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Summary: The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that more than 95% of commercial goods in the Mesoamerican region are transported overland using the Pacific Corridor. This traffic represents approximately 6 billion USD worth of goods on a highway which runs from Puebla, Mexico to Panama and crosses six national borders. The problem with the Pacific Corridor is with unreliable, inefficient and substandard infrastructure. In 2008, to upgrade the inadequate infrastructure, the IDB launched a ambitious project called International Goods in Transit. According to the report, the results of the project were outstanding: average time to cross a border was reduced from 62 minutes to eight. The project also succeeded to reduce the number of documents that traders needed to submit to border control agencies. The two reviewed files are available for download at: Interoperability at the Border: Coordinated Border Management Best Practices & Case Studies and Automating the Control of Goods in International Transit: Implementing the TIM in Central America.
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Full review: The solution, that the International Goods in Transit project produced, is basically an electronic system for managing and controlling the movement of goods in transit. The system builds on three main pillars that unlock better services at border crossing:
Important lessons learned from the project include the following:
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Summary: An Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy was written in Croatia in accordance with the guidelines of the European Union and in collaboration with international experts. This strategy and its implementation action plan was adopted by the Croatian government on the 21 April 2005. The reviewed document is available for download at: Strategy for Integrated Border Management (Croatia).
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Full review: The main objective of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy is to provide effective support for economic development of the country and to raise the standard of living of citizens. The strategy also seeks to protect life and health of people and their property from cross-border crime. Integrated Border Management requires participation of many government agencies, including border police, customs, border veterinary service, border phytosanitary service, border sanitary service and the state inspectorate. Many times also state authorities in charge of culture, mining and radiation protection contribute to the IBM Strategy formulation and implementation.
As part of the Strategy, the Croatian government created a new interdepartmental working group. The primary objective was to facilitate cross-border traffic through reduction overlapping border control activities. The working group eliminated duplicate processes by aligning responsibilities of border control agencies and by exploiting the time of the relevant synergies between relevant governmental bodies. The working group launched initiatives in following areas:
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Summary: The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has a dual mandate (1) to facilitate cross-border movements of cargo and people and (2) to protect security and safety of the Canadian people. The agency seeks to provide integrated border services, by closely cooperating with other Canadian border control agencies as well as with foreign customs administrations. The reviewed document is available for download here: Customs Cooperation Case Study for Canada.
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Full review: Forms of cooperation depend on needs of the partner agencies, but the cooperation typically includes:
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Summary: This guidebook outlines the key elements and benefits of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program that is designed to secure global supply chains and to improve United States border security. Document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/C-TPAT%20Program%20Benefits%20Guide.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)
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Full review: C-TPAT partners receive a wide range of benefits listed below:
In addition, some benefits are associated with Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) when two customs authorities formally acknowledge the security requirements or standards of one program, as being equivalent to the other program. Some of the resulting benefits to the trade community are illustrated below:
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Summary: This addendum document lists cargo security best practices with focus on prevention of weapons of mass effect, terrorists, and/or contraband from infiltrating into the international supply chain. Each best practice is linked to a specific business entity, such as a Manufacturing Company, a Highway Carrier, an Importer or a Foreign Consolidator but these may apply to other business types as well. The document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ctpat_bpa_2009_0.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)
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Full review: The best practices are outlined as follows:
Risk assessment: Programs are in place to enable the identification of the most vulnerable supply chain areas, to grade suppliers supply chain security criteria. Specific processes have been developed to manage the supplier’s products, software and services and internal monitoring systems to enhance the safety and security procedures.
Business partner requirements: Several security measures have been taken by entities. These include conducting supply chain security audits to ensure compliance of non-C-TPAT business partners; carrying out security audits of a foreign manufacturer; making security self-assessments, conducting onsite inspections to ensure freight security; shipping cargo only through accredited ports and steamship lines; monitoring compliance of manufacturing facilities; screening procurements to identify ineligible status of suppliers, and performing audits of business partners.
Conveyance/Container/Trailer Security: Examples of such security practices are: integrating special security features in the GPS (global positioning system); using laser beams to protect trailers; using colour codes for matching consignments; installing infrared sensors in docks to prevent unauthorized access; using special codes to identify correct shipments; documenting all seal changes for shipments in transit; ensuring delivery by authorized Company drivers; sealing containers; operating through C-TPAT carriers; using only “seaworthy” containers; installing in-transit temperature data sensors to ensure product quality; enclosing container storage area; conducting non-intrusive inspection prior to loading a vessel; establishing specific inspection points; using multiple security devices on each container; using automated container yards; instructing foreign suppliers to provide inspection checklists; using dock locking arms for container storage; installing motion sensors in a trailer; operating through contracted highway carriers and security services; documenting a seal destruction policy, and so forth.
Physical Access Controls: Some practices by Importers include establishing multiple security stations within the building; using metal detectors for employees; installing an electronic swipe card/ lock box systems for access control for sensitive documents; conducting electronic scanning of visitors’ drivers licenses; utilizing a third-party software system to manage key inventory; and providing panic buttons for company employees.
Physical Security: Several innovative solutions have been designed to ensure physical security, such as electronically closing gates and activating tire puncturing devices to prevent vehicle exits; using an electronic security information reporting system, installing invisible electronic fences; installing laser sensors; setting up optical light beams to detect intruders; fitting double locks on doors; Installing infrared sensors on fences; using body alarm functions for emergencies; appointing patrolling guards, using multiple glass meeting rooms; using multiple interior infrared security alarm beams to detect unauthorized access; and installing security guard view towers.
Personnel Security: An Importer requires business partners to provide a monthly master list of employees and immediately notify when their employees are hired or terminated, in order to ensure that only authorized business partner’s employees enter the manufacturing facilities.
Security Training/Threat Awareness/Outreach: Business entities have invested in a wide range of training programs. One such initiative is the four-tier C-TPAT training targeted for management and supervisors, shipping and receiving personnel, internal personnel dealing with contractors and hourly staff. Other businesses use different approaches, like establishing an online training portal;; offering general security training and of site-specific training for security guards; issuing security advisories; making regular security awareness assessments; establishing a situation matrix chart to address possible incidents; establishing a direct communication channel between the president of the company and employees; putting in place a toll free hotline for company personnel; conducting security drills and exercises; establishing a web-based security awareness training; documenting security incidents in a central database; and establishing a global communication system to contact all employees and contractors remotely.
Procedural Security: Instances of this type of security measures include a bio-thermal intrusion alarm system; a global SAP network to generate all written orders for import and export; automatic screening procedures of purchase orders for restricted parties; lock boxes for sensitive documentation; an automated loading module called the Automatic Truck Loading System (ATLS); a container seal number as the shipment tracking (invoice/bill of lading) number, and so forth.
Information Technology (IT) Security: Such security practices include a biometric fingerprint door lock; a remote data backup center; a retina scanning system for access to the computer system; requiring supervisory approval to copy data; use of electronic password protected purchase orders; establishing a daily “e-test” for employees to access computers, and so forth.
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Summary: The GAO report discusses the progress the Customs and Border Protection (CPB), a component agency of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made since 2015 with its flagship business-private supply chain security program Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The report focuses on three main areas of the C-TPAT’s management and governance: (1) awarding benefits for the C-TPAT compliant companies, (2) validating the member companies’ security compliance and (3) addressing CBP’s staffing challenges that the increasing popularity of the C-TPAT program brings. The report recommends CPB to improve its C-TPAT validation processes and instruments and to establish performance criteria for assessing the program’s impact on supply chain security and trade facilitation. The C-TPAT program and this GAO report contain useful information for the CORE’s demonstrations that import goods into the US. Also the CORE’s risk cluster can learn about opportunities and challenges a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security entails. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/274773.pdf.
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Full review: This report contains information that is particularly useful for two CORE demonstrators that cover US imports. The first WP9 demonstration is about shipping automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven. In this demo, the General Motors (GM) is the importer. Because GM holds a C-TPAT certificate, most of the information this report offers about the status and challenges of the C-TPAT program must be of interest for the company and for its CORE demonstration. The same applies to the WP14 demonstration “FALACUS” that is about importing ceramic tiles from Italy to the US via the Port of La Spezia. The demonstration has to deal with the C-TPAT program, and therefore the demo partners’ might benefit from studying this GAO report. In addition to the demonstrations, this report might support the work of the CORE’s risk cluster because the document discusses in detail challenges and possibilities of a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security program, which builds on business-government collaboration.
Cross-references:
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation’s Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Additional keywords: Border security, customs-trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT), supply chain security, counter-terrorism
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Summary: This report reviews the progress that the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) – a program for screening US-bound high-risk shipping containers in foreign ports with X-ray and radiation detection solutions – since the latest 2005 GAO review. The report discusses how the CBP’s CSI efforts have (1) contributed to the long-term, strategic planning on the US supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI activities worldwide and (3) established means to evaluate performance of the CSI activities. The report recommends CBP to develop its data collection practices that are related to the CSI team performance and the host government’s inspections of the US-bound containers. This report provides relevant information for CORE demonstrations that deal with US-bound maritime logistics and commerce. Also the risk cluster might benefit from the descriptions of the US risk-based supply chain security scheme – Automated Targeting System (AST), 24-hour rule and the importer security filing 10+2 – that the report elaborates in detail. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08187.pdf.
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Full review: This GAO report elaborates the status and challenges of the US Container Security Initiative, but it also provides a comprehensive outlook on the US maritime supply chain security. This information is likely to be relevant for the CORE’s demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that deal with US-bound container traffic. The report is a good reference document for those CORE work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain and that are producing relevant training material on supply chain security. The CORE’s risk and IT clusters benefit from the information the report offers on risk-based security solutions that use advance cargo information to calculate risk scores for US-bound shipments by the aid of automatic risk assessment algorithms.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Container Security Initiative (CSI), counter-terrorism, homeland security, maritime supply chain security
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Summary: This report discusses how the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has (1) contributed to international supply chain security standards and (2) promoted mutual recognition in the customs security area and (3) how the agency expects to implement the 100% scanning requirement of the containerized US-bound maritime cargo. The report provides a detailed outlook on the US customs supply chain security scheme, and it highlights challenges and problems that the US government faces in promoting its supply chain security strategy internationally. The development and the implementation of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards, a suite of best practices on customs security, is a central theme throughout this GAO report. Because of its broad scope, the customs-related supply chain security, this document contains information that is likely to be useful for all CORE work packages, and especially for those that involve customs administrations. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279730.pdf.
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Full review: This document provides a detailed outlook on customs-centric supply chain security from the US government’s perspective. This unique view on the customs security is going to be useful for the CORE’s early work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain security. The information is also useful for the CORE demonstrations, in which customs administrations are involved. In particular, the demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that are about US-bound trade and logistics benefit from the detailed description of the customs security initiatives that the US government has introduced since the 9/11 tragedy.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, 100% scanning legislation, SAFE framework of standards, World Customs Organizations, Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) programs, Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism
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Summary: This GAO reports reviews the current state and future challenges of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) and the Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) efforts for enhanced security of foreign origin US-bound air cargo. The report also discusses how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reached out to the air cargo industry and foreign authorities in order to strengthen the international air cargo security. The GAO report recommends that the DHS would establish a risk-based air cargo security strategy, improve interagency communication nationally, to step up compliance monitoring for the air cargo industry’s stakeholders and to assess the foreign authorities’ intent and capabilities to meet US expectations on the air cargo security that is the foundation for mutual recognition and international harmonization of regulatory frameworks on the air cargo security. This GAO report is going to be useful for the CORE risk and education cluster as well as for all the demonstrations that involve shipping of air cargo by air. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590789.pdf.
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Full review: This GAO report provides a comprehensive picture of the air cargo security in the US, in a country that is no doubt the leading force in supply chain security in general, and in air cargo security in particular. All CORE work that is related to air transport might benefit from the insights and information this GAO report offers. The DHL demonstration, that involves transport of parts for military aircraft from the US to Spain, is the most obvious work detail in CORE that can directly benefit from this GAO report. In addition, the CORE’s risk cluster can use the description of the US approach to risk-based air cargo security as a starting point when designing the CORE-specific risk-based strategies. Given that the report is very detailed and informative, the CORE’s education cluster can benefit from the report’s analysis and learn from its conclusions.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Air cargo security, mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, screening, advance cargo information, and counterterrorism
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Summary: This GAO report reviews current activities the Department of Homeland Security, its component agencies and its stakeholders are doing to protect the US-centric seaborne trade and logistics from threats arising from small vessels. The report argues that the small vessels pose two “great threats” to the US maritime system: (1) explosive-laden small vessels can be used to ram into maritime structures or (2) the small vessels can be used as vehicles for transporting tools, weapons and tools for terrorism into the US. The GAO report highlights that DHS has its Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), but the organization is not monitoring the progress its component agencies are doing in meeting its objectives. This report focuses mainly on security initiatives that affect navigation of small vessels at the US territorial waters and ports and operations of the US coastal guards and customs. Although US-based maritime logistics operations benefit from the increased security the small vessel security initiatives likely bring, they can continue their business as usual. Therefore, the CORE’s early work packages can use this report’s information to define the context of the global supply chain security, the CORE demonstrations do not need much attention to the small vessel security initiatives or this GAO report. The report is available at: http://gao.gov/assets/660/658703.pdf
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Full review: This report provides interesting background information about the US government’s efforts to secure their domestic maritime logistics and transportation from the threat of small vessels that navigate largely anonymously and unregulated. The document might be useful for the CORE early work packages that describe the context of the global supply chain security. It is however unlikely that the demonstrators would need to pay much attention to the US small vessel security initiatives because the legal requirements of the initiatives do not affect the operations of large commercial vessels, which carry most of the world’s seaborne cargo. Of course the small vessel security initiatives also affect the way the component agencies of DHS operate, but because CORE does not involve these agencies directly, in CORE, there is no need to put much effort on understanding technicalities of the small vessel security initiatives. Finally, the CORE’s clusters on education and training as well as risk management might anyhow consider the information of this GAO report relevant.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Maritime security, small vessel security, terrorism, smuggling
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