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Summary: This report by the Center for the Study of Democracy investigates existing forms of cooperation between Border Guards and customs administrations in the European Union. The study highlights obstacles to cooperation and proposes solutions and best practices for overcoming them. The study finds that despite the common policy interest on border agency cooperation and the associated pan-European standardisation efforts, the individual Member states decide the extent and forms of customs-border guard co-operation on their own. As a result, the current state of border agency collaboration and potential for improvements differ substantially between the member states. The main differences arise from the institutional set-up (e.g., number and roles of border control agencies), powers and competencies of the border control agencies, and the legislative basis (especially legal differences in terms of privacy, data protection and confidentiality of trade information). Download the report here: http://ec.europa.eu. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)
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Full review: The study concludes with a large number of recommendations for the European Union, the member states, and for the customs and border guards. The European Union should generate political will to act upon remaining challenges of border agency cooperation by creating awareness through public debates, communications and impact assessments. The EU bodies should act mediators to reconcile institutional interests of different border control agencies. The EU could also commission pilot projects on border agency cooperation, encourage joint training and increase funding of related research and development activities. Also the mandate of Frontex could be expanded to cover customs cooperation.
The individual member states should, according to the report, also mediate negotiations between border control agencies to overcome possible conflicts of interest. The member states should also evaluate impacts of various forms of customs-border guard cooperation.
The border guards and customs administrations themselves should identify and exchange best practices for strengthening their mutual collaboration. The agencies, the report recommends, should take responsibility for the pilot projects and for evaluating outcomes of the different forms of cooperation. To further improve the cooperation across the entire EU customs union, the customs and border control agencies should use Frontex more as their platform to conduct joint operations at the EU’s external border.
Reference: Center for the Study of Democracy, (2011), “Better Management of EU Borders through Cooperation”, Study to Identify Best Practices on the Cooperation Between Border Guards and Customs Administrations Working at the External Borders of the EU
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Summary: The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent government watchdog organization that has been publishing many reports on the US government’s supply chain security initiatives over the past ten years. This article reviews 25 most relevant GAO’s reports that discuss strengths, weaknesses and future challenges of the US policies and regulations on supply chain security. The review findings reveal interesting facts about similarities and differences of the US and the EU approaches to supply chain security. This comparison opens new venues for further Transatlantic benchmarking as well as harmonisation and mutual recognition of supply chain security programs. This review was conducted as part of European FP7-Project CORE. The reviewed document is available for download here: https://hicl.org. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)
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Full review: The GAO reports suggest that the US administration has been struggling with effective performance monitoring and auditing of its supply chain security initiatives. The reports indicate that there is some confusion about costs of security initiatives for the government and for the business community. There is also a lack of common understanding about the actual benefits of many of these programs. The GAO reports also urge US government officials to adopt risk-based approach to supply chain security, for example to use information and intelligence to assess risk levels of specific shipments, people, trading companies, and other entities, and then employ security solutions that are commensurate to the risk level. The GAO reports also emphasize the importance of involving the industry in the process of defining new policies and regulations.
Altogether, the review team found that the GAO documents are not only highly relevant for SCS management and governance but also of high quality. The study concludes that it might be useful for the EU to establish a quality-assurance organization similar to the US GAO. This new EU body would oversee spending of the EU and its member states on supply chain security programs and projects and this way improve efficiency of such investments.
Reference: Männistö, T., and Hintsa J., (2015), “A Decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight,” Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference in Logistics (HICL), September 24-25, 2015, Hamburg
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Summary: In a recent study, a joint CBRA-INTERPOL research team investigates what kind of training material would help law enforcement agencies to fight crime in the context of global supply chains. The team conducted a pilot survey at the LE TrainNet Meeting (Networking Meeting of the Law Enforcement training institutions) which took place in Baku, Azerbaijan, 28- 29 April 2015. Findings of the pilot survey will be used to launch a large EU-wide survey on law enforcement agencies’ training needs regarding supply chain security. The survey findings also guide production of new training and educational material that the FP7 CORE is currently producing. The reviewed document is available for download here: https://hicl.org. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)
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Full review: The article concludes that law enforcement agencies generally recognise supply chain security training as a worthwhile investment for their organisations. In partuclar, the law enforcement agencies call for new supply chain related training material especially regarding narcotics and drug precursor trafficking, corruption financial crimes and tax evasion, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in counterfeit goods, terrorism and cybercrime. They advocate increasing use of modern training techniques and tools, such as e-learning, case-based teaching, and role-playing exercises.
Other findings show that law enforcement agencies consider it very useful to develop new training and educational material that would help them to enable and encourage multi-agency collaboration, for example data sharing between police agencies and customs. The survey respondents also expressed their interest in new training material that would focus on human factors of transnational crime (e.g., motives and underlying social dynamics) and intelligence-led policing.
It is important to notice that only 16 people responded to the Baku pilot survey. The response rate was 23.2%, given there were 69 delegates registered for the LEA TrainNet meeting. The relatively low number of respondents and the relatively low response rate indicate that there is a definite need for a larger EU-wide follow-up survey.
Reference: Hintsa, J., Ahokas, J., Gallagher, R., and Männistö, T., (2015), ”Supply Chain Security: Survey on Law Enforcement Agencies’ Training Needs”, Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL), September 24-25, 2015, Hamburg.
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Summary: Thailand is interested in coordinated border management conceptualization and implementation like many other countries. There are, however, some special challenges that Thailand faces when the country tries to strengthen cooperation with its neighbouring countries. The reviewed document is available for download at: Collaborative Border Management in Thailand and Neighboring Countries: Needs, Challenges and Issues.
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Full review: The report proposes a set of recommendations for implementing coordinated border management:
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Summary: The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that more than 95% of commercial goods in the Mesoamerican region are transported overland using the Pacific Corridor. This traffic represents approximately 6 billion USD worth of goods on a highway which runs from Puebla, Mexico to Panama and crosses six national borders. The problem with the Pacific Corridor is with unreliable, inefficient and substandard infrastructure. In 2008, to upgrade the inadequate infrastructure, the IDB launched a ambitious project called International Goods in Transit. According to the report, the results of the project were outstanding: average time to cross a border was reduced from 62 minutes to eight. The project also succeeded to reduce the number of documents that traders needed to submit to border control agencies. The two reviewed files are available for download at: Interoperability at the Border: Coordinated Border Management Best Practices & Case Studies and Automating the Control of Goods in International Transit: Implementing the TIM in Central America.
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Full review: The solution, that the International Goods in Transit project produced, is basically an electronic system for managing and controlling the movement of goods in transit. The system builds on three main pillars that unlock better services at border crossing:
Important lessons learned from the project include the following:
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Summary: An Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy was written in Croatia in accordance with the guidelines of the European Union and in collaboration with international experts. This strategy and its implementation action plan was adopted by the Croatian government on the 21 April 2005. The reviewed document is available for download at: Strategy for Integrated Border Management (Croatia).
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Full review: The main objective of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy is to provide effective support for economic development of the country and to raise the standard of living of citizens. The strategy also seeks to protect life and health of people and their property from cross-border crime. Integrated Border Management requires participation of many government agencies, including border police, customs, border veterinary service, border phytosanitary service, border sanitary service and the state inspectorate. Many times also state authorities in charge of culture, mining and radiation protection contribute to the IBM Strategy formulation and implementation.
As part of the Strategy, the Croatian government created a new interdepartmental working group. The primary objective was to facilitate cross-border traffic through reduction overlapping border control activities. The working group eliminated duplicate processes by aligning responsibilities of border control agencies and by exploiting the time of the relevant synergies between relevant governmental bodies. The working group launched initiatives in following areas:
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Summary: The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has a dual mandate (1) to facilitate cross-border movements of cargo and people and (2) to protect security and safety of the Canadian people. The agency seeks to provide integrated border services, by closely cooperating with other Canadian border control agencies as well as with foreign customs administrations. The reviewed document is available for download here: Customs Cooperation Case Study for Canada.
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Full review: Forms of cooperation depend on needs of the partner agencies, but the cooperation typically includes:
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Summary: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, COSO, defines Enterprise Risk Management, ERM, as a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives. The entity objectives are set forth in following four categories: (i) Strategic – high-level goals, aligned with and supporting its mission; (ii) Operations – effective and efficient use of its resources; (iii) Reporting – reliability of reporting; and (iv) Compliance – compliance with applicable laws and regulations. According to COSO, ERM enables management to effectively deal with uncertainty and associated risk and opportunity, enhancing the capacity to build value. Within the context of FP7-CORE project – and, supply chain security management in general – ERM can be seen as a useful approach particularly when it comes to aligning security risk appetite and strategy; to enhancing security risk response decisions; and to reducing security related operational surprises and losses. Some other ERM aspects such as seizing opportunities (“positive risks”) may not apply in supply chain security management context. One more interesting note, which could also be applied for supply chain security: everyone in an entity has some responsibility for ERM. This executive summary document is available for download at: http://www.coso.org/documents/coso_erm_executivesummary.pdf
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Full review:
Background: The first version of the “Internal Control – Integrated Framework” was issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, COSO, in early 1990s, to help businesses and other entities assess and enhance their internal control systems. The change of the millennium saw heightened concern and focus on risk management, and it became clear that a need exists for a robust framework to effectively identify, assess, and manage risk. In 2001, COSO initiated a project, and engaged PricewaterhouseCoopers, to develop a framework that would be readily usable by managements to evaluate and improve their organizations’ enterprise risk management.
According to COSO (p.1), Enterprise Risk Management, ERM, encompasses:
• Aligning risk appetite and strategy – Management considers the entity’s risk appetite in evaluating strategic alternatives, setting related objectives, and developing mechanisms to manage related risks.
• Enhancing risk response decisions –Enterprise risk management provides the rigor to identify and select among alternative risk responses – risk avoidance, reduction, sharing, and acceptance.
• Reducing operational surprises and losses – Entities gain enhanced capability to identify potential events and establish responses, reducing surprises and associated costs or losses.
• Identifying and managing multiple and cross-enterprise risks – Every enterprise faces a myriad of risks affecting different parts of the organization, and enterprise risk management facilitates effective response to the interrelated impacts, and integrated responses to multiple risks.
• Seizing opportunities – By considering a full range of potential events, management is positioned to identify and proactively realize opportunities.
• Improving deployment of capital – Obtaining robust risk information allows management to effectively assess overall capital needs and enhance capital allocation.
COSO (pp.3-4) states that ERM consists of eight interrelated components, derived from the way management runs an enterprise and are integrated with the management process:
• Internal Environment – The internal environment encompasses the tone of an organization, and sets the basis for how risk is viewed and addressed by an entity’s people, including risk management philosophy and risk appetite, integrity and ethical values, and the environment in which they operate.
• Objective Setting – Objectives must exist before management can identify potential events affecting their achievement. Enterprise risk management ensures that management has in place a process to set objectives and that the chosen objectives support and align with the entity’s mission and are consistent with its risk appetite.
• Event Identification – Internal and external events affecting achievement of an entity’s objectives must be identified, distinguishing between risks and opportunities. Opportunities are channeled back to management’s strategy or objective-setting processes.
• Risk Assessment – Risks are analyzed, considering likelihood and impact, as a basis for determining how they should be managed. Risks are assessed on an inherent and a residual basis.
• Risk Response – Management selects risk responses – avoiding, accepting, reducing, or sharing risk – developing a set of actions to align risks with the entity’s risk tolerances and risk appetite.
• Control Activities – Policies and procedures are established and implemented to help ensure the risk responses are effectively carried out.
• Information and Communication – Relevant information is identified, captured, and communicated in a form and timeframe that enable people to carry out their responsibilities. Effective communication also occurs in a broader sense, flowing down, across, and up the entity.
• Monitoring – The entirety of enterprise risk management is monitored and modifications made as necessary. Monitoring is accomplished through ongoing management activities, separate evaluations, or both.
Lastly, as potential readers / users of this report, COSO suggests following: Board of Directors; Senior Management; Managers and other personnel; Regulators; Professional Organizations; and Educators.
CORE1106
https://www.dropbox.com/s/aetbp8jr6dr4z31/CORE1106-coso_erm_executivesummary.pdf?dl=0
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Summary: The GAO report discusses the progress the Customs and Border Protection (CPB), a component agency of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made since 2015 with its flagship business-private supply chain security program Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The report focuses on three main areas of the C-TPAT’s management and governance: (1) awarding benefits for the C-TPAT compliant companies, (2) validating the member companies’ security compliance and (3) addressing CBP’s staffing challenges that the increasing popularity of the C-TPAT program brings. The report recommends CPB to improve its C-TPAT validation processes and instruments and to establish performance criteria for assessing the program’s impact on supply chain security and trade facilitation. The C-TPAT program and this GAO report contain useful information for the CORE’s demonstrations that import goods into the US. Also the CORE’s risk cluster can learn about opportunities and challenges a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security entails. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/274773.pdf.
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Full review: This report contains information that is particularly useful for two CORE demonstrators that cover US imports. The first WP9 demonstration is about shipping automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven. In this demo, the General Motors (GM) is the importer. Because GM holds a C-TPAT certificate, most of the information this report offers about the status and challenges of the C-TPAT program must be of interest for the company and for its CORE demonstration. The same applies to the WP14 demonstration “FALACUS” that is about importing ceramic tiles from Italy to the US via the Port of La Spezia. The demonstration has to deal with the C-TPAT program, and therefore the demo partners’ might benefit from studying this GAO report. In addition to the demonstrations, this report might support the work of the CORE’s risk cluster because the document discusses in detail challenges and possibilities of a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security program, which builds on business-government collaboration.
Cross-references:
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation’s Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Additional keywords: Border security, customs-trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT), supply chain security, counter-terrorism
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Summary: This report reviews the progress that the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) – a program for screening US-bound high-risk shipping containers in foreign ports with X-ray and radiation detection solutions – since the latest 2005 GAO review. The report discusses how the CBP’s CSI efforts have (1) contributed to the long-term, strategic planning on the US supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI activities worldwide and (3) established means to evaluate performance of the CSI activities. The report recommends CBP to develop its data collection practices that are related to the CSI team performance and the host government’s inspections of the US-bound containers. This report provides relevant information for CORE demonstrations that deal with US-bound maritime logistics and commerce. Also the risk cluster might benefit from the descriptions of the US risk-based supply chain security scheme – Automated Targeting System (AST), 24-hour rule and the importer security filing 10+2 – that the report elaborates in detail. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08187.pdf.
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Full review: This GAO report elaborates the status and challenges of the US Container Security Initiative, but it also provides a comprehensive outlook on the US maritime supply chain security. This information is likely to be relevant for the CORE’s demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that deal with US-bound container traffic. The report is a good reference document for those CORE work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain and that are producing relevant training material on supply chain security. The CORE’s risk and IT clusters benefit from the information the report offers on risk-based security solutions that use advance cargo information to calculate risk scores for US-bound shipments by the aid of automatic risk assessment algorithms.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Container Security Initiative (CSI), counter-terrorism, homeland security, maritime supply chain security
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