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CORE-Observatory

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION – Progress and Challenges Faced in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs, GAO, March 2012 (CORE1004)

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Summary: The report discusses status and future challenges of the Transportation Security Administration’s three key security programs: The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. The two earlier programs are related to the passenger security, which not in the scope of the CORE project. The third TWIC program – an initiative for vetting backgrounds of maritime workers that require access to regulated maritime facilities and vessels – is the only program on supply chain security. The report recommends that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would improve its internal procedures (e.g., enrolment practices, background checking and quality control) and define and measure performance criteria for assessing the TWIC program’s efficiency and effectiveness. This GAO report discusses mainly passenger security programs that are not interesting for the CORE and for most of the project partners. However, learning about the TWIC program might be useful for at least those CORE demonstrations on maritime supply chain security. The document is available for download at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589587.pdf (accessed 12.3.2016)

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Full review: This GAO report has only a limited use in the CORE project because of its emphasis on passenger security programs (the Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC) program is the only program discussed in the report that has something to do with supply chain security). The CORE’s maritime demonstrations may find it useful to learn about the US way for managing credentials and access to regulated maritime facilities and vessels. The CORE’s risk cluster might learn something about conducting risk-based background checks for logistics workers, and the CORE’s educational cluster might use the description of CWIT, that this report provides, to produce training material and guidebooks on how to implement and maintain access control schemes.

CORE1004

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C-TPAT Program Benefits Reference Guide, 2014 (CORE1032)

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Summary: This guidebook outlines the key elements and benefits of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program that is designed to secure global supply chains and to improve United States border security. Document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/C-TPAT%20Program%20Benefits%20Guide.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: C-TPAT partners receive a wide range of benefits listed below:

  • C-TPAT Partners are examined at a considerably lower rate than non-C-TPAT Partners.
  • C-TPAT certified/validated highway carrier Partners are granted expedited border crossing privileges. C-TPAT Partners at many Canada/Mexico land border ports of entry have access to Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Lanes.
  • Some categories of C-TPAT importer Partners are exempt from stratified exams.
  • C-TPAT shipments subject to examination are moved ahead of any non-C-TPAT shipments, to the extent possible.
  • In the event of a significant disruption/delay in cargo processing operations, actions are taken to maintain communication and coordination with C-TPAT Partners for business resumption.
  • C-TPAT Partners’ trade compliance issues are given priority over those issues related to non-C-TPAT Partners.
  • Each C-TPAT Partner is assigned a Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS) who coordinates between the C-TPAT Partner and the US Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP). The Specialist also assists the Partner with supply chain security issues.
  • Partners have access to the C-TPAT’s automated Portal system, to communicate with CBP and exchange program related information in a secure manner.
  • C-TPAT Partners are eligible to attend C-TPAT events like the annual Conference and other training seminars organized by the program.
  • C-TPAT importer Partners are eligible to participate in the Importer Self-Assessment (ISA) Program.
  • The Penalty Mitigation benefit is granted to sea carriers for late submission of data required under the Importer Security Filing requirements.
  • C-TPAT members are eligible to participate in other U.S. Government pilot programs, such as the Food and Drug Administration’s Secure Supply Chain program.

In addition, some benefits are associated with Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) when two customs authorities formally acknowledge the security requirements or standards of one program, as being equivalent to the other program. Some of the resulting benefits to the trade community are illustrated below:

  • C-TPAT importer Partners that also conduct export operations and Partners of the foreign Customs Administration programs (manufacturers and exporters of record) are granted a reduction in their overall cargo risk score, implying fewer examinations at export and import ports.
  • A C-TPAT validation for an overseas partner is not required if an MRA is in place because CBP recognizes the status of the Partner in the foreign partnership program.
  • Companies covered by MRAs need only to comply with a common set of security requirements, avoiding the hassle of following multiple sets of requirements from one partnership program to another.
  • MRAs lead to more transparency in international commerce. Mutual exchange of information between these partners facilitates trade across Mutual Recognition Partner nations.

CORE1032

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C-TPAT Best Practices Catalog Addendum, 2009 (CORE1031)

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Summary: This addendum document lists cargo security best practices with focus on prevention of weapons of mass effect, terrorists, and/or contraband from infiltrating into the international supply chain. Each best practice is linked to a specific business entity, such as a Manufacturing Company, a Highway Carrier, an Importer or a Foreign Consolidator but these may apply to other business types as well. The document is available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ctpat_bpa_2009_0.pdf (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: The best practices are outlined as follows:

Risk assessment: Programs are in place to enable the identification of the most vulnerable supply chain areas, to grade suppliers supply chain security criteria. Specific processes have been developed to manage the supplier’s products, software and services and internal monitoring systems to enhance the safety and security procedures.

Business partner requirements: Several security measures have been taken by entities. These include conducting supply chain security audits to ensure compliance of non-C-TPAT business partners; carrying out security audits of a foreign manufacturer; making security self-assessments, conducting onsite inspections to ensure freight security; shipping cargo only through accredited ports and steamship lines; monitoring compliance of manufacturing facilities; screening procurements to identify ineligible status of suppliers, and performing audits of business partners.

Conveyance/Container/Trailer Security: Examples of such security practices are: integrating special security features in the GPS (global positioning system); using laser beams to protect trailers; using colour codes for matching consignments; installing infrared sensors in docks to prevent unauthorized access; using special codes to identify correct shipments; documenting all seal changes for shipments in transit; ensuring delivery by authorized Company drivers; sealing containers; operating through C-TPAT carriers; using only “seaworthy” containers; installing in-transit temperature data sensors to ensure product quality; enclosing container storage area; conducting non-intrusive inspection prior to loading a vessel; establishing specific inspection points; using multiple security devices on each container; using automated container yards; instructing foreign suppliers to provide inspection checklists; using dock locking arms for container storage; installing motion sensors in a trailer; operating through contracted highway carriers and security services; documenting a seal destruction policy, and so forth.

Physical Access Controls: Some practices by Importers include establishing multiple security stations within the building; using metal detectors for employees; installing an electronic swipe card/ lock box systems for access control for sensitive documents; conducting electronic scanning of visitors’ drivers licenses; utilizing a third-party software system to manage key inventory; and providing panic buttons for company employees.

Physical Security: Several innovative solutions have been designed to ensure physical security, such as electronically closing gates and activating tire puncturing devices to prevent vehicle exits; using an electronic security information reporting system, installing invisible electronic fences; installing laser sensors; setting up optical light beams to detect intruders; fitting double locks on doors; Installing infrared sensors on fences; using body alarm functions for emergencies; appointing patrolling guards, using multiple glass meeting rooms; using multiple interior infrared security alarm beams to detect unauthorized access; and installing security guard view towers.

Personnel Security: An Importer requires business partners to provide a monthly master list of employees and immediately notify when their employees are hired or terminated, in order to ensure that only authorized business partner’s employees enter the manufacturing facilities.

Security Training/Threat Awareness/Outreach: Business entities have invested in a wide range of training programs. One such initiative is the four-tier C-TPAT training targeted for management and supervisors, shipping and receiving personnel, internal personnel dealing with contractors and hourly staff. Other businesses use different approaches, like establishing an online training portal;; offering general security training and of site-specific training for security guards; issuing security advisories; making regular security awareness assessments; establishing a situation matrix chart to address possible incidents; establishing a direct communication channel between the president of the company and employees; putting in place a toll free hotline for company personnel; conducting security drills and exercises; establishing a web-based security awareness training; documenting security incidents in a central database; and establishing a global communication system to contact all employees and contractors remotely.

Procedural Security: Instances of this type of security measures include a bio-thermal intrusion alarm system; a global SAP network to generate all written orders for import and export; automatic screening procedures of purchase orders for restricted parties; lock boxes for sensitive documentation; an automated loading module called the Automatic Truck Loading System (ATLS); a container seal number as the shipment tracking (invoice/bill of lading) number, and so forth.

Information Technology (IT) Security: Such security practices include a biometric fingerprint door lock; a remote data backup center; a retina scanning system for access to the computer system; requiring supervisory approval to copy data; use of electronic password protected purchase orders; establishing a daily “e-test” for employees to access computers, and so forth.

CORE1031

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CEN Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators, 2012 (CORE1030)

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Summary: This is a guidance document for small and medium sized enterprises, SMEs. on how to apply a supply chain security approach to their operations in order to mitigate the risk of criminal activities. It gives an overview of the main crime types occurring in the supply chain along with some countermeasures, as well as the supply chain security initiatives, and the compliance requirements thereof. The document is available for purchase e.g. at:   http://shop.bsigroup.com/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030258778  (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: The recommended supply chain strategy rests on a six-step approach. The first step is to define a context for the supply chain, crime prevention and security management activities taking into consideration the security sensitiveness, the geography and transport modes, and the main stakeholders involved in the supply chain operation. The second step is to make a threat and vulnerability analysis with regard to terrorist and other criminal threats in the supply chain. The main criteria included are the gaps existing in enhanced security, the high-risk crime types, and the potential consequences of crime occurrences. The third step covers the regulatory framework, the major aspects being the regulations and programs required for successful business operations, expectations of customers and suppliers, requirements laid down by insurance providers, and relevant government authorities. The fourth step refers to an overall security plan, taking into account the physical security, data security, human resources security (including selection, training, and exit procedures), business partner security (including selection, and auditing), and process control and monitoring of deviations. The fifth step involves implementing into practice concrete security measures, investment in technologies, procurement of services, in-house solutions and so forth. The final step is to monitor and measure the security performance and take appropriate corrective actions.

Five supply chain crime types have been elucidated in this guide. These include:  Property theft (cargo theft, intellectual property breaches); targeted damage (terrorism, sabotage); cross-border duty and tax fraud; illegitimate transporting, exporting and/or importing (smuggling of prohibited and restricted goods, people smuggling); and crime facilitation (document forgery, bogus companies, cybercrime). For each crime type, the main focus should be on the issue (main features and typical sectors/products involved), scope of the problem and actions to mitigate risks.

This guidebook has chosen eight security initiatives for illustration purposes. It explains the context of each initiative, whom it is meant for, and some basic requirements and the implications. These are as follows:

  • Import Control System (ICS) in the EU (a systems tool meant for the lodging and processing of Entry Summary Declarations, and for the exchange of messages across national customs agencies, economic operators and the European Commission).
  • Export Control System (ECS) in the EU (introduces EU procedures to computerize and control indirect exports and to implement the EU safety and security regulations);
  • Maritime Security Legislation, International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in the EU (International regulations to ensure the security of maritime transportation are being issued by the International Maritime Organization, IMO, in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code);
  • Aviation Security Legislation, Air Cargo Supply Chains in the EU (three categories of aviation security legislation exist in the EU- Framework regulation, supplementing regulations, and implementing regulations-all targeted towards civil aviation security).
  • European Union Authorized Economic Operator, EU AEO (operators involved in international trade of goods certified as complying with WCO or equivalent supply chain security standards);
  • Regulated agent, Known consignor and Account consignor in the EU (Specific “trusted trader” status existing in the European air cargo supply chains);
  • ISO 28000 Series of Standards on Supply Chain Security Management Systems (address potential security issues at all stages of the supply process, e.g. terrorism, fraud and piracy);
  • Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) in Europe (fighting cargo crime using real-time intelligence and the latest preventative measures).

CORE1030

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – Examinations of High- Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed, GAO, January 2008 (CORE1010)

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Summary: This report reviews the progress that the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) – a program for screening US-bound high-risk shipping containers in foreign ports with X-ray and radiation detection solutions – since the latest 2005 GAO review. The report discusses how the CBP’s CSI efforts have (1) contributed to the long-term, strategic planning on the US supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI activities worldwide and (3) established means to evaluate performance of the CSI activities. The report recommends CBP to develop its data collection practices that are related to the CSI team performance and the host government’s inspections of the US-bound containers. This report provides relevant information for CORE demonstrations that deal with US-bound maritime logistics and commerce. Also the risk cluster might benefit from the descriptions of the US risk-based supply chain security scheme – Automated Targeting System (AST), 24-hour rule and the importer security filing 10+2 – that the report elaborates in detail. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08187.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO report elaborates the status and challenges of the US Container Security Initiative, but it also provides a comprehensive outlook on the US maritime supply chain security. This information is likely to be relevant for the CORE’s demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that deal with US-bound container traffic. The report is a good reference document for those CORE work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain and that are producing relevant training material on supply chain security. The CORE’s risk and IT clusters benefit from the information the report offers on risk-based security solutions that use advance cargo information to calculate risk scores for US-bound shipments by the aid of automatic risk assessment algorithms.

Cross-references:

  • Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
  • Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.
  • Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2004.
  • Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
  • Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
  • Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003.

Additional keywords: Container Security Initiative (CSI), counter-terrorism, homeland security, maritime supply chain security

CORE1010

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain, GAO, August 2008 (CORE1009)

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Summary: This report discusses how the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has (1) contributed to international supply chain security standards and (2) promoted mutual recognition in the customs security area and (3) how the agency expects to implement the 100% scanning requirement of the containerized US-bound maritime cargo. The report provides a detailed outlook on the US customs supply chain security scheme, and it highlights challenges and problems that the US government faces in promoting its supply chain security strategy internationally. The development and the implementation of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards, a suite of best practices on customs security, is a central theme throughout this GAO report. Because of its broad scope, the customs-related supply chain security, this document contains information that is likely to be useful for all CORE work packages, and especially for those that involve customs administrations. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279730.pdf.

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Full review: This document provides a detailed outlook on customs-centric supply chain security from the US government’s perspective. This unique view on the customs security is going to be useful for the CORE’s early work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain security. The information is also useful for the CORE demonstrations, in which customs administrations are involved. In particular, the demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that are about US-bound trade and logistics benefit from the detailed description of the customs security initiatives that the US government has introduced since the 9/11 tragedy.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008.
  • Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the SAFE Port Act. GAO-08-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation’s Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. April 26, 2007.
  • Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce Planning and Accountability. GAO-07-529. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007.
  • Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
  • Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.

Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, 100% scanning legislation, SAFE framework of standards, World Customs Organizations, Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) programs, Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism

CORE1009

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AVIATION SECURITY – Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO, April 2007 (CORE1008)

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Summary: This GAO reports reviews the current state and future challenges of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) and the Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) efforts for enhanced security of foreign origin US-bound air cargo. The report also discusses how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reached out to the air cargo industry and foreign authorities in order to strengthen the international air cargo security. The GAO report recommends that the DHS would establish a risk-based air cargo security strategy, improve interagency communication nationally, to step up compliance monitoring for the air cargo industry’s stakeholders and to assess the foreign authorities’ intent and capabilities to meet US expectations on the air cargo security that is the foundation for mutual recognition and international harmonization of regulatory frameworks on the air cargo security. This GAO report is going to be useful for the CORE risk and education cluster as well as for all the demonstrations that involve shipping of air cargo by air. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590789.pdf.

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Full review: This GAO report provides a comprehensive picture of the air cargo security in the US, in a country that is no doubt the leading force in supply chain security in general, and in air cargo security in particular. All CORE work that is related to air transport might benefit from the insights and information this GAO report offers. The DHL demonstration, that involves transport of parts for military aircraft from the US to Spain, is the most obvious work detail in CORE that can directly benefit from this GAO report. In addition, the CORE’s risk cluster can use the description of the US approach to risk-based air cargo security as a starting point when designing the CORE-specific risk-based strategies. Given that the report is very detailed and informative, the CORE’s education cluster can benefit from the report’s analysis and learn from its conclusions.

Cross-references:

  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).

Additional keywords: Air cargo security, mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, screening, advance cargo information, and counterterrorism

CORE1008

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 889/2014 of 14 August 2014 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, as regards recognition of the common security requirements under the regulated agent and known consignor programme and the Authorised Economic Operator programme, 2014 (CORE1069)

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Summary: Existing customs Regulation ((EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code) and aviation legislation (Regulation (EC) No 300/2008) provides for certain recognition of the certifications under the respective programmes, in particular with regard to the security examinations done for each of them. Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 is necessary for the recognition of the known consignor status with its relevance for the AEO as well, frame the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programmes and allow for the necessary exchange of information between customs and aviation authorities. The 889/2014 is available for download at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0889&from=EN.

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Full review: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 now provides that if the applicant for Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) status is already a regulated agent or a known consignor, the criterion on ‘appropriate security and safety standards’ shall be deemed to be met in relation to the premises for which the economic operator obtained the status of regulated agent or known consignor. Points 6.3.1.2 and 6.4.1.2 of the Annex to Commission Regulation (EU) No 185/2010 (4) provide that the appropriate authority, or independent validator acting on its behalf, should take into account whether or not the applicant for regulated agent or known consignor is a holder of an AEO certificate.

The practical implementation of both the customs legislation governing the AEO status and the aviation legislation governing the regulated agent and known consignor has shown that the existing recognition between the programmes is not sufficient to ensure the highest possible synergies between the respective security programmes. The security requirements for both the aviation security regulated agent and known consignor programme and for the customs AEO programme are equivalent to such an extent that both programmes may be aligned further.

Further alignment of both programmes in terms of equal level of recognition, including required exchange of information is necessary in order to decrease the administrative burden for the economic sector concerned and government authorities (both customs and civil aviation) while strengthening further the current level of security.

Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 is necessary for the recognition of the known consignor status with its relevance for the AEO as well, frame the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programmes and allow for the necessary exchange of information between customs and aviation authorities.

The issuing customs authority shall immediately make available to the appropriate national authority responsible for civil aviation security the following minimum information related to the status of authorised economic operator which it has at its disposal:

  • the AEO certificate – security and safety (AEOS) and AEO certificate – customs simplifications/security and safety (AEOF) including the name of the holder of the certificate and, where applicable, their amendment or revocation or the suspension of the status of authorised economic operator and the reasons therefore;
  • information about whether the specific site concerned has been visited by customs authorities, the date of the last visit and the purpose for the visit (authorisation process, reassessment, monitoring); and
  • any reassessments of AEOS and AEOF certificates and the results thereof.

Relevance for CORE: The CORE implementation objectives, which specify what will be done and how to reach the vision, are all subject to the Policies, Regulations, and Standards that exist within the Security Domain of the Global Supply Chain. The following Work Packages are directly impacted by the implementing regulation (EU) No 889/2014:

  • Research and Analysis: Undertake requirements analysis and impact assessment. The project will undertake requirements analysis from different perspectives. In WP1 we will consolidate reviews of SCS regulations policies and standards from Reference Projects and specify implementation support requirements.
  • The Demonstrators: The CORE demonstrators will validate the applicability and benefits of the CORE approach in representative operating scenarios characteristic of the global supply chain. They will specifically show the way towards a Global Secure Supply Chain. The overriding goal is to demonstrate substantial gains in security and facilitation covering every major facet of the supply chain security sector.

The CORE demonstrators affected by the implementing regulation (EU) No 889/2014 are:

  • WP12: Demonstrator Schiphol – apply global data pipeline concept to air cargo supply chains, managing air freight specific trade compliance requirements, and offering supply chain visibility in dashboards. Trade lanes with e.g. Africa, involving multiple inspection authorities.
  • WP17: DHL Demonstrator – managing airfreight trade compliance requirements EU-US in the context of fast supplying of parts.

Also, WP19 is affected here: Stakeholder Engagement – Knowledge Diffusion and Sustainable Development. Specify and apply an inclusive Stakeholder Engagement Strategy emphasizing international co-operation to promote harmonization of regulations, and to support further development and implementation of international standards.

Cross-references and citations:

  • http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/security/
  • Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92. EU Regulation establishing the Community Customs Code.
  • Regulation (EC) No 300/2008. EU Regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation security allows that entities complying with certain conditions and requirements may be certified to ensure and contribute to a secure supply chain.
  • Barosso, J. (2014), “COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 889/2014 of 14 August 2014 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, as regards recognition of the common security requirements under the regulated agent and known consignor programme and the Authorised Economic Operator programme”, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0889&from=EN.

CORE1069
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Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended, GAO, 2010 (CORE1068)

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Summary: This report reviews container security technologies that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has evaluated and tested between 2004 and 2009. These container security technologies aim to (1) detect and report unauthorized intrusions into the shipping containers and (2) to track the movement of the containers through the supply chain. As of 2009, DHS has funded and tested four different container security technologies. So far, none of the candidate technologies meet all desired functional requirements: main problems are high false alarm rates, low detection probability, and difficult installation and calibration. Besides the unsatisfactory test results, the report points out problems of conducting the phase II practical “trade lane” testing in the context of the maritime transport only. The report recommends to test the technologies “across all operational scenarios,” considering contextual differences across different modes of transport. Once the technologies would pass this extended trade lane testing, the DHS should (1) obtain support from the trade industry and international partners, (2) develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for using the technology, and (3) certify the container security technologies for use. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-887.

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Full review: This GAO document describes in detail the four container security technologies that DHS has tested since 2004, and one of these technologies happens to be the very same “composite security container” that the WP22 CORE demonstration studies. The report discusses in details the problems that the previous tests and pilots of container security technologies have encountered. Being aware of the past problems help the CORE demonstrations to avoid past mistakes. In addition to the WP22 demonstration, the other demonstrations that involve tracking & tracing of intermodal containers benefit from the information of this GAO report. For instance, the GM demonstration on maritime shipping of automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven (WP9) might use this GAO document to evaluate available technical solutions for tracking the shipping containers. The demonstrations in work packages 14-17 involve tracking and tracing and therefore may use the detailed analysis this GAO report offers on available container security technologies.

 Cross-references:

  • Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
  • Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
  • Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
  • Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended.

CORE1068

Additional keywords: Container security, maritime logistics, container security device, tracking & tracing
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AVIATION SECURITY – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO 2008 (CORE1067)

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Summary: This GAO report discusses the impact of the 26 billion USD that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent on aviation security since 2004. The report focuses especially on the current status and the future challenges of passenger screening, air cargo security and passenger watch-list matching program known as Secure Flight. The air cargo security discussion is the report’s most relevant section from the CORE’s viewpoint. The information in the report, that has been published as early as July 2008, is anyhow largely outdated: it discusses challenges that TSA and the air cargo community need to overcome before starting the 100% screening of air cargo that flies on board passenger planes, a legal requirement that become into force in August 2010 and that was set by the Implementing Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (aka the 9/11 Act). The report also recommended strengthening the security of US-bound foreign air cargo (into the US from the rest of the world), to bring it on a par with outbound air cargo security (from the US to rest of the world). More recent regulations and initiatives have corrected this weakness in the US air cargo security: today, third country air carriers must screen cargo up to US standards (or national standards if the country of origin and the US recognize each other’s air cargo regimes) before loading cargo on US-bound planes. The source document is available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1024T.

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Full review: This GAO report provides useful background information about the US air cargo security regime. This information is going to be useful for the CORE demonstration 17.1 that is about time-critical express shipping of military aircraft parts from the US to Spain. In the demonstration, the express operator DHL ships the parts by plane, and thus compliance with the US air cargo security requirements is one of the key themes of this demo. Also WP 1 might use this GAO report to describe evolution of the US air cargo regime over the years. But though this analysis would be interesting, it is not going to be the essential content in the deliverable of the WP1.

 Cross-references:

  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
  • G_A_O_, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
  • GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).

Full citation:

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008. Aviation Security – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs.

CORE1067

Additional keywords: Air cargo security, Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)

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