CORE-Observatory

Review on “MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION – DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity”, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, United States Government Accountability Office, June 2014 (CORE1098)

CORE1098-Summary: Actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and two of its component agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as other federal agencies, to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment have been limited. Report is available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663828.pdf

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Full review: While the Coast Guard initiated a number of activities and coordinating strategies to improve physical security in specific ports, it has not conducted a risk assessment that fully addresses cyber-related threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Coast Guard officials stated that they intend to conduct such an assessment in the future, but did not provide details to show how it would address cybersecurity. Until the Coast Guard completes a thorough assessment of cyber risks in the maritime environment, the ability of stakeholders to appropriately plan and allocate resources to protect ports and other maritime facilities will be limited.

Maritime security plans required by law and regulation generally did not identify or address potential cyber-related threats or vulnerabilities. This was because the guidance issued by Coast Guard for developing these plans did not require cyber elements to be addressed. Officials stated that guidance for the next set of updated plans, due for update in 2014, will include cybersecurity requirements. However, in the absence of a comprehensive risk assessment, the revised guidance may not adequately address cyber-related risks to the maritime environment.

The degree to which information-sharing mechanisms (e.g., councils) were active and shared cybersecurity-related information varied. Specifically, the Coast Guard established a government coordinating council to share information among government entities, but it is unclear to what extent this body has shared information related to cybersecurity. In addition, a sector coordinating council for sharing information among nonfederal stakeholders is no longer active, and the Coast Guard has not convinced stakeholders to reestablish it. Until the Coast Guard improves these mechanisms, maritime stakeholders in different locations are at greater risk of not being aware of, and thus not mitigating, cyber-based threats.

Under a program to provide security-related grants to ports, FEMA identified enhancing cybersecurity capabilities as a funding priority for the first time in fiscal year 2013 and has provided guidance for cybersecurity-related proposals. However, the agency has not consulted cybersecurity-related subject matter experts to inform the multi-level review of cyber-related proposals—partly because FEMA has downsized the expert panel that reviews grants. Also, because the Coast Guard has not assessed cyber-related risks in the maritime risk assessment, grant applicants and FEMA have not been able to use this information to inform funding proposals and decisions. As a result, FEMA is limited in its ability to ensure that the program is effectively addressing cyber-related risks in the maritime environment.

Why GAO Did This Study? U.S. maritime ports handle more than $1.3 trillion in cargo annually. The operations of these ports are supported by information and communication systems, which are susceptible to cyber-related threats. Failures in these systems could degrade or interrupt operations at ports, including the flow of commerce. Federal agencies—in particular DHS—and industry stakeholders have specific roles in protecting maritime facilities and ports from physical and cyber threats. GAO’s objective was to identify the extent to which DHS and other stakeholders have taken steps to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment. GAO examined relevant laws and regulations; analyzed federal cybersecurity-related policies and plans; observed operations at three U.S. ports selected based on being a high-risk port and a leader in calls by vessel type, e.g. container; and interviewed federal and nonfederal officials.

What GAO Recommends? GAO recommends that DHS direct the Coast Guard to (1) assess cyber-related risks, (2) use this assessment to inform maritime security guidance, and (3) determine whether the sector coordinating council should be reestablished. DHS should also direct FEMA to (1) develop procedures to consult DHS cybersecurity experts for assistance in reviewing grant proposals and (2) use the results of the cyber-risk assessment to inform its grant guidance. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

Full citation:  “MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION – DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity”, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, United States Government Accountability Office, June 2014.

CORE1098

Keywords: Maritime Security, Port Security, Cyber – Security, CBP U.S. – Customs and Border Protection, Coast Guard U.S., DHS-Department of Homeland Security, FEMA-Federal Emergency Management Agency, ISAC-information sharing and analysis center, IT-information technology, MTSA-Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, NIPP-National Infrastructure Protection Plan, AFE Port Act-Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, TSA-Transportation Security Administration

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Review on The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber Vulnerabilities, Policy Paper, July 2013, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence (CORE1095)

Summary: In a 50-page policy paper by the Brookings Institute and authored by Commander Joseph Kramek of the U.S.Coast Guard and a Federal Executive Fellow at the institute, the current state of affairs related to vulnerabilities at our national seaports is discussed and options to shore up cyber security are presented. In the executive summary, Commander Kramek writes that today’s U.S. port facilities rely as much upon networked computer and control systems as they do upon stevedores to ensure the flow of maritime commerce that the economy, homeland, and national security depend upon. Yet, unlike other sectors of critical infrastructure, little attention has been paid to the networked systems that undergird port operations. Report is available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/07/02%20cyber%20port%20security%20kramek/03%20cyber%20port%20security%20kramek.pdf

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Full review: No cybersecurity standards have been promulgated for U.S. ports, nor has the U.S. Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, been granted cybersecurity authorities to regulate ports or other areas of maritime critical infrastructure. In the midst of this lacuna of authority is a sobering fact: according to the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) the next terrorist attack on U.S. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) is just as likely to be a cyber attack as a kinetic attack.

The potential consequences of even a minimal disruption of the flow of goods in U.S. ports would be high. The zero-inventory, just-in-time delivery system that sustains the flow of U.S. commerce would grind to a halt in a matter of days; shelves at grocery stores and gas tanks at service stations would run empty. In certain ports, a cyber disruption affecting energy supplies would likely send not just a ripple but a shockwave through the U.S. and even global economy.

Given the absence of standards and authorities, this paper explores the current state of cybersecurity awareness and culture in selected U.S. port facilities. The use of the post-9/11 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is also examined to see whether these monies are being used to fund cybersecurity projects.

Full citation:   The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber Vulnerabilities, Policy Paper, July 2013, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.

CORE1095

Keywords: Maritime Security, Cyber-security, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), Port facility, Coast Guard, Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).

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Review of Electronic Customs Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014 REVISION (CORE1052)

Summary: The Electronic Customs Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) 2014 REVISION is a management and planning tool drawn up by the European Commission in partnership with Member States in accordance with Article 8(2) of the e-Customs decision. All the CORE demonstrators are affected by the MASP. Original review files are coded as CORE1052, in the e-library of the CORE project. Source file at: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/policy_issues/electronic_customs_initiative/electronic_customs_legislation/index_en.htm
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Review “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system” [COM (2011) 144 final] (CORE1029).

Summary: In this White Paper, the Commission sets out to remove major barriers and bottlenecks in many key areas across the fields of transport infrastructure and investment, innovation and the internal market. The aim is to create a Single European Transport Area with more competition and a fully integrated transport network which links the different modes and allows for a profound shift in transport patterns for passengers and freight. To this purpose, the roadmap puts forward 40 concrete initiatives for the next decade, explained in detail in the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the White Paper. It has some background relevance for CORE, as it proposes initiatives to build a competitive transport system that will preserve mobility, remove major barriers in key areas and fuel growth and employment. Original files are coded CORE1029, in the CORE e-library.
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Review COM(2014) 527 EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs risk management (CORE1028).

Summary: This Communication puts forward a strategy for improving customs risk management and supply chain security (‘the Strategy’) and a table of priority actions (‘the Action Plan’). Original files coded CORE1028, in the CORE e-library.
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Review COM(2012) 793 Customs Risk Management and Security of the Supply Chain. (CORE1001)

Summary: The purpose of this Communication is to: (i) review the implementation of customs risk management policy; (ii) put forward a strategic approach for the years ahead; (iii) make recommendations for action with a focus on efficient deployment of resources. Effective risk management of the movement of goods through the international supply chain is critical for security and safety and essential to facilitating legitimate trade and protecting the financial and economic interest of the EU and its Member States. There are critical challenges to be tackled and these cannot be fully resolved at Member State level but require EU action to complement and reinforce the efforts made at national level. Relevant for all of CORE, and specifically for Customs issues, e.g. WP14 Demonstrator FALACUS- FAstLAne through CUStoms. Coding in CORE e-library is CORE1001. Read more

Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots (Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE) Act of 2006, Section 231), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CORE1039)

Summary: The document reports the pilot of an integrated scanning system at three foreign ports during the six month pilot period beginning in October of 2007, which were directed by the US Congress to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), as necessary, and the private sector and host governments when possible. Full review report, and the original source file, can be found in CORE e-library with the code CORE1039. Source file at: http://155.14.72.204/security/documents/sfi_finalreport.pdf
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Consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions (CORE1025)

Summary: EU Sanctions are restrictive measures against third countries, individuals or entities that are used as a policy tool to support Common Foreign and Security Policy. Specific EU Sanctions are stipulated by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Especially, the sanctions are directed to prevent financing of terrorism and they set obligations for both the public and private sector. Full review and sources files are coded as CORE1025. Source file at: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list/index_en.htm
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Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, the UK (CORE1024)

Summary: Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 is available to General Public at the website managed by the national Archives on behalf of HM government. Relevant mainly for CORE WP19 on education and training. Full review and source files are coded as CORE1024. Source file at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/19/contents
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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, US (CORE1023)

Summary: FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.). The document underlines corruption as a facilitating element for other crimes such as human trafficking and smuggling. Relevant mainly for CORE WP19 on education and training. Full review and sources file are coded as CORE1023. Source file at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/fcpa-english.pdf
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