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CORE-Observatory

MARITIME SECURITY – DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security, GAO, July 2010 (CORE1064)

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Summary: This GAO report analyses the progress the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in maritime supply chain security over the past five to ten years. The report raises problems that the DHS and its component agencies – the Coast Guard and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) – have encountered regarding improvement of risk management, reduction of the vulnerability to threats of small vessels, implementation of security assessment in foreign ports, and the overall progress in supply chain security.  The report states that so far the Coast Guard has carried out risk assessments, but their results do not allow effective comparison and prioritization of risks across ports. The Coast guard has also identified points of vulnerability related to waterside attacks by small vessels, reached out to the general public to encourage recreational sailors to report anomalies, started tracking of small vessel, tested equipment to screen small vessels for nuclear material and conducted security maneuvers such as vessel escorts. Nevertheless, resource constraints and technical problems prevent the Coast Guard to protect the US coastline and maritime infrastructure from small-vessel threats effectively. Moreover, the Coast Guard has been assessing security in foreign ports, but the lack of the agency’s resources and certain countries’ reluctance to collaborate with the US authorities have slowed down the global security assessment. Finally, as for the general supply chain security, the DHS has been running the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) in foreign ports to test the feasibility of the 100% scanning of US-bound shipping containers with non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection equipment. The findings of the SFI pilots indicate that the 100% scanning is not a feasible policy because it would disrupt port logistics, damage international trade and raise healthy concerns, among other things. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/660/659087.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO review concentrates on the US maritime supply chain security. The document provides important information for people who are working for the CORE demonstrations of WP1 and WP14 because these demos involve maritime transportation into and from the US mainland. Those demonstrations that test tracking & tracking solutions might benefit from the document’s update on small-vessel identification and tracking systems.

Cross-references:

  • Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational Benefits, but Challenges Remain. GAO-10-433R. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
  • Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C., June 12, 2008.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, supply chain security, 100% scanning and track & trace

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security Programs, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1019)

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Summary: The report provides a comprehensive review of progress and challenges of various port security activities and programs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has carried out since 9/11. In essence, the report is a summary and an update of a number of more detailed GAO reports on maritime supply chain security. The report states that needs to strengthen further its efforts on maritime domain awareness through intensified communication among maritime stakeholders. Regarding the US domestic port security, the report recommends DHS to reassess its Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) that allows ports to request funds for security projects and to improve quality of vulnerability assessment in US ports. The report also urges DHS to overcome challenges of risk-based targeting and scanning of US-bound shipping containers.  The findings and recommendations of this report help CORE consortium understand the current state of the US maritime security regime. This understanding benefits particularly the demonstrations of WP9 and WP14. Also educational and training as well as risk clusters of CORE may find the report’s information useful. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/670/663784.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO document summarizes the US maritime supply chain security and provides useful information for the CORE project across its work packages. This information most obviously benefits WP9 and WP14 that involve US-bound maritime trade lanes. However, also the CORE’s risk cluster can find useful insight in the report, for example about challenges and opportunities of risk-based container targeting and screening approaches. This summary GAO document caters the needs of state-of-the-art work packages and the CORE’s educational and training cluster that aims to produce relevant and up-to-date material about supply chain security for a variety of stakeholders.

Cross-references:

  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18,
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System, GAO-13-9. October 25, 2012.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), risk-based controls, targeting, container scanning

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders, GAO, November 2013 (CORE1018)

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Summary: This report is a summary of previous GAO reports on US maritime supply chain security and border controls. The report focuses on progress and challenges in four main areas of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) activity on the maritime security. The report highlights that DHS and its component Coast Guard agency could improve its maritime domain awareness through increased information sharing and more advanced vessel-tracking systems. The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in turn could step up its role in securing US-bound container traffic by conducting more frequent risk assessment audits in key foreign ports that ship cargo into the US and by fostering more close relationship with foreign authorities. The GAO report also recommends the Coast Guard to rethink its maritime surveillance, interdiction and security operations because current protection and support is not adequate in high priority locations. The report also calls for more collaboration and coordination among maritime authorities, port operators and ocean carriers. Finally, the report encourages the DHS to develop performance metrics and data collection procedures the agency uses to assess and monitor its maritime security programs and activities. This report gives a recent update on the US maritime security activities that might be helpful for CORE demonstrations and clusters. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/660/659087.pdf.

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Full review: This summary GAO documents provides detailed background material about the US maritime security programs. This information is very relevant for the CORE demonstrations WP9 and WP14 that involve shipping cargo from and into the US. The information this document offers also help the CORE’s risk and IT clusters to learn lessons from the US approach to risk-based maritime security and security-related IT integration.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security. GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2010.
  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports. GAO-13-764. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2013.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, maritime surveillance, risk-based controls, targeting, container scanning

 

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MARITIME SECURITY – Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit From Agency Assessments, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1017)

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Summary: This GAO report explains how the US government agencies have fought sea piracy around the Horn of Africa and at the Gulf of Guinea since 2010. The report also describes the current state of sea piracy threats in these two areas, and it urges US government agencies to reconsider their resource allocations, strategies and tactics related to the counterpiracy efforts. The report points out that the number of annual piracy incidents at the Gulf of Guinea has surpassed the yearly incidents off the Horn of Africa. This shift in pirate attacks prompt changes in the US counterpiracy operations. However, as the report points out, the US government agencies responsible for the counterpiracy activities have not recently conducted reassessments of their actions, despite the changing conditions. The report therefore recommends the US government agencies to re-evaluate the counterpiracy efforts, especially at the Gulf of Guinea that is becoming the most important hotspot of the international sea piracy. This GAO report provides information about modern sea piracy from which CORE’s maritime demonstrations might benefit. The report is available for download at: www.gao.gov/assets/670/664268.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO report delivers a comprehensive analysis of the current state of sea piracy at the two African hotspots and the US government’s counterpiracy efforts. This information benefits those CORE demonstrations that involve maritime shipping. The detailed description of the US counterpiracy efforts might also inspire the risk cluster to find effective and efficient risk-based solutions to protect maritime logistics and transport from sea piracy.

Cross-references:

  • Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.

Additional keywords: Maritime security, sea piracy

 

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Review of TAPA TACSS – Air Cargo Security Standards, 2012 (CORE1045)

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Summary: TAPA TACSS – Air Cargo Security Standards (TACSS) is a certifiable security program for the air cargo industry to close down, as much as possible, all risks for high value freight whilst being handled and transported on the ground. Available to General Public at the TAPA Website, this standard is hyperlinked here: https://www.tapaemea.com

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Full review: The Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) is a self-funded industry group comprising of manufacturers, shippers, logistics providers and law enforcement agencies that share the objective to eliminate loss of product by criminal act. The theft of high value, high risk products moving in supply chains in Europe costs businesses in excess of € 8.2 billion a year.

Although the focus of TAPA is to stop the unauthorized removal of items from the logistics chain, many of the methods used by criminals to achieve this are entirely relevant to the other security threats seen within the industry. E.g. unauthorized entry, deception techniques, tampering of shipments etc.  TAPA has created a number of certifiable security standards:

  • FSR (Freight Security Requirements)
  • TSR (Trucking Security Requirements)
  • PSR (Parking Security Requirements)
  • TACSS (TAPA Air Cargo Security Standards)

The latter one, TACSS is a set of security standards designed specifically for Air Cargo Handling Facilities. It takes into account the mode of operation of such terminals often having open doors, and yet often operating inside a secure area within an airport, behind a fence. By providing comprehensive requirements and a certification scheme for the protection of air cargo whilst being transported on the ground, TAPA hopes to provide its own members and industry partners with viable options for improving and/or maintaining an effective air cargo security program.

There are two levels to the Standard. Level 1 & Level 2, with 1 being the higher level of security, and the decision of which Level to certify against is decided by risk assessment which takes into account the geographical location of the facility and crime levels in the area. Certification is by Independent Validator against a checklist and valid for 2 years.

Detailed analysis of relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. Among all Work Packages of the project, some are directly impacted by the project, while others are solely primarily or secondarily contributed. Among these Work Packages, the CORE demonstrators will validate the applicability and benefits of the CORE approach in representative operating scenarios characteristic of the global supply chain. They will specifically show the way towards a Global Secure Supply Chain. The overriding goal is to demonstrate substantial gains in security and facilitation covering every major facet of the supply chain security sector.

The following Work Packages are directly impacted by the TACSS initiative:

  • WP7: CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment – provide an integrated set of tools for developing solutions for the Demonstrators in line with SCSRF utilizing results from reference projects particularly e-Freight and ICargo.
  • WP12: Demonstrator Schiphol – apply global data pipeline concept to air cargo supply chains, managing air freight specific trade compliance requirements, and offering supply chain visibility in dashboards. Trade lanes with e.g. Africa, involving multiple inspection authorities.
  • WP17: DHL Demonstrator – managing airfreight trade compliance requirements EU-US in the context of fast supplying of parts. In this demonstrator, TAPA TACSS and mutual recognition with the US will become evident.

The following Work Packages are primarily affected by TAPA TACSS, as airfreight is part of global supply chain:

  • WP14: Demonstrator FALACUS – FastLAne through CUStoms – implement an extensive supply chain of ceramics products along international corridors between Italy and USA.
  • WP15: Decathlon Demonstrator – operational and security related Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) within the CORE framework will be applied to monitor the overall level of security within the supply chain for different supply chain actors Taiwan to retail shop destinations across Europe implementation of this new transit modality and the impact it would have on the overall performance of the supply chain.
  • WP19: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development – Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasizing international co-operation to promote harmonization of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.

The TACSS Initiative could also help with the following Work Packages, with the following secondary effects:

  • WP3: Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis (MTVA) Suite
  • WP4: SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps
  • WP5: Real-time Lean Agile Resilient Green Optimized (LARG+O) SC
  • WP16: ENI Demonstrator
  • WP22: Analysis and Testing of a Secure Hybrid Composite Container

CORE Impact anticipation: CORE seeks to give consolidated solutions and develop the resilience, optimization and interoperability of the global supply chain, including Port, Container, Post, Truck, Rail, Maritime and Air. Air freight is thence a part of the global vision of CORE. TAPA TACCS contributes thence directly to CORE vision. Impact?

Cross-references: Air Cargo World on TAPA TACSS and air cargo crimes: www.aircargoworld.com

Full citation: TAPA EMEA Website, TACSS Page, accessed 23 September 2014: https://www.tapaemea.com

 

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Review of IATA E-Freight – an air cargo industry initiative facilitated by IATA, to remove paper from the supply chain, 2014 (CORE1044)

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Summary: Launched by IATA in 2006 as part of the StB program, E-Freight became an industry-wide initiative involving carriers, freight forwarders, ground handlers, shippers and customs authorities. The roadmap to 100% E-Freight outlines a shared end-to-end industry approach with clear leadership roles, around three core components, or “pillars”:

  • Pillar I: Engaging regulators and governments worldwide to create an ‘e-freight route network’ with fully electronic customs procedures and where regulations support paperless shipments.
  • Pillar II: Working collaboratively within the cargo supply chain to digitize the core industry transport documents, starting with the air waybill.
  • Pillar III: Developing a plan to digitize the commercial and special cargo documents typically accompanying airfreight today, in or outside of the ‘Cargo pouch’ 2014 targets.

Year 2014 target was to grow global e-AWB penetration to 22%. Available to General Pubic at the IATA Website, this standard is hyperlinked here: http://www.iata.org

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Full review: Benefits: E-freight will bring following benefits to the air cargo industry:

  • Operational – shorter transit times, less paperwork (no copying/ printing/data-capturing)
  • Quality – improved transparency, reduced chance of data errors, no missing documents
  • Security – improved control of distribution of shipment details
  • Environmental – reduced paper consumption

Two key challenges of implementation: The first is that the ‘Contract of Carriage’ is printed on the reverse side of the paper Air Waybill. Without this, it is imperative that this ‘Contract’ is secured by other means. With this in mind, IATA has created a standard multilateral agreement that can be signed by Carrier and Agent / Forwarder as appropriate. The multi-lateral agreement was released in 2013, and will improve the numbers of e-freight shipments considerably. The second challenge is relevant to CORE and that is the electronic shipment data. This exists in two forms: FHL at House Air waybill level, and FWB at Master Air waybill level. Here the challenge is to get ‘first time right’ data. Without the correct data, any congruence checks made with the physical shipment will not align, and the shipment cannot be shipped. It is almost like turning up at the airport as a passenger with your brother’s passport.

Detailed analysis of relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. Among all Work Packages of the project, some are directly impacted by the project, while others are solely primarily or secondarily contributed. Among these Work Packages, the CORE demonstrators will validate the applicability and benefits of the CORE approach in representative operating scenarios characteristic of the global supply chain. They will specifically show the way towards a Global Secure Supply Chain. The overriding goal is to demonstrate substantial gains in security and facilitation covering every major facet of the supply chain security sector.

Data is relevant in the CORE project as it could be an enabler of some data screening, either to assess for cargo deemed to be more of a risk (like the ACAS trial running in North America), or even to specifically identify and target a specific shipment.

The following CORE Work Packages are directly impacted by the E-Freight initiative:

  • WP7: CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment – provide an integrated set of tools for developing solutions for the Demonstrators in line with SCSRF utilizing results from reference projects particularly e-Freight and iCargo.
  • WP12: Demonstrator Schiphol – apply global data pipeline concept to air cargo supply chains, managing air freight specific trade compliance requirements, and offering supply chain visibility in dashboards. Trade lanes with e.g. Africa, involving multiple inspection authorities.
  • WP17: DHL Demonstrator – managing airfreight trade compliance requirements EU-US in the context of fast supplying of parts. In this demonstrator, Cargo 2000 and mutual recognition with the US will become evident.

The following Work Packages are primarily contributed by E-Freight, as airfreight is part of global supply chain:

  • WP14: Demonstrator FALACUS – FastLAne through CUStoms – implement an extensive supply chain of ceramics products along international corridors between Italy and USA.
  • WP15: Decathlon Demonstrator – operational and security related Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) within the CORE framework will be applied to monitor the overall level of security within the supply chain for different supply chain actors Taiwan to retail shop destinations across Europe implementation of this new transit modality and the impact it would have on the overall performance of the supply chain.
  • WP19: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development – Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasizing international co-operation to promote harmonization of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.

The E-Freight Initiative could also help with the following Work Packages, which are secondarily affected:

  • WP3: Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis (MTVA) Suite
  • WP4: SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps
  • WP5: Real-time Lean Agile Resilient Green Optimised (LARG+O) SC
  • WP16: ENI Demonstrator
  • WP22: Analysis and Testing of a Secure Hybrid Composite Container

CORE Impact anticipation: CORE seeks to give consolidated solutions and develop the resilience, optimization and interoperability of the global supply chain, including Port, Container, Post, Truck, Rail, Maritime and Air. E-Freight contributes thence directly to the CORE vision.

Cross-references: WCO News Magazine: http://www.wcoomd.org

Full citation: IATA Website, E-Freight Page, accessed 23 September 2014: http://www.iata.org

 

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Review of Cargo 2000, C2K – an IATA interest group with the mission of creating and implementing quality standards for the worldwide air cargo industry, 2015 (CORE1043)

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Summary: Cargo 2000 is the quality standard for the tracking, measuring general air cargo shipments. It is a project commenced in 1997 and is supported by a self-funded group of the world’s leading Airlines, Forwarders, Ground Handling Agents and specialist IT providers. IATA then provides oversight, administration and facilitation on behalf of the Membership. Cargo 2000 (C2K) uses standard recognized IATA Cargo-IMP (Interline Message Procedures) already used within the air cargo industry to provide reference points for measurement. These are known as FSU (Freight Status Update) messages. The key metrics under C2K are NFD (Notified for Delivery), in which case the destination has received both the physical cargo shipment and the information (paper or electronic) is available for collection by the Agent of the Consignee, and FAP, Flown as planned. In this case, the service delivered matches that which was promised to the customer in terms of timings and flights. In order to simplify and standardize the various processes that support C2K, as it is used by multiple stakeholders in a live environment, the C2K Master Operating Plan (MOP) was completely revised in 2012. The result is a very visual process description that allows every stakeholder to clearly see the part they play in the overall end-to-end routing of the shipment. The visual nature of the schematics, also allows the assessment of any new legislation, processes or procedures to be predicted both up and down the chain. Available to General Pubic at the IATA Website, this standard is hyperlinked here: http://www.iata.org

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Full review: Relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. Among all Work Packages of the project, some are directly impacted by the project, while others are solely primarily or secondarily contributed. Among these Work Packages, the CORE demonstrators will validate the applicability and benefits of the CORE approach in representative operating scenarios characteristic of the global supply chain. They will specifically show the way towards a Global Secure Supply Chain. The overriding goal is to demonstrate substantial gains in security and facilitation covering every major facet of the supply chain security sector.

The following CORE Work Packages are directly impacted by the C2K Industry Standards:

  • WP7: CORE Connectivity Infrastructure and Solutions Development Environment – provide an integrated set of tools for developing solutions for the Demonstrators in line with SCSRF utilising results from reference projects particularly e-Freight and iCargo.
  • WP12: Demonstrator Schiphol – apply global data pipeline concept to air cargo supply chains, managing air freight specific trade compliance requirements, and offering supply chain visibility in dashboards. Trade lanes with e.g. Africa, involving multiple inspection authorities.
  • WP17: DHL Demonstrator – managing airfreight trade compliance requirements EU-US in the context of fast supplying of parts. In this demonstrator, Cargo 2000 and mutual recognition with the US will become evident.

The following CORE Work Packages are primarily contributed by C2K:

  • WP14: Demonstrator FALACUS – FastLAne through CUStoms – implement an extensive supply chain of ceramics products along international corridors between Italy and USA.
  • WP15: Decathlon Demonstrator – operational and security related Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) within the CORE framework will be applied to monitor the overall level of security within the supply chain for different supply chain actors Taiwan to retail shop destinations across Europe implementation of this new transit modality and the impact it would have on the overall performance of the supply chain.
  • WP19: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasising international co-operation to promote harmonisation of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.

The C2K Standard will have the secondary effects on the following Work Packages:

  • WP3: Multi-method Threat and Vulnerability Analysis (MTVA) Suite
  • WP4: SC Situational Awareness Tools & Maps
  • WP5: Real-time Lean Agile Resilient Green Optimised (LARG+O) SC
  • WP16: ENI Demonstrator
  • WP22: Analysis and Testing of a Secure Hybrid Composite Container

CORE Impact Anticipation: CORE seeks to give consolidated solutions and develop the resilience, optimisation and interoperability of the global supply chain, including Port, Container, Post, Truck, Rail, Maritime and Air. Cargo 2000 contributes thence directly to CORE vision.

Cross References: Introduction to Cargo 2000 by IATA, http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/cargo2000/Documents/c2k-introduction.pdf

Full Citation: IATA Website, Cargo 2000 Page, accessed 22 September 2014: http://www.iata.org

 

CORE1043

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C-TPAT Program Benefits Reference Guide, 2014 (CORE1032)

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Summary: This guidebook outlines the key elements and benefits of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program that is designed to secure global supply chains and to improve United States border security. Document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/C-TPAT%20Program%20Benefits%20Guide.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: C-TPAT partners receive a wide range of benefits listed below:

  • C-TPAT Partners are examined at a considerably lower rate than non-C-TPAT Partners.
  • C-TPAT certified/validated highway carrier Partners are granted expedited border crossing privileges. C-TPAT Partners at many Canada/Mexico land border ports of entry have access to Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Lanes.
  • Some categories of C-TPAT importer Partners are exempt from stratified exams.
  • C-TPAT shipments subject to examination are moved ahead of any non-C-TPAT shipments, to the extent possible.
  • In the event of a significant disruption/delay in cargo processing operations, actions are taken to maintain communication and coordination with C-TPAT Partners for business resumption.
  • C-TPAT Partners’ trade compliance issues are given priority over those issues related to non-C-TPAT Partners.
  • Each C-TPAT Partner is assigned a Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS) who coordinates between the C-TPAT Partner and the US Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP). The Specialist also assists the Partner with supply chain security issues.
  • Partners have access to the C-TPAT’s automated Portal system, to communicate with CBP and exchange program related information in a secure manner.
  • C-TPAT Partners are eligible to attend C-TPAT events like the annual Conference and other training seminars organized by the program.
  • C-TPAT importer Partners are eligible to participate in the Importer Self-Assessment (ISA) Program.
  • The Penalty Mitigation benefit is granted to sea carriers for late submission of data required under the Importer Security Filing requirements.
  • C-TPAT members are eligible to participate in other U.S. Government pilot programs, such as the Food and Drug Administration’s Secure Supply Chain program.

In addition, some benefits are associated with Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) when two customs authorities formally acknowledge the security requirements or standards of one program, as being equivalent to the other program. Some of the resulting benefits to the trade community are illustrated below:

  • C-TPAT importer Partners that also conduct export operations and Partners of the foreign Customs Administration programs (manufacturers and exporters of record) are granted a reduction in their overall cargo risk score, implying fewer examinations at export and import ports.
  • A C-TPAT validation for an overseas partner is not required if an MRA is in place because CBP recognizes the status of the Partner in the foreign partnership program.
  • Companies covered by MRAs need only to comply with a common set of security requirements, avoiding the hassle of following multiple sets of requirements from one partnership program to another.
  • MRAs lead to more transparency in international commerce. Mutual exchange of information between these partners facilitates trade across Mutual Recognition Partner nations.

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C-TPAT Best Practices Catalog Addendum, 2009 (CORE1031)

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Summary: This addendum document lists cargo security best practices with focus on prevention of weapons of mass effect, terrorists, and/or contraband from infiltrating into the international supply chain. Each best practice is linked to a specific business entity, such as a Manufacturing Company, a Highway Carrier, an Importer or a Foreign Consolidator but these may apply to other business types as well. The document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ctpat_bpa_2009_0.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: The best practices are outlined as follows:

Risk assessment: Programs are in place to enable the identification of the most vulnerable supply chain areas, to grade suppliers supply chain security criteria. Specific processes have been developed to manage the supplier’s products, software and services and internal monitoring systems to enhance the safety and security procedures.

Business partner requirements: Several security measures have been taken by entities. These include conducting supply chain security audits to ensure compliance of non-C-TPAT business partners; carrying out security audits of a foreign manufacturer; making security self-assessments, conducting onsite inspections to ensure freight security; shipping cargo only through accredited ports and steamship lines; monitoring compliance of manufacturing facilities; screening procurements to identify ineligible status of suppliers, and performing audits of business partners.

Conveyance/Container/Trailer Security: Examples of such security practices are: integrating special security features in the GPS (global positioning system); using laser beams to protect trailers; using colour codes for matching consignments; installing infrared sensors in docks to prevent unauthorized access; using special codes to identify correct shipments; documenting all seal changes for shipments in transit; ensuring delivery by authorized Company drivers; sealing containers; operating through C-TPAT carriers; using only “seaworthy” containers; installing in-transit temperature data sensors to ensure product quality; enclosing container storage area; conducting non-intrusive inspection prior to loading a vessel; establishing specific inspection points; using multiple security devices on each container; using automated container yards; instructing foreign suppliers to provide inspection checklists; using dock locking arms for container storage; installing motion sensors in a trailer; operating through contracted highway carriers and security services; documenting a seal destruction policy, and so forth.

Physical Access Controls: Some practices by Importers include establishing multiple security stations within the building; using metal detectors for employees; installing an electronic swipe card/ lock box systems for access control for sensitive documents; conducting electronic scanning of visitors’ drivers licenses; utilizing a third-party software system to manage key inventory; and providing panic buttons for company employees.

Physical Security: Several innovative solutions have been designed to ensure physical security, such as electronically closing gates and activating tire puncturing devices to prevent vehicle exits; using an electronic security information reporting system, installing invisible electronic fences; installing laser sensors; setting up optical light beams to detect intruders; fitting double locks on doors; Installing infrared sensors on fences; using body alarm functions for emergencies; appointing patrolling guards, using multiple glass meeting rooms; using multiple interior infrared security alarm beams to detect unauthorized access; and installing security guard view towers.

Personnel Security: An Importer requires business partners to provide a monthly master list of employees and immediately notify when their employees are hired or terminated, in order to ensure that only authorized business partner’s employees enter the manufacturing facilities.

Security Training/Threat Awareness/Outreach: Business entities have invested in a wide range of training programs. One such initiative is the four-tier C-TPAT training targeted for management and supervisors, shipping and receiving personnel, internal personnel dealing with contractors and hourly staff. Other businesses use different approaches, like establishing an online training portal;; offering general security training and of site-specific training for security guards; issuing security advisories; making regular security awareness assessments; establishing a situation matrix chart to address possible incidents; establishing a direct communication channel between the president of the company and employees; putting in place a toll free hotline for company personnel; conducting security drills and exercises; establishing a web-based security awareness training; documenting security incidents in a central database; and establishing a global communication system to contact all employees and contractors remotely.

Procedural Security: Instances of this type of security measures include a bio-thermal intrusion alarm system; a global SAP network to generate all written orders for import and export; automatic screening procedures of purchase orders for restricted parties; lock boxes for sensitive documentation; an automated loading module called the Automatic Truck Loading System (ATLS); a container seal number as the shipment tracking (invoice/bill of lading) number, and so forth.

Information Technology (IT) Security: Such security practices include a biometric fingerprint door lock; a remote data backup center; a retina scanning system for access to the computer system; requiring supervisory approval to copy data; use of electronic password protected purchase orders; establishing a daily “e-test” for employees to access computers, and so forth.

CORE1031

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CEN Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators, 2012 (CORE1030)

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Summary: This is a guidance document for small and medium sized enterprises, SMEs. on how to apply a supply chain security approach to their operations in order to mitigate the risk of criminal activities. It gives an overview of the main crime types occurring in the supply chain along with some countermeasures, as well as the supply chain security initiatives, and the compliance requirements thereof. The document is available for purchase e.g. at:   http://shop.bsigroup.com/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030258778  (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: The recommended supply chain strategy rests on a six-step approach. The first step is to define a context for the supply chain, crime prevention and security management activities taking into consideration the security sensitiveness, the geography and transport modes, and the main stakeholders involved in the supply chain operation. The second step is to make a threat and vulnerability analysis with regard to terrorist and other criminal threats in the supply chain. The main criteria included are the gaps existing in enhanced security, the high-risk crime types, and the potential consequences of crime occurrences. The third step covers the regulatory framework, the major aspects being the regulations and programs required for successful business operations, expectations of customers and suppliers, requirements laid down by insurance providers, and relevant government authorities. The fourth step refers to an overall security plan, taking into account the physical security, data security, human resources security (including selection, training, and exit procedures), business partner security (including selection, and auditing), and process control and monitoring of deviations. The fifth step involves implementing into practice concrete security measures, investment in technologies, procurement of services, in-house solutions and so forth. The final step is to monitor and measure the security performance and take appropriate corrective actions.

Five supply chain crime types have been elucidated in this guide. These include:  Property theft (cargo theft, intellectual property breaches); targeted damage (terrorism, sabotage); cross-border duty and tax fraud; illegitimate transporting, exporting and/or importing (smuggling of prohibited and restricted goods, people smuggling); and crime facilitation (document forgery, bogus companies, cybercrime). For each crime type, the main focus should be on the issue (main features and typical sectors/products involved), scope of the problem and actions to mitigate risks.

This guidebook has chosen eight security initiatives for illustration purposes. It explains the context of each initiative, whom it is meant for, and some basic requirements and the implications. These are as follows:

  • Import Control System (ICS) in the EU (a systems tool meant for the lodging and processing of Entry Summary Declarations, and for the exchange of messages across national customs agencies, economic operators and the European Commission).
  • Export Control System (ECS) in the EU (introduces EU procedures to computerize and control indirect exports and to implement the EU safety and security regulations);
  • Maritime Security Legislation, International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in the EU (International regulations to ensure the security of maritime transportation are being issued by the International Maritime Organization, IMO, in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code);
  • Aviation Security Legislation, Air Cargo Supply Chains in the EU (three categories of aviation security legislation exist in the EU- Framework regulation, supplementing regulations, and implementing regulations-all targeted towards civil aviation security).
  • European Union Authorized Economic Operator, EU AEO (operators involved in international trade of goods certified as complying with WCO or equivalent supply chain security standards);
  • Regulated agent, Known consignor and Account consignor in the EU (Specific “trusted trader” status existing in the European air cargo supply chains);
  • ISO 28000 Series of Standards on Supply Chain Security Management Systems (address potential security issues at all stages of the supply process, e.g. terrorism, fraud and piracy);
  • Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) in Europe (fighting cargo crime using real-time intelligence and the latest preventative measures).

CORE1030

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