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CORE-Observatory

Review on The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber Vulnerabilities, Policy Paper, July 2013, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence (CORE1095)

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Summary: In a 50-page policy paper by the Brookings Institute and authored by Commander Joseph Kramek of the U.S.Coast Guard and a Federal Executive Fellow at the institute, the current state of affairs related to vulnerabilities at our national seaports is discussed and options to shore up cyber security are presented. In the executive summary, Commander Kramek writes that today’s U.S. port facilities rely as much upon networked computer and control systems as they do upon stevedores to ensure the flow of maritime commerce that the economy, homeland, and national security depend upon. Yet, unlike other sectors of critical infrastructure, little attention has been paid to the networked systems that undergird port operations. Report is available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/07/02%20cyber%20port%20security%20kramek/03%20cyber%20port%20security%20kramek.pdf

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Full review: No cybersecurity standards have been promulgated for U.S. ports, nor has the U.S. Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, been granted cybersecurity authorities to regulate ports or other areas of maritime critical infrastructure. In the midst of this lacuna of authority is a sobering fact: according to the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) the next terrorist attack on U.S. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) is just as likely to be a cyber attack as a kinetic attack.

The potential consequences of even a minimal disruption of the flow of goods in U.S. ports would be high. The zero-inventory, just-in-time delivery system that sustains the flow of U.S. commerce would grind to a halt in a matter of days; shelves at grocery stores and gas tanks at service stations would run empty. In certain ports, a cyber disruption affecting energy supplies would likely send not just a ripple but a shockwave through the U.S. and even global economy.

Given the absence of standards and authorities, this paper explores the current state of cybersecurity awareness and culture in selected U.S. port facilities. The use of the post-9/11 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is also examined to see whether these monies are being used to fund cybersecurity projects.

Full citation:   The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber Vulnerabilities, Policy Paper, July 2013, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.

CORE1095

Keywords: Maritime Security, Cyber-security, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), Port facility, Coast Guard, Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).

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Trade and money laundering uncontained (the Economist, May 2014, CORE2006)

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Summary

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls.

The new methods for cross-border money laundering and tax evasion concern most CORE demonstrations, especially those involving international cargo movements. The emerging risk of trade-based money laundering calls for new and more effective enforcement of trade transactions. CORE is developing new solutions (e.g., data pipeline and system-based supervision) for capturing and sharing trade information across logistics operators and law enforcement agencies. The new solutions likely improve law enforcement’s capability to detect suspicious trade transactions that may have something to do with the trade-based money laundering. However, building such capability requires IT integration (e.g., interoperability), risk awareness and education and training. CORE consortium addresses these complementary activities in work carried out in risk, IT and educational clusters.

Reference

Trade and money laundering uncontained, the Economist, May 3rd 2014

CORE2006

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Punta Cana Resolution, Resolution of the Policy Commission of the World Customs Organization on the Role of Customs in the Security Context, WCO 2015 (CORE2004)

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The new Punta Cana Resolution sets guidelines for customs’ security roles in the combat against the new wave of terrorism, as manifested by recent attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, France and Mali. The resolution highlights that the customs authorities are typically the first line of defense against transnational crime, terrorism and extremism: the customs control cross-border movements of people, cargo, money and modes of transport and thus protect communities against terrorists that may exploit international supply chains to move materials, funds or operatives across borders. Building on the previous WCO instruments and agreements, especially on the WCO Security Programme, the Punta Cana resolution is the customs community’s action plan and renewed pledge of solidarity that provides a diplomatic backdrop for further counterterrorism activities. More information at: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2015/december/wco-issues-the-punta-cana-resolution.aspx

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Full review

The new Punta Cana Resolution sets guidelines for customs’ security roles in the combat against the new wave of terrorism, as manifested by recent attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, France and Mali. The resolution highlights that the customs authorities are typically the first line of defense against transnational crime, terrorism and extremism: the customs control cross-border movements of people, cargo, money and modes of transport and thus protect communities against terrorists that may exploit international supply chains to move materials, funds or operatives across borders. Building on the previous WCO instruments and agreements, especially on the WCO Security Programme, the Punta Cana resolution is the customs community’s action plan and renewed pledge of solidarity that provides a diplomatic backdrop for further counterterrorism activities.

The Punta Cana resolution encourages customs administrations worldwide to intensify collaboration within the customs community and with other border control agencies, both domestically and internationally. In case of missing or obsolete counter-terrorism strategy, the resolution urges customs to add new security roles in their mandates and activities. The Punta Cana document also recommends customs to pay close regard to the WCO’s previous agreements and instruments, such as the WCO Compliance and Enforcement Package, SAFE Framework of Standards and the WCO Security Programme. At more practical level, the resolution promotes the use of the full range of modern detection and investigation techniques, especially advance risk profiling on the basis of Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). The resolution also calls governments from around the world to provide necessary financial and human support so that their national customs administrations can contribute towards the goals of the WCO Security Programme.

The Punta Cana Resolution informs CORE consortium about the changing risk landscape where the threat of transnational terrorism is high again. The Resolution also reminds the CORE’s risk cluster of the three cornerstones of effective border security management: collaboration, technology and human resources. The Punta Cana document also gives an overlook on the customs’ security priorities over the following years. For example, the global customs community will likely invest a great deal of time and money to develop new risk profiling systems that tap into new data sources such as the Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). The same trend towards better risk profiling is likely to define also the future cargo security efforts at the borders.

Reference: WCO, 2015. Punta Cana Resolution, Resolution of the Policy Commission of the World Customs Organization on the Role of Customs in the Security Context.

CORE2004

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Review COM(2012) 793 Customs Risk Management and Security of the Supply Chain. (CORE1001)

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Summary: The purpose of this Communication is to: (i) review the implementation of customs risk management policy; (ii) put forward a strategic approach for the years ahead; (iii) make recommendations for action with a focus on efficient deployment of resources. Effective risk management of the movement of goods through the international supply chain is critical for security and safety and essential to facilitating legitimate trade and protecting the financial and economic interest of the EU and its Member States. There are critical challenges to be tackled and these cannot be fully resolved at Member State level but require EU action to complement and reinforce the efforts made at national level. Relevant for all of CORE, and specifically for Customs issues, e.g. WP14 Demonstrator FALACUS- FAstLAne through CUStoms. Coding in CORE e-library is CORE1001. Read more

ECSIT Report Summary (CORE3005)

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Summary: This reference project review focuses on German national funded research project ECSIT: Enhancing container security through non-contact inspection at the seaport terminal. The work done in ECSIT in non-intrusive inspection devices should be continued and refined in CORE ST2.3 Next Generation Scanning System. Furthermore the ECSIT AP7 Demonstration of the system might be used as a good working example for organization and operating plans towards the CORE ST 2.3.4 Field Demonstration. More support from ECSIT might be given to CORE T7.3 Scenario-based simulation and towards US-based Demo WPs for the broadly discussed and approved scenarios how to survey container with a multi-layered inspection approach in mind. The authors of the review are Marcus Engler and Matthias Dreyer, ISL. You can find the full review and original files in CORE e-library, with the coding CORE3005. More information on the project at: https://www.isl.org/en/projects/ecsit
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Review on FP7-project IMCOSEC (CORE3001)

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Summary: This is review on reference projects / specifying reusable outputs, on FP7-project IMCOSEC. The research in IMCOSEC (Integrated approach to improve the supply chain for container transport and integrated security simultaneously) was on following two conflicting trends in years before the project started: the elimination of trade barriers to ensure free trade, and increasing security demands to counter the threat of terrorism mainly. The author of the review is Marcus Engler, ISL. The original document can be found in CORE e-library coded as CORE3001. More information on the project at: http://cordis.europa.eu/search/result_en?q=IMCOSEC
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UNODC interview on the Container Control Program, CCP (CBRA blog on 18.1.2015)

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Ms. Nicole Maric and Mr. Ketil Ottersen of UNODC were kind enough to share their views on the Container Control Program – originally for the CBRA blog on supply chain security and trade facilitation. Regarding the CORE-project, this is useful information at least for the Risk-cluster, as well as for Demos in the maritime sector. Read more