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CORE-Observatory

Review of the TIR Convention and its accompanying Security and Risk Management electronic tools, 2013 (CORE1040)

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Summary: The Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention, 1975) constitutes the international legal framework for the TIR system. TIR is the only universal Customs transit system, today operational in 58 countries, that allows the goods to transit from a country of origin to a country of destination in sealed load compartments with Customs control recognition along the supply chain. This minimizes administrative and financial burdens, while Customs duties and taxes that may become due are covered by an international guarantee (covering more than USD 1 billion worth of international trade every day). In order to ensure the security of the TIR System, electronic controls run in parallel with the security elements already specified in the TIR Convention. TIR handbook can be found at: http://www.unece.org

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Full review: The TIR system is an international Customs transit system for goods. ‘TIR’ stands for Transports Internationaux Routiers (International Road Transport) and is an international harmonized system of Customs control that facilitates trade and transport whilst effectively protecting the revenue of each Country through which goods are carried. It is based on six essential principles and an electronic security and risk management control system composed of four tools:

  • Secure vehicles or containers: Goods are carried in sealed vehicles or containers which are approved for use by Customs and re-approved every two years.
  • International chain of guarantee: Duties and taxes due in case of irregularity are secured by an international guarantee chain throughout the journey.
  • TIR Carnet: The goods are accompanied by the TIR Carnet: a harmonized control document accepted by the Customs authorities of the countries of departure, transit and destination.
  • Mutual recognition of Customs controls: Control measures taken in the country of departure are accepted by countries of transit and destination.
  • Controlled access: Access to the TIR system for national issuing and guaranteeing Associations is given by the competent national authorities, and for transport operators, by the national Customs authorities and the national Association.
  • SafeTIR: An electronic control system for TIR Carnets that provides traceability and risk management, as described in Annex 10 to the TIR Convention.

Real-Time SafeTIR (RTS) allows customs officers to enhance their risk management procedures and comprises following three modules:

  • SafeTIR data transmission module: Once a TIR operation is terminated, RTS automatically sends a SafeTIR message to the IRU.
  • TCHQ: TIR Carnet Query Module allows any customs office to obtain immediate information on the status of the Carnet for the prompt detection of any possible irregularities.
  • SafeTIR Reconciliation Automation module: automates the SafeTIR data reconciliation procedure.

TIR Customs Portal is an online service developed by the IRU, which allows customs officers to:

  • obtain immediate information on the status of the TIR Carnet for the prompt detection of any possible irregularities; and
  • transmit SafeTIR data on the termination of the TIR operation.

ASKTIRweb makes it easier for TIR associations to manage the entire life-cycle of the TIR Carnets from the time of order and delivery from IRU until their return to the IRU and the subsequent administrative procedures such as claims and SafeTIR. ASKTIRweb is a mandatory TIR Carnet management system for all new TIR associations.

The TIR-EPD application is intended for submission of advance information on transported goods to Customs Authorities. Fully compliant with WCO SAFE Framework of Standards and with the national regulations of connected countries, TIR-EPD enables Customs Authorities to perform advance risk analysis. TIR Carnet Holders can send advance information free-of-charge simultaneously to the Customs Authorities of the countries according to their itineraries.

In order to ensure the security of the TIR System, electronic controls run in parallel with the security elements already specified in the TIR Convention.

The perceived strengths of the TIR-system include: Access to 58 TIR operational countries; Management of a low cost, high value guarantee; Intermodality; Security in the supply chain; Reduced delays and costs for the international transit of goods; and Trade facilitation – goods move across international borders with minimum interference. Future opportunities include: Increased trust with national Customs; Encouragement of international trade; and Economic benefits for supply chain actors and nations.

Detailed analysis and relevance for CORE:

Research and analysis: The TIR system is based on proven business-to-governments solutions and both CORE and the TIR system could benefit from an investigation and evaluation of the legal, technical and operational feasibility as well as the business benefits of integrating TIR data to the CORE ecosystem and CORE concepts and solutions such as “trusted trade lane”, “data pipeline”, “piggy-backing” for customs and “dashboards”.

Demonstrators: The use of TIR and its security and risk management electronic tools in the framework of CORE demonstrators can have four different types of advantages which meet CORE’s overarching objectives to optimize the security of global supply chain whilst maintaining or improving business performance:

  • Compliance with customs requirements: customs duties attached to the goods guaranteed by the TIR guarantee chain.
  • Security of exchanges: transmission of safety and security data, in accordance with e.g. EU Customs legislation, to national customs before the arrival of the goods at borders.
  • Facilitation of international trade: mutual recognition of customs controls for all TIR countries and reduction of customs formalities at borders.
  • Visibility of data: use of TIR security and risk management electronic tools to check the status of TIR operations in real-time.

CORE Impact anticipation: CORE can have an important impact on the TIR system by reinforcing its place as a global multimodal logistics and trade solution. The investigation and evaluation of the legal, technical and operational feasibility as well as the business benefits of using the existing features of the TIR system within the CORE ecosystem and opening cargo-related datasets can contribute to improving freight and logistics services provision and operations by shippers, LSPs, transport operators, ports and customs authorities. The efficiency and security upgrades will come by significantly reducing waiting times and administrative burden at borders and at the same time providing a more cost efficient way of improved supply chain visibility and traceability of cargo to the benefit of all private and public stakeholders.

Cross-references:

Application of the TIR Convention in the EU: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 and Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council applicable as of 1 May 2016.

Youtube video on TIR: https://www.youtube.com

 

CORE1040

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Governmental actors in supply chains & Governmental procedures, compliance and risk management – CASSANDRA Compendium Chapters 4 & 7, 2012 (CORE2007c)

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Summary: The fourth and seventh chapters of the CASSANDRA compendium elaborate on the roles of government agencies in international logistics and supply chain security (SCS). A broad range of government actors – customs, police agencies, border guards and many others – play a crucial role in enforcing and facilitating cross-border traffic through the global supply chains. These government agencies are critical stakeholders to be involved in the development, design and implementation of the two central CASSANRA concepts: the end-to-end data pipeline and the risk-based approach to cargo inspections and company audits. The CASSANDRA compendium highlights that there are important differences in the national laws and regulations, even within the European Union, that complicate international government collaboration. The differences in the legal framework and organisational cultures must be taken into account when designing new SCS solutions in the CASSANDRA and other projects. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download: www.cassandra-project.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: The CASSANDRA compendium describes how the role of government agencies in the cross-border supply chain operations is changing. The trading community and high-level policy-makers are strongly advocating trade facilitation, to make international commerce faster, more cost-efficient and less cumbersome. To address the demand for trade facilitation, many border control agencies are adopting risk-based approaches for controlling cross-border trade and travel. They exploit information increasingly to identify and target high-risk cross-border movements while facilitating low-risk traffic. To further lowering administrative hurdles to the cross-border trade, many government agencies are eliminating duplicative and redundant reporting requirements and building modern ICT systems to enable fast and reliable digital exchange of data and information.

Many law enforcement agencies are also facing budget cuts and increasing work loads, which forces them to look for new ways to increase productivity. Increased collaboration among border control agencies has been proposed as a solution for boosting productivity. The efforts towards further coordinated border management (CBM) are clearly manifested as joint-border control posts, regional single window systems (an online interface enabling trading companies, customs and other border control agencies to exchange trade-related information) and mutual recognition agreements (MRA) that harmonize customs and security related regulatory requirements across jurisdictions.

Reference: Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapters 4 & 7

 

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A Decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight, 2015 (CORE1113)

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Summary: The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent government watchdog organization that has been publishing many reports on the US government’s supply chain security initiatives over the past ten years. This article reviews 25 most relevant GAO’s reports that discuss strengths, weaknesses and future challenges of the US policies and regulations on supply chain security. The review findings reveal interesting facts about similarities and differences of the US and the EU approaches to supply chain security. This comparison opens new venues for further Transatlantic benchmarking as well as harmonisation and mutual recognition of supply chain security programs. This review was conducted as part of European FP7-Project CORE.  The reviewed document is available for download here: https://hicl.org. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review: The GAO reports suggest that the US administration has been struggling with effective performance monitoring and auditing of its supply chain security initiatives. The reports indicate that there is some confusion about costs of security initiatives for the government and for the business community. There is also a lack of common understanding about the actual benefits of many of these programs. The GAO reports also urge US government officials to adopt risk-based approach to supply chain security, for example to use information and intelligence to assess risk levels of specific shipments, people, trading companies, and other entities, and then employ security solutions that are commensurate to the risk level. The GAO reports also emphasize the importance of involving the industry in the process of defining new policies and regulations.

Altogether, the review team found that the GAO documents are not only highly relevant for SCS management and governance but also of high quality. The study concludes that it might be useful for the EU to establish a quality-assurance organization similar to the US GAO. This new EU body would oversee spending of the EU and its member states on supply chain security programs and projects and this way improve efficiency of such investments.

Reference: Männistö, T., and Hintsa J., (2015), “A Decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight,” Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference in Logistics (HICL), September 24-25, 2015, Hamburg

 

CORE1113

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Collaborative Border Management in Thailand and Neighbouring Countries: Needs, Challenges and Issues, June 2013 (CORE2014)

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Summary: Thailand is interested in coordinated border management conceptualization and implementation like many other countries. There are, however, some special challenges that Thailand faces when the country tries to strengthen cooperation with its neighbouring countries. The reviewed document is available for download at: Collaborative Border Management in Thailand and Neighboring Countries: Needs, Challenges and Issues.

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Full review: The report proposes a set of recommendations for implementing coordinated border management:

  1. A policy approach is needed, in which control and facilitation are not considered as mutually exclusive. Agencies from Thailand and neighbouring countries should define a common framework for the operations, with the awareness of the importance of costs and time reduction.
  2. There is no key host for negotiations to develop rules and regulations on border crossings with neighbouring countries. The agencies, which should be involved in the decision making and integration process, have not been identified yet. The implementation of CBM needs a clear definition about the role of the agencies involved.
  3. One topic being discussed on the implementation of CBM is the screening of people who cross the border. In this case, it is necessary to define a government policy to enhance the efficiency in border crossing.
  4. Information technology. There is a lack of necessary databases, materials and equipment to improve the efficiency of people screening. Definitely, IT is one of the most important topics to be improved, and it is necessary to define a single system for screening and monitoring border crossings.
  5. The border check points lack standardized systems for managing public utilities and suffer from congestion. There is a clear need for a government policy that would standardize the border activities and improve border infrastructure.

CORE2014

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Transit electronic platform in Central America, December 2010 (CORE2013a and 2013b)

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Summary: The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that more than 95% of commercial goods in the Mesoamerican region are transported overland using the Pacific Corridor. This traffic represents approximately 6 billion USD worth of goods on a highway which runs from Puebla, Mexico to Panama and crosses six national borders. The problem with the Pacific Corridor is with unreliable, inefficient and substandard infrastructure. In 2008, to upgrade the inadequate infrastructure, the IDB launched a ambitious project called International Goods in Transit. According to the report, the results of the project were outstanding: average time to cross a border was reduced from 62 minutes to eight. The project also succeeded to reduce the number of documents that traders needed to submit to border control agencies.  The two reviewed files are available for download at: Interoperability at the Border: Coordinated Border Management Best Practices & Case Studies and Automating the Control of Goods in International Transit: Implementing the TIM in Central America.

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Full review: The solution, that the International Goods in Transit project produced, is basically an electronic system for managing and controlling the movement of goods in transit. The system builds on three main pillars that unlock better services at border crossing:

  1. Process reengineering: the system harmonizes multiple paper-based declarations into an electronic document. This digital file stores all data that customs, migration, and phytosanitary agencies need.
  2. Information technology: the project created a new intranet system that features state- of-the-art risk analysis and cargo control systems.
  3. Cooperation: the project promoted cooperation within the country and between the different agencies operating at border crossings in the Mesoamerican Region.

Important lessons learned from the project include the following:

  • Political support for harmonizing regulations and processes is critical. Real and full commitment from the highest authorities in every participating country contributes to a cooperative environment based on mutual trust. In the case of this project, the IDB supported the decision of governments to include the project as one of the priorities highlighted in the Joint Declaration of Chiefs of State at the Presidential Summit of Tuxtla in 2008. The choice of the project coordinator is also critical for the success of the project. The coordinator must have good relationships with top government officials and have the support of the participating countries, and naturally of the IDB.
  • The project involved large number of stakeholders that have their unique characteristics and interests and operate within their legal remits. The IDB project was designed in a way that changes in national laws and regulations were not necessary.
  • All relevant agencies should participate in the coordination and harmonization process.
  • Information technology should be flexible and open to modifications.

CORE2013a

CORE2013b

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Integrated Border Management Strategy in Croatia, April 2005 (CORE2012)

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Summary: An Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy was written in Croatia in accordance with the guidelines of the European Union and in collaboration with international experts. This strategy and its implementation action plan was adopted by the Croatian government on the 21 April 2005. The reviewed document is available for download at: Strategy for Integrated Border Management (Croatia).

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Full review: The main objective of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy is to provide effective support for economic development of the country and to raise the standard of living of citizens. The strategy also seeks to protect life and health of people and their property from cross-border crime. Integrated Border Management requires participation of many government agencies, including border police, customs, border veterinary service, border phytosanitary service, border sanitary service and the state inspectorate. Many times also state authorities in charge of culture, mining and radiation protection contribute to the IBM Strategy formulation and implementation.

As part of the Strategy, the Croatian government created a new interdepartmental working group. The primary objective was to facilitate cross-border traffic through reduction overlapping border control activities. The working group eliminated duplicate processes by aligning responsibilities of border control agencies and by exploiting the time of the relevant synergies between relevant governmental bodies. The working group launched initiatives in following areas:

  • Delegation of power from one border control authority;
  • Information sharing (apart from Single Window);
  • Coordination of passenger and crew movements;
  • Joint controls Joint controls (including joint examinations); and
  • Coordination of law enforcement activities.

CORE2012

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Cooperation experiences of the Canada Border Services Agency, July 2012 (CORE2011)

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Summary: The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has a dual mandate (1) to facilitate cross-border movements of cargo and people and (2) to protect security and safety of the Canadian people. The agency seeks to provide integrated border services, by closely cooperating with other Canadian border control agencies as well as with foreign customs administrations. The reviewed document is available for download here: Customs Cooperation Case Study for Canada.

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Full review: Forms of cooperation depend on needs of the partner agencies, but the cooperation typically includes:

  1. Participation in and cooperation with international organizations: CBSA participates and cooperates in various committees and working groups, especially as part of the WCO, WTO and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
  1. Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (TACB): The CBSA is an active contributor to least-developed countries and global capacity building such as the Columbus Programme from the WCO. CBSA´s TACB focuses on two areas: (i) senior decision makers seeking to modernize their border administration and (ii) technical level design for operational and field personnel.
  1. CBSA Liaison Officers: Canada has over 60 liaison officers in more than 40 countries around the world, who are in charge of cooperation-related tasks including training transport personnel and combating fraud.
  1. CBSA Science and Engineering Directorate (Lab): Multilaterally, the Lab helps to disseminate information and intelligence on new trends in critical areas including narcotics. Bilaterally, CBSA Lab expertise and best practices have contributed to contraband detection, while supporting multiple countries in exploiting new instruments and technologies.
  1. Customs Cooperation with the United States: After the September 11, 2001 event, Canada and US increased security and compliance measures that obviously slowed down cross-border trade and travel. To reduce such negative impacts, both countries signed the Smart Border Declaration in 2001, and engaged in the Security and Prosperity Partnership in 2005. The CBSA and the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed the Framework for Co-operative Border Management, that aimed to enhance facilitation while maintaining security, and managing risk by dealing with threats as close to the point of origin as possible. Other US-Canadian cooperation forms have been developed with the objective of expanding and enhancing the benefits of trusted trader and traveller programs; coordinating investments in infrastructure and technology; simplifying business reporting requirements; enhancing screening of cargo and travellers at the perimeter to improve facilitation within the both countries; improving information sharing between both governments; and eliminating double inspections for air cargo and passenger baggage.

CORE2011

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO, September 2013 (CORE1007)

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Summary: This GAO report reviews maritime supply chain security programs that the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies – mainly the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard – have implemented since 2001. The report examines (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed risk levels of foreign ports and allocated security resources accordingly and (2) activities DHS has taken to monitor and improve efficiency and effectiveness of its security initiatives. Drawing on numerous interviews of key stakeholders and examination of key documents, the report recommends CBP to consider expansion of its Container Security Initiative (CSI) into new ports based on a periodic risk assessment of foreign ports. The report also highlights opportunities for further harmonization of the US maritime security initiatives with their foreign counterparts through mutual recognition agreements. Since this report contains fundamental information about the US maritime security programs, many CORE work packages are likely to benefit from the insights this report provides. Especially, the demonstrations, which involve ocean shipping, as well as the risk cluster, can use this information to support and guide their work. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657893.pdf (accessed 13.3.2016)

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Full review: The report provides a comprehensive outlook on the US maritime supply chain security initiatives that the DHS and its component agencies – mainly CBP and Coast Guard – have implemented since 2001. The report features some interesting figures that map the security initiatives on the global supply chain and that illustrate current solutions the US government employs to screen and examine US-bound shipping containers. The CORE’s demonstrations that involve maritime shipping are likely to benefit from the information this report provides. Also the risk cluster can use the information, and especially the mapping of the US maritime security initiatives over the global supply chain, to design risk-based, layered approaches to maritime supply chain security. The education cluster can also reuse the contents of this report to produce relevant and informative training material for various supply chain stakeholders that are involved in the seaborne trade and logistics.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act. GAO-12-1009T. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2012.
  • Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning. GAO-12-422T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012.
  • Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2011.
  • Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record. GAO-11-140R. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended. GAO-10-887. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010.

Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, Customs-trade partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI), maritime security, counter-terrorism

CORE1007

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, GAO, February 2012 (CORE1005)

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Summary: This GAO document analyses the progress and challenges of the US maritime supply chain security initiatives. The document puts a special emphasis on (1) the advance cargo information (ACI) schemes that enable the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to assess risk levels of US-bound cargo containers, (2) technologies to track, monitor and screen the shipping containers for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other contraband, and (3) to evaluate the progress towards the 100-percent scanning of the US-bound containerized cargo. As the overarching theme, the report addresses the current state of the partnerships the component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have been fostering with the private sector and foreign governments. Besides the demonstrations, which deal with the US-related maritime logistics, the CORE’s risk and educational clusters can benefit from the insight and information this report offers. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588253.pdf (accessed 12.3.2016)

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Full review: This report provides a general outlook on the US maritime supply chain security initiatives, but the contents of this document largely overlaps with other, reviewed GAO documents. However, this report offers some fresh perspectives on the US maritime security – particularly the best updates available on the advanced cargo information programs –, and therefore the CORE’s partners, which are engaged in demonstrations on maritime security, might benefit from studying this GAO document. Moreover, the CORE risk, educational and IT clusters might learn from this document how the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented its supply chain security philosophy in the maritime context. In particular, the risk cluster may use the description of the US risk-based approach to cargo inspections as a starting point for the related CORE solutions. The IT cluster may learn from the ways how the US government has organized its IT processes and infrastructure that support the maritime security initiatives. Finally, the educational cluster can use the material of this report to produce meaningful training material for CORE’s stakeholders that are engaged in maritime supply chain security.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended. GAO-10-887. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography System to Detect Nuclear Materials. GAO-10-1041T. Washington D.C.: September 15, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors. GAO-09-804T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2009.

Additional keywords: Importer Security Filing (10+2 rule), Advanced Targeting System (ATS), 24-hour rule, 100-percent scanning requirement

CORE1005

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TRANSPORTATION SECURITY – Action Needed to Strengthen TSA’s Security Threat Assessment Process, GAO, 2013 (CORE1015)

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Summary: The GAO report is about measuring the performance of the Adjudication Centre that is a department within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsible for administering background checks for people who need access to secure facilities unescorted. The centre issues the access credentials based on a through vetting of the applicant’s criminal history, immigration status, and connections to terrorist groups, among other checks. The report argues that the Adjunction Centre could improve the efficiency of the background checks – the individual security threat assessment – by improving its performance measurement system through better data and indicators. Although this GAO report focuses on a rather narrow topic, management of the background checking process, the report’s insights could benefit the CORE’s risk management cluster and those demonstrations that deal with access control matters. The report is available at: http://gao.gov/assets/660/656051.pdf

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Full review: This GAO document is closely related to the work the CORE’s risk cluster. The report describes problems the TSA’s Adjudication Centre faces when it manages the background checking process of the US-based transportation worker identification credentials (TWIC), hazardous materials endorsements (HME) and Aviation Worker (AV) authorization programs. Moreover, since access control is a central security solution in nearly all CORE demonstrators, the demonstrations might benefit from tips and guidance this report offers. At the final stages of the project, this GAO report might prove a useful document when the project consortium produces training materials on how to manage access control systems and how to administer background checks.

Cross-references:

  • Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could Advance DHS’s Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other Infrastructure. GAO-13-11. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.

CORE1015

Additional keywords: Terrorism, background checks

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Interviews

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