Border Agency Cooperation, Part 2 of 3

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Our second blog on Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) focuses on a conceptual model developed by CBRA. We have crafted this “CBRA-BAC15” diagram to visualize a set of key BAC actions and primary beneficiaries, with contributions by Dr. Toni Männistö (supply chain security post-doc researcher at CBRA), Mr. Gerwin Zomer (TNO, technical manager for the FP7-CORE project) and by Ms. Susana Wong Chan (education and training materials developer at CBRA).BAC-1

The diagram is cut to three sectors: on left side, the supply chain companies are the primary beneficiaries of BAC actions; on the right side, the government agencies form the primary beneficiary group; and on the bottom area, both supply chain companies as well as government agencies benefit from BAC actions. Each of these three sectors contains five examples of concrete border agency cooperation actions – 15 in total – explained in a moment by using real examples, whenever available in the literature or by expert suggestions. In the center of the diagram lies a circle with the more generic “smart cross-border improvement actions”, applicable to virtually any work in global trade facilitation.

The diagram should not be considered exhaustive, when it comes to all optional actions to improve BAC in a given country or region or globally. Some of the 15 key actions may be strongly interconnected, or, partially overlapping. Some of them may apply mainly on national multi-agency environment, and some of them mainly on international e.g. customs-to-customs environment. Also, the division of the key actions into the three beneficiary groups can and should be challenged, by the interested audiences. But, let´s start now by listing and illustrating the key 15 BAC actions:

Supply chain companies as the primary beneficiary (left sector in the diagram). The following five BAC actions can bring immediate benefits to the companies operating in supply chains, in terms of saving administrative costs and speeding up the supply chain – less work dealing with various certifications and audit visits, less variation and IT costs with import/export data filing and less waiting times at the borders.

  • Harmonized ´trusted trader´ & other certification programs: In the European Union, the European Commission´s implementing regulation (No. 889/2014) updates the references to the aviation security legislation in force, including recognition of the Known Consignor (KC) status and its relevance to Authorized Economic Operator (AEO), and framing the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programs.
  • Coordinated company visits & audits: Closely linked to the previous BAC-action, in the Netherlands, the Dutch Customs executes joint audits on AEO security (customs) and known consignor/regulated agent (air cargo) with the Dutch Immigration and air-police agency – during the application phase, as well as during periodical audits.
  • Harmonized data filing requirements: Despite a global, harmonized data model, harmonized tariff codes and standards on clearance procedures, there are many differences in operational import, export and transit procedures and information requirements between countries. This results in additional complexity of IT systems for globally operating traders and logistic service providers. An example is the pre-arrival security declarations, where harmonization would be most useful e.g. between the Importer Security Filing, “10+2” in the US and the Entry Summary Declaration in Europe – Multiple Filing, supported by Standard Trader Interface, under development within the Union Customs Code, UCC.
  • Synchronized border interventions & inspections: The Article 4 of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Cross Border Transport Agreement on Facilitation of Border Crossing Formalities calls upon the contracting parties to progressively adopt measures to simplify and expedite border formalities by carrying out joint and simultaneous inspection of goods and people by respective competent authorities of agencies such as customs, immigration, trade, agriculture, and health. It further provides for single-stop inspection and urges the national authorities of adjacent countries to carry out joint and simultaneous inspections.
  • Harmonized operating hours: This applies particularly in the context of two neighboring country customs offices – having same opening hours across the border helps to maximize the daily throughput volumes. As the Article 8 of the World Trade Organization´s Trade Facilitation Agreement puts it, “Each Member shall, to the extent possible and practicable, cooperate on mutually agreed terms with other Members with whom it shares a common border with a view to coordinating procedures at border crossings to facilitate cross-border trade. Such cooperation and coordination may include: … alignment of working days and hours … “. In the ASEAN region, the Article 7 of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit urges the contracting parties to “coordinate working hours of the adjacent border posts”.

Government agencies themselves as the primary beneficiary (right sector in the diagram). The following five BAC actions can provide instant benefits for the cooperating government agencies, in terms of cost savings and improved efficiency – in other words, identifying more violations and catching more bad guys with less total spending.

  • Sharing of agency intelligence, information & data: Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements (CMAAS), signed bilaterally by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and eight counterparties during years 1979-2010 (European Community, France, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, South Africa, South Korea and the United States) provide Canada with a legal basis to share customs information to prevent, investigate and combat customs offences, particularly customs fraud, and to provide reciprocal mutual assistance to ensure the proper application of customs laws. Under CMAAs Canada may share customs information pertaining to: persons, goods and means of transport; activities planned, on-going, or completed, that constitute or appear to constitute a customs offence in the territory of the country requesting the data; proven law enforcement techniques; new and emerging trends, means or methods of committing customs offences; and facilitation of risk assessment activities, within the mandate and authority of the CBSA.
  • Joint investments in common resource pools (equipment, facilities etc.): In Finland the Customs Administration and the Border Guard share common premises and equipment. Each authority has a designated role in the servicing and maintenance of the equipment. X-ray machines are largely the responsibility of Customs. Road-testing equipment, such as lorry brake-testing pads, is also maintained by Customs. All equipment can be shared and operated by each agency upon request. Thus, although the equipment belongs to one agency, it can be easily relocated to the other agency, enabling smoother processing of the workflow without unnecessary and lengthy administrative procedures, thereby reducing costs.
  • Joint teams: In the Netherlands, “HARC” – Hit and Run Cargo Rotterdam team, is a joint operation of Dutch Maritime Police, Dutch Customs, the Fiscal and Economic Crime Agency and the Ministry of Justice collaborating operationally in narcotics enforcement. Joint teams differ from Joint operations below by being a long-term / permanent set-up; while Joint operations “come and go”.
  • Joint operations: A joint operation Meerkat, (23-27 July 2012) involving the World Customs Organization and INTERPOL against the illicit trafficking of cigarettes, tobacco and alcohol in East and Southern Africa, resulted in the seizure of tons of illicitly traded products in seven countries. Operation Meerkat saw Customs and police authorities carry out some 40 raids at seaports, inland border crossing points, markets and shops in Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. More than 32 million cigarettes – equivalent to 1.6 million packets, 134 tons of raw tobacco and almost 3,000 liters of alcohol were seized, resulting in national authorities initiating a number of administrative investigations into tax evasion and other potential criminal offences.
  • Collaborative criminal investigations & prosecutions: In the United States the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) units gather officers from more than 100 different law enforcement agencies under one roof. The objective is to identify, investigate, disrupt and dismantle transnational organizations posing the greatest threat to border security, public safety and national security, by employing the full range of federal, state, local, tribal and international law enforcement resources. Over the years, the BEST has become a successful interagency law enforcement collaboration model that’s keeping the US safer.

Both supply chain companies as well as government agencies as beneficiaries (bottom sector). The five BAC actions can bring instant benefits to all parties in cross-border supply chains, in terms of lowering costs and improving performance, from supply chain company and from governmental agency perspectives.

  • ‘Single window’ -type import/ export/ transit data submissions: In the Netherlands, the authorities have designed Digipoort, the government’s ‘electronic post office’ for businesses. It provides the communication infrastructure for the exchange of digital information between companies and government authorities. Digipoort enables companies to submit import and export information at a single entry point aimed at multiple government authorities.
  • Common risk indicators, risk profiles & targeting systems: In Finland, common databases are linked to the different agencies’ operational and risk management databases, leading to a common approach when a ‘signal’ is recorded. Some control and enforcement officers have access to each other’s systems on a need-to-know basis, with levels of restricted access determined by rank and functional responsibility.
  • Mutual recognition of supply chain inspection procedures & outcomes: As part of the European Union funded research and development project FP7-CORE ( http://www.coreproject.eu/ ), the phytosanitary and customs administrations in Kenya and the Netherlands are working towards mutual recognition of controls carried out by Kenyan authorities, as well as the exploitation of digital phytosanitary certificates and other trade documents, between the two countries. Outside of the research world, mutual recognitions (MR) of customs inspections are being explored in the context of EU MR Agreements, for example with Japan.
  • Cross-training and empowering manpower: In Finland, Customs officers have been trained by the Border Guard to inspect identification documents and visas, among other procedures. Border guards have, in turn, received basic Customs training, which includes the search of vehicles and the recognition of prohibited and restricted goods, such as drugs, alcohol, and counterfeit items.
  • Joint public-private partnership arrangements, training sessions etc.: In 2011 in Hong Kong, the Customs and Excise Department established a Joint Liaison Group with the representatives of shippers, freight forwarders and truck drivers for exchanging operational views and comments on the Road Cargo System “ROCARS”. Moreover, Customs also launched an extensive publicity program and established outreach teams to assist the industry stakeholders to get used to the ROCARS. Following other government departments are listed on the ROCARS web-site http://www.rocars.gov.hk/ : Commerce and Economic Development Bureau, Census and Statistics Department, and Transport Department.

Finally, the center circle of the CBRA-BAC15 diagram highlights the basic, classical principles of trade facilitation – naturally in the context of multiple agencies dealing with cross-border regulations, procedures, IT-systems and data requirements:

  • Simplification & Harmonization: agencies work together with the first aim to streamline certification requirements and procedures, to minimize the number of data elements required from traders etc.; and the second aim to unify the rules and requirements facing supply chain companies.
  • Interoperability & Synchronization: agencies invest in improving interoperability between their inspection technologies, IT-systems etc.; they also work together to better synchronize their supervision and control processes, particularly for the benefit of supply chain companies.
  • Transparency & Predictability: agencies keep each other well informed of their current regulations, procedures, operations etc., as well as planned future changes – such proactive approach helps to minimize surprises and related hassles.

This concludes the second of three parts of our Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) blog. In Part 3 – to be published sometime in February – we focus on the overarching institutional arrangements on Border Agency Cooperation, including establishment of single border agencies (e.g. in the US and Australia); creation of one-stop border posts, OSBPs (multiple examples across the world); carrying work permanently on behalf of other agencies etc. We also plan to discuss bit more on the benefits and costs of BAC, as well as the main challenges and obstacles in BAC-projects across the globe. Talk to you again in February, Juha Hintsa.

 

Bibliography / sources for the examples and cases attached to the 15 BAC key actions:

  • Harmonized ´trusted trader´ & other certification programs: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 of 14 August 2014 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, as regards recognition of the common security requirements under the regulated agent and known consignor programme and the Authorised Economic Operator programme.
  • Coordinated company visits & audits: Email exchange with a Dutch Customs expert
  • Harmonized data filing arrangements: Interview with a Dutch supply chain and trade facilitation expert (29 January 2016); and AnNa Master Plan Extended Collaboration Project Book, December 2015. Available for download at: http://www.annamsw.eu/
  • Synchronized border interventions & inspections: Jain, S.R. (2012), “Coordinated Border Management: The Experience of Asia and the Pacific Region”, World Customs Journal, Vol. 6 No.1. (CBM25).
  • Harmonized operating hours: Article 8 (Border Agency Cooperation) of the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation of 15 July 2014; and Jain, S.R. (2012), “Coordinated Border Management: The Experience of Asia and the Pacific Region”, World Customs Journal, Vol. 6 No.1.
  • Sharing of agency intelligence, information & data: “Customs Cooperation Case Study for Canada”, paper submitted by Canada (Canada Border Services Agency – CBSA) for the July 2012 WTO Symposium on Trade Facilitation.
  • Joint investments in common resource pools (equipment, facilities etc.): “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76.
  • Joint teams: “Customs find cocaine buried in cocoa bean shipment”, NL Times 25.5.2015, Available online at: http://www.nltimes.nl/2015/05/25/customs-finds-cocaine-buried-in-cocoa-bean-shipment/ (accessed 28 January 2016).
  • Joint operations: “WCO and INTERPOL joint operation against illicit trafficking in Africa leads to tobacco and alcohol seizures”, WCO Press Release, 27 August 2012. Available online at:   http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2012/august/operation-meerkat.aspx (accessed 28 January 2016).
  • Collaborative criminal investigations & prosecutions: “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76
  • ‘Single window’ –type import/ export/ transit data submissions: “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76.
  • Common risk indicators, risk profiles & targeting systems: “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76.
  • Mutual recognition of supply chain inspection procedures & outcomes: The Consistently Optimised REsilient ecosystem, CORE FP7 project, EU. See online at: http://www.coreproject.eu/ (accessed 28 January 2016).
  • Cross-training and empowering manpower: “Coordinated Border Management”, WCO News, February 2015, No. 76.
  • Joint public-private partnership arrangements, training sessions etc.: “Road Cargo System (ROCARS) (Hong Kong China)”. Available online at: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/wco-implementing-the-wto-atf/atf/border-agency-cooperation.aspx (accessed 28 January 2016).

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 889/2014 of 14 August 2014 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, as regards recognition of the common security requirements under the regulated agent and known consignor programme and the Authorised Economic Operator programme, 2014 (CORE1069)

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Summary: Existing customs Regulation ((EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code) and aviation legislation (Regulation (EC) No 300/2008) provides for certain recognition of the certifications under the respective programmes, in particular with regard to the security examinations done for each of them. Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 is necessary for the recognition of the known consignor status with its relevance for the AEO as well, frame the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programmes and allow for the necessary exchange of information between customs and aviation authorities. The 889/2014 is available for download at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0889&from=EN.

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Full review: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 now provides that if the applicant for Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) status is already a regulated agent or a known consignor, the criterion on ‘appropriate security and safety standards’ shall be deemed to be met in relation to the premises for which the economic operator obtained the status of regulated agent or known consignor. Points 6.3.1.2 and 6.4.1.2 of the Annex to Commission Regulation (EU) No 185/2010 (4) provide that the appropriate authority, or independent validator acting on its behalf, should take into account whether or not the applicant for regulated agent or known consignor is a holder of an AEO certificate.

The practical implementation of both the customs legislation governing the AEO status and the aviation legislation governing the regulated agent and known consignor has shown that the existing recognition between the programmes is not sufficient to ensure the highest possible synergies between the respective security programmes. The security requirements for both the aviation security regulated agent and known consignor programme and for the customs AEO programme are equivalent to such an extent that both programmes may be aligned further.

Further alignment of both programmes in terms of equal level of recognition, including required exchange of information is necessary in order to decrease the administrative burden for the economic sector concerned and government authorities (both customs and civil aviation) while strengthening further the current level of security.

Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 is necessary for the recognition of the known consignor status with its relevance for the AEO as well, frame the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programmes and allow for the necessary exchange of information between customs and aviation authorities.

The issuing customs authority shall immediately make available to the appropriate national authority responsible for civil aviation security the following minimum information related to the status of authorised economic operator which it has at its disposal:

  • the AEO certificate – security and safety (AEOS) and AEO certificate – customs simplifications/security and safety (AEOF) including the name of the holder of the certificate and, where applicable, their amendment or revocation or the suspension of the status of authorised economic operator and the reasons therefore;
  • information about whether the specific site concerned has been visited by customs authorities, the date of the last visit and the purpose for the visit (authorisation process, reassessment, monitoring); and
  • any reassessments of AEOS and AEOF certificates and the results thereof.

Relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. The following Work Packages are directly impacted by the implementing regulation (EU) No 889/2014:

  • Research and Analysis: Undertake requirements analysis and impact assessment. The project will undertake requirements analysis from different perspectives. In WP1 we will consolidate reviews of SCS regulations policies and standards from Reference Projects and specify implementation support requirements.
  • The Demonstrators: The CORE demonstrators will validate the applicability and benefits of the CORE approach in representative operating scenarios characteristic of the global supply chain. They will specifically show the way towards a Global Secure Supply Chain. The overriding goal is to demonstrate substantial gains in security and facilitation covering every major facet of the supply chain security sector.

The CORE demonstrators affected by the implementing regulation (EU) No 889/2014 are:

  • WP12: Demonstrator Schiphol – apply global data pipeline concept to air cargo supply chains, managing air freight specific trade compliance requirements, and offering supply chain visibility in dashboards. Trade lanes with e.g. Africa, involving multiple inspection authorities.
  • WP17: DHL Demonstrator – managing airfreight trade compliance requirements EU-US in the context of fast supplying of parts.

Also, WP19 is affected here: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development. Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasizing international co-operation to promote harmonization of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.

Cross-references and citations:

  • http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/security/
  • Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92. EU Regulation establishing the Community Customs Code.
  • Regulation (EC) No 300/2008. EU Regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation security allows that entities complying with certain conditions and requirements may be certified to ensure and contribute to a secure supply chain.
  • Barosso, J. (2014), “COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 889/2014 of 14 August 2014 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, as regards recognition of the common security requirements under the regulated agent and known consignor programme and the Authorised Economic Operator programme”, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0889&from=EN.

CORE1069
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Border Agency Cooperation, Part 1 of 3

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“A beloved child has many names”, goes an old Finnish proverb. This saying applies quite well in the conblog-210116text of ´smart cooperation between multiple agencies when dealing with cross-border supply chains, goods movements and transports´. The World Customs Organization talks about Coordinated Border Management (CBM); the European Union about Integrated Border Management (IBM); the World Bank about Collaborative Border Management (CBM); and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe about Comprehensive Border Management (CBM). Cross-border Research Association is aligning with a fifth term: Border Agency Cooperation (BAC), a term used in the Trade Facilitation Agreement of the World Trade Organization. Despite minor differences in scope, priorities, underlying principles and philosophies among these five terms (and possibly even more), one can easily agree that the work carried out under any and all of them aims to coordinate activities across and within various border control agencies, for the benefit of both governmental agencies themselves as well as supply chain companies.

Our first blog on Border Agency Cooperation, BAC, provides an illustrative worst case example on how complex, slow and expensive a cross-border supply chain execution comes when no cooperation takes place between relevant government agencies, neither nationally nor internationally. The illustration is about meat export from Latin America (Country X) to the European Union (Country Y), with maritime transport in reefer containers.

A well-known beef producer in country X– also the first Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) beef producing company in the region – has just signed an annual contract with a beef importer and distributor in country Y. As this is the producer ‘s first export deal to the EU, the producer needs to ensure that all licenses and certificates are up to the EU standard. Organizing health certificates, certificates of origin, sanitary certificates, export licenses – and what have we – takes weeks and weeks of time. There is no communication or procedures in place between the various agencies and officials to facilitate the process, no coordinated company visits or audits, no sharing of information, and no mutual recognition of inspections.

When all documents are finally in place, and regular exports can start, the beef producer and it´s forwarding agent face the burden of filing export data to customs, to sanitary agencies, and to national security agencies – with somewhat similar datasets, but with no single-window filing opportunity. And when export controls and inspections take place – which happens often – there is no synchronization of inspection times between the different agencies. One agency might come to inspect the reefer container on Monday noon, second one on Wednesday morning, and third on Friday afternoon – another week lost in the beef supply chain lead-time.

Once the consignment is happily on board towards the EU, one continues to experience lost BAC opportunities: no data is passed from country X customs or sanitary agencies to their counterparties in country Y, to enable pre-arrival compliance control and risk assessment. In case of criminal suspicions – e.g. when supply chain insiders exploit beef shipments for cocaine smuggling – no intelligence is shared between police and customs, from country X to country Y. The option of joint law enforcement operations between country X and Y police and customs agencies has never been even considered. Even on national level, both in country X and Y, the agencies are not co-operating neither on risk profiling and targeting systems, nor during criminal investigations and prosecutions – what a waste of resources when it comes to catching and convicting the bad guys…

In the meanwhile, some ten days later, the ship arrives at a major sea port in country Y. For the importer, there is no option for single-window data filing; instead, import data must be transferred separately to all different agencies in country Y. As the customs administration in country Y has no Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) in place with country X customs – neither when it comes to AEO certificates nor when it comes to recognizing inspections carried out at export – it treats the import as a “medium to high risk” one, calling for physical inspections. And as the sanitary agency does not share any common resources with the customs administration – particularly no joint inspection facilities and equipment, including x-ray machines – and even the daily opening hours are different from the customs hours, the sanitary agency carries out their own inspections only two days after the customs intervention. And finally, improving the situation does not seem likely, as there are no joint public-private partnerships, and no export/import compliance training sessions or similar in place, neither in country Y nor in country X.

This concludes the first of three parts of our Border Agency Cooperation (BAC) blog. In Part 2 – to be published next week – we will present CBRA´s conceptual model (Hintsa J., Dec.2015) on BAC key actions and beneficiaries: which key actions to take in order to speed up the logistics chain, to save costs with all actors, to increase overall predictability, and to improve government agency performance e.g. in terms of number of seizures and convictions. In the BAC Blog Part 2, we plan to present some preliminary experiences and real-life results from FP7-project CORE. Please stay tuned!

Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended, GAO, 2010 (CORE1068)

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Summary: This report reviews container security technologies that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has evaluated and tested between 2004 and 2009. These container security technologies aim to (1) detect and report unauthorized intrusions into the shipping containers and (2) to track the movement of the containers through the supply chain. As of 2009, DHS has funded and tested four different container security technologies. So far, none of the candidate technologies meet all desired functional requirements: main problems are high false alarm rates, low detection probability, and difficult installation and calibration. Besides the unsatisfactory test results, the report points out problems of conducting the phase II practical “trade lane” testing in the context of the maritime transport only. The report recommends to test the technologies “across all operational scenarios,” considering contextual differences across different modes of transport. Once the technologies would pass this extended trade lane testing, the DHS should (1) obtain support from the trade industry and international partners, (2) develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for using the technology, and (3) certify the container security technologies for use. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-887.

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Full review: This GAO document describes in detail the four container security technologies that DHS has tested since 2004, and one of these technologies happens to be the very same “composite security container” that the WP22 CORE demonstration studies. The report discusses in details the problems that the previous tests and pilots of container security technologies have encountered. Being aware of the past problems help the CORE demonstrations to avoid past mistakes. In addition to the WP22 demonstration, the other demonstrations that involve tracking & tracing of intermodal containers benefit from the information of this GAO report. For instance, the GM demonstration on maritime shipping of automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven (WP9) might use this GAO document to evaluate available technical solutions for tracking the shipping containers. The demonstrations in work packages 14-17 involve tracking and tracing and therefore may use the detailed analysis this GAO report offers on available container security technologies.

 Cross-references:

  • Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
  • Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended.

CORE1068

Additional keywords: Container security, maritime logistics, container security device, tracking & tracing
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AVIATION SECURITY – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO 2008 (CORE1067)

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Summary: This GAO report discusses the impact of the 26 billion USD that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent on aviation security since 2004. The report focuses especially on the current status and the future challenges of passenger screening, air cargo security and passenger watch-list matching program known as Secure Flight. The air cargo security discussion is the report’s most relevant section from the CORE’s viewpoint. The information in the report, that has been published as early as July 2008, is anyhow largely outdated: it discusses challenges that TSA and the air cargo community need to overcome before starting the 100% screening of air cargo that flies on board passenger planes, a legal requirement that become into force in August 2010 and that was set by the Implementing Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (aka the 9/11 Act). The report also recommended strengthening the security of US-bound foreign air cargo (into the US from the rest of the world), to bring it on a par with outbound air cargo security (from the US to rest of the world). More recent regulations and initiatives have corrected this weakness in the US air cargo security: today, third country air carriers must screen cargo up to US standards (or national standards if the country of origin and the US recognize each other’s air cargo regimes) before loading cargo on US-bound planes. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1024T.

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Full review: This GAO report provides useful background information about the US air cargo security regime. This information is going to be useful for the CORE demonstration 17.1 that is about time-critical express shipping of military aircraft parts from the US to Spain. In the demonstration, the express operator DHL ships the parts by plane, and thus compliance with the US air cargo security requirements is one of the key themes of this demo. Also WP 1 might use this GAO report to describe evolution of the US air cargo regime over the years. But though this analysis would be interesting, it is not going to be the essential content in the deliverable of the WP1.

 Cross-references:

  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
  • G_A_O_, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Aviation Security – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs.

CORE1067

Additional keywords: Air cargo security, Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO (October 2009, CORE1066)

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Summary: The document provides a comprehensive outlook on the past and recent US initiatives on container security. The report focuses on the challenges that prevent global implementation of the 100% scanning of US-bound containers in foreign ports with both non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection devices, as mandated by the SAFE Port Act and the 9/11 Acts. The 100% scanning is believed to deter and detect terrorist attempts of smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States inside a cargo container. The reports dates back to late 2009, so the description of the current state of the US container security it provides is not necessarily no longer accurate. The report anticipates that the implementation of the 100% scanning requirement will be delayed due to various problems that were identified during the precursory Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilots. These problems are related mainly to port logistics (routing of containers through scanning sites), employee safety (radiation of screening equipment) and technical constraints (equipment failures and poor quality of scanning images). Today, we know that the US authorities have deferred the implementation already twice, first to 2014 and for the second time until 2016. Altogether, this GAO report describes in detail the challenges of the 100% scanning law and elaborates some ongoing alternative risk-based approaches to container security: (1) the strategic trade lane strategy that aims to establish 100% scanning only in high terrorist risk foreign sea ports and (2) the “10 + 2” data requirements that importers and ocean carriers must submit to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to a container is loaded aboard a US-bound vessel so that the US authorities can calculate more precise risk for each shipping container. This report includes relevant information for all the CORE’s demonstrations that involve US-bound maritime transportation. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-12.

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Full review: The GAO document provides interesting insights on the evolution of the US container security regulations over the years. This is useful supportive information for CORE demonstrations that involve maritime shipping of containers into the US. The GM demonstration of the WP9 for example covers exports of automobile parts from the EU into the US by transatlantic ocean transport. If the US Congress does not repeal or defer the 100% scanning requirement, the port of Felixstove that participates in the demonstration, need to start scanning also all GM’s US-bound containers. Likewise, the FALACUS demo (WP14), which is about shipping of ceramic tiles from Italy to the US, must take into consideration the possible effects of the 100% scanning requirement. This demonstration is particularly interesting from the 100% scanning requirement standpoint because some ceramic tiles are naturally radioactive, and thus they tend to trigger false alarms in the radiation controls. Also the P&G demonstrator in the WP17, that focuses on shipping of consumer goods into the US, the possible impact of the 100% scanning regulation.

Besides the demonstrations, the CORE’s risk cluster might benefit from the detailed analysis of the risk-based approaches to the US container security, such as the strategic trade lane strategy and the “10 + 2” data requirement. All demonstrations might benefit from lessons learnt how GAO has advises DHS and CBP to carry out cost-benefit analyses for the US container security programs (especially the Secure Freight Initiative).

Cross-references:

  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
  • Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
  • Bakshi, N., Flynn, S. E., & Gans, N. (2011). Estimating the operational impact of container inspections at international ports. Management Science, 57(1), 1-.‐‑20.

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2009. Supply Chain Security Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers.

CORE1066

Additional keywords: Ocean transportation, counter-terrorism, non-intrusive inspection

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Zambia and Zimbabwe’s single-stop solution to boosting intra-African trade, The Guardian 2012 (CORE2008)

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Summary

The Guardian news article summarizes benefits and challenges of the African first one-stop border post, located at the Chirundu border crossing across the Zambezi river between Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the border post, officials in both countries inspect only inbound traffic, for example Zambian authorities control only incoming traffic from Zimbabwe. Thanks to this one-stop arrangement, trucks and barges are obliged to stop only once and undergo only one set of border formalities. The one-stop system has accelerated border crossing times tremendously, from a two or three day wait down to a thirty-minute rest. Moreover, the faster border formalities have translated into higher traffic at the border post (from earlier 2000 to today’s 14000 trucks per month) and associated larger tax and duty revenues. But most importantly, the faster and simpler border formalities have facilitated trade of many small-scale merchants, who commonly trade small amounts of food, clothes, and other everyday commodities. Today, these small merchants face less delays, cumbersome formalities, and arbitrary duties and facilitation payments that dishonest customs officials may impose on their goods. This progress has brought many of the informal merchants, who used to smuggle their merchandise before, back into the sphere of the formal economy. Even so, the smuggling is still a major problem in Africa: the article suggests that there are smuggling routes so established that 30 tonne trucks use them to evade customs controls, and that this informal smuggling economy accounts for a staggering one-third of the African gross domestic product (GDP). The article implies that the share of the informal economy could be further reduced through consolidation of African trade blocks (there are several), harmonization and simplification of border formalities, and enhanced border agency cooperation. The news report is available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/may/29/zambia-zimbabwe-intra-african-trade

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

This Guardian article showcases a great example of successful border agency cooperation in Africa. The CORE WP12, the “demonstrator Schipol” focusing on shipping of fresh cut flowers from Kenya to the Netherlands, might choose to study this African one-stop border concept in more detail. Closer analysis may reveal key success factors and obstacles that characterize the border agency cooperation in Africa. Also CORE’s WP19, that produces material for training and education, may use this African one-stop border as an illustrative example of border agency cooperation in developing countries. The CORE’s risk and IT clusters might need to explore this case in more detail to understand technical aspects of this one-stop border post concept.

Reference

The Guardian, Zambia and Zimbabwe’s single-stop solution to boosting intra-African trade, the Guardian, 29. May, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/may/29/zambia-zimbabwe-intra-african-trade

CORE2008

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Review on“Contributing to shipping container security: can passive sensors bring a solution?” G. Janssens-Maenhout a, F. De Roob, W. Janssens, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 2009 (CORE1096)

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Summary: Illicit trafficking of fissionable material in container cargoes is recognized as a potential weakness in Nuclear Security. Triggered by the attacks of 11 September 2001, measures were undertaken to enhance maritime security in extension to the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention and in line with the US Container Security Initiatives. Effective detection techniques are needed that allow the inspector to intercept illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons components or components of other nuclear explosive devices. Report abstract is available at (one can ask for the full report e.g. vie ResearchGate): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/38053693_Contributing_to_shipping_container_security_can_passive_sensors_bring_a_solution

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Full review: Many security measures focus on active interrogation of the container content by X-ray scan, which might be extended with the newly developed tagged neutron inspection system. Both active interrogation techniques can, with the current huge volume of container traffic, only be applied to a limited number of selected containers. The question arises whether a passive detection technique can offer an alternative solution.

This study investigates if containers equipped with a small passive detector will register during transport the neutron irradiation by fissionable material such as plutonium in a measurable way. In practice, 4/5 of the containers are about 1/8 filled with hydrogenous material and undergo a typical 2 months route. For this reference case, it was found that the most compatible passive detector would be an activation foil of iridium. Monte-Carlo simulations showed that for the reference case the activity of a 250 μm thin foil with 6 cm2 cross-section would register 1.2 Bq when it is irradiated by a significant quantity of Reactor-Grade PuO2. However this activity drops with almost two orders of magnitude for other fillings and other isotopic compositions and forms of the Pu-source. The procedure of selecting the target material for Pu detection is detailed with the theoretical methods, in order to be useful for other applications. Moreover the value of such additional passive sensors for securing maritime container transport is situated within the global framework of the First, Second and Third Line of Defense against illicit trafficking.

Full citation:   G. Janssens-Maenhout a, F. De Roob, W. Janssens (2009). Contributing to shipping container security: can passive sensors bring a solution?” Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 101(2):95-105 · OCTOBER 2009.

Keywords: Nuclear illicit trafficking, Maritime container transport, Passive detection technique

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CORE Information Observatory

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cbra_blog_post_040116Please visit FP7-CORE Information Observatory . If you find it useful for your work, please consider registering to become a regular CORE Observatory user and to receive the CBRA Monthly Newsletter!

On behalf of the whole CBRA-team – Sangeeta, Susana, Susan, Phan Hien, Toni, Vladlen, Duayner, Perttu, Matti, Ari-Pekka, Ninoslav, Peter, Andrew, Harri x 2, and David x 2 (https://www.cross-border.org/team/ ) – I would like to wish you the best of success for the year 2016, in your professional as well as private life. In the context of global supply chains, we are ready to work with you towards faster and more predictable global logistics, naturally combined with low crime rates and with high compliance rates. One great tool to support such “common industry-government-academia global supply chain mission” is our new media platform – the recently launched FP7-CORE Information Observatory, which you can find at: https://www.cross-border.org/core-observatory/core-observatory-full-list/

CORE Observatory gives you 10-20 regular reviews and updates per month on supply chain security and trade facilitation policies, regulations, standards, good practices, roadmaps, research papers etc. – for the benefit of FP7-CORE partners, and beyond. Our primary focus is currently on European Union and its main trading partners – global expansion is possible later, depending on user needs and priorities. Each CORE Observatory entry has a title and a summary, visible to every user. At the end of the summary we provide a URL for the source document, whenever an electronic version is available in public domain. Starting 1 January 2016, the title and summary are also translated to Spanish. New languages (e.g. French, Arabic or Russian) may be offered later in 2016 depending on user preferences. The full review text is available only for the registered users, who will also receive the CBRA Monthly Newsletter, tailored to their personal information needs and interests. The CORE Observatory entries are listed in chronological order, the latest entry appearing on the top of the list. Any user – registered or not – can search CORE Observatory entries either via pre-defined keywords and tags (most common ones listed on the right side of the web page), or via free text search.

Again, Happy New Year 2016 everyone – and looking forward to having many new visitors at the FP7-CORE Information Observatory!

Yours, Juha

IT-enabled Resilient, Seamless and Secure Global Supply Chains: Introduction, Overview and Research Topics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, by Klievink, B., Zomer, G., 2015 (CORE2003)

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Summary: How does IT innovation contribute towards development of secure, resilient and integrated international supply chains? This is the question that Bram and Zomer seek to address by examining research agendas of a set of past and present European supply chain projects. In their research paper, these authors identify three main areas of innovation – technology, supply chain risk concepts and collaboration and supervision concepts – that lead the way towards higher uptake of new IT technologies and services in the global supply chains. The authors argue that developers of modern IT-enabled supply chains should pay more regard on non-technical challenges that often hinder adoption of modern IT solutions. The study also introduces and discusses five research papers that will be presented at the fourth Workshop on IT-enabled Resilient, Seamless and Secure Global Supply Chains, WITNESS 2015. The full paper will be available in public domain by fall 2016.

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Full review: The paper provides a comprehensive outlook on innovation agendas that present EU 7th framework supply chain projects follow. The study summarises CORE’s innovation goals and clarifies definitions and purposes of CORE key concepts such as the system-based supervision, supply chain resiliency and advanced data capture and sharing mechanisms. Therefore, the paper strengthens the conceptual basis of the CORE’s IT and risk management clusters. The CORE demonstrations will benefit from the paper indirectly if the IT and risk clusters refine the paper’s ideas and findings into applicable concepts that could be implemented in the demonstrations. The paper highlights three main areas of innovation that will likely improve security, resiliency and efficiency of the global supply in the future:

Technological innovation – The technological innovation focuses largely on IT-enabled capture and sharing of data among operators who are involved in end-to-end supply chains. Timely sharing of relevant and quality data is believed to support secure and efficient supply chain management because such data helps supply chain actors to detect faster logistics contingencies and disruptions and react to them. The higher data availability also supports use of modern sensor, track & trace and cargo screening technologies. For example, better information about cargo flows allow customs administrations to focus their screening activities on high-risk cargo.

Risk concepts – The data availability leads to higher visibility over the supply chain and empowers supply chain actors to regain control over cargo. The increased control helps the supply chain actors to detect faster to operational contingencies and disruptions.

Collaboration and supervision models – Risk-based approach to customs inspections is a departure from the 100% screening philosophy, under which every single shipment faces inspection. The modern risk-based approach disrupts less cross-border trade and commerce than the 100% screening because customs (and other border control agencies) select only a percentage of shipments, those that represent the highest risk, to inspection. Another new concept is system-based supervision, an approach that seeks to assess traders’ internal controls of customs compliance rather than conducting transaction-driven

Reference: Klievink, B., Zomer, G., 2015. IT-enabled Resilient, Seamless and Secure Global Supply Chains: Introduction, Overview and Research Topics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 443-453)

CORE2003

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