Rail - Cross-border Research Association

The first Annual SYNCHRO-NET meeting

July 9, 2016/0 Comments/in Air, Airport, All transport modes, Blog, Capacity building, CBRA, EU, FP7, Freight forwarder, Global, Inland waterway, IT, IT-cluster, Maritime, Multi-modal, Optimization, Perishable goods, Rail, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Road, Sea port, Time-critical goods, Tracking, Transport carrier, WP4, WP5, WP6, WP7 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

The SYNCHRO-NET project had its first annual project meeting in Barcelona in early June. I had a pleasure to take part in the three-day event and enjoy the welcoming atmosphere and sunny weather of the Catalonian capital.

For those who are not yet familiar with the project, SYNCHRO-NET is a three-and-half-year demonstration project on advanced logistics optimization. The project seeks to advance and promote new concepts of synchro-modality and slow steaming for more cost-efficient, less congested and greener intermodal supply chains. The project includes three demonstrations that test slow-steaming and synchro-modal solutions in real international logistics networks. The first demonstrator involves shipping of goods from the Far-East to the ports of Valencia, Algeciras and Barcelona, and subsequent movement by rail inland and final short truck movement. The second demonstrator focuses on regional logistics movements through the Port of Cork. The third demonstrator will address multimodal container movements in major European routes. The project is funded by the European Commission under the Horizon 2020 Programme.

During the two first days of the meeting, the Partner Forum discussed the SYNCHRO-NET work ahead: standardization, development of a tool for logistics optimization, real-world demonstrations, and exploitation and dissemination of the project’s results. The discussion produced some interesting findings and conclusions. The Partner Forum observed that, given the large number and variety of factors, the optimization of shipping and logistics in terms of cost (including CAPEX, crew cost, fuel), duration, environmental impact, reliability and various types of risks is nothing but an easy task. For example, weather, tide and state of the sea affect maritime logistics, its speed, reliability and cost-efficiency. There was also a great deal of discussion about the dimensions of risk in the meeting. The International Organization of Standardization (ISO) defines risk as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives.” In this light, the concept of risk in the SYNCHRO-NET context covers at least damage to cargo, lead time variability, variability of cost, and possibility of theft and piracy. The Forum concluded that cost-efficiency and quality of international logistics depend largely on real-time awareness and visibility over logistics operations: “the sooner you know, the lower the cost will be to solve the problem.”

The three days of SYNCHRO-NET meetings culminated in the International Logistics and Material Handling (SIL) conference, the primary annual industry fair and networking event for logistics professionals in Spain. In the conference, Mr. Santiago Blasco (DHL) introduced SYNCHRO-NET at the “Consumer & Goods” working session for a large audience. Later that day, a group of leading logistics experts from Spain and the rest of Europe debated on pressing topics at three SYNCHRO-NET roundtables. The roundtable sessions focused on the general theme “How to build win-win solutions synchro-modal logistics stakeholders.” Here are brief summaries of the roundtable sessions:

“Smart Steaming – how to build a win-win solution for all stakeholders.” The members of the roundtable raised concerns about organizational, technical and business challenges of future slow steaming. There are obvious draw-back in slow steaming such as longer lead times and lower capacity utilization. However, the panel concluded that smart rather than slow steaming is here to stay: “While maintaining high service level, we can make logistics more cost-efficient.”

”Effective management of synchro-modal logistics.” The panelists of the second session argued that the concept of synchro-modality is not yet very established in the logistics sector. Even so, the panel agreed that synchro-modality builds on real-time optimization, risk analysis and advanced, ITC-enabled logistics planning. Synchro-modality requires visibility over the supply chain, so that logistics planers react to contingencies and can make effective decisions in real time. The panel concluded that collaboration across supply chain operators – especially among shippers, carriers, freight forwarders – is the key to synchronized international logistics.

“Synchro-modal IT tools: innovation and value added to the logistics industry.” The third panel focused on the rather technical topic of leveraging cloud-based IT architecture for advanced logistics planning. The panelists saw a great potential in modern ICT solutions to enable synchro-modality, smart steaming and other ways for optimizing international freight transport. There still remain challenges for bridging a broad array of different computer systems for higher degree of logistics interconnectedness and interoperability.

The SYNCHRO-NET project has had a strong start, and the project progresses on the right track and at the full speed after one year of work. There is still much hard work to do over the next six months, for CBRA and other partners. In autumn, CBRA researchers will be focusing on reviewing policies, legislations, and standards that have an effect on synchro-modality and slow steaming. The CBRA team will also continue promoting the SYNCHRO-NET project and its findings at various events and publications. Stay with SYNCHRO-NET and visit the project website www.synchro-net.org.

CBRA Blog by Dr. Toni Männistö

Figure 1 Santiago Bosco presenting SYNCHRO-NET at the the International Logistics and Material Handling (SIL) conference

New survey on European postal security

June 15, 2016/0 Comments/in Air, Blog, CBRA, Counter-terrorism, Customs risks, EU, FP7, Global, IT, Mail operator, Multi-modal, Rail, Risk management, Road, Scanning, Screening, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Tracking, Trade facilitation, Trafficking, UPU, WP2, WP3 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

PostEurop and Cross-border Research Association have launched a new online survey on postal security management to promote further development and implementation of best security practices in the postal sector. The survey is part of the ongoing SAFEPOST project that the European Commission is co-funding under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). SAFEPOST project going to finish in the end of July after four years of work towards higher postal security in the European Union.

The survey studies the current state of postal security management among PostEurop members, 52 postal operators in 49 European countries. The goal is to collect responses mainly from security and safety managers of the PostEurop members, but also postal expert familiar with sorting and distribution processes are welcome to provide their inputs. The first part of the survey focuses on security implementation and security performance, and the second part studies postal managers’ expectations and concerns regarding the following six main SAFEPOST innovations:

Common Postal Security Space:

SAFEPOST has created an online platform for sharing security-related information between postal operators. This Common Postal Security Space provides a digital track record of security controls and related evidence (for example X-ray images) that a postal parcel has encountered over its journey, and facilitates an easy and controlled way to exchange information both with other operators as well as the authorities.

D-tube drug screening station:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated a new screening solution, D-tube, that can be fully integrated into the sorting process. The D-Tube’s prototype detects illegal substances, such as narcotics and explosives, at high accuracy.

Explosive detection system:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated a Raman spectroscopy screening device for detecting trace amounts of explosives and explosive precursors on the outside of postal items. The device is designed to be seamlessly integrated, at the same level as X-ray machines already used today, in the sorting process and detect the explosive threats at a high accuracy and at a low false alarm rate (≈ 1 %).

Image recognition system:

SAFEPOST has developed an Image Recognition solution that photographs five visible sides of a postal parcel at one or more locations in the postal network. The solution compares these images to detect signs of tampering or damage (≈ 92% detection rate). The current solution functions properly when the conveyor belt moves no faster than 0.5 m/s.

Radiological screening:

SAFEPOST has demonstrated detection of radiation in moving parcels, that can be fully integrated into the sorting process. The current version of the detector is able to detect any harmful level of radiation, and identify the radioactive isotope, and when possible to consider effects of possible attempts of hiding the radioactivity with lead or other shielding material by detecting neutron radiation.

Security standard and certificate:

SAFEPOST project is working towards a new European security standard for the postal operators that would give recommendations about use of security inspection technologies, exchange of security-related information, cyber security, and key security performance indicators. This standard would pave the road towards a voluntary security certification program that would help the postal operators to show their commitment to security.

This survey research is expected to produce interesting new insights about postal security activities and security performance among the PostEurop members. If the response rate is high, the survey findings will set a basis for pan-European benchmarking of security activities. The findings would also contribute to smart policy making, legislation, and standardisation in the field of postal security.

Finally, depending on the response rate, CBRA is going to publish an academic journal paper based on the results. Building on solid theory on supply chain security risk management, the journal paper would provide new empirical about how supply chain security implementation is associated operational and security performance. We expect that collaborative security measures improve both on-time delivery performance (a proxy for operational performance) and supply chain security performance simultaneously. Collaborative security measures include survey items such as “we coordinate security activities with our business customers” and “we exchange customs declaration information with customs authorities electronically [for example, ITMATT or CUSITM messages]”. Another hypothesis is that, on the one hand, non-collaborative security contributes to supply chain security performance but decrease on-time delivery performance on the other hand. Examples of such non-collaborative measures include “we use tamper-evident mail bags to transport high-value postal items” and “We perform security controls also on non-airmail items to detect explosives.” The figure below summarises the theory and hypotheses of the research paper.

Figure 1 Theoretical framework of the SAFEPOST survey paper

The survey findings will be presented in the final SAFEPOST meeting in Madrid 5-6 July 2016. After the meeting, we hope that we can expand the scope of the survey to cover the rest of the world, as well. The next step would be to contact representatives of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and coordinate distribution of the survey into the organisations’ 192 member countries.

EU logistics security – an interesting decade

May 21, 2016/0 Comments/in Authorized Economic Operator, Blog, CBRA, CEN, CLECAT, CPT, EC, ESC, EU, Freight forwarder, Government, Inland waterway, IRU, Other-cluster, Policy, Rail, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Road, Standardization, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Transport carrier, WP19 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

I had a great pleasure to work intensively on the European surface transport security standardization efforts, some years ago – this CBRA Blog aims to summarize the main work done, and the key objectives achieved.

Couple of years after the US 9/11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the European Commission Directorate General of Transport and Energy, EC DG TREN, started to prepare a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing cargo surface transport security. In the meanwhile, 9/11 was already triggering an avalanche of new customs, aviation and maritime supply chain security regulations, programs and standards, in the US, Europe and across the globe. But when it came specifically to surface transport security for road and rail cargo (and inland waterways, to that matter) in Europe, nothing was cooking before the DG TREN initiative “Secure Operator”, first announced in 2004. By 2006, the main goal of the EC proposal for a regulation on enhancing supply chain security (SCS) in the EU was shaped as to achieve greater protection of the European freight transport system against possible terrorist attacks. The specific objectives of the draft regulation were defined as: (i) to increase the level of security along the supply chain without impeding the free flow of trade; (ii) to establish a common framework for a systematic European approach without jeopardizing the common transport market and existing security measures; and (iii) to avoid unnecessary administrative procedures and burdens at European and national levels. In addition, the draft regulation related to the need to prevent a patchwork of various supply chain security standards and solutions across EU.

However, it quickly became clear that there was no common sense of urgency in supply chain security regulations across EU Member States, particularly in the context of threat of terrorism to surface (cargo) transport. One was lacking a commitment towards an integrated approach, which would urge everybody to look at the holistic supply chain picture. The countries and especially stakeholder (or, lobby) organizations clearly focused on their specific interests on a part of the supply chain, thus appearing uncomfortable when trying to identify the “big picture”. Ultimately, the draft regulation was blocked in the European legislative process and finally officially withdrawn by the Commission, in 2010.

In the meanwhile, already in 2005, an expert group in supply chain security was formed under the umbrella of European Committee for Standardization (CEN) – and that’s when Cross-border Research Association started to play a role in the “EU land transport security regulations and standards play”, first as the rapporteur for the expert group, and later as the research party for the technical committee in supply chain security. The expert group was formed technically under the CEN working group “Protection and Security of the Citizen” (CEN/BT/WG161), and the (pre)standardization work was partly based on the Logistics Action Plan of the EC that indicated the need for standardization in the transport security domain for the whole logistic chain.

Following the conclusions and recommendations by the expert group, the CEN Technical Committee in Supply Chain Security (CEN/TC 379) was established in 2008, producing ultimately three tangible outputs: Supply Chain Security Feasibility Study (in 2010); CEN Technical Report “Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators” (in 2012, CEN/TR 16412:2012); and, a European Standard: Logistics – Specifications for reporting crime incidents (in 2013, EN 16352:2013-06). The first of the outcomes is available for free (ask by email: cbra@cross-border.org ), and the latter two you can purchase e.g. from your national standardization institute web shop. All in all, great project experience behind us, couple of good publications, and many new contacts and even few friends for lifetime – thus, no regrets, and if asked, would become rapporteur and lead researcher on these important topics, again and again!

And finally, when it comes to the future of SCS regulation and standardization work in Europe – in particular in the land transport security sector (e.g. the LANDSEC expert group, Commission Decision 2012/286/EU): do not be shy in exploiting the tangible outcomes of a decade of our joint work, in particular the Euronorm EN 16352:2013-06, “Logistics: specifications for reporting crime incidents” – no reason to reinvent the wheel!

CBRA Blog by Dr. Juha Hintsa on 21.5.2016

Summarizing the main milestones of the surface transport security 2004-2014 regulatory and standardization process tracks:

A) Regulatory process -track was largely driven by the European Commission Directorate General for Transport and Energy (EC DG TREN), comprising of the following five sequential steps:
A1. Preparation of the Secure Operator legislation at EC DG TREN (2004-2006)
A2. Publication of the legislative proposal (EC, 2006a)
A3. Publication of an impact assessment study (EC, 2006b)
A4. Announcements and debates at European Parliament and Council (2006-2009)
A5. Withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission, (18.9.2010)

B) Standardization process -track – for which the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) was responsible – consisting of the following seven, chronologically ordered steps:
B1. Establishment of an Expert group in supply chain security, under CEN/BT/WG161, “Protection and Security of the Citizen” (2005)
B2. Publication of the final report of the Expert group, approved by CEN/BT/WG161 (14.11.2006)
B3. Establishment of the CEN Technical Committee in Supply Chain Security, CEN/TC 379 (2008)
B4. Publication of Supply Chain Security Feasibility Study (15.1.2010)
B5. Publication of the CEN Technical Report, CEN/TR 16412:2012 “Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators” (2012)
B6. Publication of a European Standard: Logistics – Specifications for reporting crime incidents, EN 16352:2013-06 (2013)
B7. Closure of the CEN Technical Committee in Supply Chain Security, CEN/TC 379 (2014).

Main references / bibliography:

CEN (2013), “Logistics: specifications for reporting crime incidents”, EN 16352:2013-06
CEN (2012), “Supply chain security (SCS): Good practice guide for small and medium sized operators”, CEN/TR 16412:2012
CEN (2006), “Expert group: Supply chain security”, approved by CEN/BT/WG161, 14.1.2006
EC (2012), “Commission Staff Working Document on Transport Security”, SWD(2012), 143 final.
EC (2006a), COM(2006)79 final, 2006/0025(COD), COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on enhancing supply chain security Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on enhancing supply chain security, (SEC(2006)251)
EC (2006b), SEC(2006)251 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Annex to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on enhancing supply chain security and Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on enhancing supply chain security – IMPACT ASSESSMENT – {COM(2006)79 final}
Hintsa, J., Ahokas, J., Männistö, T. and Sahlstedt, J. (2010), “CEN supply chain security (SCS) feasibility study”, CEN/TC 379 Supply Chain Security, Final report, 15.12010

C-TPAT Program Benefits Reference Guide, 2014 (CORE1032)

March 6, 2016/0 Comments/in Air, Airport, All transport modes, All-clusters, C-TPAT, CBP, CBRA, Contraband, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Demo-cluster, Exporter, Express courier, Freight forwarder, Government, Guidebook, Importer, Inland waterway, IT-cluster, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Maritime, Multi-modal, Other-cluster, Rail, Retailer, Risk-cluster, Road, Sea port, Shipper, Supply chain security, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Trusted Trader, USA, Warehouse keeper, WP1, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP2, WP20, WP21, WP22, WP3, WP4, WP5, WP6, WP7, WP8, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This guidebook outlines the key elements and benefits of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program that is designed to secure global supply chains and to improve United States border security. Document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/C-TPAT%20Program%20Benefits%20Guide.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: C-TPAT partners receive a wide range of benefits listed below:

C-TPAT Partners are examined at a considerably lower rate than non-C-TPAT Partners.
C-TPAT certified/validated highway carrier Partners are granted expedited border crossing privileges. C-TPAT Partners at many Canada/Mexico land border ports of entry have access to Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Lanes.
Some categories of C-TPAT importer Partners are exempt from stratified exams.
C-TPAT shipments subject to examination are moved ahead of any non-C-TPAT shipments, to the extent possible.
In the event of a significant disruption/delay in cargo processing operations, actions are taken to maintain communication and coordination with C-TPAT Partners for business resumption.
C-TPAT Partners’ trade compliance issues are given priority over those issues related to non-C-TPAT Partners.
Each C-TPAT Partner is assigned a Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS) who coordinates between the C-TPAT Partner and the US Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP). The Specialist also assists the Partner with supply chain security issues.
Partners have access to the C-TPAT’s automated Portal system, to communicate with CBP and exchange program related information in a secure manner.
C-TPAT Partners are eligible to attend C-TPAT events like the annual Conference and other training seminars organized by the program.
C-TPAT importer Partners are eligible to participate in the Importer Self-Assessment (ISA) Program.
The Penalty Mitigation benefit is granted to sea carriers for late submission of data required under the Importer Security Filing requirements.
C-TPAT members are eligible to participate in other U.S. Government pilot programs, such as the Food and Drug Administration’s Secure Supply Chain program.

In addition, some benefits are associated with Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) when two customs authorities formally acknowledge the security requirements or standards of one program, as being equivalent to the other program. Some of the resulting benefits to the trade community are illustrated below:

C-TPAT importer Partners that also conduct export operations and Partners of the foreign Customs Administration programs (manufacturers and exporters of record) are granted a reduction in their overall cargo risk score, implying fewer examinations at export and import ports.
A C-TPAT validation for an overseas partner is not required if an MRA is in place because CBP recognizes the status of the Partner in the foreign partnership program.
Companies covered by MRAs need only to comply with a common set of security requirements, avoiding the hassle of following multiple sets of requirements from one partnership program to another.
MRAs lead to more transparency in international commerce. Mutual exchange of information between these partners facilitates trade across Mutual Recognition Partner nations.

CORE1032

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C-TPAT Best Practices Catalog Addendum, 2009 (CORE1031)

March 6, 2016/0 Comments/in Air, Airport, All transport modes, All-clusters, C-TPAT, CBP, CBRA, Contraband, CORE-Observatory, Counter-terrorism, Demo-cluster, Exporter, Express courier, Freight forwarder, Government, Guidebook, Importer, Inland waterway, IT-cluster, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Maritime, Multi-modal, Other-cluster, Rail, Retailer, Risk-cluster, Road, Sea port, Shipper, Supply chain security, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Trusted Trader, USA, Warehouse keeper, WP1, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP2, WP20, WP21, WP22, WP3, WP4, WP5, WP6, WP7, WP8, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This addendum document lists cargo security best practices with focus on prevention of weapons of mass effect, terrorists, and/or contraband from infiltrating into the international supply chain. Each best practice is linked to a specific business entity, such as a Manufacturing Company, a Highway Carrier, an Importer or a Foreign Consolidator but these may apply to other business types as well. The document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ctpat_bpa_2009_0.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: The best practices are outlined as follows:

Risk assessment: Programs are in place to enable the identification of the most vulnerable supply chain areas, to grade suppliers supply chain security criteria. Specific processes have been developed to manage the supplier’s products, software and services and internal monitoring systems to enhance the safety and security procedures.

Business partner requirements: Several security measures have been taken by entities. These include conducting supply chain security audits to ensure compliance of non-C-TPAT business partners; carrying out security audits of a foreign manufacturer; making security self-assessments, conducting onsite inspections to ensure freight security; shipping cargo only through accredited ports and steamship lines; monitoring compliance of manufacturing facilities; screening procurements to identify ineligible status of suppliers, and performing audits of business partners.

Conveyance/Container/Trailer Security: Examples of such security practices are: integrating special security features in the GPS (global positioning system); using laser beams to protect trailers; using colour codes for matching consignments; installing infrared sensors in docks to prevent unauthorized access; using special codes to identify correct shipments; documenting all seal changes for shipments in transit; ensuring delivery by authorized Company drivers; sealing containers; operating through C-TPAT carriers; using only “seaworthy” containers; installing in-transit temperature data sensors to ensure product quality; enclosing container storage area; conducting non-intrusive inspection prior to loading a vessel; establishing specific inspection points; using multiple security devices on each container; using automated container yards; instructing foreign suppliers to provide inspection checklists; using dock locking arms for container storage; installing motion sensors in a trailer; operating through contracted highway carriers and security services; documenting a seal destruction policy, and so forth.

Physical Access Controls: Some practices by Importers include establishing multiple security stations within the building; using metal detectors for employees; installing an electronic swipe card/ lock box systems for access control for sensitive documents; conducting electronic scanning of visitors’ drivers licenses; utilizing a third-party software system to manage key inventory; and providing panic buttons for company employees.

Physical Security: Several innovative solutions have been designed to ensure physical security, such as electronically closing gates and activating tire puncturing devices to prevent vehicle exits; using an electronic security information reporting system, installing invisible electronic fences; installing laser sensors; setting up optical light beams to detect intruders; fitting double locks on doors; Installing infrared sensors on fences; using body alarm functions for emergencies; appointing patrolling guards, using multiple glass meeting rooms; using multiple interior infrared security alarm beams to detect unauthorized access; and installing security guard view towers.

Personnel Security: An Importer requires business partners to provide a monthly master list of employees and immediately notify when their employees are hired or terminated, in order to ensure that only authorized business partner’s employees enter the manufacturing facilities.

Security Training/Threat Awareness/Outreach: Business entities have invested in a wide range of training programs. One such initiative is the four-tier C-TPAT training targeted for management and supervisors, shipping and receiving personnel, internal personnel dealing with contractors and hourly staff. Other businesses use different approaches, like establishing an online training portal;; offering general security training and of site-specific training for security guards; issuing security advisories; making regular security awareness assessments; establishing a situation matrix chart to address possible incidents; establishing a direct communication channel between the president of the company and employees; putting in place a toll free hotline for company personnel; conducting security drills and exercises; establishing a web-based security awareness training; documenting security incidents in a central database; and establishing a global communication system to contact all employees and contractors remotely.

Procedural Security: Instances of this type of security measures include a bio-thermal intrusion alarm system; a global SAP network to generate all written orders for import and export; automatic screening procedures of purchase orders for restricted parties; lock boxes for sensitive documentation; an automated loading module called the Automatic Truck Loading System (ATLS); a container seal number as the shipment tracking (invoice/bill of lading) number, and so forth.

Information Technology (IT) Security: Such security practices include a biometric fingerprint door lock; a remote data backup center; a retina scanning system for access to the computer system; requiring supervisory approval to copy data; use of electronic password protected purchase orders; establishing a daily “e-test” for employees to access computers, and so forth.

CORE1031

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CEN Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators, 2012 (CORE1030)

March 5, 2016/0 Comments/in Air, Airport, All transport modes, All-clusters, Authorized Economic Operator, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Corruption, Counterfeiting, Cybercrime, Demo-cluster, DG MOVE, DG TAXUD, Document forgery, EC, Environmental crime, EU, Exporter, Express courier, Fraud, Freight forwarder, Hijacking, Human trafficking, Identity theft, Importer, Inland waterway, ISO28000, IT-cluster, Known Consignor, Mail operator, Manufacturer, Maritime, Money laundry, Multi-modal, Other-cluster, Rail, Regulated Agent, Retailer, Risk-cluster, Road, Sea port, Shipper, Standard, Standardization, Supply chain security, TAPA, Tax evasion, Terrorism/destruction, Theft, Trafficking, Transport carrier, Violence, Warehouse keeper, WP1, WP10, WP11, WP12, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP16, WP17, WP18, WP19, WP2, WP20, WP21, WP22, WP3, WP4, WP5, WP6, WP7, WP8, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This is a guidance document for small and medium sized enterprises, SMEs. on how to apply a supply chain security approach to their operations in order to mitigate the risk of criminal activities. It gives an overview of the main crime types occurring in the supply chain along with some countermeasures, as well as the supply chain security initiatives, and the compliance requirements thereof. The document is available for purchase e.g. at: http://shop.bsigroup.com/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030258778 (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: The recommended supply chain strategy rests on a six-step approach. The first step is to define a context for the supply chain, crime prevention and security management activities taking into consideration the security sensitiveness, the geography and transport modes, and the main stakeholders involved in the supply chain operation. The second step is to make a threat and vulnerability analysis with regard to terrorist and other criminal threats in the supply chain. The main criteria included are the gaps existing in enhanced security, the high-risk crime types, and the potential consequences of crime occurrences. The third step covers the regulatory framework, the major aspects being the regulations and programs required for successful business operations, expectations of customers and suppliers, requirements laid down by insurance providers, and relevant government authorities. The fourth step refers to an overall security plan, taking into account the physical security, data security, human resources security (including selection, training, and exit procedures), business partner security (including selection, and auditing), and process control and monitoring of deviations. The fifth step involves implementing into practice concrete security measures, investment in technologies, procurement of services, in-house solutions and so forth. The final step is to monitor and measure the security performance and take appropriate corrective actions.

Five supply chain crime types have been elucidated in this guide. These include: Property theft (cargo theft, intellectual property breaches); targeted damage (terrorism, sabotage); cross-border duty and tax fraud; illegitimate transporting, exporting and/or importing (smuggling of prohibited and restricted goods, people smuggling); and crime facilitation (document forgery, bogus companies, cybercrime). For each crime type, the main focus should be on the issue (main features and typical sectors/products involved), scope of the problem and actions to mitigate risks.

This guidebook has chosen eight security initiatives for illustration purposes. It explains the context of each initiative, whom it is meant for, and some basic requirements and the implications. These are as follows:

Import Control System (ICS) in the EU (a systems tool meant for the lodging and processing of Entry Summary Declarations, and for the exchange of messages across national customs agencies, economic operators and the European Commission).
Export Control System (ECS) in the EU (introduces EU procedures to computerize and control indirect exports and to implement the EU safety and security regulations);
Maritime Security Legislation, International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in the EU (International regulations to ensure the security of maritime transportation are being issued by the International Maritime Organization, IMO, in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code);
Aviation Security Legislation, Air Cargo Supply Chains in the EU (three categories of aviation security legislation exist in the EU- Framework regulation, supplementing regulations, and implementing regulations-all targeted towards civil aviation security).
European Union Authorized Economic Operator, EU AEO (operators involved in international trade of goods certified as complying with WCO or equivalent supply chain security standards);
Regulated agent, Known consignor and Account consignor in the EU (Specific “trusted trader” status existing in the European air cargo supply chains);
ISO 28000 Series of Standards on Supply Chain Security Management Systems (address potential security issues at all stages of the supply process, e.g. terrorism, fraud and piracy);
Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) in Europe (fighting cargo crime using real-time intelligence and the latest preventative measures).

CORE1030

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Review on“Contributing to shipping container security: can passive sensors bring a solution?” G. Janssens-Maenhout a, F. De Roob, W. Janssens, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 2009 (CORE1096)

January 15, 2016/0 Comments/in Academic, CBRA, CORE-Observatory, Customs, Demo-cluster, Inland waterway, Maritime, Multi-modal, Rail, Risk management, Risk-cluster, Road, Scanning, Scientific, Screening, Sea port, Supply chain security, Terrorism/destruction, Trade facilitation, Transport security agency, WP10, WP11, WP13, WP14, WP15, WP17, WP6, WP9 /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: Illicit trafficking of fissionable material in container cargoes is recognized as a potential weakness in Nuclear Security. Triggered by the attacks of 11 September 2001, measures were undertaken to enhance maritime security in extension to the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention and in line with the US Container Security Initiatives. Effective detection techniques are needed that allow the inspector to intercept illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons components or components of other nuclear explosive devices. Report abstract is available at (one can ask for the full report e.g. vie ResearchGate): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/38053693_Contributing_to_shipping_container_security_can_passive_sensors_bring_a_solution

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Full review: Many security measures focus on active interrogation of the container content by X-ray scan, which might be extended with the newly developed tagged neutron inspection system. Both active interrogation techniques can, with the current huge volume of container traffic, only be applied to a limited number of selected containers. The question arises whether a passive detection technique can offer an alternative solution.

This study investigates if containers equipped with a small passive detector will register during transport the neutron irradiation by fissionable material such as plutonium in a measurable way. In practice, 4/5 of the containers are about 1/8 filled with hydrogenous material and undergo a typical 2 months route. For this reference case, it was found that the most compatible passive detector would be an activation foil of iridium. Monte-Carlo simulations showed that for the reference case the activity of a 250 μm thin foil with 6 cm2 cross-section would register 1.2 Bq when it is irradiated by a significant quantity of Reactor-Grade PuO2. However this activity drops with almost two orders of magnitude for other fillings and other isotopic compositions and forms of the Pu-source. The procedure of selecting the target material for Pu detection is detailed with the theoretical methods, in order to be useful for other applications. Moreover the value of such additional passive sensors for securing maritime container transport is situated within the global framework of the First, Second and Third Line of Defense against illicit trafficking.

Full citation: G. Janssens-Maenhout a, F. De Roob, W. Janssens (2009). Contributing to shipping container security: can passive sensors bring a solution?” Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 101(2):95-105 · OCTOBER 2009.

Keywords: Nuclear illicit trafficking, Maritime container transport, Passive detection technique

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FP7-CONTAIN Report Summary (CORE3011)

March 1, 2015/0 Comments/in CORE-Observatory /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This review on reference project focuses on: FP7-CONTAIN project. The CONTAIN Base platform might contribute to CORE Supply Chain Situational Awareness Toolset (T4.1). The CONTAIN Dashboard is a good example towards CORE T3.3. The author of the review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. The document code is CORE3011, in the CORE e-library.
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FP7-COMCIS Report Summary (CORE3010)

March 1, 2015/0 Comments/in CORE-Observatory /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This review on reference project focuses on: COMCIS (Collaborative Information Services for Container Management), which was an EU research project focusing on facilitating the development of interoperable communication channels between businesses and authorities, with the use of electronic messages and state-of-the-art communication infrastructure. An important infrastructural component of the COMCIS unified interoperability layer is the Single Point Data Interchange (SPDI) component. The author of the review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. Document coding in CORE e-library is CORE3010. More information on the project at: http://www.comcis.eu/
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Review on FP7-SUPPORT project (CORE3007)

February 28, 2015/0 Comments/in CORE-Observatory /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This review on reference projects, specifying reusable outputs, focuses FP7-SUPPORT project. The author of the review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. The original review documents can be found in CORE e-library with the coding CORE3007. More information on the project at: http://www.mypsms.com/default.aspx
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ECSIT Report Summary (CORE3005)

February 28, 2015/0 Comments/in CORE-Observatory /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This reference project review focuses on German national funded research project ECSIT: Enhancing container security through non-contact inspection at the seaport terminal. The work done in ECSIT in non-intrusive inspection devices should be continued and refined in CORE ST2.3 Next Generation Scanning System. Furthermore the ECSIT AP7 Demonstration of the system might be used as a good working example for organization and operating plans towards the CORE ST 2.3.4 Field Demonstration. More support from ECSIT might be given to CORE T7.3 Scenario-based simulation and towards US-based Demo WPs for the broadly discussed and approved scenarios how to survey container with a multi-layered inspection approach in mind. The authors of the review are Marcus Engler and Matthias Dreyer, ISL. You can find the full review and original files in CORE e-library, with the coding CORE3005. More information on the project at: https://www.isl.org/en/projects/ecsit
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FP7-project e-Freight Report Summary (CORE3003a)

February 28, 2015/0 Comments/in CORE-Observatory /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This document is about CORE review of reference projects and specification of reusable outputs, on FP7-project e-Freight. Authors are Marcus Engler and Oliver Klein, both from ISL. The original files can be found in CORE e-library, with coding CORE3003a. More information on the project at: http://www.efreightproject.eu/
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Review on FP7-project IMCOSEC (CORE3001)

February 28, 2015/0 Comments/in CORE-Observatory /by Vladlen Tsikolenko

Summary: This is review on reference projects / specifying reusable outputs, on FP7-project IMCOSEC. The research in IMCOSEC (Integrated approach to improve the supply chain for container transport and integrated security simultaneously) was on following two conflicting trends in years before the project started: the elimination of trade barriers to ensure free trade, and increasing security demands to counter the threat of terrorism mainly. The author of the review is Marcus Engler, ISL. The original document can be found in CORE e-library coded as CORE3001. More information on the project at: http://cordis.europa.eu/search/result_en?q=IMCOSEC
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