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Summary: The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has a dual mandate (1) to facilitate cross-border movements of cargo and people and (2) to protect security and safety of the Canadian people. The agency seeks to provide integrated border services, by closely cooperating with other Canadian border control agencies as well as with foreign customs administrations. The reviewed document is available for download here: Customs Cooperation Case Study for Canada.
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Full review: Forms of cooperation depend on needs of the partner agencies, but the cooperation typically includes:
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Summary: This GAO report reviews maritime supply chain security programs that the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies – mainly the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard – have implemented since 2001. The report examines (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed risk levels of foreign ports and allocated security resources accordingly and (2) activities DHS has taken to monitor and improve efficiency and effectiveness of its security initiatives. Drawing on numerous interviews of key stakeholders and examination of key documents, the report recommends CBP to consider expansion of its Container Security Initiative (CSI) into new ports based on a periodic risk assessment of foreign ports. The report also highlights opportunities for further harmonization of the US maritime security initiatives with their foreign counterparts through mutual recognition agreements. Since this report contains fundamental information about the US maritime security programs, many CORE work packages are likely to benefit from the insights this report provides. Especially, the demonstrations, which involve ocean shipping, as well as the risk cluster, can use this information to support and guide their work. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657893.pdf (accessed 13.3.2016)
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Full review: The report provides a comprehensive outlook on the US maritime supply chain security initiatives that the DHS and its component agencies – mainly CBP and Coast Guard – have implemented since 2001. The report features some interesting figures that map the security initiatives on the global supply chain and that illustrate current solutions the US government employs to screen and examine US-bound shipping containers. The CORE’s demonstrations that involve maritime shipping are likely to benefit from the information this report provides. Also the risk cluster can use the information, and especially the mapping of the US maritime security initiatives over the global supply chain, to design risk-based, layered approaches to maritime supply chain security. The education cluster can also reuse the contents of this report to produce relevant and informative training material for various supply chain stakeholders that are involved in the seaborne trade and logistics.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, Customs-trade partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI), maritime security, counter-terrorism
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Summary: This GAO document analyses the progress and challenges of the US maritime supply chain security initiatives. The document puts a special emphasis on (1) the advance cargo information (ACI) schemes that enable the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to assess risk levels of US-bound cargo containers, (2) technologies to track, monitor and screen the shipping containers for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other contraband, and (3) to evaluate the progress towards the 100-percent scanning of the US-bound containerized cargo. As the overarching theme, the report addresses the current state of the partnerships the component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have been fostering with the private sector and foreign governments. Besides the demonstrations, which deal with the US-related maritime logistics, the CORE’s risk and educational clusters can benefit from the insight and information this report offers. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588253.pdf (accessed 12.3.2016)
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Full review: This report provides a general outlook on the US maritime supply chain security initiatives, but the contents of this document largely overlaps with other, reviewed GAO documents. However, this report offers some fresh perspectives on the US maritime security – particularly the best updates available on the advanced cargo information programs –, and therefore the CORE’s partners, which are engaged in demonstrations on maritime security, might benefit from studying this GAO document. Moreover, the CORE risk, educational and IT clusters might learn from this document how the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented its supply chain security philosophy in the maritime context. In particular, the risk cluster may use the description of the US risk-based approach to cargo inspections as a starting point for the related CORE solutions. The IT cluster may learn from the ways how the US government has organized its IT processes and infrastructure that support the maritime security initiatives. Finally, the educational cluster can use the material of this report to produce meaningful training material for CORE’s stakeholders that are engaged in maritime supply chain security.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Importer Security Filing (10+2 rule), Advanced Targeting System (ATS), 24-hour rule, 100-percent scanning requirement
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Summary: The report discusses status and future challenges of the Transportation Security Administration’s three key security programs: The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. The two earlier programs are related to the passenger security, which not in the scope of the CORE project. The third TWIC program – an initiative for vetting backgrounds of maritime workers that require access to regulated maritime facilities and vessels – is the only program on supply chain security. The report recommends that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would improve its internal procedures (e.g., enrolment practices, background checking and quality control) and define and measure performance criteria for assessing the TWIC program’s efficiency and effectiveness. This GAO report discusses mainly passenger security programs that are not interesting for the CORE and for most of the project partners. However, learning about the TWIC program might be useful for at least those CORE demonstrations on maritime supply chain security. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589587.pdf (accessed 12.3.2016)
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Full review: This GAO report has only a limited use in the CORE project because of its emphasis on passenger security programs (the Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC) program is the only program discussed in the report that has something to do with supply chain security). The CORE’s maritime demonstrations may find it useful to learn about the US way for managing credentials and access to regulated maritime facilities and vessels. The CORE’s risk cluster might learn something about conducting risk-based background checks for logistics workers, and the CORE’s educational cluster might use the description of CWIT, that this report provides, to produce training material and guidebooks on how to implement and maintain access control schemes.
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Summary: This document contains two annexes. Annex 1 covers the Customs 2020 Work Programme for 2015. It describes the activities and the budget breakdown for the year 2015 for pursuing the objectives laid down in Regulation 1294/2013 that establishes an action programme for customs in the European Union between 2014 and 2020. Annex 2 covers Fiscalis 2020 Work Programme for 2015. It covers the action plans and the budget breakdown for 2015 in relation to Regulation 1286/2013 establishing an action programme to improve the operation of taxation systems in the European Union for the period 2014-2020. The activities and financial coverage are based on three main items-action grants, procurement and other actions. The document is available for download at: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_cooperation/fiscalis_programme/legal_texts_docs/awp_2015_en.pdf (accessed on 12.3.2016)
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Full review: The overall objective of the Customs 2020 programme is to facilitate the functioning and modernisation of the customs union in order to strengthen the internal market by means of cooperation between participating countries, their customs authorities and their officials. It is designed to support the shaping and implementation of the UCC (Union Customs Code).
The overarching objective of Fiscalis 2020 programme is to support the fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning and the implementation of Union law in the field of taxation. The Fiscalis 2020 programme is a tool, which supports and implements the overall tax policy at the European Union level.
In the Customs 2020 programme, action grants cover grants for joint actions, grant for expert team on new Import Control System (ICS) and grant for expert team on Automated Export System / New Computerised Transit System (AES/NCTS). The Joint Actions grants will fund activities related to the implementation of Union law and policy in the field of customs; improving the European Information Systems for customs, the adoption of best working practices, enhancing the expertise of customs officials, and improving cooperation between relevant organizations both on the EU and international levels. The grant for the expert teams on ICS and AES/NCTS will help achieve the objectives of the year. These objectives include the implementation of the UCC and the required Customs Information Systems in particular, and imposing a tight schedule in terms of IT systems implementation until 2020.
Under Fiscalis 2020 programme, the action grants only cover joint actions that will fund activities related to improving the European Information Systems for taxation, the administrative cooperation, the competence of tax officials, the implementation of Union law in the field of taxation, and for streamlining administrative procedures.
Procurement activities for both the programmes cover IT Capacity Building Actions and Joint and Competency Building Actions. The contracts for public procurement related to IT Capacity building concern the development, maintenance, operation, and quality control of Union components of the existing and new European Information Systems. Procurement activities related to Customs 2020 aim at interconnecting customs authorities, whereas as those associated with Fiscalis 2020 aim at interconnecting taxation administrations. The Joint and Competency Building procurement contracts concern the development, maintenance, support and dissemination of common customs (for Customs 2020) or taxation training (Fiscalis 2020); online collaboration services; staff performance building services; scientific studies, and communication support.
Other expenditures include the funding of external experts who may be invited to contribute to selected activities for achieving the overarching objectives of the two programmes.
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Summary: This guidebook outlines the key elements and benefits of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program that is designed to secure global supply chains and to improve United States border security. Document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/C-TPAT%20Program%20Benefits%20Guide.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)
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Full review: C-TPAT partners receive a wide range of benefits listed below:
In addition, some benefits are associated with Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) when two customs authorities formally acknowledge the security requirements or standards of one program, as being equivalent to the other program. Some of the resulting benefits to the trade community are illustrated below:
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Summary: This addendum document lists cargo security best practices with focus on prevention of weapons of mass effect, terrorists, and/or contraband from infiltrating into the international supply chain. Each best practice is linked to a specific business entity, such as a Manufacturing Company, a Highway Carrier, an Importer or a Foreign Consolidator but these may apply to other business types as well. The document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ctpat_bpa_2009_0.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)
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Full review: The best practices are outlined as follows:
Risk assessment: Programs are in place to enable the identification of the most vulnerable supply chain areas, to grade suppliers supply chain security criteria. Specific processes have been developed to manage the supplier’s products, software and services and internal monitoring systems to enhance the safety and security procedures.
Business partner requirements: Several security measures have been taken by entities. These include conducting supply chain security audits to ensure compliance of non-C-TPAT business partners; carrying out security audits of a foreign manufacturer; making security self-assessments, conducting onsite inspections to ensure freight security; shipping cargo only through accredited ports and steamship lines; monitoring compliance of manufacturing facilities; screening procurements to identify ineligible status of suppliers, and performing audits of business partners.
Conveyance/Container/Trailer Security: Examples of such security practices are: integrating special security features in the GPS (global positioning system); using laser beams to protect trailers; using colour codes for matching consignments; installing infrared sensors in docks to prevent unauthorized access; using special codes to identify correct shipments; documenting all seal changes for shipments in transit; ensuring delivery by authorized Company drivers; sealing containers; operating through C-TPAT carriers; using only “seaworthy” containers; installing in-transit temperature data sensors to ensure product quality; enclosing container storage area; conducting non-intrusive inspection prior to loading a vessel; establishing specific inspection points; using multiple security devices on each container; using automated container yards; instructing foreign suppliers to provide inspection checklists; using dock locking arms for container storage; installing motion sensors in a trailer; operating through contracted highway carriers and security services; documenting a seal destruction policy, and so forth.
Physical Access Controls: Some practices by Importers include establishing multiple security stations within the building; using metal detectors for employees; installing an electronic swipe card/ lock box systems for access control for sensitive documents; conducting electronic scanning of visitors’ drivers licenses; utilizing a third-party software system to manage key inventory; and providing panic buttons for company employees.
Physical Security: Several innovative solutions have been designed to ensure physical security, such as electronically closing gates and activating tire puncturing devices to prevent vehicle exits; using an electronic security information reporting system, installing invisible electronic fences; installing laser sensors; setting up optical light beams to detect intruders; fitting double locks on doors; Installing infrared sensors on fences; using body alarm functions for emergencies; appointing patrolling guards, using multiple glass meeting rooms; using multiple interior infrared security alarm beams to detect unauthorized access; and installing security guard view towers.
Personnel Security: An Importer requires business partners to provide a monthly master list of employees and immediately notify when their employees are hired or terminated, in order to ensure that only authorized business partner’s employees enter the manufacturing facilities.
Security Training/Threat Awareness/Outreach: Business entities have invested in a wide range of training programs. One such initiative is the four-tier C-TPAT training targeted for management and supervisors, shipping and receiving personnel, internal personnel dealing with contractors and hourly staff. Other businesses use different approaches, like establishing an online training portal;; offering general security training and of site-specific training for security guards; issuing security advisories; making regular security awareness assessments; establishing a situation matrix chart to address possible incidents; establishing a direct communication channel between the president of the company and employees; putting in place a toll free hotline for company personnel; conducting security drills and exercises; establishing a web-based security awareness training; documenting security incidents in a central database; and establishing a global communication system to contact all employees and contractors remotely.
Procedural Security: Instances of this type of security measures include a bio-thermal intrusion alarm system; a global SAP network to generate all written orders for import and export; automatic screening procedures of purchase orders for restricted parties; lock boxes for sensitive documentation; an automated loading module called the Automatic Truck Loading System (ATLS); a container seal number as the shipment tracking (invoice/bill of lading) number, and so forth.
Information Technology (IT) Security: Such security practices include a biometric fingerprint door lock; a remote data backup center; a retina scanning system for access to the computer system; requiring supervisory approval to copy data; use of electronic password protected purchase orders; establishing a daily “e-test” for employees to access computers, and so forth.
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Summary: The GAO report discusses the progress the Customs and Border Protection (CPB), a component agency of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made since 2015 with its flagship business-private supply chain security program Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The report focuses on three main areas of the C-TPAT’s management and governance: (1) awarding benefits for the C-TPAT compliant companies, (2) validating the member companies’ security compliance and (3) addressing CBP’s staffing challenges that the increasing popularity of the C-TPAT program brings. The report recommends CPB to improve its C-TPAT validation processes and instruments and to establish performance criteria for assessing the program’s impact on supply chain security and trade facilitation. The C-TPAT program and this GAO report contain useful information for the CORE’s demonstrations that import goods into the US. Also the CORE’s risk cluster can learn about opportunities and challenges a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security entails. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/274773.pdf.
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Full review: This report contains information that is particularly useful for two CORE demonstrators that cover US imports. The first WP9 demonstration is about shipping automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven. In this demo, the General Motors (GM) is the importer. Because GM holds a C-TPAT certificate, most of the information this report offers about the status and challenges of the C-TPAT program must be of interest for the company and for its CORE demonstration. The same applies to the WP14 demonstration “FALACUS” that is about importing ceramic tiles from Italy to the US via the Port of La Spezia. The demonstration has to deal with the C-TPAT program, and therefore the demo partners’ might benefit from studying this GAO report. In addition to the demonstrations, this report might support the work of the CORE’s risk cluster because the document discusses in detail challenges and possibilities of a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security program, which builds on business-government collaboration.
Cross-references:
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation’s Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Additional keywords: Border security, customs-trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT), supply chain security, counter-terrorism
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Summary: This report reviews the progress that the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) – a program for screening US-bound high-risk shipping containers in foreign ports with X-ray and radiation detection solutions – since the latest 2005 GAO review. The report discusses how the CBP’s CSI efforts have (1) contributed to the long-term, strategic planning on the US supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI activities worldwide and (3) established means to evaluate performance of the CSI activities. The report recommends CBP to develop its data collection practices that are related to the CSI team performance and the host government’s inspections of the US-bound containers. This report provides relevant information for CORE demonstrations that deal with US-bound maritime logistics and commerce. Also the risk cluster might benefit from the descriptions of the US risk-based supply chain security scheme – Automated Targeting System (AST), 24-hour rule and the importer security filing 10+2 – that the report elaborates in detail. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08187.pdf.
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Full review: This GAO report elaborates the status and challenges of the US Container Security Initiative, but it also provides a comprehensive outlook on the US maritime supply chain security. This information is likely to be relevant for the CORE’s demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that deal with US-bound container traffic. The report is a good reference document for those CORE work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain and that are producing relevant training material on supply chain security. The CORE’s risk and IT clusters benefit from the information the report offers on risk-based security solutions that use advance cargo information to calculate risk scores for US-bound shipments by the aid of automatic risk assessment algorithms.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Container Security Initiative (CSI), counter-terrorism, homeland security, maritime supply chain security
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Summary: This report discusses how the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has (1) contributed to international supply chain security standards and (2) promoted mutual recognition in the customs security area and (3) how the agency expects to implement the 100% scanning requirement of the containerized US-bound maritime cargo. The report provides a detailed outlook on the US customs supply chain security scheme, and it highlights challenges and problems that the US government faces in promoting its supply chain security strategy internationally. The development and the implementation of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards, a suite of best practices on customs security, is a central theme throughout this GAO report. Because of its broad scope, the customs-related supply chain security, this document contains information that is likely to be useful for all CORE work packages, and especially for those that involve customs administrations. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279730.pdf.
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Full review: This document provides a detailed outlook on customs-centric supply chain security from the US government’s perspective. This unique view on the customs security is going to be useful for the CORE’s early work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain security. The information is also useful for the CORE demonstrations, in which customs administrations are involved. In particular, the demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that are about US-bound trade and logistics benefit from the detailed description of the customs security initiatives that the US government has introduced since the 9/11 tragedy.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, 100% scanning legislation, SAFE framework of standards, World Customs Organizations, Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) programs, Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism
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Cross-border Research Association
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Email: cbra@cross-border.org