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Summary: This report discusses how the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has (1) contributed to international supply chain security standards and (2) promoted mutual recognition in the customs security area and (3) how the agency expects to implement the 100% scanning requirement of the containerized US-bound maritime cargo. The report provides a detailed outlook on the US customs supply chain security scheme, and it highlights challenges and problems that the US government faces in promoting its supply chain security strategy internationally. The development and the implementation of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards, a suite of best practices on customs security, is a central theme throughout this GAO report. Because of its broad scope, the customs-related supply chain security, this document contains information that is likely to be useful for all CORE work packages, and especially for those that involve customs administrations. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279730.pdf.
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Full review: This document provides a detailed outlook on customs-centric supply chain security from the US government’s perspective. This unique view on the customs security is going to be useful for the CORE’s early work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain security. The information is also useful for the CORE demonstrations, in which customs administrations are involved. In particular, the demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that are about US-bound trade and logistics benefit from the detailed description of the customs security initiatives that the US government has introduced since the 9/11 tragedy.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, 100% scanning legislation, SAFE framework of standards, World Customs Organizations, Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) programs, Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism
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Summary: This GAO report reviews current activities the Department of Homeland Security, its component agencies and its stakeholders are doing to protect the US-centric seaborne trade and logistics from threats arising from small vessels. The report argues that the small vessels pose two “great threats” to the US maritime system: (1) explosive-laden small vessels can be used to ram into maritime structures or (2) the small vessels can be used as vehicles for transporting tools, weapons and tools for terrorism into the US. The GAO report highlights that DHS has its Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), but the organization is not monitoring the progress its component agencies are doing in meeting its objectives. This report focuses mainly on security initiatives that affect navigation of small vessels at the US territorial waters and ports and operations of the US coastal guards and customs. Although US-based maritime logistics operations benefit from the increased security the small vessel security initiatives likely bring, they can continue their business as usual. Therefore, the CORE’s early work packages can use this report’s information to define the context of the global supply chain security, the CORE demonstrations do not need much attention to the small vessel security initiatives or this GAO report. The report is available at: http://gao.gov/assets/660/658703.pdf
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Full review: This report provides interesting background information about the US government’s efforts to secure their domestic maritime logistics and transportation from the threat of small vessels that navigate largely anonymously and unregulated. The document might be useful for the CORE early work packages that describe the context of the global supply chain security. It is however unlikely that the demonstrators would need to pay much attention to the US small vessel security initiatives because the legal requirements of the initiatives do not affect the operations of large commercial vessels, which carry most of the world’s seaborne cargo. Of course the small vessel security initiatives also affect the way the component agencies of DHS operate, but because CORE does not involve these agencies directly, in CORE, there is no need to put much effort on understanding technicalities of the small vessel security initiatives. Finally, the CORE’s clusters on education and training as well as risk management might anyhow consider the information of this GAO report relevant.
Cross-references:
Additional keywords: Maritime security, small vessel security, terrorism, smuggling
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Summary
This document sets a vision of the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the primary border control agency present at the US borders, for year 2020. The vision builds on four general goals and associated objectives that aim to improve safety, security and prosperity of the American people. Collaboration, risk management as well as exchange and exploitation of information and intelligence are in the heart of the vision document and integral elements of its goals and objectives. The vision document is available at: http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf
Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)
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Full review
The vision’s first goal is to counter transnational terrorism and crime at and beyond the US borders. Keys to effective counter-terrorism and anti-crime efforts are understanding of threat landscape as well as interagency and international coordination on border management. The second goal is about promoting a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to border security and management, in order to exploit complementary capabilities of various border control agencies to the fullest extent. Specific objectives underpinning this goal are “situational awareness of the air, land and maritime borders”, “detection, interdiction and disruption of illegal border activities” and “strengthening comprehensive trade enforcement. Here the key is to collect information and intelligence about trade flows and carry out risk assessment to identify and target high-risk cargo movements and facilitate low-risk traffic. Other objectives are strengthening processes to conduct out-bound enforcement and interdiction of travelers and cargo as well as advance a comprehensive, predictive targeting strategy to identify threats as early as possible.
The third goal is about enhancing the US economic competitiveness by facilitating lawful trade and travel. The goal consists of objectives that seek to reduce cost of trade and travel by streamlining customs processes. Other objectives are to harmonize procedures throughout US government agencies and to develop risk-segmentation for better facilitation of low-risk trade and travel. Agility and adaptability of the CBP organization is the fourth goal. Sub-goals, or objectives, include optimization of CBP’s organizational structure, strengthening organizational structure and advance CBP’s effectiveness through technologies and business innovations. The vision document concludes with a presentation of principles and process of risk management in the customs context.
This vision document contains lots of relevant information for many CORE work packages, especially for those that deal with US-bound supply chains (WP9, WP14 and WP17. Certainly, also work packages dealing with risk assessment and educational material benefit from this material. Altogether, revealing strategic priorities of the CBP, the document reflects the trends of customs-centric supply chain security worldwide, and this information is very valuable for CORE and its work packages.
Reference
US CBP, 2015. Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration
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Summary
Pan-African economic integration has progressed over past years, producing a broad range of regional trade agreements and economic communities that seek to harmonise policies, develop common infrastructure and remove barriers to intra-African trade. Against expectations, however, this increased integration has not translated into strong economic growth in Africa. This article discusses how sub-Saharan countries can overcome trade barriers that undermine the African economic integration. The article’s focus is on border posts and customs procedures that play a key role in facilitating cross-border traffic.
According to the article, the problems of international trade in Africa are largely explained by inadequate infrastructure that creates congestion and limits connectivity, delays that stem from complex and manual customs procedures, corruption and by illicit trade. One-stop-border-posts are a promising approach to streamline customs procedures and curb corruption. The joint border post may bring trade facilitation benefits as significant as costly investments on roads, ports, bridges and other transport infrastructure. The articles highlights the Chirundu One-Stop Border Post between Zambia and Zimbabwe as a successful case of border agency cooperation. Previous Observatory review (CORE2008, 20 January 2016) describes the Chirundu border crossing in more detail.
The paper concludes by suggesting One-Stop-Border-Post as a promising way towards higher trade facilitation and African integration. To organise one-stop-border-post, the first thing to do is to analyse roles and procedures of different border control agencies. The task of high-level governance is to define how responsibilities across the various border control agencies are harmonised, coordinated and delegated. Metrics and statistics should underpin the design, as numerical data into traffic flows and clearance times are likely to reveal the major bottlenecks in the cross-border traffic. Finally, the article proposes extended exchange of information and data across government agencies, domestically and internationally. The article is available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE_INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE.pdf
Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)
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Full review
The discussion on one-stop-border-posts in the African context is closely related to the CORE project and its many work packages. Especially the WP12, the demonstrator Schipol, that deals with imports of fresh cut flowers from Kenya to the Netherlands, benefits from the insights into African bureaucratic practices at many African borders. The demonstrator should consider the set of recommendations for higher border agency cooperation that the article proposes. Besides the demonstrators, the article provides a concise and informative outlook on international in Africa. At least CORE’s WP19, should consider the African perspective on cross-border trade when developing training material.
Reference
Barka, H., B., 2012. Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions. African Development Bank
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Summary: Existing customs Regulation ((EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code) and aviation legislation (Regulation (EC) No 300/2008) provides for certain recognition of the certifications under the respective programmes, in particular with regard to the security examinations done for each of them. Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 is necessary for the recognition of the known consignor status with its relevance for the AEO as well, frame the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programmes and allow for the necessary exchange of information between customs and aviation authorities. The 889/2014 is available for download at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0889&from=EN.
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Full review: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 now provides that if the applicant for Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) status is already a regulated agent or a known consignor, the criterion on ‘appropriate security and safety standards’ shall be deemed to be met in relation to the premises for which the economic operator obtained the status of regulated agent or known consignor. Points 6.3.1.2 and 6.4.1.2 of the Annex to Commission Regulation (EU) No 185/2010 (4) provide that the appropriate authority, or independent validator acting on its behalf, should take into account whether or not the applicant for regulated agent or known consignor is a holder of an AEO certificate.
The practical implementation of both the customs legislation governing the AEO status and the aviation legislation governing the regulated agent and known consignor has shown that the existing recognition between the programmes is not sufficient to ensure the highest possible synergies between the respective security programmes. The security requirements for both the aviation security regulated agent and known consignor programme and for the customs AEO programme are equivalent to such an extent that both programmes may be aligned further.
Further alignment of both programmes in terms of equal level of recognition, including required exchange of information is necessary in order to decrease the administrative burden for the economic sector concerned and government authorities (both customs and civil aviation) while strengthening further the current level of security.
Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 is necessary for the recognition of the known consignor status with its relevance for the AEO as well, frame the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programmes and allow for the necessary exchange of information between customs and aviation authorities.
The issuing customs authority shall immediately make available to the appropriate national authority responsible for civil aviation security the following minimum information related to the status of authorised economic operator which it has at its disposal:
Relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. The following Work Packages are directly impacted by the implementing regulation (EU) No 889/2014:
The CORE demonstrators affected by the implementing regulation (EU) No 889/2014 are:
Also, WP19 is affected here: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development. Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasizing international co-operation to promote harmonization of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.
Cross-references and citations:
CORE1069
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Summary: This report reviews container security technologies that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has evaluated and tested between 2004 and 2009. These container security technologies aim to (1) detect and report unauthorized intrusions into the shipping containers and (2) to track the movement of the containers through the supply chain. As of 2009, DHS has funded and tested four different container security technologies. So far, none of the candidate technologies meet all desired functional requirements: main problems are high false alarm rates, low detection probability, and difficult installation and calibration. Besides the unsatisfactory test results, the report points out problems of conducting the phase II practical “trade lane” testing in the context of the maritime transport only. The report recommends to test the technologies “across all operational scenarios,” considering contextual differences across different modes of transport. Once the technologies would pass this extended trade lane testing, the DHS should (1) obtain support from the trade industry and international partners, (2) develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for using the technology, and (3) certify the container security technologies for use. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-887.
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Full review: This GAO document describes in detail the four container security technologies that DHS has tested since 2004, and one of these technologies happens to be the very same “composite security container” that the WP22 CORE demonstration studies. The report discusses in details the problems that the previous tests and pilots of container security technologies have encountered. Being aware of the past problems help the CORE demonstrations to avoid past mistakes. In addition to the WP22 demonstration, the other demonstrations that involve tracking & tracing of intermodal containers benefit from the information of this GAO report. For instance, the GM demonstration on maritime shipping of automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven (WP9) might use this GAO document to evaluate available technical solutions for tracking the shipping containers. The demonstrations in work packages 14-17 involve tracking and tracing and therefore may use the detailed analysis this GAO report offers on available container security technologies.
Cross-references:
Full citation:
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended.
Additional keywords: Container security, maritime logistics, container security device, tracking & tracing
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Summary
The Guardian news article summarizes benefits and challenges of the African first one-stop border post, located at the Chirundu border crossing across the Zambezi river between Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the border post, officials in both countries inspect only inbound traffic, for example Zambian authorities control only incoming traffic from Zimbabwe. Thanks to this one-stop arrangement, trucks and barges are obliged to stop only once and undergo only one set of border formalities. The one-stop system has accelerated border crossing times tremendously, from a two or three day wait down to a thirty-minute rest. Moreover, the faster border formalities have translated into higher traffic at the border post (from earlier 2000 to today’s 14000 trucks per month) and associated larger tax and duty revenues. But most importantly, the faster and simpler border formalities have facilitated trade of many small-scale merchants, who commonly trade small amounts of food, clothes, and other everyday commodities. Today, these small merchants face less delays, cumbersome formalities, and arbitrary duties and facilitation payments that dishonest customs officials may impose on their goods. This progress has brought many of the informal merchants, who used to smuggle their merchandise before, back into the sphere of the formal economy. Even so, the smuggling is still a major problem in Africa: the article suggests that there are smuggling routes so established that 30 tonne trucks use them to evade customs controls, and that this informal smuggling economy accounts for a staggering one-third of the African gross domestic product (GDP). The article implies that the share of the informal economy could be further reduced through consolidation of African trade blocks (there are several), harmonization and simplification of border formalities, and enhanced border agency cooperation. The news report is available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/may/29/zambia-zimbabwe-intra-african-trade
Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)
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Full review
This Guardian article showcases a great example of successful border agency cooperation in Africa. The CORE WP12, the “demonstrator Schipol” focusing on shipping of fresh cut flowers from Kenya to the Netherlands, might choose to study this African one-stop border concept in more detail. Closer analysis may reveal key success factors and obstacles that characterize the border agency cooperation in Africa. Also CORE’s WP19, that produces material for training and education, may use this African one-stop border as an illustrative example of border agency cooperation in developing countries. The CORE’s risk and IT clusters might need to explore this case in more detail to understand technical aspects of this one-stop border post concept.
Reference
The Guardian, Zambia and Zimbabwe’s single-stop solution to boosting intra-African trade, the Guardian, 29. May, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/may/29/zambia-zimbabwe-intra-african-trade
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Summary: The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code sets new standards for security for ships at sea as well as port facilities around the world. It aims to make shipping activities more secure against threats of terrorism, piracy and smuggling. Security at sea has been a concern to governments, shipping lines, port authorities and importers and exporters for years. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, provided the catalyst for formalizing tough new security measures. In December of 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) organized a conference to discuss issues related to security at sea. At this conference, representatives from 150 nations (the Contracting Governments) participated in drafting amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, and the ISPS Code was adopted. Changes to the SOLAS Convention include amendments to Chapters V and XI, and Chapter XI was divided into Chapters XI-1 and XI-2. The new Chapter XI-2 provides the umbrella ISPS regulations. The Code itself is divided into two parts. Part A presents mandatory requirements, Part B contains guidance regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the Code. Source document is available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/bestpractices/32.pdf
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Full review: The Code aims, among other things, to establish an international framework for co-operation between Contracting Governments, government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade and to establish relevant roles and responsibilities at the national and international level. ISPS provisions relating to port facilities relate solely to the ship/port interface. Also, ISPS provisions do not extend to the actual response to attacks or to any necessary clear-up activities after such an attack. In addition, for each ship and port authority affected, the ISPS Code requires:
Enforcement Date: The ISPS Code went into effect on July 1, 2004.
Full citation: Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, International Maritime Organization. SOLAS/CONF.5/32. 12 December 2002
Keywords: Maritime Security, Port Security, Ship Security Plan (SSP), Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), Ship Security Officer (SSO), Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
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Summary
International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)
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Full review
International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls.
The new methods for cross-border money laundering and tax evasion concern most CORE demonstrations, especially those involving international cargo movements. The emerging risk of trade-based money laundering calls for new and more effective enforcement of trade transactions. CORE is developing new solutions (e.g., data pipeline and system-based supervision) for capturing and sharing trade information across logistics operators and law enforcement agencies. The new solutions likely improve law enforcement’s capability to detect suspicious trade transactions that may have something to do with the trade-based money laundering. However, building such capability requires IT integration (e.g., interoperability), risk awareness and education and training. CORE consortium addresses these complementary activities in work carried out in risk, IT and educational clusters.
Reference
Trade and money laundering uncontained, the Economist, May 3rd 2014
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Summary
Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route to the strengthened enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. The South American cocaine smuggling routes have displaced several times over the years due, and now again the Caribbean route is the same one than traffickers used two decades ago. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.
The drug traffickers move significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes, sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)
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Full review
Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route strengthened law enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. Because traffickers prefer smuggling routes that offer the highest profit-to-risk ratios, the South American cocaine smuggling networks are evolving constantly. Routes have displaced several times over the years, and now the route is again the same than two decades ago.
Today, traffickers move again significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes and sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.
Trends of international drug trafficking often influence intensity of law enforcement efforts in global supply chains. Thus, changes in South American drug trafficking may affect also the two CORE trade lanes that import goods from the region into Europe, (1) imports of fresh cut flowers from Colombia to the Netherlands (WP11) and (2) imports of coffee and cocoa beans from South America to Europe (WP13). These trade lanes may become subject to more intense anti-drug controls over the following years. Besides the CORE demo cluster, also the CORE risk cluster benefit from the insight this article provides on the recent trends in routes, volumes and methods of the South American drug trafficking. This information may be useful for CORE’s activities that are developing educational and training material.
Reference
Drug trafficking in the Caribbean – the Full circle, the Economist, May 24th 2014
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