MARITIME SECURITY – DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security, GAO, July 2010 (CORE1064)

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Summary: This GAO report analyses the progress the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in maritime supply chain security over the past five to ten years. The report raises problems that the DHS and its component agencies – the Coast Guard and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) – have encountered regarding improvement of risk management, reduction of the vulnerability to threats of small vessels, implementation of security assessment in foreign ports, and the overall progress in supply chain security.  The report states that so far the Coast Guard has carried out risk assessments, but their results do not allow effective comparison and prioritization of risks across ports. The Coast guard has also identified points of vulnerability related to waterside attacks by small vessels, reached out to the general public to encourage recreational sailors to report anomalies, started tracking of small vessel, tested equipment to screen small vessels for nuclear material and conducted security maneuvers such as vessel escorts. Nevertheless, resource constraints and technical problems prevent the Coast Guard to protect the US coastline and maritime infrastructure from small-vessel threats effectively. Moreover, the Coast Guard has been assessing security in foreign ports, but the lack of the agency’s resources and certain countries’ reluctance to collaborate with the US authorities have slowed down the global security assessment. Finally, as for the general supply chain security, the DHS has been running the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) in foreign ports to test the feasibility of the 100% scanning of US-bound shipping containers with non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection equipment. The findings of the SFI pilots indicate that the 100% scanning is not a feasible policy because it would disrupt port logistics, damage international trade and raise healthy concerns, among other things. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/660/659087.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO review concentrates on the US maritime supply chain security. The document provides important information for people who are working for the CORE demonstrations of WP1 and WP14 because these demos involve maritime transportation into and from the US mainland. Those demonstrations that test tracking & tracking solutions might benefit from the document’s update on small-vessel identification and tracking systems.

Cross-references:

  • Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational Benefits, but Challenges Remain. GAO-10-433R. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
  • Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C., June 12, 2008.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, supply chain security, 100% scanning and track & trace

 

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AVIATION SECURITY – Progress Made, but Challenges Persist in Meeting the Screening Mandate for Air Cargo, GAO, March 2011 (CORE1062)

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Summary: This GAO report reviews the recent progress of the US air cargo security scheme. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the main agency responsible for the US air cargo security, has been working towards the implementation of the 100% screening requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. So far TSA has set up a voluntary Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) to allow trusted logistics operators to screen air cargo outside congested airports, launched a program for testing technologies for air cargo screening and expanding its program for approving explosive detection dog teams. The main obstacle in meeting the 100% screening requirement is that TSA has no reliable mechanism for verifying screening data from domestic foreign screening operators, which self-report the data. TSA also struggles in finding resources to employ as many transport security inspectors as it is required to oversee the Certified Cargo Screening Program. The report also points out that the current technologies that TSA has approved for cargo screening cannot screen large cargo units – pallets or unit loading devices (ULDs) – and this incapability reduces speed and cost-efficiency of air cargo screening. Overall, this GAO document provides a general outlook on state and challenges the US air cargo security regime, and therefore those CORE demonstrations that focus on the US-bound or US-origin air transport should consider the report as a key source material. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/130/125678.pdf.

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Full review: This document is relevant for the CORE demonstrations that involve air transportation into or through or from the US. Especially the DHL demo, that concentrates on shipping of military aircraft parts from the US to Spain, is affected by the TSA’s programs and initiatives that the report analyses. The report is very concise and informative, so it might be beneficial to the CORE’s educational and training activities.

Cross-references:

  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).

Additional keywords: Air cargo security, 100% screening, Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress Made, but further actions needed to secure the maritime energy supply, GAO, August 2011 (CORE1061)

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Summary: The GAO report discusses actions the US Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have taken to strengthen security of energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure – that produces, transports, or receives oil and natural gas – from terrorist attacks. The report’s key recommendation is that the Coast Guard need to assess risks to all offshore facilities in the US territorial waters, to improve emergency response plans in case of oil spills and to design performance measures for emergency response activities. This GAO document focuses on a rather narrow field of critical infrastructure, the US maritime energy infrastructure, which is not in the CORE’s scope. The CORE’s risk cluster might consider useful the description how the Coast Guard has applied its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) to determine risk of the US maritime energy infrastructure. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d11883t.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO document is not very relevant to CORE because of its topic (the US maritime energy infrastructure) that is not within the CORE’s scope. Even so, the risk cluster, the IT cluster and the demonstrations on maritime transport might consider useful of the insight this report offers on security risk assessment.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan And Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
  • Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed. GAO-11-153R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Additional keywords: Critical infrastructure protection (CIP), maritime security and security of supply

 

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PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM, Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO, November 2011 (CORE1060)

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Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has granted almost 1.7 billion USD to port security through the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The program is administered by a component agency of DHS, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This GAO reports highlights some problems that the grant program has encountered. The first issue is that the risk assessment the FEMA uses to assess risk levels and assign grants to different ports does not take into account how security improvements affect the vulnerability of the ports to terrorist attacks. The report recommends the FEMA to design a vulnerability index that accounts for security improvement and to coordinate with the Coast Guard to get access to the most accurate vulnerability and threat information. The second issue with the grant program is that much of the grant money does not get used and translate into practical port security projects. The GAO report proposes acceleration of the grant granting process with updated administrative procedures and with more administrative staff.  Finally, this GAO report recommends the FEMA to develop performance metrics to assess its administration in relation to the Port Security Grant Program. The contents of this GAO report is not very relevant to CORE because no US seaports are partners in the project. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf.

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Full review: This document has only a limited relevance for CORE because the consortium does not involve any US seaport operators. The demonstrations of WP9 and WP14 that cover shipping of goods from and into the US through local seaports might find it useful to learn about how US ports can apply for funds to improve the security. Otherwise, other demonstrations do not benefit much of this information. However, the CORE’s risk cluster can benefit from the rather detailed description of the risk analysis model in the report’s Appendix II.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan And Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
  • Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed. GAO-11-153R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Additional keywords: Critical infrastructure protection (CIP), maritime security and security of supply, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)

 

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Needs to Enhance Its Guidance and Oversight of High-Risk Maritime Cargo Shipments, GAO, January 2015 (CORE1059)

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Summary: The report reviews the US Customs and Border Protection’s (CPB) approach to risk assessment and targeting of maritime shipping containers. The report’s highlights that CPB does not have clear decision rules and reporting procedures to monitor percentage of containers that the risk assessment system flags high-risk and that get eventually examined. The source of this problem is that the CPB’s officials (targeters) may waive examination of the high-risk containers if the container (i) falls within a predetermined category (standard exception), or (ii) the targeters can articulate why the shipment should not be considered high risk. The targeting units have currently differing definitions of “standard exceptions” and differing views on what constitutes the “articulate reasons.” The GAO report recommends the CPB to clarify, harmonize and enforce the rules and the procedures for waiving the high-risk containers from examination. As for CORE, this report provides a detailed and recent outlook on the US maritime risk assessment and targeting scheme, and this information is going to support work of the CORE’s risk cluster and the demonstrations that involve shipping of sea containers into the US. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/670/668098.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO reports contains crucial information about the US risk assessment and container targeting systems that benefit the CORE’s risk cluster. The report outlines principles, procedures, datasets and scanning methods that constitute the world’s most advanced risk assessment system for maritime shipping containers. The CORE’s IT cluster might also benefit from the report’s description of the CPB’s Automated Targeting System (ATS) that is used to compute risk scores for shipping containers and flag the ones with the highest score as high-risk. Regarding the CORE demonstrations, the GM demon (WP19) must comply with data requirements (24-hour rule and the “10+2” rule) that enable the US risk assessment and targeting system. Also the demos involving customs controls, especially WP11.2 and WP10.1, may learn something from the ways how the US border control authorities are assessing risk levels of incoming containers.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System. GAO-13-9. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.
  • Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders. GAO-14-196T. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2013.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.

Additional keywords: Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements (known as the 10+2 rule), 24-hour rule, risk assessment

 

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TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING – Stakeholder Satisfaction Varies; TSA Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Efforts, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1020)

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Summary: This report presents and discuses findings of a survey on stakeholders’ satisfaction to the US Transportation Security Administration’s security-related activities and to the way the TSA disseminates information about its activities. The survey’s scope is the overall US transportation system, covering aviation, rail, and highway modalities and transport of passengers and freight. Given the broad scope and the US-centricity of the survey, this report is not very relevant for CORE. The education and training cluster could anyhow learn how security-related user satisfaction surveys are done and how to establish a mechanism for collecting regular user feedback. The report is available for download at: http://gao.gov/assets/670/664350.pdf.

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Full review: The scope of the report is very broad and the information about cargo security is limited, so the CORE project cannot much benefit from this report. However, the project’s educational and training cluster might use the report’s information to design ways administer end-user surveys: what questions to ask, which stakeholders to survey and how to report the findings. Some demonstrations adopt some of the report’s ideas and methods to collect high-quality user requirements.

Additional keywords: Transportation security, aviation security

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders, GAO, November 2013 (CORE1018)

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Summary: This report is a summary of previous GAO reports on US maritime supply chain security and border controls. The report focuses on progress and challenges in four main areas of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) activity on the maritime security. The report highlights that DHS and its component Coast Guard agency could improve its maritime domain awareness through increased information sharing and more advanced vessel-tracking systems. The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in turn could step up its role in securing US-bound container traffic by conducting more frequent risk assessment audits in key foreign ports that ship cargo into the US and by fostering more close relationship with foreign authorities. The GAO report also recommends the Coast Guard to rethink its maritime surveillance, interdiction and security operations because current protection and support is not adequate in high priority locations. The report also calls for more collaboration and coordination among maritime authorities, port operators and ocean carriers. Finally, the report encourages the DHS to develop performance metrics and data collection procedures the agency uses to assess and monitor its maritime security programs and activities. This report gives a recent update on the US maritime security activities that might be helpful for CORE demonstrations and clusters. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/660/659087.pdf.

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Full review: This summary GAO documents provides detailed background material about the US maritime security programs. This information is very relevant for the CORE demonstrations WP9 and WP14 that involve shipping cargo from and into the US. The information this document offers also help the CORE’s risk and IT clusters to learn lessons from the US approach to risk-based maritime security and security-related IT integration.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security. GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports. GAO-13-764. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2013.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, maritime surveillance, risk-based controls, targeting, container scanning

 

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Review of TRANSPark truck parking service (CORE1041)

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Summary: As a response to the increasing security concerns surrounding goods transport by road, the IRU Membership has been providing information on safe and secure truck parking areas to road hauliers and truck drivers for more than two decades. Since the early 1990s, this information was disseminated in the form of a printed handbook. In 2007 the online website was launched.  In 2013 a smartphone app was launched. Currently initiatives are taken to encourage the use of TRANSPark globally. It does not have much documentation available, except promotional fliers and the website and the app themselves. Available to the General Public at: http://www.iru.org and through the Android and iPhone TRANSPark app, which can be downloaded from the stores. Overall relevance to CORE is high, as truck transports constantly risk being attacked by organised crime with the aim to either steal fuel, cargo or potentially even to use a truck for terrorist purposes. Therefore, ensuring that trucks are parked at safe and secure truck parking areas is essential for drivers, road hauliers, shippers and other stakeholders involved in supply chain security.

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Full review: The current strengths include: Bringing information on safe and secure truck parking areas to drivers and road hauliers; Offering a driver-haulier-shipper-enforcement social network, enabling info sharing on latest road cargo related security threats; and providing flexible platform with expected future expansions to further ensure information sharing between key road haulage actors. Future opportunity is: Using this established communication channel for two-way information sharing with truck drivers, road hauliers, shippers and enforcement. And future threat is: The success of this community, as any other, depends strongly on the uptake by users.

Detailed analysis and relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives depend on securing every element of the supply chain, and ensuring swift information sharing between different actors. TRANSPark could be relevant to following Work Packages:

  • Research and Analysis: TRANSPark-relevant information could contribute to understanding the amount of crime against road hauliers on roads, such as fuel theft and cargo theft.
  • Demonstrators: TRANSPark webservice and app(s) could be made available to the CORE demonstrators. Certain TRANSPark functionalities could be amended to suit CORE developments better, in all demonstrators where trucks need to take a rest or stay at truck parking areas.

CORE Impact anticipation: CORE could have a strong impact on future developments of the TRANSPark webservice and the app. The service is constantly evolving and is looking for new ways to improve security of the road haulage for drivers, hauliers, and other relevant stakeholders.

App and video:

Available to General Public at: http://www.iru.org  and through the Android and iPhone TRANSPark app, which can be downloaded from the stores.

Youtube video on TRANSPark: https://www.youtube.com

 

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Draft SADC guidelines for Coordinated Border Management: A Practical Guide on Best Practices and Tools for Implementation, 2011 (CORE1115)

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Summary: The 15 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are looking ways to ease the transition of their regional Free Trade Area towards a more integrated Customs Union where people and cargo would cross borders without excessive delays and administrative burden. The countries expect that the smoother cross-border traffic would contribute to the economic growth in the region. Central to the integration effort is coordinated border management, i.e., closer collaboration among various border control agencies, both nationally and internationally. The SADC guidelines provides a comprehensive catalogue and description of best practices of border agency cooperation and guidance how to implement them in the Southern-African context. Besides the guidelines, the document also features a comprehensive glossary of coordinated border management vocabulary. You can download the guidelines here: http://www.sadc.int. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: The guideline document suggests that coordinated border management depends on three levels of coordination: 1) intra-agency coordination within boundaries of one organization, 2) inter-agency cooperation between separate border control agencies or between the agencies and associated ministries and other policy-making bodies, and 3) international cooperation among border control agencies at both sides of a border or among governments at various supranational political forums.

The guideline document discusses in detail six key areas of coordinated border management. The most fundamental of the management areas is the legal and regulatory framework that defines a necessary legal basis for inter-agency and international cooperation and exchange of information. The second key management area is the institutional framework that is about governance and organizational structures underlying border control operations and high-level decision-making. The third management area concerns the procedures for cooperation at the borders. The fourth management area focuses on human resources and training, and the fifth on exchange of data, information, and intelligence. The sixth and the last management area is about providing infrastructure and equipment that supports other areas of coordinated border management.

Reference: Southern-African Development Community, 2011. “Draft SADC guidelines for Coordinated Border Management: A Practical Guide on Best Practices and Tools for Implementation”

 

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Governmental actors in supply chains & Governmental procedures, compliance and risk management – CASSANDRA Compendium Chapters 4 & 7, 2012 (CORE2007c)

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Summary: The fourth and seventh chapters of the CASSANDRA compendium elaborate on the roles of government agencies in international logistics and supply chain security (SCS). A broad range of government actors – customs, police agencies, border guards and many others – play a crucial role in enforcing and facilitating cross-border traffic through the global supply chains. These government agencies are critical stakeholders to be involved in the development, design and implementation of the two central CASSANRA concepts: the end-to-end data pipeline and the risk-based approach to cargo inspections and company audits. The CASSANDRA compendium highlights that there are important differences in the national laws and regulations, even within the European Union, that complicate international government collaboration. The differences in the legal framework and organisational cultures must be taken into account when designing new SCS solutions in the CASSANDRA and other projects. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: The CASSANDRA compendium describes how the role of government agencies in the cross-border supply chain operations is changing. The trading community and high-level policy-makers are strongly advocating trade facilitation, to make international commerce faster, more cost-efficient and less cumbersome. To address the demand for trade facilitation, many border control agencies are adopting risk-based approaches for controlling cross-border trade and travel. They exploit information increasingly to identify and target high-risk cross-border movements while facilitating low-risk traffic. To further lowering administrative hurdles to the cross-border trade, many government agencies are eliminating duplicative and redundant reporting requirements and building modern ICT systems to enable fast and reliable digital exchange of data and information.

Many law enforcement agencies are also facing budget cuts and increasing work loads, which forces them to look for new ways to increase productivity. Increased collaboration among border control agencies has been proposed as a solution for boosting productivity. The efforts towards further coordinated border management (CBM) are clearly manifested as joint-border control posts, regional single window systems (an online interface enabling trading companies, customs and other border control agencies to exchange trade-related information) and mutual recognition agreements (MRA) that harmonize customs and security related regulatory requirements across jurisdictions.

Reference: Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapters 4 & 7

 

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