical resources, training and services. At CRDF Global, I work in partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program, CSP in short, on programming collaborating with government, security, academic, and industrial communities around the world to strengthen their ability to thwart chemical attacks. Prior to working with CSP, I supported and implemented the Department of State’s Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, WMDT in short, projects within the scope of CRDF Global support for the WMDT.

 

Thanks for sharing that. Can you explain more about CRDF Global and the Chemical Security Program, CSP, by the US State Department?

CSP works with a number of implementing partners, including CRDF Global, to promote chemical security through sponsorship of projects designed to identify and address chemical security vulnerabilities and prevent chemical attacks.

CSP collaborates with diverse stakeholders, including partner governments, subject matter experts, and international organizations, to enhance chemical security through capacity building workshops, and trainings.

 

I had the pleasure to join twice the CRDF Global workshops in 2015: first to Hurghada, Egypt, in March 2015, and second to Istanbul, Turkey, in December 2015. The former workshop was targeted for the Egyptian government and chemical industry, and the latter one for the Iraqi government and chemical industry. Extremely interesting 3-4 days in both workshops, with great audiences and co-speakers / co-facilitators. In both workshops I gave presentations e.g. on FP7-project CORE / dangerous goods tracking, and on Dow Chemical supply chain security – thanks again to Ms. Antonella Di Fazio of Telespazio and Dr. Toni Mannisto of CBRA for co-producing these presentations. What is the current status of CSP regarding these countries today, if I may ask?

Thank you again for your participation in these workshops, Juha. We all appreciated you sharing your experience in chemical supply chain and transportation security.

We have continued work with our partners in Egypt on chemical supply chain security. CRDF Global, the Federation of Egyptian Industries’ Environmental Compliance Office (FEI-ECO) and the Federation of Egyptian Industries’ Chamber of Chemical Industries (CCI) held an event in December, also sponsored by CSP, which convened 170 government, industry and academia representatives from Egypt’s chemical sector to highlight Egypt’s achievements in securing the chemical supply chain and identify further steps required to secure their chemicals in transit.  FEI-ECO and CCI are also working to provide technical guidance and support for Egyptian chemical companies to adopt Responsible Care®, an international voluntary chemical management initiative developed by the chemical industry to help chemical companies operate safely, securely and profitably.

In Iraq, CRDF Global and CSP have continued to work closely with a variety of partners from across the chemical and security communities. Most recently in April, with sponsorship from CSP, CRDF Global implemented the 1st National Chemical and Biological Security Coordination Conference in Baghdad. The conference convened Iraqi government, security, industrial, and academic sectors to discuss national efforts, interagency coordination, and best practices to counter chemical and biological proliferation in Iraq.

 

Any plans in 2016 to organize similar workshops in the MENA region?

We will continue to work with our international partners, including in the MENA region, in 2016. As the world becomes more connected, we will continue to focus on securing the chemical supply chain.  Many of our partners have also identified chemical ground transportation security as an area of particular interest.  We look forward to working with technical experts like CBRA and leaders from chemical communities worldwide to enhance global chemical security.

 

Thanks a lot Dace for this interview – and hope to meet you soon again, at one the upcoming missions / workshops! Juha

New survey on European postal security

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PostEurop and Cross-border Research Association have launched a new online survey on postal security management to promote further development and implementation of best security practices in the postal sector. The survey is part of the ongoing SAFEPOST project that the European Commission is co-funding under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). SAFEPOST project going to finish in the end of July after four years of work towards higher postal security in the European Union.

The survey studies the current state of postal security management among PostEurop members, 52 postal operators in 49 European countries. The goal is to collect responses mainly from security and safety managers of the PostEurop members, but also postal expert familiar with sorting and distribution processes are welcome to provide their inputs. The first part of the survey focuses on security implementation and security performance, and the second part studies postal managers’ expectations and concerns regarding the following six main SAFEPOST innovations:

Common Postal Security Space:

SAFEPOST has created an online platform for sharing security-related information between postal operators. This Common Postal Security Space provides a digital track record of security controls and related evidence (for example X-ray images) that a postal parcel has encountered over its journey, and facilitates an easy and controlled way to exchange information both with other operators as well as the authorities.

D-tube drug screening station:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated a new screening solution, D-tube, that can be fully integrated into the sorting process. The D-Tube’s prototype detects illegal substances, such as narcotics and explosives, at high accuracy.

Explosive detection system:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated a Raman spectroscopy screening device for detecting trace amounts of explosives and explosive precursors on the outside of postal items. The device is designed to be seamlessly integrated, at the same level as X-ray machines already used today, in the sorting process and detect the explosive threats at a high accuracy and at a low false alarm rate (≈ 1 %).

Image recognition system:

SAFEPOST has developed an Image Recognition solution that photographs five visible sides of a postal parcel at one or more locations in the postal network. The solution compares these images to detect signs of tampering or damage (≈ 92% detection rate). The current solution functions properly when the conveyor belt moves no faster than 0.5 m/s.

Radiological screening:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated detection of radiation in moving parcels, that can be fully integrated into the sorting process. The current version of the detector is able to detect any harmful level of radiation, and identify the radioactive isotope, and when possible to consider effects of possible attempts of hiding the radioactivity with lead or other shielding material by detecting neutron radiation.

Security standard and certificate:

SAFEPOST project is working towards a new European security standard for the postal operators that would give recommendations about use of security inspection technologies, exchange of security-related information, cyber security, and key security performance indicators. This standard would pave the road towards a voluntary security certification program that would help the postal operators to show their commitment to security.

This survey research is expected to produce interesting new insights about postal security activities and security performance among the PostEurop members. If the response rate is high, the survey findings will set a basis for pan-European benchmarking of security activities. The findings would also contribute to smart policy making, legislation, and standardisation in the field of postal security.

Finally, depending on the response rate, CBRA is going to publish an academic journal paper based on the results. Building on solid theory on supply chain security risk management, the journal paper would provide new empirical about how supply chain security implementation is associated operational and security performance. We expect that collaborative security measures improve both on-time delivery performance (a proxy for operational performance) and supply chain security performance simultaneously. Collaborative security measures include survey items such as “we coordinate security activities with our business customers” and “we exchange customs declaration information with customs authorities electronically [for example, ITMATT or CUSITM messages]”. Another hypothesis is that, on the one hand, non-collaborative security contributes to supply chain security performance but decrease on-time delivery performance on the other hand. Examples of such non-collaborative measures include “we use tamper-evident mail bags to transport high-value postal items” and “We perform security controls also on non-airmail items to detect explosives.” The figure below summarises the theory and hypotheses of the research paper.

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Figure 1 Theoretical framework of the SAFEPOST survey paper

The survey findings will be presented in the final SAFEPOST meeting in Madrid 5-6 July 2016. After the meeting, we hope that we can expand the scope of the survey to cover the rest of the world, as well. The next step would be to contact representatives of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and coordinate distribution of the survey into the organisations’ 192 member countries.

 

CASSANDRA compendium. Standards in supply chain management (Ch. 9)

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Summary: Chapter 9 of the CASSANDRA compendium lists and discusses various standards that set the context for international supply chain management. The chapter focuses especially on management standards (e.g., ISO28000), technical standards (e.g., RFID, electronic seals and barcodes), standards for exchange of information among supply chain stakeholders (e.g., UN/EDIFACT and XML messaging), and customs security standards (especially the World Customs Organisations’ SAFE Framework of Standards). GS1 Global Visibility Framework and other industry standards are included in the discussion, as well. The chapter points out that because a large variety of standards are already available, the challenge is not a lack of standardisation but the lack of harmonisation between different standards. The section also concludes that even if the diversity of standards was harmonised, the next step would be to ensure that the standards would be consistently implemented in different contexts.

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Full review: The chapter focuses on listing different standards that affect the modern supply chain management. There not much details to be reported in this section. However, especially people working with CORE work package 6 “SCS Reference Framework and Standards” should read the brief listing and general discussion of standards and standardisation. Other chapters of the CASSANDRA compendium provide complementary information about standardisation in the field of supply chain management (e.g., Ch. 5 & 6).

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapter 9

CORE2007

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CASSANDRA compendium. Technologies for supply chain visibility and security (Ch. 8)

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Summary: Chapter 8 of the CASSANDRA compendium reviews current and future technologies that help managers to improve visibility and security over global end-to-end supply chains. The supply chain visibility technologies, in essence, provide logistics managers with a variety of information – shipment data, performance metrics, inventory levels, production / delivery schedules and sales forecast, for example – in or close to real time. The chapter’s review on supply chain security technologies focus mainly on security sensors (e.g., motion detectors), container seals, biometric user authentication devices (e.g., fingerprints), and non-intrusive inspection equipment (e.g., X-ray screening stations). The section also elaborates modern ways for sharing information among stakeholders that are concerned about security of the supply chain. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: Chapter 8 includes some interesting details and insights about modern visibility and security technologies, many of which are relevant especially for CORE demonstrations but also for other work packages such as WP2 (SCS controls), WP7 (CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment) and WP8 (CORE Ecosystem).

Many large logistics operators have developed own supply chain visibility systems to coordinate and organise logistics operations. A large logistics service provider, Kühne+Nagel uses its KN login visibility system that allows the company to optimise its complex global operations in terms of speed, time-certainty, security and cost-efficiency and many other relevant metrics. DHL, a German-based international express courier and logistics company, uses its LOGIS software for its operations. Previous EU projects have also developed visibility systems, for example Smart CM SICIS (Shared Intermodal Container Information System).

These visibility systems enable fast response to most operational contingencies that are about cause deviations from original plans. For instance, if a shipper got instant information about a stolen container, a new delivery could be quickly arranged and the consignee could be informed as soon as possible about the reshipment. Moreover, the visibility systems often interface ITC systems of other key stakeholders in the international supply chains. Customs, for example, receive advance cargo information (ACI) automatically from these systems.

The second part of the chapter 8 focuses exclusively on security technologies. The review starts with description of security sensors that are designed to detect tampering, unplanned detours, and other suspicious events in the supply chain. The modern sensor technologies sense at least changes in lighting, acceleration, location (geo-fencing functionality), motion and CO2 levels (used, e.g., to detect stowaways inside shipping containers). The chapter introduces modern user authentication technologies (e.g., fingerprints, face, retina, hand geometry and other unique biometric characteristics). Some information is provided regarding non-intrusive screening solutions that are often considered to be necessary for fast and secure screening operations. The rest of the chapter discusses various technical and institutional solutions for exchanging security-relevant information among supply chain operators and relevant government agencies. Especially interoperability of ICT systems seems to be crucial for effective security efforts in the global supply chains. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapter 8

CORE2007

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CASSANDRA compendium. Private sector perspectives on risk management (Ch. 5) and crime prevention and security management in supply chains (Ch. 6)

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Summary: Chapters 5 & 6 of the CASSANDRA compendium provide a general overview on supply chain security risk management from the private sector perspective. Explaining the essentials of supply chain risk management, Chapter 5 introduces commonly used risk management models and tools (e.g., risk matrices and risk registers), discusses various classifications of supply chain risks, and elaborates current trends of risks and risk management in the supply chain context. Chapter 6 focuses on specific challenges of supply chain security risks – the risks that arise from intentional, man-made criminal activities such as terrorism, theft, trafficking, and sabotage. The chapter explains a few early classifications of supply chain security risks (e.g., motive-based typology and taxonomies based on private sector perspectives). Following the classifications of security risks, the chapter puts forth a few models for managing security risks in the supply chain context (e.g., the 8-layer model for supply chain security management). The chapter concludes with a detailed case study on security management of an international security company and a comparison of supply chain security management and the total quality management (TQM) management philosophy. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: Previous observatory entries have already shown the relevance of the CASSANDRA compendium to the community of supply chain management professionals. The compendium’s chapters 5 & 6 give a brief summary of risk management and security risk management in the context of international supply chains. The contents of the chapters are relevant and useful for people involved in FP7 CORE project, especially for those involved in work packages 3 (Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis Suite) and 4 (SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps).

Chapter 5 elaborates a set of common supply chain risk management tools. The model of Waters (2007) summarises rather obvious three steps of the risk management process: identifying risks, analysing risks and responding to risks. The model proposes, for example, that managers can identify supply chain risks through analysis of past events, collection of opinions, and through operational analysis. The model also calls for managerial attention to prerequisites of successful risk management – mutual trust, cooperation and information exchange among relevant stakeholders involved in supply chain management – and highlights importance of continuous monitoring and controlling the risk management process. The chapter concludes with the four classic approaches to risk management: risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer (e.g., insurance and contractual agreements), and acceptance. The classifications of supply chain risks include typologies focusing on risk sources (natural hazards operational failure and terrorism), risk consequences (e.g., risk to operations, risk to reputation and risk to profits), and objects of vulnerability (e.g., information, materials, personnel and financial flows).

The chapter on crime prevention and security management (Ch. 6) in supply chains provides a concise summary on supply chain security management from the private sector perspective. The chapter starts by describing some early classifications of supply chain security risks. A motive-based taxonomy classifies such risks into the three categories: economic crime (profit as motive), other crime types (ideological, emotional and other reasons as motive) and facilitating crime that covers activities that do not bring direct crime benefits but help committing other rewarding crime crimes later on. (e.g., document fraud, bribery and use of intimidation). The chapter’s next section elaborates ways to mitigate security risks in the global supply chains, highlighting the key ideas of the so-called 8-layer model for supply chain security management (the model incorporates multiple aspects of risk assessment, hands-on design and planning, implementation of a variety of technologies, procedures, and incentives as well as preparation for dealing with the consequences of supply chain crime). The chapter provides also a case study with an international tobacco company that runs high security risk supply chain operations. The section also contrasts, rather interestingly, principles of security management against the fundaments of the total quality management (TQM) management philosophy. The chapter continues with a brief review of regulations (e.g., EU customs security and aviation security regulations) and standards on supply chain security management (World Customs Organization’s SAFE framework of standards, and industry standards of the Transported Asset Protection Association).

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapters 5 & 6

CORE2007

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MARITIME SECURITY – Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, GAO, March 2009 (CORE1065)

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Summary: The US government considers identification and tracking of vessels at the US coastal areas, inland waterways and ports important for protecting the US homeland and economy from maritime terrorism. The US coastal guards use a range of identification and tracking solutions to detect any anomalies in maritime traffic that might suggest terrorist activity, such as transportation of weapons of mass destruction, use of explosive-laden boats as weapons, smuggling of weapons, drugs, people or other contraband. This GAO report reviews the US Coast Guards’ current and future solutions for monitoring the maritime traffic: long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), long-range automatic identification system (AIS) and various radar and camera systems. The report elaborates strengths and weaknesses of these identification and tracking solutions and proposes a roadmap for further strengthening of the US coastal security. The future advancements should pay particular attention to tracking of small and non-commercial vessels and to reconsider ways to collect and analyze data that is relevant for coastal surveillance.  Offering background information about vessel-level tracking and tracing of maritime cargo movements, the report is a relevant source document for those CORE demonstrations that involve shipping of containers from, through and into the US. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf.

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Full review: CORE demonstrations of WP9 and WP14 benefit from the background information this GAO document offers on identification and tracking of vessels because these two demos involve US seaports and shipping at the US territorial waters. Also the CORE’s risk and IT clusters might find the information of this GAO document useful. The information that the identification and tracking provide allow the coastal guards to assess risk-levels of individual vessel movements and decide when it is reasonable to intervene and check anomalies. The vessel tracking and identification involves also a great deal of IT integration because it currently involves many technical components and synthetizes data collected from many different sources.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
  • Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), long-range automatic identification system (AIS), track & trace

 

CORE1065

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